Coercion theory is one of the most fully developed bodies of theory in the social sciences, one that has advanced the field of national security by illuminating the logic that underlies threats, violence, and war. Coercion has a long history, of course, but its manifestation as a sustained point of focus in contemporary social science may arguably be traced to Thomas Crombie Schelling’s 1966 book,
Arms and Influence.
1 An economist by training, Schelling developed his early work at a time when debates over nuclear strategy dominated the landscape, although his work is applicable to all varieties of force.
2 Over the past 50 years, scholars have embraced and built upon Schelling’s work, using it to shed light on an array of issues in defense and national security.
3 If coercion theory is understood in the academy, however, it is less well understood by practitioners, especially those in the military. This is a problem for civil-military communication, and, more generally, for national strategy and military outcomes.