skärdis
Greatest Leader
Ei niin, ja varsinkin kun lumisaderintamat tulevat Suomeen yleensä lounaistuulien mukana.
Kylmän sodan salaisuudet??
- Viestiketjun aloittaja Hejsan
- Aloitus PVM
Ei niin, ja varsinkin kun lumisaderintamat tulevat Suomeen yleensä lounaistuulien mukana.
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Tässä parit videot noista neukkujen maansiirtoydinkokeista.
Näin syntyy tekojärvi.
Ja tässä sammutetaan maakaasupalo ydinräjähdettä käyttämällä.
Näin syntyy tekojärvi.
Ja tässä sammutetaan maakaasupalo ydinräjähdettä käyttämällä.
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Olikohan tämä josta vuosia sitten luin mitenkä raskailla rannikkotykeillä olisivat ampuneet presidentinlinnaa.
Johtava sotahistoriallinen mediahan on jo vuosia olleet iltapäivälehdet. Erikoislehtiä ilmestyy kuitenkin jo sellainen joukko vuosittain, että ne floppaa taloudellisesti, ellei myyntijulisteessa ole jotain raflaavaa. Selailin pikaisesti kassajonossa eikä otsikolle ollut mitään katetta. Suosittelen kirjastoa ilmaisena vaihtoehtona!
JR49
Respected Leader
Seutulaina onkin ollut suosikkini jo pitkään. Ilmainen, ja saa koko maakunnan kaikkien kirjastojen varastot käyttöönsä. Kaukolainahan maksaa, tämä ei.
Panssarivaunuilla ja tykeillä. Liioitteluahan tuo on, mutta ei mielestäni niin pahasti kuin yleensä.
Soldierblue
Ylipäällikkö
En tiedä jos on ollut täällä aiemmin
I've been reading an excellent book "Ilmatorjuntaohjukset Suomessa" (Anti-aircraft missiles in Finland). Published in 2009: editor of the book, colonel Ahti Lappi, is former Inspector of Air Defence, so he knows his stuff. The book is very through and contains quite detailed information about the missiles and their use. Surprisingly good information even from some still operational missiles, traditionally Finnish military has been more secretive about its stuff than North Korea. Thought that some bits might interest some people here.
Paris Peace Treaty 1947 banned Finland from acquiring missiles. In the face of developing technology, this restriction soon was viewed obsolete as it became essentially impossible to have any kind of effective military without missiles. Finnish airspace was essentially defenceless in the '50s - this greatly irked Soviet Union, as not only US recon aircraft used Finnish airspace, many likely bomber routes went over Finland. Thus in early '60s, Soviets pressured Finland to update its air defences. This didn't sit well with US & UK who were worried about Soviet military influence in Finland. Result was a bizarre Mexican standoff, as each of the three countries supported modifying the Paris Peace Treaty restrictions, but only if the missiles were acquired from THEIR country.
Missiles were also expensive, but it was argued that "Helsinki would surely cost much more!" In 1962 a preliminary deal was struck with USSR about purchase of 15 MiG-21's and three batteries of SA-2's, but the missile part was torpedoed by foreign politics. Buying missiles from both West and East was not financially feasible, so missiles were dropped altogether. (Price comparison: three batteries would have costed 4.6 billion Marks (87 million Euros in modern currency), 15 MiG's costed �89M. Thus, fly-away cost of a MiG-21F was around 3.67 million euros - less than 1/10th what cheapest modern fighters cost today!).
This debacle led to unfortunate situation where old 88mm Rheinmetall-Borsig remained as primary air defence asset against high-altitude threats until late '70s. Only then political climate had changed and missile purchase finally became feasible. Missiles were bought from Soviet Union, as the purchase was easiest to fund using bilateral Soviet trade.
Strela-2M (SA-7B, in Finland ItOhj 78): 122 launchers and 1091 missiles were acquired. They were organized to form six batteries which basically meant that six most important brigades got a missile battery each. Tactics were to position the missile teams well behind front line, to take shots against targets attacking frontline units. Strela's ability to really "defend the target" was of course limited as it would lock only on jets exhaust, thus their role was defined to attrit the enemy air assets. Strela batteries also experimented forming a "line" against cruise missiles (simulated by Hawk trainers). Results were thought as promising, single battery could cover a front of about 30 kilometres and about 70% of the targets were 'intercepted', even in nighttime.
611 missiles were expended in training against various targets: of these, 10% were direct hits, 75.5% were "aircraft hits" (ie. passed so close they would have likely hit a real aircraft), 14.5% were misses. Thus, the hit probability was over 85%, which is especially good when one figures that some misses were because missile was fired well outside launch envelope, or that many rounds had reached or exceeded their operational lifetime. Lappi mentions that aging missiles tended to become "stiff" (I assume this means they would not guide well). The missile proved highly accurate which might sound surprise given many horror stories about Soviet manufactured missiles.
Practice targets were usually either target rockets, or drone, or balloon. Rocket was the most common, it was uncomplicated but somewhat challenging target as it was quite fast and flight time was short. Soviets did not utilize any kind of proximity sensor with the targets, so Finns designed their own to find out how close the missiles passed. About two-thirds of the firings were made by conscripts, accuracy difference between conscripts and professional soldiers was negligeble. Trial firings were made also from Nuoli-class motor gunboats, but these were somewhat abortive, rocking small boat was not an ideal platform for a MANPADS.
S-125M1 Pechora (SA-3 Goa, ItOhj-79): choice was made between SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6. SA-2 was probably rejected as increasingly obsolete, whilst SA-6 was seen as having inadequate ceiling and range for intended role (defence of the capital). Although SA-3 did not represent latest Soviet technology, version was the most recent which had entered Soviet service only few years earlier. Purchase included equipment for three firing batteries and one 'technical battery' (ie. support unit).
Sometimes it is written about deficient Soviet customer support for the weapons they sold, but this is not the impression one gets from reading about these missile projects. Personnel training in Soviet Union for SA-3 was very through, some of the instructors had combat experience from Vietnam or Middle East. Pretty much only mentioned problem was that some of the training equipment was very unreliable (Soviet practice was to relegate systems rejected by operational units for training). When the missiles arrived, all the components were very throughly packed and supporting equipment bordered on being excessive (down to stuff like vacuum flasks for the missile testers). There was also plenty of spares. Some upgrades to system was done in 1984, mid-life overhaul was performed in 1993. Manufacturer also regularly issued technical bulletins about user experiences and maintenance, these were written by other end-users and were very useful. Being old-fashioned tube-technology, it was sometimes difficult to recruit enough qualified people to maintain the system, particularly in later years.
As a system, SA-3 was somewhat cumbersome, at best semi-mobile. One deployment was done in Lapland, in middle of winter: this proved workable, though pretty laborous. Although the system itself performed well, it was vulnerable to both countermeasures and direct attacks. Finns attached ZU-23 batteries as close-in defence for the missile batteries, 57mm guns were also used in this role.
40 missiles total were fired in training, of these, 38 were hits (95% hit rate). One of the misses was with optical back-up system. Live firings were done by both conscripts and reservist units. Targets were either drones (Northrop KDR2R-5) or parachute target deployed from MiG-21. As can be seen, targets were not very challenging, so system's actual combat performance can't be deduced from these. However, system in itself was highly reliable and accurate. Longest range hit was from distance of 20.4 kilometres. Lowest altitude hit was 400 metres, highest 4.5 kilometres. As can be seen, system's ceiling was never put to proper test, Finns did not have suitable targets. As a curious detail, sometimes foreign militaries attempted to jam the radars, particularly Swedes (Lohtaja training area is located on Finnish west coast). Generally this jamming did not cause major problems.
Last firings were done in 1995 and system was retired in 2000. There was a plan to keep the radars operable after missiles were retired, but this was not done. Upgrade of the system was not considered as manufacturer had announced in 1992 that 'Pechora' spare part production was to be discontinued and missiles were no longer manufactured. This proved to be premature as the upgrade packages were later indeed marketed, but by then Finns had already purchased Buk.
Igla-1 (SA-16, ItOhj-86): as said, there were enough Strela units only for six brigades. More were needed, and as Soviets were willing to export their newer Igla-1 missiles, a major new purchase was made: around 160 launchers and over 1500 missiles. This meant that there were now enough missiles to attach a MANPADS battery for all frontline brigades. Igla-1 was much superior to Strela in essentially all respects. Seeker head was tested against various aircraft targets and it proved many times more sensitive than old Strela seeker, now frontal aspect attacks against jets were possible. Seeker also had limited ability to dodge flares. Guidance had an interesting feature - unlike Strela, it did not guide directly to the hottest part of the target (ie. jet exhaust), but slighly ahead of it, thus hitting more vulnerable parts of the aircraft instead of exhaust pipe.
Curiously, no actual training course took place: missiles were taken to training without any prior experience. This didn't prove to me much of a problem as firing of the missile was not too different from Strela. Later, a short course was held in Turkmenistan. 302 missiles were expended in training, producing 45 direct hits (15%) and 40 misses. Hit rate was thus around 87%. This was only marginally better than Strela, but in real battlefield, difference would have been undoubtely considerable.
Igla (SA-18, ItOhj-86M): in 1990's, preliminary plans about Strela modernization were made. Russians considered 17 years as absolute maximum for missile's service life, after that missile propellant would become unsafe. However, these plans were abandoned. Russia began to pay off old Soviet debt by weapon deliveries, and this proved to be somewhat of a jackpot for air defence arm. Newest variant of Igla was presented to Finnish officers in 1992 and purchase of 912 missiles was made in 1994. Russians told that this variant had been produced since 1983, which explains why Igla-1 was released to export so soon. Cost of a launcher was 13 580 US dollars, and missile costed $66 680. Whole deal costed about same as two F-18's.
Most important feature was the new dual band seeker, which was about twice as sensitive as Igla-1's. Russian presenters had claimed that it's ability to avoid countermeasures was superior to other similar missiles, and tests showed that this was not an empty boast. Seeker would completely ignore all IR flares, it wouldn't lock to them at all! Even Mistral was not as good at avoiding flares. Russians also claimed that the countermeasure avoidance was effective against "optic-electric" active IR jammers (I assume this means 'lamp' style radiators like L-166), but it was not designed to counter 'shutter' type modulated IR jammers.
Magnavox-IR sights were also tested on Igla (same sights were used on Stinger), and the sight worked well. American representative commented that the sight was actually easier to use on Igla, which was more ergonomic than Stinger. Compared to older types, relatively few Iglas were expended in training. Only 67 missiles were fired: six were direct hits (9%) and seven missed (10.4%). Since entire weapon type was removed from service, there was no large "shoot-off" of older stock, like with previous missile types. Last firings were done in 2005, and missiles were gradually removed from stocks.
Crotale NG (ItOhj-90): First missile acquisitions left air defence lacking any short range missile systems to protect important targets and key forces. This role was covered by radar-guided artillery systems like 35mm Oerlikon KD or 57mm S-60, however, they were few in number and their range insufficient against some threats. S-60, particularly, was rejected already in 1960 as an "obsolete weapon" - and then bought anyway 15 years later. SHORAD acquisition was long and drawn-out process. Since first missiles were bought from USSR, it was decided that SHORAD system would be bought from the West. Despite this, several Soviet systems were also evaluated. Of various requirements, mobility, all-weather operation and good performance envelope (range & ceiling) were thought paramount. One problem was that when the project got underway (mid-80s), first generation systems were getting obsolescent and newer systems might be politically difficult to acquire. US & UK were traditionally sensitive about selling modern military equipment to Finland, and Roland had to be dropped out as Paris Peace Treaty made acquiring German made systems impossible. Anyway, one by one, candidates were narrowed down:
-SA-13 and RBS-70 were too short-ranged and lacked all-weather capability
-SA-8 was viewed being obsolescent tube technology (note the problems maintaining same generation technology in SA-3), and also overpriced.
-Rapier Blindfire was obsolescent, lacking in range and overpriced. Finns requested information about Rapier 2000, but British refused, undoubtely believing that Finns would immediately sell it to nearest GRU agent.
-Skyguard was lacking in mobility, also the missile (Sparrow) was American and export license might not be granted.
-ADATS seemed for long a front-runner, but it was lacking in all-weather capability, and eventually, US would not grant export license. This was probably a blessing in disguise, as ADATS ended up having a rocky development path.
Crotale was eventually a clear winner, particularly after French offered a completely new NG-variant at very reasonable price. It featured new, very capable Vought VT-1 missile, and entire system, along with radar, could be integrated to one armoured vehicle - for example, Finnish XA-180, resulting to intimidating looking system. Original plan called for 16 batteries (32 vehicles) at first phase, later expanded to 30: it was a major disappointment that only ten units (20 vehicles) were acquired. Nevertheless, Crotale was a huge boost to Finnish air defence capabilities as the system was truly top-notch. Total cost of 20 vehicles was over 900 million Marks (240 million Euros in modern currency): about same as the cost of later Buk acquisition.
Sensor equipment was extensive: surveilance radar, fire control radar, TV camera, IR detector and FLIR. All are integrated to vehicle turret. Surveilance radar was frequency-hopping doppler radar, it could handle 20 targets at one time, and track 8 of them simultaneously, at range of 18 kilometres. Fire control radar was frequency-hopping monopulse radar with range of about 20 kilometres. FLIR could detect targets from up to 15 kilometres range under good conditions. In addition to normal radar guided mode, missile could be fired using either of two different optic backup methods. Radar was so sensitive that it was calculated that stealth aircraft could be targeted near maximum firing range, which was 11 kilometres. Although the system could fire at only one target at the time, flight time of the missile was so short (10 seconds to 8 kilometres) that flight of four aircraft could be shot down in less than a minute, this capability was later demonstrated in training. Operationally, Crotale battery was coupled with separate mobile surveilance radar and ZU-23 batteries.
Of course not everything was perfect. As the system was so new, there were some teething problems which attracted some embarrassing publicity. First firings resulted to several misses: proximity fuze failed to detect small targets and there were problems with datalinks. These issues were solved.
Initial training was done in France: training course was well-executed, though schedule was puzzlingly loose, with hours of time reserved for matters which were handled in 15 minutes: apparently the French were used to less experienced foreign trainees. Spare time proved no problem as it left more time for practical training. English skills of some of the teachers was not the best and could be described as 'Franglish'.
Russian general Pavel Grachev visited Finland in 1993 and told the press that Crotale was a crappy system and Finns should have used their money on Russian systems. Finns pointed out that none of these mythical systems had been offered to Finland at the time: SA-15 was presented to Ahti Lappi in 1993. It might have been a serious entry had it been offered five years earlier, but Lappi's impression was that its fire control system was much more basic than Crotale's.
Crotale MLU program was started 2004. Designation was ItO-90M. Not much detail is provided about the modernisation, it seems however that new, longer ranged missiles are integrated.
Mistral (ItO-91). Navy had occasionally experimented using Strelas, both to protect ships and bases. However, dedicated missile was needed. As the missile had to be fitted on small combatants like Rauma-class missile boats (240 tons), weight & space restriction was severe. Crotale was studied, but naval variant was far too large & cumbersome for these small vessels. Again, number of potential candidates was quite small. Missile with 'fire & forget' capability was preferred as it was thought that small ships' rocking and heaving would make command guided missiles impractical, this ruled out RBS-70. Norwegians had been using Mistral, so they were quickly consulted about the system, and procurement decision was made.
Original idea was to construct combined gun-missile turret, with Mistrals and 23mm guns. This proved impractical for the space constraints, so instead Sako designed separate but interchangeable turrets for Mistral and ZU-23, which could be switched at the harbour. In addition to shiborne systems, Navy acquired land launchers: it is mentioned that six launchers were bought for every ship-based system. I'm unsure about total number of shipborne systems, but it was probably around ten to fourteen: this would mean 60-70 or so Mistral land launchers. Naval launcher has a FLIR and TV camera; land launcher has just an electro-optical sight, though FLIR could be attached.
Mistral was larger than shoulder-launched missiles. Missile was faster, had large warhead (almost three times heavier than Igla/Strela) and proximity fuze (shoulder-launched missiles had only impact fuze). Maximum range, however, was only marginally greater than that of Igla. Missile seeker contained four separate detection elements and was more complicated and sensitive than in smaller missiles. Approaching jet aircraft without afterburner could be tracked at distances of 4 to 5 kilometres and light helicopter at 3 to 4km, this was beyond even new Igla's performance. Seeker was programmed to reject flares based on their angular movement, however it was not as insensitive to flares as Igla. Launch required spinning up the gyro and cooling the seeker, this took about five seconds, similar to Igla.
No detailed shooting results are given, but it is mentioned that ships' combined gun/missile fire against two separate targets was not a problem. After Gulf War where several Iraqi missile boats were sunk by helicopters, it was claimed that the boats small size rendered their fire control radars ineffective, but this does not seem to have manifested at least on Finnish vessels. Of course, target drones are not particularly challenging targets: author expresses some scepticism whether Mistral could actually shoot down incoming anti-ship missiles due to missile's range limitations.
As a shipborne system, Mistral is on its way out: all ships carrying the missile are either retired or upgraded or going to be upgraded to Umkhonto. It however appears that the land launchers will remain in service for at least some time.
Buk M1 (SA-11, ItO 96): In 1990, Finland declared Paris Peace Treaty arms limitations null and all the political wrestling associated with weapons procurement was finally history. Preliminary plans to replace SA-3 were put in motion in 1991. Finnish delegations checked out several different systems: particularly impressive was a demonstration seen in Moscow visit 1993: heavy & complex S-300V (SA-12) unit went from firing positions to marching order and back to firing position under five minutes - without any soldiers having to step out of the vehicles! Given what a pain redeployment of much less capable SA-3 had been, this showed just how much this class of systems had advanced. Other systems showed were Tor M1 (SA-15), S-300PMU (SA-10) and Gang (SA-11) which had only recently entered Russian service (name 'Gang' was apparently meant to designate export variant, but it was later dropped in favour of 'Buk').
Following systems were considered:
-S-300V (SA-12): complex and very expensive
-S-300PMU1 (SA-10): expensive and somewhat vulnerable to combat damage compared to lighter systems
-Buk-M1 (SA-11): seemed most suitable
-SAMP/T: modern but not yet ready, and expensive
-NASAMS: cheap and generally satisfactory, but lacking in range, very simplistic
-RBS-23 BAMSE: potentially capable, but short-ranged, not yet ready
Patriot was not amongst the candidates, though Lappi had seen the system live. It's problems were similar to SA-10/12: expensive and vulnerable to SEAD.
Funding of the missile project was however in doubt: country was in severe depression, and F-18 -acquisition forced other Army projects to tight budget. However, political leadership in both countries was willing to solve some of the Soviet debt issue with military acquisitions. As said earlier, this was a huge boost for air defence arm and made a large missile purchases possible. Buk M1 (SA-11) was selected as the preferred system.
At last minute, Russians began backtracking: they were reluctant to sell Buk to Finns, and instead offered S-300PMU1 (SA-10). It is not clear why, but it was possible that it was because SA-11 was not yet exported to other countries. SA-10 was somewhat older system, and perhaps considered less sensitive. However, Finns were adamant: funding (one billion Marks, about 170 million Euros in todays money) was adequate for barely one SA-10 battery: by contrast, it would buy three SA-11 batteries. (In comparison, F-18 deal ended up costing around 14 billion Marks). Eventually, Russians relented. Negotiations went somewhat differently than in the Soviet era: in the past, customer would be offered a complete unit at fixed price: "You buy this missile battery with associated equipment for X rubles". Now, every item was priced individually - though Russians seemed inexperienced in that, and prices appeared somewhat arbitrary. Representatives from manufacturing company were also present in pricing negotiations - for the first time! It was truly the new era of Kapitalism.
New era also showed in three month training period undertaken in Russia in 1996. Although instructors were still competent, there was shortage of workable training equipment, owing partly to all technical engineers in the garrison having quit or retired. Russian administration was often uncooperative and there were various attempts to milk extra money from the guests. Problems were perhaps partly because this was the first foreign course for the type, but it was clear that old times of Friendship and Cooperation were gone. Live fire practice was done in Kazakhstan 1997 and it went well: low-flying jet drone and ballistic missile target were both shot down. Buk M1 is first missile in Finnish inventory which could intercept ballistic targets, although this capability is limited to 'aeroballistic' targets, ie. mostly just artillery missiles. No data is given on Finnish live firings, but it is implied that the system has worked well. Like with other missiles in Finnish service, operationally Buk batteries are coupled with ubiquitous ZU-23 batteries.
Performance-wise, SA-11 was considerable improvement over SA-3: maximum range was 35km, maximum inteception altitude 22km and minimum altitude 15 metres. Pk against aerial target maneuvering at 8G was 0.6 which in practice meant that outmaneuvering the missile was very difficult. But even bigger improvement was ability to disperse to cover wide region. SA-11 battery could cover area of over four times greater than SA-3 battery. All vehicles are tracked and have very good all-terrain mobility. Deployment from marching order to firing position took 5 minutes for all vehicles, including phased array surveilance radar (which had maximum detection range of 160 kilometres). TELAR (firing unit) could keep its equipment running during march, cutting deployment time to mere 20 seconds. Whereas SA-3 battery was dependent from its single fire control radar, in SA-11 each TELAR has its own fire control radar.
According to manufacturer, operational lifetime of Buk's missile is 25 years: this is unusually long, achieved because aging parts of the missile can be replaced. Current plans are that Buk is to be retired by 2016: needless to say, col. Lappi thinks this is a major mistake, as several upgrade packages exist.
Umkhonto (ItO 2004): this naval SAM was acquired both to supplement and replace Mistral for Navy's frontline vessels. Four new missile boats and two old minelayers were equipped with it. The book tells very little about Umkhonto: possibly because it was a navy project and Lappi was not involved. The missile itself is command linked with targeting information from either radar, IR sensor or datalink; with terminal IR guidance. Maximum ceiling is very respectable 8km and maximum engagement range is 10km. Four separate targets can be engaged simultaneusly. I'm somewhat unclear whether upcoming modernization of Rauma class missile boats will feature Umkhonto, or upgraded Mistral (or perhaps nothing at all?).
ASRAD-R (ItO 05, ItO 05M): this project began in late '80s to replace obsolete Bofors 40mm guns as point defence weapons. Both gun and missile systems were considered: gun systems included new Bofors 40mm BOFI, and 25mm Oerlikon Diana. Missile systems studied were Javelin (the SAM, not the ATGM), Mistral, RBS-70 and Stinger. Gun systems were capable, but quite expensive: BOFI costed up to 15 million Marks per gun. (for comparison, few years earlier Army had bought Igla-1's for less than 100 000 Marks for launcher+missile, and ZU-23's for 300 000 Marks per gun). RBS-70 was considered most suitable, only down side was that command guided missile required quite a bit of training to master (around 100 hours of simulator training). However, detoriated economic situation of early '90s terminated these plans. Only result was that 35mm Oerlikon guns were modernized in 1988, these guns are still in service.
As Crotale purchase ended up much smaller than hoped, these plans were revived in mid-90s. Requirements were range over 5 kilometres, night fighting capability and ability to fire at incoming targets. LGB's were thought as one of the primary threats. Three companies responded to specification:
-Shorts (ASPIC with Starstreak missile)
-STN Atlas Elektronik (ASRAD-R with RBS-70 Bolide)
-Matra (Mistral 2)
Igla, Stinger and unnamed Israeli missile (I assume SPYDER) were also considered, but they did not fill the requirements and manufacturers dropped out from the competition. For the first time, field trials were undertaken between the competitors. Starstreak was the fastest (Mach 3+) but shortest ranged (6 kilometres). It had no proximity fuze. Mistral 2 had marginally greater range. However, being IR guided it was probably not best fit for the requirements, also it had only manual target tracking and no radar. Bolide missile was longest ranged (up to 9 kilometres) and declared winner in 2002.
Relatively small quantity of the missile was bought: four batteries, each consisting of two vehicle mounted systems and two MANPAD variants. Latter got their own designation ItO 05M, where M stands for "MANPAD" (and not 'modernized' like in case with ItOhj 86M). Some systems were mounted on domestic Nasu tracked transports. The plan was to attach one battery to each of the three new 'Readiness Brigades' and one battery was relegated for air defence of the capital. Missile carrier is equipped with HARD 3D surveilance radar: it is an LPI radar with detection range of around 20km. Other sensors include FLIR and TV camera. Man-portable system can also employ FLIR. One ASRAD-R battery can cover up to 400 square kilometre area: in comparison, old 57mm AA gun battery could cover max. 80km^2.
To make up shortage of missiles caused by retirement of Iglas, more MANPAD variants were ordered in 2007 and further in 2010. However, the numbers were very small (2007 order apparently consisted of only five systems) and unable to replace huge quantity of Iglas retired.
I've been reading an excellent book "Ilmatorjuntaohjukset Suomessa" (Anti-aircraft missiles in Finland). Published in 2009: editor of the book, colonel Ahti Lappi, is former Inspector of Air Defence, so he knows his stuff. The book is very through and contains quite detailed information about the missiles and their use. Surprisingly good information even from some still operational missiles, traditionally Finnish military has been more secretive about its stuff than North Korea. Thought that some bits might interest some people here.
Paris Peace Treaty 1947 banned Finland from acquiring missiles. In the face of developing technology, this restriction soon was viewed obsolete as it became essentially impossible to have any kind of effective military without missiles. Finnish airspace was essentially defenceless in the '50s - this greatly irked Soviet Union, as not only US recon aircraft used Finnish airspace, many likely bomber routes went over Finland. Thus in early '60s, Soviets pressured Finland to update its air defences. This didn't sit well with US & UK who were worried about Soviet military influence in Finland. Result was a bizarre Mexican standoff, as each of the three countries supported modifying the Paris Peace Treaty restrictions, but only if the missiles were acquired from THEIR country.
Missiles were also expensive, but it was argued that "Helsinki would surely cost much more!" In 1962 a preliminary deal was struck with USSR about purchase of 15 MiG-21's and three batteries of SA-2's, but the missile part was torpedoed by foreign politics. Buying missiles from both West and East was not financially feasible, so missiles were dropped altogether. (Price comparison: three batteries would have costed 4.6 billion Marks (87 million Euros in modern currency), 15 MiG's costed �89M. Thus, fly-away cost of a MiG-21F was around 3.67 million euros - less than 1/10th what cheapest modern fighters cost today!).
This debacle led to unfortunate situation where old 88mm Rheinmetall-Borsig remained as primary air defence asset against high-altitude threats until late '70s. Only then political climate had changed and missile purchase finally became feasible. Missiles were bought from Soviet Union, as the purchase was easiest to fund using bilateral Soviet trade.
Strela-2M (SA-7B, in Finland ItOhj 78): 122 launchers and 1091 missiles were acquired. They were organized to form six batteries which basically meant that six most important brigades got a missile battery each. Tactics were to position the missile teams well behind front line, to take shots against targets attacking frontline units. Strela's ability to really "defend the target" was of course limited as it would lock only on jets exhaust, thus their role was defined to attrit the enemy air assets. Strela batteries also experimented forming a "line" against cruise missiles (simulated by Hawk trainers). Results were thought as promising, single battery could cover a front of about 30 kilometres and about 70% of the targets were 'intercepted', even in nighttime.
611 missiles were expended in training against various targets: of these, 10% were direct hits, 75.5% were "aircraft hits" (ie. passed so close they would have likely hit a real aircraft), 14.5% were misses. Thus, the hit probability was over 85%, which is especially good when one figures that some misses were because missile was fired well outside launch envelope, or that many rounds had reached or exceeded their operational lifetime. Lappi mentions that aging missiles tended to become "stiff" (I assume this means they would not guide well). The missile proved highly accurate which might sound surprise given many horror stories about Soviet manufactured missiles.
Practice targets were usually either target rockets, or drone, or balloon. Rocket was the most common, it was uncomplicated but somewhat challenging target as it was quite fast and flight time was short. Soviets did not utilize any kind of proximity sensor with the targets, so Finns designed their own to find out how close the missiles passed. About two-thirds of the firings were made by conscripts, accuracy difference between conscripts and professional soldiers was negligeble. Trial firings were made also from Nuoli-class motor gunboats, but these were somewhat abortive, rocking small boat was not an ideal platform for a MANPADS.
S-125M1 Pechora (SA-3 Goa, ItOhj-79): choice was made between SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6. SA-2 was probably rejected as increasingly obsolete, whilst SA-6 was seen as having inadequate ceiling and range for intended role (defence of the capital). Although SA-3 did not represent latest Soviet technology, version was the most recent which had entered Soviet service only few years earlier. Purchase included equipment for three firing batteries and one 'technical battery' (ie. support unit).
Sometimes it is written about deficient Soviet customer support for the weapons they sold, but this is not the impression one gets from reading about these missile projects. Personnel training in Soviet Union for SA-3 was very through, some of the instructors had combat experience from Vietnam or Middle East. Pretty much only mentioned problem was that some of the training equipment was very unreliable (Soviet practice was to relegate systems rejected by operational units for training). When the missiles arrived, all the components were very throughly packed and supporting equipment bordered on being excessive (down to stuff like vacuum flasks for the missile testers). There was also plenty of spares. Some upgrades to system was done in 1984, mid-life overhaul was performed in 1993. Manufacturer also regularly issued technical bulletins about user experiences and maintenance, these were written by other end-users and were very useful. Being old-fashioned tube-technology, it was sometimes difficult to recruit enough qualified people to maintain the system, particularly in later years.
As a system, SA-3 was somewhat cumbersome, at best semi-mobile. One deployment was done in Lapland, in middle of winter: this proved workable, though pretty laborous. Although the system itself performed well, it was vulnerable to both countermeasures and direct attacks. Finns attached ZU-23 batteries as close-in defence for the missile batteries, 57mm guns were also used in this role.
40 missiles total were fired in training, of these, 38 were hits (95% hit rate). One of the misses was with optical back-up system. Live firings were done by both conscripts and reservist units. Targets were either drones (Northrop KDR2R-5) or parachute target deployed from MiG-21. As can be seen, targets were not very challenging, so system's actual combat performance can't be deduced from these. However, system in itself was highly reliable and accurate. Longest range hit was from distance of 20.4 kilometres. Lowest altitude hit was 400 metres, highest 4.5 kilometres. As can be seen, system's ceiling was never put to proper test, Finns did not have suitable targets. As a curious detail, sometimes foreign militaries attempted to jam the radars, particularly Swedes (Lohtaja training area is located on Finnish west coast). Generally this jamming did not cause major problems.
Last firings were done in 1995 and system was retired in 2000. There was a plan to keep the radars operable after missiles were retired, but this was not done. Upgrade of the system was not considered as manufacturer had announced in 1992 that 'Pechora' spare part production was to be discontinued and missiles were no longer manufactured. This proved to be premature as the upgrade packages were later indeed marketed, but by then Finns had already purchased Buk.
Igla-1 (SA-16, ItOhj-86): as said, there were enough Strela units only for six brigades. More were needed, and as Soviets were willing to export their newer Igla-1 missiles, a major new purchase was made: around 160 launchers and over 1500 missiles. This meant that there were now enough missiles to attach a MANPADS battery for all frontline brigades. Igla-1 was much superior to Strela in essentially all respects. Seeker head was tested against various aircraft targets and it proved many times more sensitive than old Strela seeker, now frontal aspect attacks against jets were possible. Seeker also had limited ability to dodge flares. Guidance had an interesting feature - unlike Strela, it did not guide directly to the hottest part of the target (ie. jet exhaust), but slighly ahead of it, thus hitting more vulnerable parts of the aircraft instead of exhaust pipe.
Curiously, no actual training course took place: missiles were taken to training without any prior experience. This didn't prove to me much of a problem as firing of the missile was not too different from Strela. Later, a short course was held in Turkmenistan. 302 missiles were expended in training, producing 45 direct hits (15%) and 40 misses. Hit rate was thus around 87%. This was only marginally better than Strela, but in real battlefield, difference would have been undoubtely considerable.
Igla (SA-18, ItOhj-86M): in 1990's, preliminary plans about Strela modernization were made. Russians considered 17 years as absolute maximum for missile's service life, after that missile propellant would become unsafe. However, these plans were abandoned. Russia began to pay off old Soviet debt by weapon deliveries, and this proved to be somewhat of a jackpot for air defence arm. Newest variant of Igla was presented to Finnish officers in 1992 and purchase of 912 missiles was made in 1994. Russians told that this variant had been produced since 1983, which explains why Igla-1 was released to export so soon. Cost of a launcher was 13 580 US dollars, and missile costed $66 680. Whole deal costed about same as two F-18's.
Most important feature was the new dual band seeker, which was about twice as sensitive as Igla-1's. Russian presenters had claimed that it's ability to avoid countermeasures was superior to other similar missiles, and tests showed that this was not an empty boast. Seeker would completely ignore all IR flares, it wouldn't lock to them at all! Even Mistral was not as good at avoiding flares. Russians also claimed that the countermeasure avoidance was effective against "optic-electric" active IR jammers (I assume this means 'lamp' style radiators like L-166), but it was not designed to counter 'shutter' type modulated IR jammers.
Magnavox-IR sights were also tested on Igla (same sights were used on Stinger), and the sight worked well. American representative commented that the sight was actually easier to use on Igla, which was more ergonomic than Stinger. Compared to older types, relatively few Iglas were expended in training. Only 67 missiles were fired: six were direct hits (9%) and seven missed (10.4%). Since entire weapon type was removed from service, there was no large "shoot-off" of older stock, like with previous missile types. Last firings were done in 2005, and missiles were gradually removed from stocks.
Crotale NG (ItOhj-90): First missile acquisitions left air defence lacking any short range missile systems to protect important targets and key forces. This role was covered by radar-guided artillery systems like 35mm Oerlikon KD or 57mm S-60, however, they were few in number and their range insufficient against some threats. S-60, particularly, was rejected already in 1960 as an "obsolete weapon" - and then bought anyway 15 years later. SHORAD acquisition was long and drawn-out process. Since first missiles were bought from USSR, it was decided that SHORAD system would be bought from the West. Despite this, several Soviet systems were also evaluated. Of various requirements, mobility, all-weather operation and good performance envelope (range & ceiling) were thought paramount. One problem was that when the project got underway (mid-80s), first generation systems were getting obsolescent and newer systems might be politically difficult to acquire. US & UK were traditionally sensitive about selling modern military equipment to Finland, and Roland had to be dropped out as Paris Peace Treaty made acquiring German made systems impossible. Anyway, one by one, candidates were narrowed down:
-SA-13 and RBS-70 were too short-ranged and lacked all-weather capability
-SA-8 was viewed being obsolescent tube technology (note the problems maintaining same generation technology in SA-3), and also overpriced.
-Rapier Blindfire was obsolescent, lacking in range and overpriced. Finns requested information about Rapier 2000, but British refused, undoubtely believing that Finns would immediately sell it to nearest GRU agent.
-Skyguard was lacking in mobility, also the missile (Sparrow) was American and export license might not be granted.
-ADATS seemed for long a front-runner, but it was lacking in all-weather capability, and eventually, US would not grant export license. This was probably a blessing in disguise, as ADATS ended up having a rocky development path.
Crotale was eventually a clear winner, particularly after French offered a completely new NG-variant at very reasonable price. It featured new, very capable Vought VT-1 missile, and entire system, along with radar, could be integrated to one armoured vehicle - for example, Finnish XA-180, resulting to intimidating looking system. Original plan called for 16 batteries (32 vehicles) at first phase, later expanded to 30: it was a major disappointment that only ten units (20 vehicles) were acquired. Nevertheless, Crotale was a huge boost to Finnish air defence capabilities as the system was truly top-notch. Total cost of 20 vehicles was over 900 million Marks (240 million Euros in modern currency): about same as the cost of later Buk acquisition.
Sensor equipment was extensive: surveilance radar, fire control radar, TV camera, IR detector and FLIR. All are integrated to vehicle turret. Surveilance radar was frequency-hopping doppler radar, it could handle 20 targets at one time, and track 8 of them simultaneously, at range of 18 kilometres. Fire control radar was frequency-hopping monopulse radar with range of about 20 kilometres. FLIR could detect targets from up to 15 kilometres range under good conditions. In addition to normal radar guided mode, missile could be fired using either of two different optic backup methods. Radar was so sensitive that it was calculated that stealth aircraft could be targeted near maximum firing range, which was 11 kilometres. Although the system could fire at only one target at the time, flight time of the missile was so short (10 seconds to 8 kilometres) that flight of four aircraft could be shot down in less than a minute, this capability was later demonstrated in training. Operationally, Crotale battery was coupled with separate mobile surveilance radar and ZU-23 batteries.
Of course not everything was perfect. As the system was so new, there were some teething problems which attracted some embarrassing publicity. First firings resulted to several misses: proximity fuze failed to detect small targets and there were problems with datalinks. These issues were solved.
Initial training was done in France: training course was well-executed, though schedule was puzzlingly loose, with hours of time reserved for matters which were handled in 15 minutes: apparently the French were used to less experienced foreign trainees. Spare time proved no problem as it left more time for practical training. English skills of some of the teachers was not the best and could be described as 'Franglish'.
Russian general Pavel Grachev visited Finland in 1993 and told the press that Crotale was a crappy system and Finns should have used their money on Russian systems. Finns pointed out that none of these mythical systems had been offered to Finland at the time: SA-15 was presented to Ahti Lappi in 1993. It might have been a serious entry had it been offered five years earlier, but Lappi's impression was that its fire control system was much more basic than Crotale's.
Crotale MLU program was started 2004. Designation was ItO-90M. Not much detail is provided about the modernisation, it seems however that new, longer ranged missiles are integrated.
Mistral (ItO-91). Navy had occasionally experimented using Strelas, both to protect ships and bases. However, dedicated missile was needed. As the missile had to be fitted on small combatants like Rauma-class missile boats (240 tons), weight & space restriction was severe. Crotale was studied, but naval variant was far too large & cumbersome for these small vessels. Again, number of potential candidates was quite small. Missile with 'fire & forget' capability was preferred as it was thought that small ships' rocking and heaving would make command guided missiles impractical, this ruled out RBS-70. Norwegians had been using Mistral, so they were quickly consulted about the system, and procurement decision was made.
Original idea was to construct combined gun-missile turret, with Mistrals and 23mm guns. This proved impractical for the space constraints, so instead Sako designed separate but interchangeable turrets for Mistral and ZU-23, which could be switched at the harbour. In addition to shiborne systems, Navy acquired land launchers: it is mentioned that six launchers were bought for every ship-based system. I'm unsure about total number of shipborne systems, but it was probably around ten to fourteen: this would mean 60-70 or so Mistral land launchers. Naval launcher has a FLIR and TV camera; land launcher has just an electro-optical sight, though FLIR could be attached.
Mistral was larger than shoulder-launched missiles. Missile was faster, had large warhead (almost three times heavier than Igla/Strela) and proximity fuze (shoulder-launched missiles had only impact fuze). Maximum range, however, was only marginally greater than that of Igla. Missile seeker contained four separate detection elements and was more complicated and sensitive than in smaller missiles. Approaching jet aircraft without afterburner could be tracked at distances of 4 to 5 kilometres and light helicopter at 3 to 4km, this was beyond even new Igla's performance. Seeker was programmed to reject flares based on their angular movement, however it was not as insensitive to flares as Igla. Launch required spinning up the gyro and cooling the seeker, this took about five seconds, similar to Igla.
No detailed shooting results are given, but it is mentioned that ships' combined gun/missile fire against two separate targets was not a problem. After Gulf War where several Iraqi missile boats were sunk by helicopters, it was claimed that the boats small size rendered their fire control radars ineffective, but this does not seem to have manifested at least on Finnish vessels. Of course, target drones are not particularly challenging targets: author expresses some scepticism whether Mistral could actually shoot down incoming anti-ship missiles due to missile's range limitations.
As a shipborne system, Mistral is on its way out: all ships carrying the missile are either retired or upgraded or going to be upgraded to Umkhonto. It however appears that the land launchers will remain in service for at least some time.
Buk M1 (SA-11, ItO 96): In 1990, Finland declared Paris Peace Treaty arms limitations null and all the political wrestling associated with weapons procurement was finally history. Preliminary plans to replace SA-3 were put in motion in 1991. Finnish delegations checked out several different systems: particularly impressive was a demonstration seen in Moscow visit 1993: heavy & complex S-300V (SA-12) unit went from firing positions to marching order and back to firing position under five minutes - without any soldiers having to step out of the vehicles! Given what a pain redeployment of much less capable SA-3 had been, this showed just how much this class of systems had advanced. Other systems showed were Tor M1 (SA-15), S-300PMU (SA-10) and Gang (SA-11) which had only recently entered Russian service (name 'Gang' was apparently meant to designate export variant, but it was later dropped in favour of 'Buk').
Following systems were considered:
-S-300V (SA-12): complex and very expensive
-S-300PMU1 (SA-10): expensive and somewhat vulnerable to combat damage compared to lighter systems
-Buk-M1 (SA-11): seemed most suitable
-SAMP/T: modern but not yet ready, and expensive
-NASAMS: cheap and generally satisfactory, but lacking in range, very simplistic
-RBS-23 BAMSE: potentially capable, but short-ranged, not yet ready
Patriot was not amongst the candidates, though Lappi had seen the system live. It's problems were similar to SA-10/12: expensive and vulnerable to SEAD.
Funding of the missile project was however in doubt: country was in severe depression, and F-18 -acquisition forced other Army projects to tight budget. However, political leadership in both countries was willing to solve some of the Soviet debt issue with military acquisitions. As said earlier, this was a huge boost for air defence arm and made a large missile purchases possible. Buk M1 (SA-11) was selected as the preferred system.
At last minute, Russians began backtracking: they were reluctant to sell Buk to Finns, and instead offered S-300PMU1 (SA-10). It is not clear why, but it was possible that it was because SA-11 was not yet exported to other countries. SA-10 was somewhat older system, and perhaps considered less sensitive. However, Finns were adamant: funding (one billion Marks, about 170 million Euros in todays money) was adequate for barely one SA-10 battery: by contrast, it would buy three SA-11 batteries. (In comparison, F-18 deal ended up costing around 14 billion Marks). Eventually, Russians relented. Negotiations went somewhat differently than in the Soviet era: in the past, customer would be offered a complete unit at fixed price: "You buy this missile battery with associated equipment for X rubles". Now, every item was priced individually - though Russians seemed inexperienced in that, and prices appeared somewhat arbitrary. Representatives from manufacturing company were also present in pricing negotiations - for the first time! It was truly the new era of Kapitalism.
New era also showed in three month training period undertaken in Russia in 1996. Although instructors were still competent, there was shortage of workable training equipment, owing partly to all technical engineers in the garrison having quit or retired. Russian administration was often uncooperative and there were various attempts to milk extra money from the guests. Problems were perhaps partly because this was the first foreign course for the type, but it was clear that old times of Friendship and Cooperation were gone. Live fire practice was done in Kazakhstan 1997 and it went well: low-flying jet drone and ballistic missile target were both shot down. Buk M1 is first missile in Finnish inventory which could intercept ballistic targets, although this capability is limited to 'aeroballistic' targets, ie. mostly just artillery missiles. No data is given on Finnish live firings, but it is implied that the system has worked well. Like with other missiles in Finnish service, operationally Buk batteries are coupled with ubiquitous ZU-23 batteries.
Performance-wise, SA-11 was considerable improvement over SA-3: maximum range was 35km, maximum inteception altitude 22km and minimum altitude 15 metres. Pk against aerial target maneuvering at 8G was 0.6 which in practice meant that outmaneuvering the missile was very difficult. But even bigger improvement was ability to disperse to cover wide region. SA-11 battery could cover area of over four times greater than SA-3 battery. All vehicles are tracked and have very good all-terrain mobility. Deployment from marching order to firing position took 5 minutes for all vehicles, including phased array surveilance radar (which had maximum detection range of 160 kilometres). TELAR (firing unit) could keep its equipment running during march, cutting deployment time to mere 20 seconds. Whereas SA-3 battery was dependent from its single fire control radar, in SA-11 each TELAR has its own fire control radar.
According to manufacturer, operational lifetime of Buk's missile is 25 years: this is unusually long, achieved because aging parts of the missile can be replaced. Current plans are that Buk is to be retired by 2016: needless to say, col. Lappi thinks this is a major mistake, as several upgrade packages exist.
Umkhonto (ItO 2004): this naval SAM was acquired both to supplement and replace Mistral for Navy's frontline vessels. Four new missile boats and two old minelayers were equipped with it. The book tells very little about Umkhonto: possibly because it was a navy project and Lappi was not involved. The missile itself is command linked with targeting information from either radar, IR sensor or datalink; with terminal IR guidance. Maximum ceiling is very respectable 8km and maximum engagement range is 10km. Four separate targets can be engaged simultaneusly. I'm somewhat unclear whether upcoming modernization of Rauma class missile boats will feature Umkhonto, or upgraded Mistral (or perhaps nothing at all?).
ASRAD-R (ItO 05, ItO 05M): this project began in late '80s to replace obsolete Bofors 40mm guns as point defence weapons. Both gun and missile systems were considered: gun systems included new Bofors 40mm BOFI, and 25mm Oerlikon Diana. Missile systems studied were Javelin (the SAM, not the ATGM), Mistral, RBS-70 and Stinger. Gun systems were capable, but quite expensive: BOFI costed up to 15 million Marks per gun. (for comparison, few years earlier Army had bought Igla-1's for less than 100 000 Marks for launcher+missile, and ZU-23's for 300 000 Marks per gun). RBS-70 was considered most suitable, only down side was that command guided missile required quite a bit of training to master (around 100 hours of simulator training). However, detoriated economic situation of early '90s terminated these plans. Only result was that 35mm Oerlikon guns were modernized in 1988, these guns are still in service.
As Crotale purchase ended up much smaller than hoped, these plans were revived in mid-90s. Requirements were range over 5 kilometres, night fighting capability and ability to fire at incoming targets. LGB's were thought as one of the primary threats. Three companies responded to specification:
-Shorts (ASPIC with Starstreak missile)
-STN Atlas Elektronik (ASRAD-R with RBS-70 Bolide)
-Matra (Mistral 2)
Igla, Stinger and unnamed Israeli missile (I assume SPYDER) were also considered, but they did not fill the requirements and manufacturers dropped out from the competition. For the first time, field trials were undertaken between the competitors. Starstreak was the fastest (Mach 3+) but shortest ranged (6 kilometres). It had no proximity fuze. Mistral 2 had marginally greater range. However, being IR guided it was probably not best fit for the requirements, also it had only manual target tracking and no radar. Bolide missile was longest ranged (up to 9 kilometres) and declared winner in 2002.
Relatively small quantity of the missile was bought: four batteries, each consisting of two vehicle mounted systems and two MANPAD variants. Latter got their own designation ItO 05M, where M stands for "MANPAD" (and not 'modernized' like in case with ItOhj 86M). Some systems were mounted on domestic Nasu tracked transports. The plan was to attach one battery to each of the three new 'Readiness Brigades' and one battery was relegated for air defence of the capital. Missile carrier is equipped with HARD 3D surveilance radar: it is an LPI radar with detection range of around 20km. Other sensors include FLIR and TV camera. Man-portable system can also employ FLIR. One ASRAD-R battery can cover up to 400 square kilometre area: in comparison, old 57mm AA gun battery could cover max. 80km^2.
To make up shortage of missiles caused by retirement of Iglas, more MANPAD variants were ordered in 2007 and further in 2010. However, the numbers were very small (2007 order apparently consisted of only five systems) and unable to replace huge quantity of Iglas retired.
Soldierblue
Ylipäällikkö
NASAMS II (ItO 12): In 2004 new project began for both medium- and long range SAM acquisition. Preliminary round for the latter included SPYDER LR, EUROSAM ER and Patriot. Russian systems had became politically unfashionable so they were left out. First two were still in development phase. Germany offered used, surplus Patriot PAC2+ systems, this deal would have included both anti-radiation and ABM missiles. Deal fell through: possibly because of uncertainities concerning support and operational lifetime. It was calculated that upkeep costs for single Patriot battery were around 3 million euros a year, and they would likely rise as the system aged.
Medium range SAM project to replace SA-11 went on, however. Buk M1 modernization was rejected on the grounds of lacking NATO compability (which Lappi thinks as somewhat bizarre as several current or prospective NATO countries use Russian AD systems) and cost (thought to be up to half of the acquisition cost of new system). New western system was preferred and several were shortlisted: NASAMS, BAMSE, Umkhonto ER, EUROSAM and Mica. In final round in 2009, competition narrowed down between SAMP/T (with Aster missiles) and NASAMS II (which uses AMRAAMs). Key requirement was ability to cover both capital region, and 'one military target' simultaneously. SAMP/T was more in the class of Patriot or S-300. It had long range, but was somewhat cumbersome and vulnerable. NASAMS was much more resilient, cheaper and networked, so it won the contest. Synergy advantage for using same missile as Air Force was also mentioned (though this is IMO rather dubious advantage). NASAMS offered 'more bang for a buck': Chief-of-Defence commented that "Instead of a Cadillac, we bought four Volvos". Total cost of the contract was 346 million Euros.
NASAMS II is somewhat different beast compared to earlier variant which lost out to Buk M1 in mid-90s. Radar is much improved AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel, with detection range of 75 kilometres. This is not too long for missile of this class (and probably made worse by low mounting of the radar) but adequate given it's cheaper cost (which means more radars). In addition the system has MPS 600 electro-optical sensor, which has FLIR, TV camera and laser range finder; under good conditions it can detect targets from up to 40km range. Several different communication links are used, including Link 11B and Link 16. As AMRAAM uses it's own radar for terminal guidance, the system does not have dedicated fire control radar; target information can be fed to missile from either surveilance radar, IR sensor or even some outside source. Thus the system has 'fire and forget' capability, which Buk doesn't have. All vehicles are wheeled; terrain capability is thus much worse than with its predecessor, but on the plus side, vehicles are cheaper to maintain.
Biggest downside is that missile's range is meagre 25km and maximum ceiling is just 10km: this is insufficient for several current and prospective threats, so the system would need a true long-range missile alongside to cover this shortcoming, but there doesn't appear to be any money available for such system. Potentially, new missiles could be fitted to the system in the future to partly cover these shortcomings.
----------------
So that's that. Present going project in Finnish Air Defence community is VSHORAD system acquisation to replace already retired Igla's and increasingly obsolete 23mm cannons. This project is too recent and didn't make it in the book. Rumour mill is that this time, IR guided missile will be preferred. This is somewhat bizarre development in the sense that it would have been perfectly feasible to extend Igla service life up to 2014 or so, now FDF is 'reinventing the wheel', possibly even with new version of the same missile! I guess there have been some personnel changes which have resulted to quick turnarounds in "officially endorsed views". It is said that shortlisted systems include RBS-70, Stinger, Igla-S, Mistral, Grom and South Korean Chiron.
http://simhq.com/forum/ubbthreads.php/topics/3627384/7
Medium range SAM project to replace SA-11 went on, however. Buk M1 modernization was rejected on the grounds of lacking NATO compability (which Lappi thinks as somewhat bizarre as several current or prospective NATO countries use Russian AD systems) and cost (thought to be up to half of the acquisition cost of new system). New western system was preferred and several were shortlisted: NASAMS, BAMSE, Umkhonto ER, EUROSAM and Mica. In final round in 2009, competition narrowed down between SAMP/T (with Aster missiles) and NASAMS II (which uses AMRAAMs). Key requirement was ability to cover both capital region, and 'one military target' simultaneously. SAMP/T was more in the class of Patriot or S-300. It had long range, but was somewhat cumbersome and vulnerable. NASAMS was much more resilient, cheaper and networked, so it won the contest. Synergy advantage for using same missile as Air Force was also mentioned (though this is IMO rather dubious advantage). NASAMS offered 'more bang for a buck': Chief-of-Defence commented that "Instead of a Cadillac, we bought four Volvos". Total cost of the contract was 346 million Euros.
NASAMS II is somewhat different beast compared to earlier variant which lost out to Buk M1 in mid-90s. Radar is much improved AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel, with detection range of 75 kilometres. This is not too long for missile of this class (and probably made worse by low mounting of the radar) but adequate given it's cheaper cost (which means more radars). In addition the system has MPS 600 electro-optical sensor, which has FLIR, TV camera and laser range finder; under good conditions it can detect targets from up to 40km range. Several different communication links are used, including Link 11B and Link 16. As AMRAAM uses it's own radar for terminal guidance, the system does not have dedicated fire control radar; target information can be fed to missile from either surveilance radar, IR sensor or even some outside source. Thus the system has 'fire and forget' capability, which Buk doesn't have. All vehicles are wheeled; terrain capability is thus much worse than with its predecessor, but on the plus side, vehicles are cheaper to maintain.
Biggest downside is that missile's range is meagre 25km and maximum ceiling is just 10km: this is insufficient for several current and prospective threats, so the system would need a true long-range missile alongside to cover this shortcoming, but there doesn't appear to be any money available for such system. Potentially, new missiles could be fitted to the system in the future to partly cover these shortcomings.
----------------
So that's that. Present going project in Finnish Air Defence community is VSHORAD system acquisation to replace already retired Igla's and increasingly obsolete 23mm cannons. This project is too recent and didn't make it in the book. Rumour mill is that this time, IR guided missile will be preferred. This is somewhat bizarre development in the sense that it would have been perfectly feasible to extend Igla service life up to 2014 or so, now FDF is 'reinventing the wheel', possibly even with new version of the same missile! I guess there have been some personnel changes which have resulted to quick turnarounds in "officially endorsed views". It is said that shortlisted systems include RBS-70, Stinger, Igla-S, Mistral, Grom and South Korean Chiron.
http://simhq.com/forum/ubbthreads.php/topics/3627384/7
Soldierblue
Ylipäällikkö
En ymmärrä??
Soldierblue
Ylipäällikkö
Edit
Soldierblue
Ylipäällikkö
Aaaaah, mää luulin että tee istutte tietokoneen kanssa vaikkapa laptop tai kotona...olen itse yrittänyt kännykällä mutta ei see toimii
aj77
Greatest Leader
Suomi teki äärimmäisen salaiset suunnitelmat Neuvostoliiton torjumiseksi kylmän sodan aikana – Juhlakirja paljastaa kassakaapissa säilytetyt käskyt vasta nyt
Itää vastaan suunnatut puolustuskäskyt pidettiin hyvin pienen piirin tietona. Suunnitelmia oli muun muassa peitenimillä Valpuri ja Kalervo.
”Tiedämme, että kun 1950-luvun alussa tehtiin ensimmäinen Polttoainehankinta-suunnitelma lännen suuntaan, niin samaan aikaan oli luonnokset myös idän suuntaan”, sanoo Tynkkynen.
Polttoainehankinta-käskyä päivitettiin vuonna 1958, jolloin annettiin uusi käsky, jonka peitenimi oli Valpuri. Sen rinnalla valmistui puolustussuunnitelma peitenimeltä Matkakertomus.
Matkakertomus-suunnitelmasta säilyneet osat paljastavat, että puolustus perustui seitsemään peräkkäiseen vyöhykkeeseen, jotka kulkivat etelästä pohjoiseen. Torjuntasuuntana oli itä.""
https://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000005699833.html
Itää vastaan suunnatut puolustuskäskyt pidettiin hyvin pienen piirin tietona. Suunnitelmia oli muun muassa peitenimillä Valpuri ja Kalervo.
”Tiedämme, että kun 1950-luvun alussa tehtiin ensimmäinen Polttoainehankinta-suunnitelma lännen suuntaan, niin samaan aikaan oli luonnokset myös idän suuntaan”, sanoo Tynkkynen.
Polttoainehankinta-käskyä päivitettiin vuonna 1958, jolloin annettiin uusi käsky, jonka peitenimi oli Valpuri. Sen rinnalla valmistui puolustussuunnitelma peitenimeltä Matkakertomus.
Matkakertomus-suunnitelmasta säilyneet osat paljastavat, että puolustus perustui seitsemään peräkkäiseen vyöhykkeeseen, jotka kulkivat etelästä pohjoiseen. Torjuntasuuntana oli itä.""
https://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000005699833.html
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Erittäin mielenkiintoista asiaa. Vahvistaa sen mitä varsin yleisesti on uumoiltu, eli sen että ensimmäiset sotienjälkeiset puolustussuunnitelmat virallisesti laadittiin huolella mahdollisia YYA-konsultaatioita silmällä pitäen. Meillä tuli olla mustaa valkoisella näyttää venäläisille että varaudutaan myös lännestä tulevaan hyökkäykseen.
Ei yllätä lainkaan se, että idästä tulevaa uhkaa varauduttiin toki myös torjumaan. Tätä koskevat suunnitelmat ovatkin sitten 60-luvulle asti olleet pienen piirin tiedossa. 70-luvulla voimaan tullut alueellinen puolustusjärjestelmä poisti tarpeen potentiaalisen vihollisen nimeämiseen. Voitiin sanoa, että aluepuolustusdoktriinin mukaisesti jokainen sotilaslääni kykeni aloittamaan puolustustaistelun omalla vastuualueellaan.
Mielenkiintoiselta kuulostaa myös tuo kirjassa mainittu tieto retuperällä olleesta materiaalisesta valmiudesta. Maavoimilta puuttui kymmeniä tuhansia rynnäkkökivääreitä, jolloin lähes puolet varustettavista joukoista piti varustaa vielä konepistoolein ja kiväärein. Kenttätykistön tykeistä kolmasosa oli täysin vanhentuneita. Miinoja puuttui satojatuhansia. Lisäksi puolelle kenttäarmeijasta ei olisi ollut antaa teräskypärää.