hyviä poustauksia mutta jos käännät tekstin rus > eng , Niin eikö se saman tien voi laittaa savoksi. Tosin siinä on kyllä kukkasia mutta kuitenkin.Tässä toinen Sergey Vakulenko / Сергей Вакуленко (Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center) kirjoittama artikkeli, joka on julkaistu 15.9.2025 - tälle ei taida olla toistaseksi englanninkielistä käännöstä joten otin käännökse Google Translatella (tämä käännös hävittää hyperlinkit joita artikkelissa on aina toisinaan, kannattaa siis vilkaista myös alkuperäisen artikkelin kääntämätöntä tekstiä jossa nämä yksityiskohdat kiinnostavat):
The Bargaining Triad. What's Preventing Russia and China from Reaching an Agreement on Power of Siberia 2
The problem isn't the price itself, but the triad of "price, flexibility, and duration." For China, it's clear: if politics are removed from the equation, gas supplies along this route can be relied upon for many years after the pipeline is built. But China has a clear understanding of its gas needs for the next 15-20 years, and what happens after that is a big question.
Sergey Vakulenko
September 15, 2025
https://carnegieendowment.org/russi...china-gas-deals?lang=ru¢er=russia-eurasia
The Bargaining Triad. What's Preventing Russia and China from Reaching an Agreement on Power of Siberia 2
The problem isn't the price itself, but the triad of "price, flexibility, and duration." For China, it's clear: if politics are removed from the equation, gas supplies along this route can be relied upon for many years after the pipeline is built. But China has a clear understanding of its gas needs for the next 15-20 years, and what happens after that is a big question.
Sergey Vakulenko
September 15, 2025
The Russian Federation has added the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to its list of "undesirable organizations." If you are located in Russia, please do not publicly link to this article.
The announcement of progress in negotiations on the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline project, made during the Russian delegation's September visit to China, was entirely expected. An analysis of Chinese economic needs indicates that Beijing will need supplies through this pipeline by approximately 2030, and the project will take approximately five years to complete.
The rationale for a second Power of Siberia pipeline is obvious. China has a demand for gas and a need to hedge imports in the event of geopolitical crises, while Russia has large volumes of this fuel and a desire to compensate for Europe's withdrawal from it. However, political and transactional considerations significantly complicate the agreement on the parameters of the future contract.
Russia's Position
The Russian-Chinese gas trade is currently structured in such a way that China remains Moscow's only buyer capable of accepting the volumes of gas Russia is willing to supply. This isn't just due to the loss of the European market. Yamal's gas reserves are so vast that supplies to Europe alone were insufficient, even in the best of times—before 2022, and even before 2014—to fully monetize them.
Even then, Gazprom was making plans to export Yamal gas to China. Despite the long distance to the Chinese market, this could be profitable because the geology of the Yamal fields ensures very low gas prices at the wellhead. Considering that this region had already been developed and brought into commercial production in the 2010s with the launch of the Bovanenkovo field, increasing production—additional billions of cubic meters—would be even cheaper.
Construction of a pipeline from Yamal to China is a large and expensive project, but not unique in its kind. The distance from Yamal to Kyakhta on the Mongolian border is roughly the same as the distance from Urengoy to the Ukrainian border, and the section through Mongolia (935 km) is almost as long as the Ukrainian transit route. Even if the cost of delivery from Yamal to the Mongolian-Chinese border is approximately $100 per 1,000 cubic meters, the total cost of producing and delivering Russian gas to the Chinese market will be the lowest compared to competitors.
Chinese Market Prospects
China currently consumes just over 400 billion cubic meters of gas per year. About 60% of this comes from domestic production, with the remaining 40% covered by imports. Approximately half of this imported gas comes via pipelines—primarily from Russia and Turkmenistan—and the other half is in the form of LNG.
Indeed, China is already one of the world leaders in renewable energy development, which will continue to grow significantly. Nevertheless, the share of gas in the country's electricity sector remains low, while coal still accounts for over 50%. Replacing coal with gas in power generation reduces CO2 emissions by approximately half. In the municipal sector, switching from coal to gas is a simple way to improve air quality in cities, which is becoming an important goal for China.
This means that the development of renewable energy in the coming decades may slow the growth of fossil fuel consumption and help reduce the share of coal, but it is unlikely to halt the growth of gas demand. Furthermore, the widespread adoption of electric vehicles will increase electricity consumption, and China is currently converting trucks en masse to natural gas, in part to reduce its dependence on imported oil.
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According to forecasts from experts at CNPC, China’s largest oil and gas company, China’s gas demand will grow to 600–670 billion cubic meters by 2040. The lower limit (around 600 billion) corresponds to the scenario of moving toward carbon neutrality. The same study predicts China’s own gas production to peak at 280–310 billion cubic meters between 2035 and 2040. This means that by the second half of the 2030s, China’s total gas imports should grow from the current 180 billion to 290–390 billion cubic meters.
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Today, about a third of China's LNG imports come from Qatar, another third from Australia, 10% each from Russia and Malaysia, and the remaining 15% from other exporters. LNG production in Qatar and Russia will remain at current levels or grow in the foreseeable future. However, forecasts for Australia and Malaysia indicate a decline in production and exports in the 2030s due to rising domestic demand and depletion of the resource base. So Beijing will have to look for new sources of gas to replace supplies from these countries. There are hopes for new large LNG projects in Mozambique and Tanzania, but they will not fill the entire opening niche.
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Global LNG production capacity will grow by almost 300 billion cubic meters per year by 2030. However, this increase will be unevenly distributed: about half of the new volumes will come from the United States, another 20% from Qatar, and about 10% from Canada.
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Relying on supplies from the US is difficult for China. US-Chinese relations are going through hard times. Firstly, because of growing concerns around the Taiwan issue. Secondly, because the US now perceives China as both a military-political and an economic threat. Both Democratic and Republican administrations are waging trade wars with China, and the Chinese authorities are reciprocating.
Beijing and Washington are interested in continuing trade, but they are trying to minimize mutual dependence and not give the other side potential leverage. China has already demonstrated how restricting the export of raw materials, in its case key minerals, can be a strong argument in a trade dispute, but Beijing understands that if the Chinese economy depends on some import items from the US, then such vulnerability will certainly be exploited.
That is, China is unlikely to increase gas purchases from the US. In 2021, the United States shared 2nd-3rd place with Qatar among LNG exporters to China, but by 2024 it had fallen to fourth place with a share of about 5%. The last ship with a cargo of LNG for China left an American port in mid-November 2024, since then Beijing has stopped buying gas from the United States.
A similar break already happened in 2019, when Donald Trump, during his first presidential term, started a trade war with China, which ended with a major agreement. But the current conflict is apparently deeper and more protracted, and China is more aware of the strength of its negotiating position.
Beijing is increasingly resorting to demonstrative gestures emphasizing its strength, independence and ability to withstand American pressure. Apparently, it is in this context that the first open receipt of a cargo of LNG delivered to China from the sanctioned Russian project Arctic LNG 2 should be viewed. Moreover, the first trial purchases are turning into regular ones right before our eyes, and all this happened against the backdrop of the lavish SCO summit in Tianjin.
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For China, Russian and Central Asian gas have another important advantage over almost all LNG supplies. If tensions between China and the West escalate, the delivery of LNG to China may be in question. Cargo from Qatar and Africa passes through the Straits of Malacca and Taiwan. Cargo from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia ends up in the South China Sea, bypassing the Strait of Malacca, but the need to pass by Taiwan remains.
An additional risk is associated with the fact that almost all large LNG projects in the world are implemented with significant participation of companies headquartered in the United States and other NATO countries. Against this background, supplies from Russia and Central Asia through pipelines running deep in the continent are a useful insurance against this risk.
Therefore, despite numerous suspensions and delays, Beijing continues to build Line D of the Central Asia-China pipeline with a capacity of 30 billion cubic meters per year. But in any case, this volume will not be enough to fully meet China's growing needs.
Three-dimensional bargaining
China needs gas, Russia has large volumes, but there remains one more fundamental issue that could theoretically create a barrier to expanding trade. Beijing's informal policy implies that no exporter of critical resources to China should occupy an excessively large market share.
Meanwhile, the existing and contracted volumes of gas supplies from Russia for the near future make Russia's share impressive. 38 billion cubic meters per year via the Power of Siberia - 1, an additional 6 billion cubic meters of increased supplies along this route, 10 billion cubic meters from Sakhalin plus an additional 2 billion cubic meters from there give a total of 56 billion cubic meters. And here we must also add the significant volumes of Russian LNG supplies. Such figures create that excessively high share, which Beijing does not want to exceed.
However, one should not exaggerate Beijing's scrupulousness in this matter. For example, Line D of the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan will more than double supplies from there, which in 2024 already amounted to about 32 billion cubic meters. And Chinese strategists do not see a problem in this, nor in the fact that Turkmen gas goes through several transit countries at once.
When Russian pipeline exports reach the volumes stated in press releases, their share in China's import portfolio, which has grown by that time, will be from 27% to 36%. If we talk about gas consumption as a whole, it will be 16-17.6%. The figures are significant, but not overwhelming.
Fundamentally, everything looks like literally all the stars should favor the speedy implementation of Power of Siberia 2 and the expansion of Russian gas supplies to China. But, in addition to fundamental ones, there are also political and transactional considerations.
For Russia, the price of gas at the Chinese border, below which supplies become completely unprofitable, is about $120-130 per thousand cubic meters. For China, the alternative to Russian pipeline supplies is LNG, which costs an average of $370. This creates ample room for negotiations, but at the same time increases the complexity of the deal: each side is well aware of the other's BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement).
Russian negotiators know that under Power of Siberia 1 they agreed to the most unfavorable conditions compared to other gas sellers. Gas from Turkmenistan is sold at the Chinese border according to almost the same formula as gas from Russia, but at a price $50 more per thousand cubic meters. And this is despite the fact that Russian gas is delivered to the outskirts of Beijing, and Turkmen gas is delivered to the far western border of China.
Moscow probably wants to correct the mistakes of the past and negotiate terms at least comparable to those under which the Central Asian countries trade. Chinese negotiators know this, too, and this fact serves as an anchor for new negotiations. Why should China be accommodating now, if toughness bore fruit at a time when Russia was in a much more comfortable position?
(tästä puuttuu yksi kuvaaja - käy katsomassa se alkuperäistä artikkelista)
In addition, there are considerations of the duration and flexibility of the contract. It is advantageous for Russia to demand the longest possible contract with minimal flexibility. The main costs for it are for the construction of the pipeline - a fixed investment at the start, which is gradually recouped with each thousand cubic meters.
Economically, this is similar to buying a house for rent: the owner wants the apartments not to be empty, and the tenants to pay steadily. The higher the expected volatility of the future cash flow, the higher the price must be asked to obtain an equal return adjusted for this volatility.
The commercial life of the project is also important. If there is confidence that the project will generate revenue in a quarter of a century, current payments may be smaller. If the future is uncertain, then you want the project to pay off quickly, covering the construction costs during the period of guaranteed cash flow.
In the case of the Russian-Chinese gas contract, the problem is not in a single price, but in the triad of "price - flexibility - duration". For China, it is obvious that if politics are removed from the equation, then after the pipeline is built, gas supplies along this route can be relied upon for many years. But China has a good understanding of its gas needs for the next 15-20 years, and what will happen after that is a big question. It is difficult to predict how quickly China's renewable energy will develop.
The same goes for flexibility. China buys part of its LNG under spot contracts, and Russian gas is always hyper-competitive compared to them. But who knows how the situation will turn out in the future. Perhaps, in order to ease tensions in relations with the United States, it will be useful to conclude a long-term contract for gas supplies. Or, for example, Chinese state-owned oil and gas companies will launch a large project in Africa. Gas from there will certainly be more expensive than Russian gas, but this will be its own project and it will need to be given a guaranteed sales market.
Such doubts are not uncommon when signing long-term contracts, but almost always the hesitant buyer or seller knows: the counterparty has alternatives, so the deal must be made, otherwise a third party will appear. In this case, Russia has no alternatives, so China risks not the complete loss of a convenient supplier, but only that deliveries will begin later.
That is why the negotiations are so tense and long. Firstly, China is trying to remove as much uncertainty for itself as possible in terms of the necessary volumes and deadlines. Secondly, it is testing how much it can twist Russia's arm in terms of price and other conditions. For Beijing, both of these exercises are practically free: the Chinese negotiators do not see any risks that the deal will fall through and they will have to agree to significantly worse alternatives.
On the other hand, it may have been important for China earlier not to irritate the United States by openly demonstrating too close relations with Russia and not to take actions that would look like support for Russian aggression in Ukraine. Now, however, such considerations are no longer of decisive importance against the backdrop of a larger-scale conflict between Beijing and Washington. Moreover, sometimes demonstrative gestures prove useful.
All this allows the Russian side to continue to loudly declare that another important stage in the project's implementation has been reached. But, as Zenon taught, you can be as close to the finish line as you like, but still be an infinite number of steps away.
A link that will open without a VPN is here.
Lännen taloussota Venäjälle ja sen seuraukset
- Viestiketjun aloittaja Heinrich
- Aloitus PVM
hyviä poustauksia mutta jos käännät tekstin rus > eng , Niin eikö se saman tien voi laittaa savoksi. Tosin siinä on kyllä kukkasia mutta kuitenkin.
-TripleX-
Respected Leader
Jännä homma, että aavistuksen ennen taannoista Putlerin vierailua Kiinaan, isäntämaa poisti kuparia ja nikkeliä koskevat valtiontuet, joiden avulla kiinalaiset yritykset ovat saaneet mm. venäläisiä metalleja hankittua hieman alle markkinahintojen. Mahtoi olla viesti Putlerille siitä kuka käskee ja kuka hyppää.
Ryssälän syyskuun öljy- ja kaasutuloista ennakoidaan haihtuneen lähes neljännes.
Melkoinen suonenisku kyllä.
oilprice.com
Ryssälän syyskuun öljy- ja kaasutuloista ennakoidaan haihtuneen lähes neljännes.
Melkoinen suonenisku kyllä.
Russia's Oil and Gas Revenues Face Significant September Decline | OilPrice.com
Russia's oil and gas revenues are projected to significantly decline in September due to lower crude prices and a stronger ruble, impacting the Kremlin's budget.
oilprice.com