Einomies1
Respected Leader
JASSM-ohjuksiin ja yli horisontin kantaviin ohjuksiin yleensä liittyy maalittamisjärjestelmät tärkeinä osana kill-chainia.
Defence24-julkaisussa on kirjoitettu kattavasti Puolan JASSM / JASSM ER hankinnasta ja problematiikasta pitkän kantaman asejärjestelmän täydestä hyödyntämisestä.
Initially, the Air Force did not suffer from problems which were evident in case of the Polish Navy, since the Polish aircraft have only been using armament, the range of which was equal to the range of their onboard sensors. The Air Force began to think of acquisition of a long range reconnaissance solution, when the F-16 jets were introduced into service. In reality, this problem has been actually noticed after a decision was made to purchase the AGM-158A JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile) weapon. The name of this ordnance suggests (Stand-off) that the missile requires external data to conduct an effective strike. The missile has a range of 370 kilometres, no possibilities of looking for targets that are to be attacked remain at disposal of the pilot. Data as such shall be downloaded externally, however, as for now, pilots of the F-16 jets used by the Polish Air Force have no Polish target indication system at their disposal.
Satelliitit puuttuvat toistaiseksi ja lähes 1000 km päähän kantavan aseen maalin määrittely voi olla työlästä jos ei ole oikeata työkalupakkia. Miten meillä?
Saadaanko USA:n satelliittidataa käytettäväksi ohjusten kiinteiden maalien tarkkaan määrittelyyn?
Vastapuolen ilmatorjuntajärjestelmän tai kaukovalvontatutkien kolmiomittaus tehdään nyt pääosin maasta käsin esim. Dragonshield-järjestelmän lento/maasensoreilla. Hornetit eivät kykene määrittelemään tai paikantamaan radiosäteilyä ja muodostamaan laukaisuparametrejä.
Asia voi toki muuttua F-35 AN/ASQ-239 järjestelmällä, Growlerilla tai muilla vastaavilla, uusilla kyvyillä jotka mahdollistavat jollain etäisyydellä tiettyjen aikakriittisten maalien paikantamisen ja datan siirron JASSM-ohjuksille. Täyttä operatiivista kantamaa vastustajan syvyyteen tuskin saavutetaan ilman satelliittijärjestelmää. JASSM ER käyttää samanlaista ohjausta melko varmasti kuin LRASM ja kyseistä asetta hankkiessa tulee viimeistään ajankohtaiseksi satelliittitiedustelun ja datalinkin käyttötarve.
Defence24-julkaisussa on kirjoitettu kattavasti Puolan JASSM / JASSM ER hankinnasta ja problematiikasta pitkän kantaman asejärjestelmän täydestä hyödyntämisestä.
Initially, the Air Force did not suffer from problems which were evident in case of the Polish Navy, since the Polish aircraft have only been using armament, the range of which was equal to the range of their onboard sensors. The Air Force began to think of acquisition of a long range reconnaissance solution, when the F-16 jets were introduced into service. In reality, this problem has been actually noticed after a decision was made to purchase the AGM-158A JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile) weapon. The name of this ordnance suggests (Stand-off) that the missile requires external data to conduct an effective strike. The missile has a range of 370 kilometres, no possibilities of looking for targets that are to be attacked remain at disposal of the pilot. Data as such shall be downloaded externally, however, as for now, pilots of the F-16 jets used by the Polish Air Force have no Polish target indication system at their disposal.
And yet again, a status quo occurs. In the Air Force, as well as in the Navy, not only was the said problem disregarded, but also a decision has been made to acquire more missiles – AGM-158B JASSM-ER model in this case – the range of which is even longer, defined as 1000 kilometres. And, again, the Air Force is receiving armament, the full capabilities of which cannot be utilized, at least for now.
Imagery Analysis System And Beyond
Imagery Analysis System And Beyond
JASSM and JASSM-ER problem is not going to be solved through acquisition of the Imagery Analysis System, the procurement of which has been planned by the Armament Inspectorate. The procurement procedure which began in December 2016 only concerns a single element of the targeting system, namely the place where the digital geo-spatial data is going to be collected, stored, analysed, interpreted and archived.
The system mentioned above is to consist of two, cooperating elements: service-server infrastructure and workgroup infrastructure. The workgroup infrastructure also refers to the tasks that are to be completed by the whole system, namely ongoing provision of information, geo-spatial analysis, and preparation, archiving and distribution of the gathered data.
The matter is highly urgent, since JASSM and JASSM-ER missiles may be used as an effective deterrent. May be – if the user knows the targets that should be destroyed in order to deter the potential adversary.
Within the requirements defining the shape of the aforesaid suite, the Ordering Party also expects that it includes additional two data acquisition subsystems: system for receiving the data from SAR satellites, and system for receiving the data from optoelectronic satellites. Still, we have no idea, as to where such data should come from. Poland has neither airborne long range reconnaissance platforms, nor radar or optronic satellites at its disposal. Yet again, the Polish authorities are acquiring a fragment of the puzzle which, in no way, would provide us with an autonomy in using the armament procured by the Polish Armed Forces.
What is more, there is no chance that at the moment when the analysis system is introduced, such reconnaissance solutions would also be acquired. The Armament Inspectorate has assumed that the corresponding task shall be completed in two years, six months from the date when the agreement is signed for creating the execution design, and 18 months for implementation of the aforesaid design. Introduction of a military satellite platform in a period which is so short is virtually impossible.
The system mentioned above is to consist of two, cooperating elements: service-server infrastructure and workgroup infrastructure. The workgroup infrastructure also refers to the tasks that are to be completed by the whole system, namely ongoing provision of information, geo-spatial analysis, and preparation, archiving and distribution of the gathered data.
The matter is highly urgent, since JASSM and JASSM-ER missiles may be used as an effective deterrent. May be – if the user knows the targets that should be destroyed in order to deter the potential adversary.
Within the requirements defining the shape of the aforesaid suite, the Ordering Party also expects that it includes additional two data acquisition subsystems: system for receiving the data from SAR satellites, and system for receiving the data from optoelectronic satellites. Still, we have no idea, as to where such data should come from. Poland has neither airborne long range reconnaissance platforms, nor radar or optronic satellites at its disposal. Yet again, the Polish authorities are acquiring a fragment of the puzzle which, in no way, would provide us with an autonomy in using the armament procured by the Polish Armed Forces.
What is more, there is no chance that at the moment when the analysis system is introduced, such reconnaissance solutions would also be acquired. The Armament Inspectorate has assumed that the corresponding task shall be completed in two years, six months from the date when the agreement is signed for creating the execution design, and 18 months for implementation of the aforesaid design. Introduction of a military satellite platform in a period which is so short is virtually impossible.
For example Göktürk-1A satellite launched in early December 2016 was created on the basis of an agreement concluded back in 2009, by and between the Turkish Ministry of Defence and the Telespazio joint venture, formed by Leonardo/Finmeccanica and Thales. This task required 7 years to be completed then.
In case of the Polish public procurement procedures, potential conclusion of the contract would take place in two years. The Imagery Analysis System acquired by the Armament Inspectorate is going to, for seven years at least, be operated solely with the use of commercially available data from the civil satellites.
Moreover, Polish Ministry of Defence has signed an agreement with its Italian counterpart, on the basis of which radar data from the Italian SAR Cosmo-SkyMed Seeconda Generazione system could be obtained. When it comes to the optoelectronic data, acquisition of the imagery gathered by the IAI OptSat-3000 satellite, constructed by the Israeli IAI facility for Italy, would constitute a bridge solution, however this platform has not yet been sent into the orbit (which is to happen this year), and Poland would still be dependent on the Italian MoD. Poland, thus, will only act as the data downloader, without an ability to offer anything in return. Hence, the principles of operation would be different from the ones pursued by France, Germany, Italy and Spain (with the latter state joining the aforesaid group in the future), the capabilities and systems of which overlap and complement themselves.
Moreover, Polish Ministry of Defence has signed an agreement with its Italian counterpart, on the basis of which radar data from the Italian SAR Cosmo-SkyMed Seeconda Generazione system could be obtained. When it comes to the optoelectronic data, acquisition of the imagery gathered by the IAI OptSat-3000 satellite, constructed by the Israeli IAI facility for Italy, would constitute a bridge solution, however this platform has not yet been sent into the orbit (which is to happen this year), and Poland would still be dependent on the Italian MoD. Poland, thus, will only act as the data downloader, without an ability to offer anything in return. Hence, the principles of operation would be different from the ones pursued by France, Germany, Italy and Spain (with the latter state joining the aforesaid group in the future), the capabilities and systems of which overlap and complement themselves.
The P-DUGS Polish Defence User Ground Segment station is being erected in Białobrzegi, north of Warsaw, for the purpose of acquiring the data from the Italian CosmoSkyMed satellites. The said facility is to obtain the initial operational readiness this year, with full capacity being planned to be attained in 2020. After the relevant modernization is implemented, the said system could also be used to download the optoelectronic data from the OptSat-3000 satellite, and from the prospective Polish systems.
https://www.defence24.com/poland-needs-satelites-and-targeting-system-for-jassm-missiles
Satelliitit puuttuvat toistaiseksi ja lähes 1000 km päähän kantavan aseen maalin määrittely voi olla työlästä jos ei ole oikeata työkalupakkia. Miten meillä?
Saadaanko USA:n satelliittidataa käytettäväksi ohjusten kiinteiden maalien tarkkaan määrittelyyn?
Vastapuolen ilmatorjuntajärjestelmän tai kaukovalvontatutkien kolmiomittaus tehdään nyt pääosin maasta käsin esim. Dragonshield-järjestelmän lento/maasensoreilla. Hornetit eivät kykene määrittelemään tai paikantamaan radiosäteilyä ja muodostamaan laukaisuparametrejä.
Asia voi toki muuttua F-35 AN/ASQ-239 järjestelmällä, Growlerilla tai muilla vastaavilla, uusilla kyvyillä jotka mahdollistavat jollain etäisyydellä tiettyjen aikakriittisten maalien paikantamisen ja datan siirron JASSM-ohjuksille. Täyttä operatiivista kantamaa vastustajan syvyyteen tuskin saavutetaan ilman satelliittijärjestelmää. JASSM ER käyttää samanlaista ohjausta melko varmasti kuin LRASM ja kyseistä asetta hankkiessa tulee viimeistään ajankohtaiseksi satelliittitiedustelun ja datalinkin käyttötarve.
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