Neuvostoliiton ja Varsovan liiton (sekä muiden) tuotantomääristä

[Antares]

Tässäpä mielenkiintoinen asia joka tuli vastaan melkein vahingossa. Julkaisin aikaisemmin tässä ketjussa kolmen merkittävän venäläisen lähdeteoksen taulukot, nämä kolme kirjaa löytyvät tästä viestistä: LINKKI

Kirjat ovat nimeltään:

Отечественные бронированные машины. ХХ век. 1905-1941 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2002

Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. 1905-1941 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2002

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Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005

Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005

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Отечественные Бронированные Машины ХХ век Том 3: 1946-1965 - А.Г. Солянкин, И.Г. Желтов, К.Н. Кудряшов - 2010

Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 3. 1946-1965 - Solyankin A.G., Zheltov I.G., Kudryashov K.N. - 2010

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Jos on tarkkana, huomaa että kolmannen teoksen kirjoittajista puuttuvat Pavlov M.V. ja Pavlov I.V. jotka ovat veljeksiä. En tiedä tarkempia yksityiskohtia, mutta muistan kuulleeni että kirjoittajaryhmä "hajosi" ennen kuin kolmas kirja saatiin valmiiksi.

Neljäs kirja, joka oli tarkoitus käsitellä aikaväli 1966-2000 puolestaan törmäsi vaikeuksiin - tai näin ainakin väitetään / spekuloidaan eri venäjänkielisillä sivuilla. Yhdeksi syyksi on sanottu sitä että kyseinen ajanjakso sisältää paljon salaiseksi luokiteltua materiaalia. Muistan lukeneeni että jossain vaiheessa jokin osa tästä porukasta harkitsi aikaväliä 1966-1985 mutta siitäkin on jo vuosia aikaa. Ilmeisesti ei johtanut mihinkään tai jos johti, niin ei ainakaan kirjan julkaisuun.

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MUTTA tässä se mikä on mennyt minulta aikaisemmin ohitse: vuonna 2021 Pavlovin veljekset julkaisivat uuden kirjan ja se käsittelee aikaväliä 1945-1965: LÄHDE

Павлов М. В., Павлов И. В. "Отечественные бронированные машины 1945-1965 гг. Часть I. Легкие, средние и тяжелые танки" - 2021

Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V. “Domestic armored vehicles 1945-1965.” Part I. Light, medium and heavy tanks" - 2021




Minulla ei ole pääsyä tähän kirjaan ja Alexey Khlopotovin blogikirjoituksen mukaan kirjan painos oli 1 000 kpl joista 500 kpl meni UVZ:n sisäiseen käyttöön ja loput 500 kpl myyntiin. Oletan että kauppa kävi nopeasti ja toista painosta ei oteta, joten kirjan löytäminen käynee vaikeaksi tai kalliiksi. Venäläinen kirja kun on kyseessä, niin yleensä ennemmin tai myöhemmin näistä ilmestyy jonkinlainen digitaalinen versio internettiin - joko skannattu tai valokuvattu.

Jos vertaa Solyankin et al. kirjaan niin siinä on 670 sivua kun taas Pavlovin veljesten kirjassa on 1 112 sivua. Lisäksi Pavlovin veljesten kirjasta on julkaistu vasta ensimmäinen osa, joka käsittelee pelkästään panssarivaunuja aikavälillä 1946-1965. Toinen osa, jota he työstävät parhaillaan käsittelee Khlopotovin mukaan "muita panssaroituja ajoneuvoja".

Kuten tästä voi päätellä, Pavlovin veljesten kirjat tulevat olemaan sisällön määrän osalta selvästi Solyankin et al. kirjaa laajempia, mutta sillä ei välttämättä ole tämän ketjun kannalta suurta merkitystä. Tässä ketjussa on pyritty keskittymään tuotantomääriin ja oletan että Solyankin et al. kirjasta löytyvä taulukko sisältää tarkan datan eikä Pavlovin veljesten kirjassa ole siihen lisättävää - olettaen että eivät ole löytäneet jotain korjattavaa.

Neuvostoliiton kylmän sodan aikaisen panssarivaunujen tuotannon osalta heidän kirjansa on kuitenkin erinomaiselta kuulostava, ainakin sen perusteella mitä olen lukenut arvosteluja. Tämän kirjasarjan aikaisemmat kirjat ovat parhaat lähdeteokset tästä aiheesta ja oletan että tämä olisi erinomainen lisä niiden kaveriksi.

Tämä löytö yleensäkin herätti pienen pienen toivonkipinän siitä että kenties jossain vaiheessa saataisiin vastaava teos myös vuoden 1965 jälkeiselle ajalle. Aikaväli 1966-2000 olisi erinomainen koska se käsittelisi paitsi Neuvostoliiton viimeiset vuosikymmenet niin myös Venäjän ensimmäiset vuodet. Jos heillä olisi yhtä avoin pääsy arkistoihin kuin kolmen ensimmäisen kirjan osalta, silloin saataisiin vihdoin vastaus moneen avoimeen kysymykseen eri panssarivaunujen vuosituotantomääristä ja erityisesti eri varianttien osalta.

Ymmärrettävistä syistä nämä asiat ovat vielä nykyäänkin Venäjällä suuria salaisuuksia, koska erityisesti 1980-luvulla valmistetut panssarivaunut ovat heillä edelleen aktiivijoukkojen käytössä. 1990-luku puolestaan nähdään syvän häpeän aikana, jolloin panssarivaunujen tuotanto sukelsi syvälle. Epäilemättä siinä on yksi syy salailulle.

Niin tai näin, tämä Pavlovin veljesten tuore / pari vuotta sitten tapahtunut uuden kirjan julkaisu on mennyt minulta ohitse ja olen siitä iloinen, vaikkei minulla olekaan kyseistä kirjaa käsissä. Kenties sitten jossain vaiheessa JA kenties näiden kirjojen valmistumisen jälkeen he suuntaavat katseen vuoden 1965 jälkeisiin vuosiin? Toivottavasti.

 

[Antares]

Andrei Tarasenkon tuorein talteen:

December 27, 1987, the last T-64 type tank (T-64BV) left the factory. A rally was held. It was a farewell to a whole epoch that left a great mark in tank building.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1739983176871669798

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Tällä kertaa Telegram-viesti ei tarjoa lisätietoa aiheeseen. LÄHDE

Tämä ei ole sinänsä uutta tietoa koska T-64BV ja yleisemmin T-64 perheen vaunujen valmistus päättyi vuoden 1987 lopussa.

Tarkka päivämäärä on Tarasenkon mukaan 27.12.1987.

 

[Antares]

Tässä ketjussa on pääasiassa uustuotantomääriä yms. dataa mutta en keksinyt tälle infolle muuta paikkaa, joten otetaan tänne talteen.

Linkistä aukeaa ko. nettisivu Google Translate -käännöksellä mutta lainaan tähän ja seuraavaan viestiin Twitter-ketjun kuvat koska niissä näkyvät alkuperäinen teksti sekä Chung-Tzu käyttäjän kommentit / käännökset punaisella tekstillä:

In 2016, the Glavcom blog posted this interesting table of 1991 costs for various overhauls and upgrades implemented by BTRZs (army repair plants) in the USSR, which seems to have been ignored.

These costs are mostly for labour and minor components required for the repair/upgrade. Major things like guns, weapon systems, engines, transmissions, radios etc. would have been provided by the military and are not included. Engine repairs would have been done at the factory.

https://glavcom-blogspot-com.translate.goog/2016/10/1991.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en

Thursday, October 27, 2016​

Price level of the State Technical University of the USSR Ministry of Defense for the overhaul of armored vehicles as of 1991​

https://twitter.com/x/status/1739959909418987934

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Jatkuu seuraavassa viestissä: LINKKI

 

[Antares]

Edellisen viestin (LINKKI) asia jatkuu:



Taulukon alla oli tällainen teksti:



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The cost of overhauling 1 T-80 gas turbine 'monoblock' is more than the cost of overhauling an entire T-64A.



Some of the more obscure vehicles mentioned:

GPM-54 LINKKI
BMR-2 LINKKI
BREM-2 LINKKI
8U218, the other 'Tyulpan' ('803') LINKKI
2P19 ('810') LINKKI
PRP-3 (1Zh3, '767') LINKKI

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Jos aihe kiinnostaa, tästä aikaisemmasta viestistä (LINKKI) löytyy Tankograd-blogin artikkelista poimittu taulukko, johon on merkitty eri Neuvostoliiton panssarivaunujen valmistuskustannuksia sekä "overhaul" kustannuksia. Valitettavasti taulukon alkuperäinen lähde ei ole tiedossa ja käännöksen perusteella ko. hinnat ovat Yhdysvaltain dollareita (ei tiedossa, minkä vuoden kurssi - oletan että kylmän sodan loppupuolelta eli 1980-luvun loppu tai 1990-luvun alku) kun taas tässä ja edellisessä viestissä olevat taulukkoihin merkityt hinnat ovat Venäjän ruplia vuoden 1991 kurssilla.

HUOM: tässä Chung-Tzu twitter-tilin kommentit ko. taulukosta. Hän myös kertoo sen lähteen: LINKKI

I have spoken to Chobitok on this and he says that table is not reliable because the values are not normalised by year of production. The table came from his 1st T-64 book. He doesn't use it in his 2nd book for this reason. You can only compare tanks from roughly the same era.

It is also difficult to directly compare costs this way because producing stuff in the Urals is generally more expensive than in Kharkov or Leningrad, due to how isolated the Urals are from the main resource and industrial centres

Oryxin listoja ylläpitävä Jakub Janovsky puolestaan kommentoi näin: LÄHDE

The big problem with it is that AFAIK it reflected only the (at that time) cost of work - not the components that were at that time transferred for free (since all involved companies were owned by the state)

Johon Chung-Tzu vastasi näin: LÄHDE

Yes, it is the same for the table I posted

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khozraschet

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Toisaalta tästä toisesta viestistä (LINKKI ja LINKKI 2) löytyy taulukko, jonka väitetään olevan БТРЗ № 61 eli 61st armored repair plant tehtaan seinältä otettu kuva. Sen data on aikaväliltä 1985-2015 ja he tekivät kylmän sodan loppupuolella T-54, T-55 ja T-62 panssarivaunujen peruskorjausta (arvatenkin myös asensivat ko. peruskorjauksen yhteydessä tietyt modernisoinnit ja päivitykset ko. vaunuihin - jos tällainen työ oli tilattu heiltä).

Taulukon mukaan ko. pajalla T-80 vaunujen peruskorjaus alkoi vuonna 1989 ja T-72 vaunujen peruskorjaus vuonna 1994. T-54 ja T-55 vaunujen peruskorjaus puolestaan päättyi vuonna 1990 ja T-62 vaunujen peruskorjaus vuonna 1991, ainakin tällä ko. pajalla (tosin korjasivat 30 kpl T-62 vaunuja vuonna 1993 mutta tämä on poikkeus sääntöön).

Yllä olevaa ns. hinnastoa voinee soveltaa tämän БТРЗ № 61 taulukon kanssa ja halutessaan arvioida, minkä verran ruplia per vuosi käytettiin peruskorjaustyöhön minäkin vuotena (toki ruplan kurssi vaihtelee, kuten aina valuuttojen osalta - tulisi siis arvioida jonkinlainen korjauskerroin jos haluaa arvioida esim. vuoden 1985 tai 1988 kustannuksia näiden vuoden 1991 hintojen avulla).

 

[Antares]

Neuvostoliiton T-72 panssarivaunujen kehityksestä 1970- ja 1980-luvuilla.

Lähde:

Tanks at the Iron Curtain 1975-90 - Steven J. Zaloga - kirja julkaistu 24.10.2023

Lainaus kirjan sivuilta 17-18.

T-72: the mobilization tank

Development of an improved T-72 began in May 1975. The original T-72 was inferior to the T-64A in protection. Although it shared the same glacis plate with combination armor, the turret was homogenous cast steel, lacking the aluminum or ceramic insert used in the T-64A turret. A number of different protection options were tested, finally settling on the 172.10.073SB Kvartz turret which added a sintered quartz filler (peschanye sterzhni) in front cavities of the turret. This feature entered production during the final production run of the baseline T-72 tanks at Nizhni-Tagil in July 1978 and was nicknamed the “Dolly Parton” in NATO.

Although the design bureau at Nizhni-Tagil proposed a wide range of upgrades to the T-72, this was resisted by defense minister Dmitry Ustinov. He viewed the T-72 as a second-rate mobilization tank suitable for second tier units and for export. He favored a conversion of the Nizhni-Tagil plant to the T-80. Proposals for expensive T-72 options, such as guided projectiles and advanced fire controls, were rejected in favor of the premium tanks such as the T-64A and T-80.

In conjunction with the turret armor improvements, the T-72 upgrade program examined modest fire control improvements. The TPD-2-49 optical rangefinder was replaced by the TPD-K1 laser rangefinder in the late production T-72 (172M sb4) in 1978. New production tanks with the full upgrade package were designated T-72A and entered production at Nizhni-Tagil in September 1978; it was formally accepted for service on June 22, 1979.

A series of incremental upgrades continued on the T-72A including steel reinforced rubber side skirts in January 1979 on the T-72A (172M sb6). An improved combination armor for the glacis plate entered production in October 1979 that switched from the original 80mm steel–105mm GRP–20mm steel sandwich to a 60–105–50mm sandwich. Tests of Israeli M111 105mm APFSDS projectiles obtained by the Soviet Army in the wake of the 1982 Lebanon War suggested that the glacis plate was still vulnerable. As a short-term solution, a 16mm steel appliqué plate was added to the front of the glacis plate starting in 1983.

A program to modernize the T-72A began in July 1981 as Izdeliye 184. The turret armor was substantially revised by the use of semi-active armor as described earlier. The new turret offered the equivalent of 500–520mm of rolled homogenous armor against APFSDS and 600–620mm against HEAT warheads. Limited production of the new turrets began on July 1, 1983, alongside the earlier Kvartz turret on late-production T-72A tanks. The complete switch to the new turret took place on January 1, 1984. This version was nicknamed the “Super Dolly Parton” in NATO.

Unlike the T-64 and T-80, the initial production versions of the T-72 could not fire guided projectiles such as the Kobra missile. In March 1982, work began on the Izdeliye 177 that was fitted with the new 9K120 Svir missile system and in February 1983 a study began on the Izdeliye 179 with the Kobra missile system. In February 1984, operational trials were conducted of the various upgrades to the T-72A.

A formal start of production of the T-72B was on November 27, 1984. The T-72B had the new 9K120 Svir missile system, the new 172.10.100SB turret adapted to mount the new 1K13-49 gunner’s sight, Kontakt-1 ERA, the improved 2A46M 125mm gun, and the uprated 840hp V-84-1 engine. Some of the final production batches of T-72A manufactured in 1983–84 had some of the features associated with the T-72B including the new turret, but lacked the Svir missile system and the Kontakt-1. In December 1985, production of the T-72B1 began and was completed in September 1989. It was the same as the T-72B but lacked the Svir missile system to reduce the cost of the tank. Armor protection on the T-72B continued with an improved configuration of semi-active armor in the casting of a new turret. The glacis armor was also changed, with the gap between the outer and inner steel armor plates now filled with four spaced steel plates of 10–10–20–20mm instead of the GRP sandwich used in earlier configurations. These armor upgrades were introduced into T-72B production in October 1987.

The final upgrade package for the T-72B was dubbed T-72B Usovershenstvovanniy (“Improved”; 188 SB; T-72BM). This substituted the new Kontakt-5 ERA for the Kontakt-1. Various other upgrades were tested including the improved 2A66 Anker 125mm gun, the Shtora anti-missile optical jammer, and the Agava thermal imaging gunner’s sight. Production of the T-72B tank at Nizhni-Tagil formally ended on November 13, 1991. A small production run of the T-72BM (188-1) with Kontakt-5 took place prior to the collapse of the USSR, but many of the other upgrades did not occur until the advent of the re-named T-90 in August 1991.

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Tässä on useita kiinnostavia yksityiskohtia, mutta tartun ensimmäisenä viimeisen kappaleen tekstiin jossa kirjoitetaan T-72BM / Product 188-1 panssarivaunuista eli T-72BU eli T-90 obr 1992 edeltäjästä.

Ustyantsevin Nizhny Tagilin eli UVZ:n historiaa käsittelevän kirjan lopusta löytyy tällainen maininta: LÄHDE

T-72SM ("PRODUCT 188-1")

1987

An improved T-72B tank, developed as part of the “Improvement-72B” design project and equipped, among other things, with a KDZ, a TSHU-1 optoelectronic suppression system, a 140-1 sighting system, a 2A46M cannon and a B-84-1 engine. In experimental development, he received the index "product 188-1". In 1989, two prototypes of the tank passed state tests. The tank "product 188-1" was adopted by the Russian army by a decree of the government of the Russian Federation of October 5, 1992 (order of the Minister of Defense of April 28, 1993) under the name "tank T-72BM". However, this tank was not mass-produced.

Zalogan mukaan vaunuja olisi valmistettu "a small production run...prior to the collapse of the USSR" kun taas Ustyantsev kirjoittaa kahdesta testit läpäisseestä prototyyppivaunusta.

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HARMITTAVASTI Zalogan kirja ei kommentoi T-72B obr 1989 vaunuja sanallakaan.

Ustyantsev kirjoittaa T-72B vaunuja käsittelevässä kuvauksessaan näin:

Since March 1989, a complex of built-in reactive armor has been installed on the turret, upper front part of the hull and fenders. T-72B is in service research institutes of the Russian army and the armies of a number of foreign countries.

ELI Kontakt-5 elementeillä varustetut T-72B vaunut olivat todellakin sarjatuotannossa ??.3.1989 jälkeen - mutta missä suhteessa Kontakt-1 varusteltuihin vaunuihin? Korvasivatko ne kokonaan vai valmistettiinko molempia rinnakkain?

Vaikuttaa siltä että T-72B obr 1989 oli todellakin osa kylmän sodan todellisuutta ihan sen viimeisinä vuosina - mutta mikä määrä niitä valmistettiin ja minä vuosina?

Olen aina kamppaillut tämän kanssa, koska asiasta ei ole kirjoitettu selvästi tai ainakaan sellaista lähdettä ei ole tullut vastaan. Teoriassa Ustyantsevin kirjoittaman perusteella olisi mahdollista että T-72B obr 1989 voisi käsittää 10/12 osaa vuoden 1989 T-72B tuotannosta, koko vuoden 1990 tuotannon ja 11,5/12 osaa vuoden 1991 tuotannosta - tosin tällöin jätetään vientiin tarkoitetut T-72S pois laskuista. Kenties myös muita, mahdollisesti samaan aikaan tuotannossa olleita malleja.

Minulla on kuitenkin ongelmia suhteuttaa tämä tulkinta UVZ:n väitettyjen tuotantomäärien kanssa: LÄHDE

1989: 933
1990: 776
1991: ?

Vaikuttaisi siltä että tuolla logiikalla T-72B obr 1989 vaunuja täytyisi olla ainakin 1 553 kpl vuoden 1990 lopussa.

JOS näin todellakin olisi ollut, niin miksi tämä vaunutyyppi on (ainakin näennäisesti) niin harvinainen? En muista nähneeni niitä Tsetsenian ensimmäisessä tai toisessa sodassa (toki kyseisiin sotiin lähetetyt joukko-osastot määrittivät sen, millä kalustolla siellä operoitiin). Uskon että näitä on valmistettu jokunen sata, mutta tuskin kuitenkaan tuhatta vaunua - muuten sen luulisi olevan yleisempi eikä kenties olisi ollut tarvetta T-72BA modernisointiohjelmalle 2000-luvun alussa?

T-80UD oli toinen merkittävä Kontakt-5 elementtejä sisältänyt massatuotettu kylmän sodan aikainen panssarivaunu.

T-80U voidaan laskea kolmanneksi, mutta niiden valmistusmäärät jäivät pieneksi ollen noin 200 kpl vuoden 1991 lopuksi (50kpl LKZ:n tuotantoa vuonna 1989 ja 150 kpl Omskin tuotanto vuonna 1991 - mahdollisesti Kharkovan tehtaan tuotantoa muutama kymmenen vaunua 1983 ja 1984 mutta minulla ei ole tälle varmaa lähdettä).

Kuvaavaa lienee se, että T-80UD vaunuja oli sijoitettuna Moskovan hoviyksiköiden käyttöön ja ne nähtiin Moskovan paraatissa vuonna 1990 mutta T-80U vaunut loistivat poissaolollaan Neuvostoliiton viimeisinä vuosina. JOS niiden sarjatuotanto olisi todella alkanut Omskissa vuonna 1987, niin miksei vaunuja osoitettu tietyille yksiköille? Miksei niitä nähty paraateissa?

Muistutan, että UVZ aloitti T-72BA modernisointiprojektin vaunujen toimittamisen vuoden 2000 tienoilla, mutta sen alkupuolella modernisoidut T-72 vaunut oli varustettu Kontakt-1 elementeillä ja vasta myöhemmin ne korvattiin Kontakt-5 elementeillä. Koko projekti oli muutenkin oman aikansa tuote eli saman mallinimen alla on monia eri variantteja. Virallisesti T-72BA hyväksyttiin Venäjän asevoimien käyttöön vuonna 2005.

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Toinen havainto, mikä on toki ollut tiedossa jo aikaisemmin mutta hyvä silti sanoa ääneen: T-72A obr 1983 on todellinen ja olemassaoleva variantti mutta sen yleisyys ei ole selvää. Ainakaan Zalogan mukaan koko vuoden 1983 tuotanto ei ole niitä eikä välttämättä edes koko puolen vuoden tuotanto:

Limited production of the new turrets began on July 1, 1983, alongside the earlier Kvartz turret on late-production T-72A tanks. The complete switch to the new turret took place on January 1, 1984.

Eli rajoitettu uusien tornien valmistus alkoi 1.7.1983 mutta se tapahtui rinnakkain aikaisempien Kvartz-tornien kanssa.

Toisaalta uudet tornit korvasivat vanhat tornit 1.1.1984 alkaen eli tästä nähdään että T-72A obr 1984 mallin valmistus käsittää melkoin koko vuoden 1984 tuotannon:

A formal start of production of the T-72B was on November 27, 1984.

Eli voidaan arvioida että T-72A obr 1984 voisi käsittää 11/12 osaa vuoden 1984 tuotannosta ja T-72B puolestaan 1/12 osaa? Kenties, toki tässä oletetaan että koko vuoden tuotanto olisi muuten tasan jakautunut kuukausien kesken eli ei olisi nähty minkäänlaista hetkellistä laskua.

Zalogan mukaan UVZ:n T-72B tuotanto tapahtui aikavälillä:

27.11.1984 - 13.11.1991 (eli melko tasan seitsemän vuotta)

Samoin hänen mukaansa UVZ:n T-72B1 tuotanto tapahtui aikavälillä:

??.12.1985 - ??.9.1989 (eli kenties kolme vuotta ja kymmenen kuukautta?)

Tästä herää toki kysymys: eikö UVZ valmistanut yhtään T-72B vaunua vuonna 1992 tai 1993? Zalogan kirja on aika selväsanainen että tuotanto päättyi tuolloin. He pyrkivät saavaan T-90 panssarivaunun sarjatuotantoon ja samaan aikaan etsivät T-72S vaunuille ulkomaisia ostajia. T-72S tuotannosta ei ole selviä vuosikohtaisia määriä mutta Ustyantsevin kirjan mukaan niiden valmistus olisi alkanut vuonna 1987 ja hän kirjoittaa niiden valmistusmäärästä näin:

In total, according to some reports, a little more than 400 T-72S tanks were manufactured.

Toki tässä väistetään vastuunottaminen numeron oikeudesta, kun kirjoitetaan että "tiettyjen raporttien mukaan".

Zalogan kirjasta "T-90 standard tank: the first tank of the new Russia" (kirja julkaistu 20.2.2018 - alleviivaus minun)

In 1992, the Russian Army ordered only 20 tanks: 5 T-80U tanks from Omsk and 15 tanks from Nizhni-Tagil. Tank production at Omsk and Nizhni-Tagil in 1992–93 was well beyond the puny state orders due to some export orders, but only a pale shadow of the 1980s. This additional production was not ordered by the Russian Army, but undertaken simply to keep the plants from closing. There was the hope that large export orders would emerge to save the plants and sop up this surplus. However the anticipated export orders did not materialize. The UVZ in Nizhni-Tagil had about 350 T-72S and T-90 tanks in its factory yards, and Omsk had 150−200 T-80U tanks. Some of these T-80U tanks were exported to Cyprus and South Korea in 1996; UVZ gradually exported the T-72 tanks. Lack of pay at the Nizhni-Tagil plant led to strikes in July 1995 during which the workers seized several of the idle tanks and drove them through the city in protest.

Tässä ei suoraan sanota, minä vuonna heillä olisi ollut noin 350 kpl T-72S ja T-90 vaunuja tehtaan pihalla, mutta minun vaikutelma on että puhutaan vuosista 1992-1993 eli melko pian Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen. Kiehtovasti tässä ei sanota että T-72B vaunut olisivat muodostaneet osaa tästä määrästä eli ehkä niiden tuotanto todellakin päättyi vuoden 1991 lopuksi ja kaikki vaunut toimitettiin asiakkaalle? Kenties T-72S vaunuja valmistettiin niiden rinnalla aikavälillä 1987-1991 ja myös tämän jälkeen? UVZ haki aktiivisesti T-72S vientikauppoja mutta ei ole tiedossa, kuinka suuri määrä vaunuja valmistettiin. Pelkät testit ja esittelyt eivät riitä perustelemaan usean sadan vaunun valmistusta pihalle seisomaan - paitsi jos spekuloidaan rohkeasti tulevilla kaupoilla.

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Muutamien mallien tuotannon alkamisesta Zalogan kirjan mukaan:

T-72A tuotanto alkoi ??.09.1978 vaikka vaunutyyppi hyväksyttiin virallisesti 22.6.1979

60-105-50mm rungon panssarointi tuli tuotantoon ??.10.1978 (korvasi aikaisemman 80-105-20mm). Täten nähdään että käytännössä jokainen T-72A vaunu on varustettu tällä rungon panssaroinnilla, poislukien ensimmäisen kuukauden tuotanto eli 09.1978.

T-72B ja T-72B1 rungon onkalon teräslevypakan koostumus vaihtui 10-10-20-20mm malliseksi ??.10.1987 alkaen.

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MUOKKAUS: lisään tämän verran ylempään pohdintaan: T-72BM ja T-72BU josta tuli myöhemmin T-90 obr 1992. Näiden kahden osalta näkee toisinaan kirjoituksia ristiin ja rastiin. Toisten mukaan kyseessä olisivat yksi ja sama vaunu, toisten mukaan kaksi erilaista ja samanaikaista projektia. JOS tehdään oletus että kyseessä olisi sama projekti, silloin T-72 obr 1989 edustaisi prototyypin tai korkeintaan pienen esisarjan asteelle jäänyttä kokeilua, joka korvattiin myöhemmin lisää monimutkaisempia ja kalliimpia ominaisuuksia sisältävällä (ja samalla selvästi suorituskykyisemmällä) T-90 obr 1992 vaunulla. Tällöin olisi siis loogista että nimensä mukaisesti T-72 obr 1989 vaunuja olisi tosiaan valmistettu jokin pieni määrä erilaisia testejä varten ainakin vuonna 1989 ja kenties sen jälkeenkin, mutta vaunu ei olisi ollut varsinaisessa massatuotannossa.

Toinen vaihtoehto on tuo mitä kirjoitin aikaisemmin eli T-72 obr 1989 olisi tullut UVZ:n massatuotantoon vuonna 1989 ja korvannut joko osittain tai kokonaan Kontakt-1 elementeillä varustetut T-72B ja T-72B1 vaunut. Tässä tapauksessa kysymys on silti sama, jonka esitin yllä eli miksi T-72B obr 1989 on (ainakin näennäisesti) niin harvinainen vaunu jos niitä todellakin valmistettiin satoja tai kenties pari tuhatta vaunua ihan kylmän sodan lopuksi?

Oryxin listan mukaan Ukrainan sodan aikana on menetetty tuhottuina, kaapattuina tai hylättyinä (tähän päivään eli 14.12.2023 mennessä): LÄHDE

2 kpl T-72 Ural
42 kpl T-72A
13 kpl T-72AV
322 kpl T-72B
98 kpl T-72B obr 1989
38 kpl T-72B obr 2022
29 kpl T-72BA
349 kpl T-72B3
3 kpl T-72B3 obr 2014
253 kpl T-72B3 obr 2016
21 kpl T-72B3 obr 2022
140 kpl unknown T-72

Yhteensä 1 310 kpl.

Joku voisi sanoa että T-72B obr 1989 vaunut muodostivat erinomaisen aihion T-72BA ja T-72B3 modernisaatioille, mistä syystä alkuperäisessä kunnossa olevia vaunuja oli pienempi määrä aktiivijoukkojen käytössä ja varastoissa. Tämä on mahdollista, tosin toisen tulkinnan mukaan T-72BA ja T-72B3 modernisaatioiden perustana käytettiin T-72B varastovaunuja JA varsinaisia T-72B obr 1989 vaunuja oli valmistettu niin pieni määrä ettei niiden käyttäminen modernisoinnin aihioina ollut järkevää. Tämä pieni määrä T-72B obr 1989 vaunuja käytettiin siis aktiivijoukkojen käytössä ja peruskorjattiin sitä mukaa kun sille oli tarve / kuin korjaussuunnitelma vaati.

Pyöritin aikaisemmassa ylle lainatussa viestissä T-72BM ja T-72BU nimisten vaunujen eroja. Zalogan vanhempi kirja selventää sitä, mitä hän tarkoittaa ko. nimityksillä.

Lainaus Steve Zalogan kirjasta "T-90 standard tank: the first tank of the new Russia" (kirja julkaistu 20.2.2018) sivuilta 6-8:

T-72 BECOMES T-90

The T-72 tank had been accepted for Soviet army service in August 1973. The basic design had undergone evolutionary improvements at UVZ in Nizhni-Tagil. By the late 1980s, the standard production type was the T-72B (Obiekt 184) that had entered mass production in 1985. The next step at UVZ was a parallel effort to examine an entirely new tank design, the Obiekt 187, alongside a substantially modernized T-72B, called the Obiekt 188.

The Obiekt 187 started with a clean slate and was managed by deputy chief designer A. S. Shchelgachev. The design of a completely new tank had not been authorized by the Kremlin and was largely the result of the local initiatives of the Nizhni-Tagil plant. It was funded under the same program as the Obiekt 188. The hull design was significantly larger than the T-72 to permit the use of a larger engine. The first two prototypes were quite similar to the Obiekt 188 in many respects, including the use of an 840hp V-84 diesel engine and a cast turret. The third and fourth prototypes laid the groundwork for the intended configuration with a new welded turret as well as much more powerful engines, the GTD-1500 gas turbine or the 1,200hp Chelyabinsk A-85-2 diesel engine. The fifth and sixth prototypes were intended to serve as the patterns for eventual serial production. The armament on the Obiekt 187 was the new 2A66 125mm gun developed at artillery plant No. 9 in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinberg). Although this gun could employ the same 125mm ammunition used in the existing Soviet D-81T 125mm tank guns, it used improved construction that permitted higher bore pressures. Development of the 2A66 gun was accompanied by the development of a new family of 125mm tank gun ammunition. One of the main limitations of the existing tanks was the height of the autoloaders. This limited the length of the long-rod penetrators used in their APFSDS (armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding-sabot) projectile. To improve armor penetration, a longer penetrator was necessary as well as a new autoloader that could accommodate the lengthened ammunition, and this was developed as the 3BM39 Anker. Fire control was based on the 1A45 Irtysh system as on the Obiekt 188. The Obiekt 187 used a next-generation reactive armor codenamed Malakhit along with improved laminate armor in the hull and turret.

Design of the Obiekt 188 was formally initiated by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on June 19, 1986 and undertaken by the Nizhi-Tagil design bureau under engineer V. N. Venediktov, overseen by the plant’s new chief designer, Vladimir Potkin. The original study program was codenamed “OKR Sovershenstvovanie 72B (72B Upgrade).” The core of the new program was to incorporate the 1A45 Irtysh fire-control system of the T-80U tank into the T-72B. In addition, the Obiekt 188 would incorporate the latest in protective technology including a new generation of reactive armor. At the same time, a parallel program was undertaken under the direction of engineer N. A. Molodnyakov to develop an export version of the Obiekt 188, since there was some indication that this type would be superseded in Soviet service by the newer and more advanced Obiekt 187.

The Obiekt 188 was designated initially as T-72BM, the “M” indicating “modernized.” The Obiekt 188 incorporated a new generation of reactive armor, designated as Kontakt-5. The most important change in the Obeikt 188 was the incorporation of the 1A45 Irtysh fire-control system from the T-80U. The new fire-control system permitted the use of the 9K119 Refleks guided 125mm projectile, including a fire-on-the-move capability at speeds up to 30 km/h. The fire-control system also permitted the use of the new Aynet high explosive projectile with an air-burst feature. When the air-burst function was selected, the fire-control system monitored the ballistic path of the projectile, and when it passed over the target, it remotely detonated the warhead overhead the target, enhancing its effect against targets such as entrenched troops.

The first four Obiekt 188 prototypes were delivered for state trials in January 1989. Various technical issues were discovered and rectified. The second set of trials involved two improved tanks, and were conducted between June and September 1990. This improved variant was sometimes called T-72BU (usovershenstvovaniy: “improved”). Results of the trials were very favorable, and on March 27, 1991, the Russian Ministry of Defense recommended adopting operational trials by army units. At the same time, work on the Obiekt 187 was halted, though the reasons for this cancelation have remained a state secret.

The collapse of the Soviet Union occurred later in 1991, but before the Obiekt 188 entered mass production. The turmoil surrounding the Soviet collapse delayed work on the Obiekt 188 since the issue of state funding was thrown into chaos. To further complicate matters, there had been widespread international attention on the poor combat performance of the T-72 in the hands of Iraqi troops in the 1991 Operation Desert Storm conflict. Whether the main fault was the poor training and leadership of the Iraqi Army or inherent problems in the tank’s design, the T-72’s international reputation had been ruined by the Iraqi debacle.2 At this time, the T-72 was a staple Soviet export product, and so there was some pressure to rename the Obiekt 188 to distance it from the tarnished reputation of the T-72. The first plan was to change the designation to T-88, a contraction of its internal design codename, Obiekt 188. On June 8, 1992, the new Russian president Boris Yeltsin visited the UVZ plant in Nizhni-Tagil and was shown prototypes of the Obiekt 188. After the visit, Yeltsin agreed to authorize the Obiekt 188 for serial production as the T-88. However, after further discussion, the name was changed again to T-90 to symbolize the fact that it was the first new Russian tank to be built in the 1990s. This was formally adopted in an October 5, 1992 state decree. The export version was designated as T-90S, the S indicating Shchit (Shield).

The first tank of an initial low-rate production batch was ready on September 30, 1992, and by the end of the year 13 T-90 tanks had been assembled. Supply of the Agava-2 thermal imaging sight was a problem due to the low output of the device as well as its extremely high cost. In the event, only two of the original batch of tanks received this sight, the remainder receiving the cheaper Buran-PA night sight. The basic T-90 was followed on the assembly floor in March 1994 by the T-90K command tank. This version had additional radio equipment fitted including the R-163-50 transceiver, a special 4-meter antenna, a navigation aid, and an AB1-P28.5 auxiliary power unit. In general, about 5 percent of Russian tanks were built in the command tank configuration. Total T-90 production in 1992 to 1994 was about 105 tanks.

 

[Antares]

Tarasenkon tuorein talteen, tällä kertaa Object 432 eli alkuperäinen T-64 versio:

By the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR CM dated December 30, 1966, the Object 432 medium tank was adopted for service with the Soviet Army and was given the name "T-64 Tank".

Mass production of the T-64 tank was organized at the Malyshev Plant in late 1966, and 743 tanks of this modification were produced until 1969. Most of the T-64s were upgraded to the T-64R type and served until the 1990s.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1741107264172290341

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Hänen telegram-kanavansa viesti ei tarjoa lisättävää twitter-viestiin, mutta otetaan kuitenkin linkki talteen: LINKKI

 

[Antares]

Andrei Tarasenkon tuorein talteen:

On January 14, 1985, by Order No. 07 of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, the Soviet Army adopted the T-80BV, T-72AV, and T-64BV tanks equipped with the "Kontact" ERA.




The "Kontact" successfully, although with a number of comments, passed the state tests, the act on which was signed on January 14, 1983. Now almost 40 years have passed since those times, but the "Kontact"still takes its place on tanks.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1746526633953984698

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Hänen Telegram-kanavallaan asia on ilmaistu hieman monisanaisemmin: LÄHDE

#OTD On January 14, 1985, by order of the USSR Minister of Defense No. 07, the T-80BV, T-72AV, T-64BV tanks equipped with the “Contact” mounted dynamic protection complex were adopted into service by the Soviet Army.

“Contact” successfully, although with a number of comments, passed state tests, the act of which was signed on January 14, 1983.

Now almost 40 years have passed since those times, but Kontakt still has its place on tanks. The developers of the Steel Research Institute and industry failed to develop new containers and protective devices. They made some ugly canvas bags, then tin containers, patented them, received a bonus, and then, it seems, they killed it all.

 

[Antares]

T-64A panssarivaunun valmistuksen hinta eri tekijöihin jaettuna, sanotaan olevan ensimmäiseltä tuotantovuodelta eli 1974:

How much did the T-64A cost in the first year after its adoption (1974)?

In the table you can see the cost structure of the T-64A and other products of the Malyshev plant.

We can see that more than half of the cost are purchased products (55%), i.e. sights, stabilizers, etc.

The second is equipment costs - 14%, workers' salaries - 7%.

The cost of production in the end amounted to 135 389 p., and the wholesale selling price 143 300 p.

Also in the cost intervened installation ZU-64, which cost 5 700 p.

A profit of 7,773 rubles from each tank.

Not much.

(katso kuvan tarkempi versio twitterissä)

https://twitter.com/x/status/1746887710617338353

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Viestin kommenteista poiminta: Those factories were not set up for profit.

Johon Andrei Tarasenko vastasi näin: I know, but they had to build housing for workers, kindergartens, dormitories, etc.

 

[Antares]

Andrei Tarasenko tuorein talteen:

#OTD The T-84 tank was adopted into service with the Ukrainian Army by Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 237-5 of 08.02.2000.

Due to lack of funds, it was not possible to form full-fledged units armed with T-84 tanks (BM Oplot). Only an initial batch of 10 tanks was manufactured and delivered to the troops. 4 went to the USA under the designation T-80UD, having received a modified Drozd APS (478BEM1) and one received an air conditioner.

Spoiler: Isoja kuvia

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(kuvan suurempi versio löytyy twitter-viestistä)


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https://twitter.com/x/status/1755547101520437351

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Viestin kommenteissa kysyi näin: What happened to the ones that went to the US?

Johon Vesa-Mattï Puro niminen käyttäjä vastasi näin: https://defence-blog.com/ukrainian-tank-spotted-at-u-s-army-yuma-proving-ground/

Spoiler: Artikkelin teksti kokonaisuudessaan

Ukrainian tank spotted at U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground​

NEWSARMY
By Dylan Malyasov

Apr 3, 2020
Modified date: Apr 3, 2020



A satellite image has recently emerged on military online forums showing what appears to be Soviet-era T-72 main battle tanks at U.S. Army Yuma Proving Grounds, one of the largest military installations in the world.

The military expert from Nowa Technika Wojskowa, Damian Ratka drew attention that the Ukrainian T-80U also stood in line with Soviet main battle tanks.

”Well look what I have found. At Yuma Proving Grounds, among many T-72’s stored there, I found one of the 4 purchased by the U.S. from Ukraine in 2004 T-80UD/T-84 tanks,” Ratka said on Twitter.

In 2003, the U.S. Government obtained four T-80UD main battle tanks from Ukraine. The four T-80UD tanks arrived at the U.S. Army Aberdeen Test Center throughout December 2003 and January 2004.

The T-80UD is a Ukrainian variant of a T-80U main battle tank, fitted with a diesel engine in place of the high performance gas turbine. Also, this version of the tank is equipped with the Knife explosive reactive armour (ERA).

About 500 T-80UD tanks were built in the Malyshev plant in Kharkiv between 1987 and 1999. Pakistan, countering India’s adoption of the Russian T-90, bought almost 320 Ukrainian T-80UDs for its main armoured corps of the Pakistani Army.

WELL LOOK WHAT I HAVE FOUND. AT YUMA PROVING GROUNDS, AMONG MANY T-72’S STORED THERE, I FOUND ONE OF THE 4 PURCHASED BY US FROM UKRAINE IN 2004 T-80UD/T-84 TANKS. PIC.TWITTER.COM/0QFSRFRA18
— DAMIAN RATKA (@DRATKA1) MARCH 28, 2020

If you would like to show your support for what we are doing, here's where to do it.

If you wish to report grammatical or factual errors within our news articles, you can let us know by using the online feedback form.

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About author:

Dylan Malyasov

Dylan Malyasov is the editor-in-chief of Defence Blog. He is a journalist, an accredited defense advisor, and a consultant. His background as a defense advisor and consultant adds a unique perspective to his journalistic endeavors, ensuring that his reporting is well-informed and authoritative. read more

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Hänen Telegram-kanavansa viesti tarjoaa hieman lisätietoa (lisäksi siellä on pari kuvaa joita ei ole twitter-viestissä): LÄHDE

#OTD The T-84 tank was adopted by the Ukrainian Army by Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 237-5 dated 02/08/2000.

Due to a lack of funds, it was not possible to form full-fledged units armed with T-84 tanks (BM Oplot). Only an initial batch of 10 tanks was manufactured and delivered to the troops. 4 went to the USA under the designation T-80UD receiving a modified KAZ "Drozd" (478BEM1), and one - an air conditioner.

After the adoption of the BM Oplot, every president and prime minister of Ukraine promised that now we are already starting to build Oplots, but everyone had the same result.

At the moment, the machine is already outdated in its ideology and in its existing form its production has lost its meaning.

t.me/btvt2019/9890
1.8Kviews
Feb 8 at 12:41

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Tuossa Defence Blog artikkelissa kirjoitetaan näin:

About 500 T-80UD tanks were built in the Malyshev plant in Kharkiv between 1987 and 1999. Pakistan, countering India’s adoption of the Russian T-90, bought almost 320 Ukrainian T-80UDs for its main armoured corps of the Pakistani Army.

Aikaisemmassa viestissäni oli erään "Filip MiSko" nimeä käyttävän kirjoittajan spekulatiivinen väite Kharkovan tehtaan T-80U ja T-80UD vuosituotannosta: LÄHDE

T-80U / UD in Kharkov:
1983 - 10 T-80U units (December).
1985 - 30 units T-80U + 5 units T-80UD.
further only UD.
1986 - 45-47 units
1987 - 75 units
1988 - 125 units
1989 -150 units
1990 - 170 units
1991 - 100 units
1992 - 43 units

A total of 40 T-80U units and 715 T-80UD units.

Toisaalta jaoin aikaisemmassa viestissä (LINKKI) taulukon kirjasta nimeltä 100 лет российского танкостроения (julkaistu vuonna 2020). Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 239.

Siinä taulukossa on hieman eroja yllä kerrottuihin määriin verrattuna. Kirjan taulukon mukaan Kharkovan tehtaan T-80UD tuotanto olisi alkanut vasta vuonna 1986. Kirjan taulukossa vuosien 1986 ja 1987 valmistusmäärät ovat eri suuruiset kuin "Filip MiSko" kommentissa, tosin vuosien 1988, 1989 ja 1990 osalta ne ovat samat. Kirjan taulukon mukaiset vuosituotantomäärät:

1986: 50
1987: 55
1988: 125
1989: 150
1990: 170

Näiden numeroiden summa on 550 eli enemmän kuin Defence Blog artikkelissa kerrottu 500 kpl.

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HUOM: on syytä muistaa että on myös teorisoitu että Neuvostoliiton "vuosituotantomäärissä" voi olla kyseessä paitsi aito uustuotanto niin myös vanhojen varastovaunujen modernisointi. Eli tilastoidut numerot eivät tarkoittaisi pelkästään uusia panssarivaunuja.

Toisaalta on myös mahdollista että numeroissa on jonkin verran vääristälyä, varsinkin Neuvostoliiton viimeisten vuosien aikana, mutta tällaisen arvioiminen menee nopeasti hyvin vaikeaksi, varsinkin jos ei ole edes jonkinlaisia arvioita tai todisteita vääristelyn suuruudesta. Tässä puhutaan kuitenkin sotatarvikkeista ja vaikka Neuvostoliitossa valehdeltiin ja vääristeltiin monia asioita, sotatarvikkeiden tuotanto otettiin tosissaan. En siis usko että näissä olisi valtavan suuria virheitä.

 

[Antares]

Tässä sanotaan olevan yksi todiste siitä että alkuperäisiä T-90 obr 1992 panssarivaunuja on modernisoitu T-90M standardiin:

This T-90M's hull have number "Щ08ВТ9745", that is means that hull is made in 1994 (literally it's the upgraded T-90 Obr.1992)

The number decoding:

Щ - stands for the 1994
08 - stands for the month (august)
ВТ - stands for the "The Nizhny Tagil Wagon Factory", or just the UVZ (Нижнетагильский вагоностроительный завод)
9745 - serial number

There is also another number on the hull "1Р5Л02ВТ", it's a repair number. I don't know how to decipher this number because the old decoding system doesn't work for it.

Images are from "Army-2021" exhibition.

Spoiler: Isoja kuvia

https://twitter.com/x/status/1755958499333243373

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Suyi kysyi häneltä viestin kommenteissa näin: Is there a table for the relationship between letters and the years of production?

Johon 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝔇𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝔇𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 vastasi näin: LÄHDE



Л - 1970
Н - 1971
П - 1972
М - 1973
П - 1974
А - 1975
Д - 1976
Г - 1977
Б - 1978
Б - 1979
С - 1980
Я - 1981
К - 1982
Ф - 1983
В - 1984
Я - 1985
Х - 1986
Ц - 1987
Е - 1988
Т - 1989
Ж - 1990
Ш - 1991
Е - 1992
Ю - 1993
Ш - 1994
Ч - 1995
2Л - 1996
2П - 1997
2Ч - 1998
2П - 1999
2М - 2000
2А - 2001
2Д - 2002
2Г - 2003
25 - 2004
2Б - 2005
2У - 2006
2И - 2007
2Х - 2008
2С - 2009
2Э - 2010
2Т - 2011
2Ж - 2012
2Ш - 2013

MUTTA: voidaanko olettaa että sama logiikka jatkuisi näin (eli vaihdetaan numero kyrillisen kirjaimen eteen):

2Е - 2014
2Ю - 2015
2Ш - 2016
2Ч - 2017
3Л - 2018
3П - 2019
3Ч - 2020
3П - 2021
3М - 2022
3А - 2023
3Д - 2024
3Г - 2025
35 - 2026
3Б - 2027
3У - 2028
3И - 2029
3Х - 2030
3С - 2031
3Э - 2032
3Т - 2033
3Ж - 2034
3Ш - 2035

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Lisäksi häneltä kysyttiin näin: Do you know factory markings for the other Soviet tank factories (Chelyabinsk, Leningrad, Kharkov, Omsk)? I assume this coding system is Soviet legacy.

Johon hän vastasi näin: LÄHDE

Yes it's Soviet legacy

АТ - Chelyabinsk
БТ - Leningrad
ВТ - Nizhni Tagil
ГТ - Omsk
ЕТ - Kharkiv
ЖТ - Kurgan



Kuvan tekstien konekäännös:

Коды заводов:

АТ - Челябинский тракторный завод, Выксенский завод
БТ - Ленинградский Кировский завод
ВТ - Нижнетагильский вагоностроительный завод
ГТ - Омский машиностроительный завод
ДТ - Липецкий машиностроительный завод
ЕТ - Харьковский тепловозостроительный завод
ЖТ - Курганский машиностроительный завод
ИТ - Завод "Баррикады" или Ижорский завод
КТ - Челябинский завод дизельных двигателей
ЛТ - Заволжский машиностроительный завод (Арзамас)
МТ - Челябинский завод № 200
НТ - Калининградский оптический завод или завод в г. Киржач
ПТ - Минский тракторный завод
РТ - Рубцовский машиностроительный завод
ТТ - Муромский машиностроительный завод
ШТ - Завод "Уралтрансмаш"
ЭТ - Волгоградский тракторный завод
УТ - Курганский завод колесных тягачей
ЮТ - Мелитопольский металлургический завод
ЯТ - Загорский оптико-механический завод

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Factory codes:

АТ - Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, Vyksensky Plant
БТ - Leningrad Kirov Plant
ВТ - Nizhny Tagil Carriage Works
ГТ - Omsk Machine-Building Plant
ДТ - Lipetsk Machine-Building Plant
ЕТ - Kharkov Diesel Locomotive Plant
ЖТ - Kurgan Machine-Building Plant
ИТ - Plant "Barricades" or Izhora plant
КТ - Chelyabinsk Diesel Engine Plant
ЛТ - Zavolzhsky Machine-Building Plant (Arzamas)
МТ - Chelyabinsk plant No. 200
НТ - Kaliningrad optical plant or plant in Kirzhach
ПТ - Minsk Tractor Plant
РТ - Rubtsovsky Machine-Building Plant
ТТ - Murom Machine-Building Plant
ШТ - Uraltransmash Plant
ЭТ - Volgograd Tractor Plant
УТ - Kurgan Wheel Tractor Plant
ЮТ - Melitopol Metallurgical Plant
ЯТ - Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant

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MUOKKAUS: löysin yhden ehdotuksen / tiedon sille miten panssarivaunun toinen ns. korjausnumero tulisi tulkita, katso linkitetyn ketjun viesti numero 108 (alla viestin tekstin konekäännös, viesti julkaistu 29.8.2021): LÄHDE

Ремонтный номер - первый ремонт, Уралвагонзавод, февраль 2021.

Repair number - first repair, Uralvagonzavod, February 2021.

ELI oletan että tarkoitetaan näin:

1Р5Л02ВТ

1 - stands for first repair
02 - stands for the month (february)
ВТ - stands for the "The Nizhny Tagil Wagon Factory", or just the UVZ (Нижнетагильский вагоностроительный завод)

Täten näiden merkkien Р5Л tulisi siis kertoa korjauksen / modernisoinnin vuosi, viestin kirjoittajan mukaan 2021.

Kenties kaksi ensimmäistä merkkiä eli 1Р tarkoittavat "first repair"? Tällöin 5Л tarkoittaisi korjauksen vuotta.

HUOM: on tietysti mahdollista että hän ei tiedä mistä puhuu ja yrittää vain vääntää vanhan koodiavaimen tähän uuteen sopivaksi?

Häneltä kysyttiin näin ketjun viestissä numero 111:

Спасибо. То есть 5Л - 2021 г. ? Я думал 2021 г. - 2Ч.

Thank you. That is, 5Л - 2021? I thought 2021 - 2Ч.

Lisäksi toinen käyttäjä kirjoitti ketjun viestissä numero 126 kuvitelleensa samaa eli että 2Ч tarkoittaisi vuotta 2021.

Alkuperäinen kirjoittaja ei vastannut mitään tähän ketjuun eli ei täsmentänyt, mitä tarkoitti.

Kenties korjausten / modernisointien koodistossa käytetään eri merkkejä vuosiluvun osalta kuin mitä panssarivaunujen uustuotannossa? Merkintävirhe on tietysti yksi mahdollisuus, mutta pitäisi saada useampi kuin yksi vaunu ja sen sarjanumero tutkittavaksi jotta voisi olla varmempi oletuksissaan.

HUOM: Серийные номер = serial number (venäjänkielellä)

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HUOM: Dead district kommentoi tätä venäläisen foorumin spekulointia korjausnumerosta näin: LÄHDE

It can be correct,but I'm not sure.

How we can be sure that 5Л is 2021, it can be 2020.

5Л is year, 02 is month.

ВТ is UVZ.

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Why 1Р is the first repair? Tank is 27 years old.

That's why I have no idea what this is.

The old repair number is like that:

1 РК 87

1 - repair number (first repair)

РК - factory code

87 - year

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MUOKKAUS: Neuvostoliiton aikana oli käytössä useita eri sarjanumeroformaatteja, löysin niistä muutaman blogikirjoituksen:

OSA 1: https://tankist-31.livejournal.com/155814.html

OSA 2: https://tankist-31.livejournal.com/156922.html

OSA 3: https://tankist-31.livejournal.com/157533.html

Tämän perusteella vaikuttaa selvältä että sarjanumeroilla oli oma sekava järjestelmänsä ennen toista maailmansotaa ja sitä muutettiin sodan jälkeen. Tuorein järjestelmä otettiin käyttöön vuodesta 1970 alkaen, kuten tuossa yllä selitetään.

Muistan lukeneeni joskus tämän blogin kirjoituksia, tosin en tunnollisesti vaan yksittäisesti silloin tällöin.

Jos hakee hänen blogistaan sanoilla Серийные номера eli sarjanumero, löytyy useita mainintoja:

https://www.livejournal.com/rsearch?q=Серийные номера&sort=_score&journal=tankist_31&journalId=83419838&searchArea=post&es=31

Hän on kiertänyt museoita ja valokuvannut niissä ajoneuvoja sekä niiden sarjanumeroita, tosin valtaosa tuloksista näyttää käsittelevän T-34 vaunuja ja yleisemmin toisen maailmansodan aikaisia (ei yllätys, ne ovat yleisiä Venäjän museoissa).

Toisinaan kuitenkin on tuoreempia kylmän sodan aikaisia vaunuja.

 

[Antares]

Linkitin aikaisemmin tämän "Military history visualized" -Youtube-kanavan videon nimeltä "Where are Russia's T-80s?" LINKKI

Hyvää pohdintaa, mutta tämän ketjun kannalta mielenkiintoisin osuus on ihan videon lopussa, missä hän tuumailee löytämiensä kokonaisvalmistusmäärien suuria eroja. Näille ei ole selvää selitystä, mutta samoja arvauksia mitä tässäkin ketjussa on ollut. Haluan pureutua videoon tarkemmin myöhemmin, mutta käsittelen ensin yhtä sen kommenteista.

Videon kommenteissa ei ole suuremmin pohdittu tätä erikoista kokonaismäärien poikkeamaa, minkä luulisi herättävän kovasti keskustelua: eri lähteiden kesken on yli 2 000 vaunun ero.

Siellä oli kuitenkin yksi kommentti, jossa ei ole tietysti kerrottu lähteitä (tämä on toki tyypillistä internetissä eikä kannata odottaa parempaa Youtube-videon kommenteilta), mutta poimin silti numerot tähän koska siinä on mielenkiintoinen poikkeama.

Tarkoitan käyttäjän "Filip MiSko" kommenttia, jonka lainaan alle kokonaisuudessaan:

i found this nambers of t80 produktion. erial production in Omsk (modifications T-80B and BV):

1978 - 3 pieces
1979 - 60 pieces
1980 - 90 pieces
1981 - 208 pieces
1982 - 320 pieces
1983 - 440 pieces
1984 - 570 pieces (including 26 command ones, before that command ones were not issued)
1985 - 610 pieces (including 33 command)
1986 - 620 pieces (including 67 command)
1987 - 685 pieces (including 30 command)
1988 - 740 pieces (including 40 command)
1989 - 510 pieces (including 30 command) + 50 pieces of T-80U in Leningrad (LKZ)
1990 - 460 pieces (including 30 command)
1991 - 75 pieces of T-80BV. + 150 pieces of T-80U.

Further only T-80U.
1992 - 5 pieces (Omsk);
1993 - 65 units (Omsk);
1994 - 92 pieces (Omsk);
1995 - 51 pieces (Omsk);
1996 - 18 pieces (Omsk).

(plus another 45 * T-80U made in Kharkov).

In total, excluding Kharkov and experimental early machines (T-80), which were made in small batches in Leningrad, 5391 T-80B and BV and 431 T-80U were manufactured.

T-64(A, B, BV) - 13,100 pcs.
T-72 of all modifications, only for the USSR (until 1990) - 17,831.

In total, 35,872 T-64, T-72, T-80 of all modifications + 200 T-80U and about 700 T-80UD were produced in 1991.

T-80U / UD in Kharkov:
1983 - 10 T-80U units (December).
1985 - 30 units T-80U + 5 units T-80UD.
further only UD.
1986 - 45-47 units
1987 - 75 units
1988 - 125 units
1989 -150 units
1990 - 170 units
1991 - 100 units
1992 - 43 units

A total of 40 T-80U units and 715 T-80UD units.

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Puran hänen kommenttinsa numerot järjestyksessä ylhäältä alaspäin, yksi oleellinen kokonaisuus kerrallaan.

Omskin T-80B ja T-80BV tuotantoa (sekä komentovaunut) koskevat numerot ovat selvästi Омский завод транспортного машиностроения (julkaistu vuonna 2018) kirjan sivulta 100 löytyvästä taulukosta (näiden vaunutyyppien vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1978-1990).

Omskin T-80BV ja T-80U vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1991-1996 ovat myös hyvin selvästi samasta kirjasta, taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 108.

Jaoin nämä taulukot aikaisemmin tässä ketjussa. LINKKI

"Filip MiSko" kommentti ei mainitse sanallakaan Leningradin tehtaan T-80 / T-80B / T-80BV tuotantoa, mutta hän mainitsee tehtaan valmistamiksi 50 kpl T-80U vaunua vuonna 1989. Sinänsä kommentti ei siis ole väärin, koska siinä kirjoitetaan Omskin tehtaan T-80 vaunujen tuotannosta, mutta oletan että hän ei ole nähnyt 100 лет российского танкостроения (julkaistu vuonna 2020) kirjan taulukkoa (LINKKI) jossa kerrotaan (väitetysti) Leningradin tehtaan T-80 perheen vaunujen tuotanto aikavälillä 1976-1989. Näiden vuosien summa on taulukon mukaan 1 135 kpl. Maininta LKZ:n 50 kpl T-80U tuotannosta vuonna 1991 löytyy kirjasta Омский завод транспортного машиностроения (julkaistu vuonna 2018) joka on selvästi yksi hänen tärkeimpiä lähteitään:

True, it was not possible to deploy the serial production of the T-80U until the end of the 1980s. Only in Leningrad in 1989, 50 machines were built - and even then with an old gas turbine engine with a power of 1100 hp. In Omsk, the new machine was mastered only in 1991 [12].

Takaisin kommentin pureksintaan.

Tämä seuraava kohta on mysteeri: (plus another 45 * T-80U made in Kharkov).

MUTTA asia on selvä, jos lukee hänen kommenttinsa loppuun asti: hänen mukaansa Kharkovan tehdas valmis 10 kpl T-80U vaunuja vuonna 1983 ja 30 kpl vuonna 1985. Mistä hän saa summaan +5 kpl, vaikea sanoa. Ehkä kirjoitusvirhe, ehkä tarkoittaa "sarjatuotantoa edeltäneitä prototyyppivaunuja"?

Omskin T-80 vaunujen tuotannon kokonaismäärät täsmäävät, ei yllätyksiä tässä.

Nämä seuraavat kokonaismäärät ovat eri taulukosta:

T-64(A, B, BV) - 13,100 pcs.
T-72 of all modifications, only for the USSR (until 1990) - 17,831.

Sama data on jaettu taulukon muodossa parikin kertaa tässä ketjussa: LINKKI 1, LINKKI

Taulukko löytyy kirjasta nimeltä Уральский вагоностроительный завод. 80 лет (julkaistu vuonna 2016) sivulta 77.

HUOM: huvittavasti kummassakin linkkien takana jaetussa taulukossa on laskettu väärin T-64A / T-64B ja T-80 summat, pitäisi lukea 13 108 kpl T-64A / T-64B osalta ja 7 066 kpl T-80 osalta. Rivien tiedot on oikein mutta summat merkitty väärin näille kahdelle. T-72 osalta summat ovat oikein.

Steve Zalogan kirjasta "T-90 standard tank: the first tank of the new Russia" (kirja julkaistu 20.2.2018) sivulta 5 löytyy muuten sama taulukko MUTTA siinä ei ole eritelty Neuvostoliiton asevoimille toimitettuja vaunuja ja suoraan vientiin valmistettuja - tämä erottelu löytyy ylempää linkitetyistä taulukoista.

HUOM: "Filip MiSko" kirjoittaa T-64(A, B, BV) - 13,100 pcs. kun taas jakamieni taulukkojen mukaan summan pitäisi olla 13 108 kpl. Liekö käynyt pyöristysvirhe?

Tämän jälkeen hän kirjoittaa kokonaismääristä yleisesti, ei mitään erikoista tässä.

MUTTA tätä seuraa mielenkiintoisin osuus:

T-80U / UD in Kharkov:
1983 - 10 T-80U units (December).
1985 - 30 units T-80U + 5 units T-80UD.
further only UD.
1986 - 45-47 units
1987 - 75 units
1988 - 125 units
1989 -150 units
1990 - 170 units
1991 - 100 units
1992 - 43 units

A total of 40 T-80U units and 715 T-80UD units.

Jaoin aikaisemmassa viestissä (LINKKI) taulukon kirjasta nimeltä 100 лет российского танкостроения (julkaistu vuonna 2020). Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 239.

Siinä taulukossa on hieman eroja yllä kerrottuihin määriin verrattuna. Kirjan taulukon mukaan Kharkovan tehtaan T-80UD tuotanto olisi alkanut vasta vuonna 1986. Kirjan taulukossa vuosien 1986 ja 1987 valmistusmäärät ovat eri suuruiset kuin "Filip MiSko" kommentissa, tosin vuosien 1988, 1989 ja 1990 osalta ne ovat samat. Kirjan taulukon mukaiset vuosituotantomäärät:

1986: 50
1987: 55
1988: 125
1989: 150
1990: 170

Toisaalta kirjan 100 лет российского танкостроения (julkaistu vuonna 2020) taulukossa kirjoitetaan ainoastaan T-80UD tuotannosta joten sinänsä ei ole väärin jos Kharkovan valmistamat T-80U vaunut jäävät mainitsematta JA jos puristaa "Filip MiSko" kommentissa 5 kpl vuodelta 1985 vuoden 1986 valmistusmäärän kanssa samaan pakettiin (5 + 45 tai 5 + 47), niin saadaan suunnilleen sama numero kuin kirjan taulukossa vuonna 1986: 50-52 kpl.

MUTTA vuosi 1987 on selvästi poikkeava: 55 kpl vs. 75 kpl

Voisiko olla kirjoitusvirhe? Tai käännösvirhe? Toisaalta tuntuisi että 75 kpl edustaisi luonnollisempaa kasvua: vajaa 50 --> 75 --> 125, kuin 50 --> 55 --> 125.

HUOM: ei pidä koskaan sotkea logiikkaa näihin, meillä on nämä numerot ja sillä hyvä.

Toisaalta kirjassa jaettu taulukko päättyy vuoteen 1990 mutta "Filip MiSko" tietää kertoa numerot myös vuosille 1991 ja 1992. Nämä voivat olla poimintoja muista lähteistä, esim. seuraava lainaus on Steve Zalogan kirjasta "T-80 standard tank - Soviet armys last champion" (kirja julkaistu 17.2.2009):

The Kharkov plant in newly independent Ukraine attempted to keep T-80 production alive there, but suffered from some unique problems. About 70 percent of the T-80UD came from plants outside Ukraine, mainly Russia. Production was 800 combat vehicles in 1991, but only 43 in 1992 and none in 1993 as the supply of components dried up.

Vaan mistä vuoden 1991 numero on peräisin? Samaan tapaan poimittu jostain muusta lähteestä? Yritin aikaisemmassa viestissä yhdistellä eri lähteitä ja laskea vuoden 1991 tuotantomäärää, mutta tulokseksi tuli aivan liian suurelta kuulostava 250 kpl. LINKKI

Hyvä osoitus taas siitä että logiikan käyttö aukkojen täyttämiseen johtaa useimmiten vääriin tuloksiin. Ei myöskään voi koskaan olla varma, pitääkö jokin kirjoitus ottaa 100% todesta, kuten viestissä lainattu Steve Zalogan kirjoittama: The Kharkov tank plant, long considered the premier Soviet tank design and production center, had produced 800 T-80UD tanks in 1991. Tämän numeron käyttäminen yhdessä muiden lähteiden kanssa johti siihen että vuoden 1991 valmistusmääräksi voi laskea tuon 250 kpl. JOS todellinen määrä olisikin "Filip MiSko" kommentin mukainen 100 kpl, virhe olisi huomattavan suuri (100 vs 250).

Kharkovan tehtaan T-80U / T-80UD vuosituotantomäärien lähde on toistaiseksi mysteeri. Linkitin lähteet jotka antavat osittain samat numerot, mutta ei kuitenkaan täysin samoja. Onko "Filip MiSko" kommentissa sitten lainattu jotain toista kirjallista lähdettä? Selvästi tämä voi olla jostain alan kirjallisuudesta TAI tullut muuten vain vastaan jossain keskustelupalstalla / blogissa. En ihmettelisi, jos ukrainalaiset olisivat olleet rennompia näiden tuotantomäärien numeroiden jakamisen osalta ja siten ne olisivat olleet tiedossa jo pidempään (jos on asioinut oikeilla foorumeilla), mutta jos muisti ei petä pahasti, en muista nähneeni näitä numeroita koskaan aikaisemmin.

"Filip MiSko" kommentissa ei kerrota tuotantomääriä vuoden 1992 jälkeiselle ajalle mutta arvatenkin 1990-luku oli synkkää aikaa myös Kharkovan tehtaan osalta. Panssarivaunujen valmistus oli usean komponentin osalta riippuvainen Venäjällä sijaitsevista tehtaista ja kun maiden tiet erkanivat, nämä logistiikkaketjut katkesivat. Toki Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen myötä panssarivaunujen ostaja hävisi myös eikä itsenäistyneellä Ukrainalla ollut rahaa saati tarvetta ylläpitää panssarivaunutuotantoa. Kharkovan tehtaan kohtalo oli pitkälti sama kuin Omskilla eli hakivat raivokkaasti vientikauppoja 1990- ja 2000-luvun alussa mutta onnistumiset olivat lopulta aika vähäisiä. Kokivat sitten hitaan kuoleman ja menettivät pala kerrallaan eri kykyjä mitä vaunun valmistamisessa tarvitaan (tornin valaminen, moottorin valmistus jne.). Venäjällä oli pitkälti sama tilanne myös UVZ:n osalta, mutta muutama suurempi vientikauppa pitivät heidät pinnalla. Samoin Venäjän valtion kassan toipuminen ja armeijan modernisointi noin vuodesta 2012 alkaen pitivät tehtaan toiminnassa, joskaan ei läheskään siinä laajuudessa kuin mitä se oli Neuvostoliiton aikaan.

Makustelin aikaisemmassa viestissäni "Military history visualized" -Youtube-kanavan videon nimeltä "Where are Russia's T-80s?" kommenttia, jonka oli jättänyt käyttäjä nimeltä "Filip MiSko".

Hän kirjoitti Kharkovan tehtaan T-80U / T-80UD vuosituotannosta näin:

T-80U / UD in Kharkov:
1983 - 10 T-80U units (December).
1985 - 30 units T-80U + 5 units T-80UD.
further only UD.
1986 - 45-47 units
1987 - 75 units
1988 - 125 units
1989 -150 units
1990 - 170 units
1991 - 100 units
1992 - 43 units

A total of 40 T-80U units and 715 T-80UD units.

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Toiset lähteet antavat suunnilleen samansuuruiset vuosituotantomäärät aikavälille 1986-1990, mutta en ole löytänyt sellaisia jotka kertoisivat Kharkovan tehtaan T-80U tuotannosta jonka väitetään tapahtuneen ennen T-80UD vaunujen sarjatuotannon alkamista.

Luin pitkästä aikaa tankist_31 nimimerkin blogia ja sieltä löytyi artikkeli jossa hän vertailee T-80U, T-80UD ja T-80BV vaunujen ulkoisia tunnusmerkkejä keskenään (LÄHDE). Artikkeli on siis pääasiassa kuvia ja niistä tehtyjä havaintoja, mutta siellä on myös tällainen tekstiosuus (artikkeli julkaistu 23.11.2020 - alleviivaus minun):

Last time we finished looking at the differences between the T-80BV tanks.

Now we move on to modifications of UD and U, as well as their derivatives. Let's start with T80UD. Let’s conditionally divide these cars into early and late ones.

Early vehicles were equipped with the Kontakt-1 NDZ, had a turret of a different design and looked something like this. (katso kuvat blogista)

The main difference between the tanks of the UD modification is the diesel engine and corresponding changes in the mechanical equipment.

But here, too, everything is not so simple. The fact is that at the Kharkov plant, from December 83 to December 85, a small batch (different sources give different numbers - from 33 to 60 vehicles) of Object-219A tanks with a gas turbine engine was produced. That is, the result was a hybrid that looked like the early T-80UD, but had a gas turbine engine and the corresponding mechanical equipment.

And it would be possible not to mention this modification, because they made very few of them, but there is one thing...

In the second hangar of Kubinka there is just such a machine (presumably serial number У12ЕТ41008 - December 1984).







Another car was preserved in Saratov, but it was subsequently redesigned several times and therefore there will be a separate story about it.



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Valitettavasti hän ei kerro tarkemmin, mikä lähde antaa minkäkin tuotantomäärän Kharkovan valmistamille T-80U vaunuille.

Artikkelin lopussa hän tarjoaa tällaisen linkin: http://www.russianarms.ru/forum/index.php/board,545.0.html

Valitettavasti tämä ei avaa mitään viestiketjua.

Filip MiSko kertoi määriksi näin:

1983 - 10 T-80U units (December).
1985 - 30 units T-80U + 5 units T-80UD.

Hänen lähteensä mukaan vaunuja olisi siis valmistettu yhteensä 40 kpl aikavälillä 1983-1985, tosin ei yhtäkään vuonna 1984 mikä olisi outoa. Toki tämä voisi selittyä sillä että valmistivat ensin 10 kpl testeihin, jotka tehtiin valtaosaksi vuoden 1984 aikana. Positiivisten tulosten jälkeen valmistettiin noin panssarivaunupataljoonan verran vaunuja vuonna 1985. Tämä on vain yksi selitys sille, miksi yksi vuosi olisi hypätty yli.

tankist-31 puolestaan antoi tällaisen vaihteluvälin:

The fact is that at the Kharkov plant, from December 83 to December 85, a small batch (different sources give different numbers - from 33 to 60 vehicles) of Object-219A tanks with a gas turbine engine was produced

HUOM: on kenties hieman väärin puhua näistä vaunuista "T-80U" merkinnällä, koska niistä puuttui mm. Kontakt-5 ERA-panssarointi. Niillä varustettuja vaunuja kutsutaan nimellä Object-219AS eli S-kirjain lisätty perään.

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Artikkelin kommenteissa oli myös viihdyttävää keskustelua T-80UE-1 vaunuista, nimimerkitön käyttäjä kirjoitti näin:

In general, not all 219A objects had closed protection devices, there were vehicles with plugs in place of the protection protection system and pins like on the T-80U, such as the car from Saratov or like this car.



T-80UE-1 is a T-80BV chassis with a T-80UD turret and there was one tank with an LP-1 searchlight and a Buran-M sight

Johon Pavel Lusta nimimerkki vastasi näin:

Judging by the serial numbers, the T-80UE-1 is also based on the T-80U hulls. I filmed five of these myself.

tankist_31 vastasi alkuperäiseen kommenttiin näin:

I think that initially all 219A were with closed control valves. Later, some of the Object-219A tanks were converted into command tanks. They were already going as Object-630A. This is exactly the car in your photos in Saratov. That is, the alteration took place after graduation. Another interesting thing is that the command vehicle that you showed above (serial number И12ЕТ41036) and the tank from Saratov (И12ЕТ41038) were at the same time in Kubinka. Perhaps they were converted there (which is unlikely), or they were tested there.

Johon kr_ts vastasi näin:

And this cannot be about. 219A produced by LKZ?

Johon tankist_31 vastasi näin:

I made a mistake in my entry. Object-219A was developed by the Kirov plant, they were also produced there. And those cars that were made in Kharkov were designated Object-219AS (T-80U). In the video there are Leningrad cars.

Johon nimimerkitön käyttäjä vastasi näin:

Object 219AS are only vehicles with VDZ Kontakt-5.
Object 219A was developed by SKB-2 LKZ, but the chassis was worked on there, and the BO was initially developed in Kharkov. In Kharkov, they released an installation batch of T-80U (still object 219A), a battalion set (either 31 - TB MSP, or 45 vehicles - TB TP) for military testing. They all scattered across training grounds and armored personnel carriers; as of 2019, there were still about 15 units in different organizations. Then Kharkov was able to push through the diesel version, and the topic of the T-80U hung until 1989, when they finally began mass production of the 219AS with VDZ Kontakt-5 in homeopathic quantities.

armor_kiev_ua niminen käyttäjä vastasi tankist_31 kommenttiin näin:

The batch released in Kharkov was also designated 219A.

There is such a car in Kubinka.

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Nimimerkitön käyttäjä kirjoittaa että Kharkovassa olisi valmistettu yhden panssarivaunupataljoonan verran Object-219A / T-80U vaunuja ennen kuin aloittivat T-80UD sarjatuotannon. Hänen kommenttinsa mukaan T-80U tuotantomäärä voisi siis olla joko 31 tai 45 panssarivaunua. Vaunut valmistettiin armeijan testejä varten ja hajaantuivat niiden jälkeen pitkin ja poikin Neuvostoliittoa. Hänen mukaansa vuonna 2019 näitä olisi ollut ainakin 15 kpl eri organisaatioiden hallinnassa.

Samassa viestissä hän vahvistaa sen mitä muista lähteistä on nähtävissä eli T-80U sarjatuotanto alkoi tämän ns. esisarjan jälkeen vasta vuonna 1989. Muut lähteet kertovat että LKZ valmisti tällöin 50 kpl T-80U vaunuja. Omsk puolestaan valmisti ensimmäiset T-80U vaunut vasta vuonna 1991.

Toki se että nimimerkitön käyttäjä kirjoittaa näin internetissä ei tarkoita että hänellä olisi aiheesta uutta tai henkilökohtaista tietoa. Kenties hän on vain lukenut ne samat kirjat joista minä olen lainannut pätkiä tähän ketjuun.

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Kuinka monta T-80UE-1 vaunua on valmistettu? Kirjoitin aikaisemmassa viestissäni että 10 kpl vaikuttaisi olevan varma määrä mutta valmistettiinko enemmän, siitä en ole onnistunut löytämään tietoa. JOS valmistettiin enemmän, niin olisi loogista että määrä olisi joko numeron 10 monikerta tai sitten 31 kpl eli panssarivaunupataljoonan vaunumäärä.

JOS Pavel Lusta on oikeassa, niin hänen mukaansa näistä ainakin viidessä on T-80U panssarivaunun runko.

Useammin kuulee väitteitä että näissä olisi T-80B tai T-80BV vaunun runko jonka päälle on asennettu T-80UD vaunusta otettu torni. Lisäksi tehty muuta modernisointia, tosin ei liian paljon koska kyseessä on 2000-luvun alun modernisointi eikä Venäjällä ollut silloin ylenmäärin rahaa panssarivaunujen modernisointiin (kuten saman ikäpolven T-72BA modernisoinnista nähdään).

 

[Antares]

Panssarivaunuista paljon tietävä Chung-Tzu kertoi arvionsa Ukrainan varastovaunujen määrästä (aihioiden määrä toki, koska kaikki eivät välttämättä ole aktivoitavissa - sama juttu kuin ryssällä siis):

Still relying on The Military Balance, are we?

It's also complete bullshit.

(seuraavan tekstin lähde: LÄHDE - kirja nimeltä Основной боевой Т-64 танк - 50 лет в строю - sivulta 142)





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(seuraavan tekstin lähde: LÄHDE)




I can tell you what they officially had in service at the start of the war: 723 (85 of which were Bulats)

1574 - 40 export - 723 in service would leave around 800 in storage/training at the start of 2014.

Officially acknowledged permanent losses (2014-2016): 79. LostArmour claims: 169 destroyed + 22 captured.

So the reserve of tanks left would be between 600-700.

Some of the losses were probably T-64As, known to have been used in combat, as well as T-72s, which began appearing at the end of 2014.

T-64A and T-64B are mostly identical hull-wise, so that would include another 750-800 hulls that can potentially be reused

https://twitter.com/x/status/1761121845535793543

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Hän selventää näkemystään Military Balancen osalta, häneltä kysyttiin näin: Tzu this is in your wheelhouse how far off is Military Balance?

Johon Chung-Tzu vastasi näin: In storage, we can estimate based on losses + pre-2014 figures: ~600-800 T-64Bs, 800 T-64As, 400 T-72s in storage = 1,800-2,000, some of which have been returned to service since 2014

Johon alkuperäinen kommentoija vastasi näin: Thanks I know Military Balance is a lazy man's tool, that has no basis in reality.

Johon Chung-Tzu vastasi näin: They're mostly just guessing, which is as good as it gets for somewhere like Somalia, but for some countries like Ukraine or Russia there is enough information out there if you are willing to look.

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Lainasin tässä ketjussa aikaisemmassa viestissä (LINKKI) parin muun lähteen numeroita T-64 vaunujen osalta.

Kirjoitin siinä näin Ukrainalle jääneistä vaunuista:

Yhden lähteen mukaan Ukrainalle jääneet vaunut olivat, tosin CFE ilmoitusten perusteella T-80 vaunuja olisi ollut 350 kpl vuonna 1992. Tämän lisäksi alla olevasta taulukosta puuttuvat T-54 ja/tai T-55 vaunut, joita heillä oli myös "jokin määrä", arvatenkin useita satoja ellei jopa yli tuhat. Military Balancen mukaan heillä olisi ollut jo pitkään 112 kpl T-55 vaunuja, vanhin julkaisu jossa tämä mainitaan on vuodelta 2004 (vanhin julkaisu, johon minulla on pääsy):



Minulla ei ole tälle lähdettä, vaan nämä numerot ovat tulleet joskus vastaan internettiä selatessa.

Otin ne tietysti talteen, koska kenties ovat oikein, kenties eivät.

Mikäli näille löytyy lähde, laitan sen tietysti jakoon.

Yllä olevan "minun taulukon" T-64 perheen vaunujen numeroiden lähde löytyi (lainaus sivulta, konekäännös englanniksi - artikkeli julkaistu 19.4.2017 ja sen on kirjoittanut ukrainalainen historioitsija Mikhail Zhirokhov): LÄHDE

After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine inherited a rich tank heritage - about 4,000 tanks of three types: T-72, T-64 and T-80. These included 227 T-64R, 539 T-64A, 539 T-64B1, 507 T-64B and 528 T-64BV.

Kuten nähdään, "minun taulukossa" on virhe: siinä lukee vasemman reunan sarakkeessa "T-64" kun lähteen mukaan pitäisi lukea "T-64R" eli alkuperäisen Obyekt 432 / T-64 vaunun myöhempi "modernisaatio".

Lisäksi jos lukee ukrainalaisen historioitsija Mikhail Zhirokhov T-80 panssarivaunuja käsittelevän artikkelin, siellä kirjoitetaan näin (artikkeli julkaistu 31.05.2017): LÄHDE

At the end of 1991, in the European part of the USSR there were 4839 T-80 tanks of all modifications, of which Ukraine received only 248. Moreover, only 60 T-80UD, the rest - modifications T-80, T-80B and T-80BV.

Eli "minun taulukossa" on virhe T-80 vaunujen määrän osalta, siinä lukee 200 kpl kun taas alkuperäinen lähde sanoo 248 kpl.

Mikhail Zhirokhov on myös kirjoittanut artikkelin T-55 vaunuista Ukrainassa, siellä kirjoitetaan näin (artikkeli julkaistu 24.4.2020): LÄHDE

After the collapse of the USSR, about 4 thousand tanks of several models remained on the territory of Ukraine. However, only the T-64 of various modifications were officially accepted into service. All the rest immediately went into storage, and not only frankly outdated models, but also modern (even by today's standards) T-72 and T-80. Our story today is about outdated cars and their fate.

So, in units of the Soviet Army (primarily training units) in 1991 there were 168 T-55 tanks , and an even larger number were in storage.

ELI hänen mukaansa Ukraina peri 168 kpl T-55 vaunuja jotka olivat pääasiassa erilaisten koulutusyksikköjen käytössä sekä "kyseistä määrää suuremman määrän" T-55 vaunuja jotka olivat varastoissa. Hän ei kuitenkaan tarkenna, kuinka suuresta määrästä on kyse.

Artikkelin sävy kertoo että hänen mielestään ja kenties myös Ukrainan armeijan mielestä T-55 vaunut olivat vanhentuneita jo Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen hetkellä ja mainitaan muutama ulkomaan vientikauppa:

Despite their obsolescence, the cars were (and still are) very popular in Asia and Africa. The reason is cheapness. So Ukrainian officials began to quite actively sell off the T-55 fleet . From 2007 to 2016 alone, 110 tanks were sold - 50 to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 60 to Sudan.

T-72 vaunuja käsittelevässä artikkelissa hän kirjoitti Ukrainan vientikaupasta näin (artikkeli julkaistu 29.09.2017): LÄHDE

There is no complete data on export deliveries, but it is known, for example, that in 2005–2011 alone, 487 tanks were sold, which amounts to 79 percent of the total volume of tank deliveries from Ukraine. There were deliveries after 2011, and the total number of cars sold is usually estimated at 870 units.

Nämä kaksi yhdessä eivät toki selitä, mikä määrä T-55 vaunuja heillä oli alunperin ja mitä niille tapahtui. Selvästikin yrittivät myydä niitä, mutta niin yritti moni muukin maa 1990-luvulla ja 2000-luvun alussa, koska näitä vaunuja valmistettiin suuri määrä ja moni maa sai niitä perinnöksi.

Toki jos vaunuja ei saada myytyä kokonaisina, niiden kannibalisointi ja myynti varaosina on yksi vaihtoehto.

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Joka tapauksessa yllä lainatussa Chung-Tzu tekstissä kerrotaan että Ukrainalle olisi jäänyt Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen seuraava määrä vaunuja (ne vaunuperheet jotka mainitaan ko. lainauksissa):

T-64B, T-64B1 ja T-64BV = 1 574 kpl
T-64 perheen vaunuja yhteensä = 2 340 kpl

T-72A ja T-72B1 = 1269 kpl
T-72B = 40 kpl

Minun yllä olevasta taulukosta voidaan laskea:

T-64B + T-64B1 + T-64BV = 507 + 539 + 528 = 1 574 kpl

T-64 perheen vaunuja yhteensä = T-64 + T-64A + T-64B + T-64B1 + T-64BV = 227 + 539 + 507 + 539 + 528 =2 340 kpl

ELI minun taulukon numerot täsmäävät Chung-Tzu lainaaman lähteen tietojen kanssa, tosin minun taulukossa on tarkempi jaottelu. Eivät täsmää ihan 100% T-72 osalta koska Chung-Tzu lähteen summa on 1 309 kpl ja minun taulukossa se on 1 300 kpl - mutta hyvin lähellä joka tapauksessa.

Kenties minun taulukkoni tiedot ovat siis oikein, tai kenties tämä on vain sattumaa?

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MUOKKAUS: Chung-Tzu kommentoi taulukkoani seuraavasti:

The 226 inherited seems a bit high to me, but I have nothing on that LÄHDE

1309 T-72A/B1/B + unknown number of 1st gen T-72 Urals LÄHDE

It's probably not that far off. Closer than TMB at least. LÄHDE

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Chung-Tzu kommentoi lähteen löytymisen jälkeen näin:

200+ is still a bit high for T-64R LÄHDE

Also not clear whether his other numbers include storage or not LÄHDE

Niin tai näin, hyvä että taulukon numeroille löytyi lähde.

 

[Antares]

Yksi edellisen viestin lähteistä oli tämä artikkeli, joka käsittelee T-72 vaunuja Ukrainan armeijan palveluksessa Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen.

Tässä artikkelin tekstin konekäännös englanniksi (artikkeli julkaistu 29.9.2017 eli kolme ja puoli vuotta Krimin valtaamisen ja itäisen Ukrainan "levottomuuksien" alkamisen jälkeen)

https://fraza.com/analytics/262941-ukrainskij-arsenal-t-72-

Ukrainian Arsenal: T-72

Author: Mikhail Zhirokhov “Fr az a” Historian
29.09.17
09:32
29991

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine decided to keep only one type of tank in service - the T-64, the production and repair of which was carried out in Kharkov. And the available 1269 T-72A and B1 and 40 T-72B were sent to storage bases, from where they began to be sold en masse.

There is no complete data on export deliveries, but it is known, for example, that in 2005–2011 alone, 487 tanks were sold, which amounts to 79 percent of the total volume of tank deliveries from Ukraine. There were deliveries after 2011, and the total number of cars sold is usually estimated at 870 units.

Such a fairly high popularity of T-72 tanks in the world can be explained quite simply: vehicles of this type are one of the main mass-produced battle tanks of the second generation, which have proven themselves well in numerous local wars and are easy for personnel to master.



T-72 tanks were in storage in this state in the spring of 2014

At the time of the annexation of Crimea and the start of armed clashes in Donbass, the tank was not officially in service with the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In total, about two dozen T-72s were in training units - in Desna, at the Yavorovsky training ground, in Kharkov - to train mechanics-drivers of engineering vehicles based on the tank.

However, due to the deployment of new brigades and the loss of T-64 materiel, a large number of tanks were required. Therefore, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine decided to adopt the T-72 tank. This was announced in the fall of 2014

This was a necessary measure, since the T-72 tank is significantly inferior to the T-64 in terms of firepower, fire control system and armor protection, and the provision of spare parts and training for the crews of two essentially different tanks pose a huge logistical problem.

Therefore, the T-72s were not used in tank brigades, but were given to the “new” motorized infantry and motorized brigades, formed mainly on the basis of territorial defense battalions.



Training machines at the 169th training center of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry "Desna"

The T-72s did not have time to take an active part in the 2015 winter campaign due to their small numbers. In the history of the war in Donbass, there is only one combat episode left - the raid on Elenovka on January 25, 2015. Then one T-72 was lost due to a technical malfunction (you can read more here.

Over the next two years, the capacities of the Lvov Armored Plant and several smaller enterprises actively worked to restore the T-72 fleet.

The exact number of T-72 tanks in the army today is not known for certain: for obvious reasons, only a few figures appear in the media. Thus, we can confidently say that as of December 2015, the troops had 367 T-72 units (some of them needed major repairs). And this does not include tanks in the National Guard. Today these numbers are an order of magnitude higher.

As of the summer of 2017, mountain infantry brigades, as well as the 53rd mechanized and 57th motorized infantry brigades, are armed with T-72 tanks (mainly modifications of the AB). They are at the disposal of individual battalions, for example, “Aidar” and “Donbass-Ukraine”.

Throughout the entire period of Ukrainian independence, Ukrainian tank builders carried out export-oriented work on modernizing the T-72 fleet.



"Kiev" modification of the T-72 for Ethiopia - T-72UA1

Thus, Kharkov tank builders developed a whole line of modernization projects, which, alas, were never accepted as a basis in any known T-72 modernization program in the world.

Apparently, the first was the T-72AG, which was shown at the IDEX'97 exhibition (Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates) in 1997. This modernization option involved replacing the standard 780/840 hp engine. a new engine of the 6TD series, which was developed for the T-80UD/Oplot tanks. Moreover, there were two options: 6TD-1 with a power of 1000 hp. and 6TD-2 with a power of 1200 hp. The engines are interesting because they can run on different types of fuel (diesel, gasoline, kerosene, jet fuel, or a mixture of them in any proportion).

It was planned to install a satellite navigation system. To increase the level of protection on the T-72AG tank, additional armor modules were installed on the frontal parts of the hull and turret, built-in dynamic protection on the hull and turret, as well as side screens with high explosive protection in the front part of the hull. Also, the modernized T-72AG tank was equipped with a modern fire control system: instead of the TPD-K1 sight, there was a 1G46 sight; instead of the TPN-1 (TPN-3) night sight, there is a TO1-KO1E night gunner's complex with a TPN-4E sight. The new fire control system made it possible to use the Kombat tank guided projectile.

In order to increase the protection of the crew from weapons of mass destruction, the T-72AG tank was equipped with a collective protection system designed to seal the crew compartment, as well as a Varta optical-electronic anti-tank missile countermeasures system.

The future customer was also offered three weapon options to choose from: retaining the 125 mm 2A46 cannon, installing the domestic KBA-1 or a Western-made 120 mm cannon. A distinctive feature of the T-72AG was the presence of a closed-type anti-aircraft gun mounted on the commander's hatch.



T-72-120, August 2017, Kharkov © Facebook user Mykola Salamakha

The further development of the T-72AG was facilitated by a joint modernization project by Ukrainian, Czech and French designers of the T-72MP. The main difference was the installation of a Western-made fire control system: the commander's panoramic day sight VS/MVS 580 and the gunner's combined (day/night) sight SAVAN-15 with a built-in laser rangefinder and thermal imaging camera.

The tank's security was increased thanks to the installation of built-in and additional dynamic protection of a new generation. The T-72MP was also equipped with an optical-electronic protection system against infrared and laser-guided anti-tank guided missiles, similar to the Shtora-1 and Shtora-2 systems found on the Russian T-80U and T-90 tanks. The vehicle is also equipped with new fire extinguishing, diagnostic and communication systems.

The T-72AG variant, which was proposed for NATO countries (primarily Eastern European countries), was the T-72-120. The main difference was the installation of a 120-mm smoothbore gun for NATO ammunition. The weapon system is equipped with a new automatic loader located in the turret niche, similar to that installed on the French Leclerc tank. The transporter houses 22 unitary rounds, the remaining 20 are placed in a special niche in the rear of the fighting compartment. The fire control system, auxiliary weapons, power plant and protection of the T-72-120 are completely similar to the T-72AG tank.

Another cheap version of the T-72AG was supposed to be the T-72AMG, the main difference of which remained the original Soviet engine.



T-72 commissioned at the Lvov Armored Plant

The Kiev Armored Plant also offered its own modernization options. Thus, the people of Kiev managed to supply 40 T-72UA1 tanks to Ethiopia. This is a modernization of the T-72B1 with the installation of a Kharkov 5TDFMA-1 diesel engine instead of the B-84 and enhanced armor protection. Interestingly, two such vehicles reached the front in the winter of 2015, but quickly broke down as a result of poor operation and were sent back to the factory.

In August 2017, they also presented an option for modernizing T-72 tanks for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which was called T-72AMT. It is proposed to install on this tank Russian V-84-1 engines, a 12.7-mm anti-aircraft machine gun mount with remote control from the T-64BV tank, a dynamic protection complex modeled on the T-72UA tank only with partial use of elements of the "Knife" complex, leading wheels with tracks like T-80, etc.

The use of rather outdated observation devices of Russian or Belarusian production also looks ambiguous: the commander’s observation device TKN-3UM, the sight-guidance device 1K13-49 “Neman”, the driver’s night device TNK-72 or TVN-4BUP.

More or less standardized within the Armed Forces of Ukraine tank fleet is only the installation of radio equipment: radio stations of the Turkish company Aselsan and Lybid-K-2RB (actually Motorola assembled by the Kiev company Dolya and Co. Ltd.), as well as a set of navigation equipment GLONASS/GPS CH -3003 “Basalt” (produced by the State Enterprise “Orizon-Navigation”).

A serious advantage of this modification of the T-72 is the possibility of using the Kombat tank guided missile (TUR) developed and produced by the Kyiv State Design Bureau "Luch". The maximum firing range is 5 kilometers, the “Combat” covers this distance in 17.5 seconds, the total weight of the projectile is 33 kilograms.


(jätin tämän kuvan lainaamatta - katso se artikkelista: LINKKI)
One of the tanks of the National Guard of Ukraine with its own name “Behemoth”

The TUR control is semi-automatic using a laser beam: during the flight of a missile, it is not the target that is irradiated with a laser, but the missile itself - in fact, the laser beam shines into the “tail” of the missile and guides it to the target. This illumination method is good because the enemy has virtually no chance of interfering with the missile. At the end of the 1990s. Serial production of missiles was established, a limited batch entered service with the troops in 1999, and officially entered into service in 2006.

The number of missiles produced for the needs of the national armed forces is unknown: at least 50 missiles were purchased before the end of 2007; in 2008, $13 million was allocated for the purchase of a batch of missiles. Production resumed with the outbreak of the war in Donbass. In 2015 alone, 380 missiles were delivered to the troops, and procurement continues.

To date, there is no information about state tests of this modification. That is, we can say that for now there is no talk of adoption.


(jätin tämän kuvan lainaamatta - katso se artikkelista: LINKKI)
T-72AMT

Thus, we can safely say that the number of T-72 tanks in the Ukrainian Armed Forces will gradually increase. However, whether they will remain in service after the end of the active phase of hostilities is a big question, since maintaining three types of tanks at once (and in addition to the T-64 and T-72, the T-80 is also currently in service) is extremely expensive.

 

[Antares]

Aikaisempi viestini (LINKKI) on melkoinen tilkkutäkki lainauksia ristiin rastiin, joten korjasin "oman taulukkoni" jossa oli Ukrainan Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen väitetysti saavien panssarivaunujen määriä.

Numeroiden lähde on ukrainalainen historioitsija Mikhail Zhirokhov / Михаил Жирохов «Фраза» ja hänen julkaisemansa neljä artikkelia. JOS aihe kiinnostaa, kannattaa klikata artikkelissa hänen nimeään, jolloin saa 15 sivun verran vanhempia artikkeleita. Hän on julkaissut niitä Ukrainan käytössä olevasta kalustosta sekä Ukrainan sodan eri taisteluista (aikaväli 2014-2017 - en ole lukenut niitä kaikkia mutta tulee vaikutelma että painottuvat pääasiassa vuosiin 2014-2015 eli "aktiivisen vaiheen" osuuteen).

Suorat linkit lähteisiin:

T-55 = https://fraza.com/analytics/289209-t-55-tankovoe-nasledie-sssr (artikkeli julkaistu 24.4.2020)
T-64 = https://fraza.com/analytics/258890-ukrainskij-arsenal-tanki-t-64 (artikkeli julkaistu 19.4.2017)
T-72 = https://fraza.com/analytics/262941-ukrainskij-arsenal-t-72- (artikkeli julkaistu 29.09.2017)
T-80 = https://fraza.com/analytics/259840-ukrainskij-arsenal-t-80- (artikkeli julkaistu 31.05.2017)



Kuten nähdään, lähde ei kerro T-55 vaunujen tarkkaa määrää mutta sanavalinnan takia on pääteltävissä että niitä oli varastoituna enemmän kuin 168 kpl. Täten taulukkoon olisi voinut merkitä niiden määräksi 2 x 168 = 336 kpl mutta todellisuudessa niitä oli enemmän (kuten hänen sanavalinnoista voidaan päätellä - mutta kuinka paljon enemmän? Aavistus enemmän vai merkittävästi enemmän?). En halunnut alkaa sotkemaan taulukkoa enempää vaan käytin ne numerot, jotka hän antoi ja jätin kommentiksi hänen kirjoittamansa tekstin käännöksen.

Lisäksin myös ChungTzu nimimerkkiä käyttävän twitter-tilin kommentit, koska niissä voi olla perää. Hänen mukaansa T-72 perheen vaunujen määrästä puuttuvat ensimmäisen sukupolven T-72 Urals vaunut, joita jäi Ukrainalle "tuntematon määrä". Lisäksi hän kommentoi että yli 200 kpl T-64R vaunuja kuulostaa liian suurelta määrältä, tosin hänellä ei ole antaa parempia numeroita. Näiden lisäksi hän ei ole varma, sisältävätkö lähteen antamat numerot varastovaunuja vai ovatko ne aktiivijoukkojen käytössä olleiden vaunujen määriä.

ChungTzu nimimerkkiä käyttävän twitter-tilin takana on mies joka on kirjoittanut useita kirjoja panssarivaunuista ja niiden käytöstä (mm. Ukrainan sodassa 2014-2015 aktiivisten taistelujen aikana) joten kyseessä ei ole mikä tahansa "mies internetissä". En nyt muista tältä istumalta, mitkä olivat hänen kirjoittamansa kirjat mutta lisään täsmennyksen kun ehdin hakemaan. Joka tapauksessa kyseessä on kirjoittaja, joka tietää aiheesta ja jonka näkemyksiä kannattaa kuunnella - tämä ei tarkoita että hän olisi aina oikeassa.

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Artikkelin sävy kertoo että hänen mielestään ja kenties myös Ukrainan armeijan mielestä T-55 vaunut olivat vanhentuneita jo Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen hetkellä ja mainitaan muutama ulkomaan vientikauppa (artikkeli julkaistu 24.4.2020): LÄHDE

Despite their obsolescence, the cars were (and still are) very popular in Asia and Africa. The reason is cheapness. So Ukrainian officials began to quite actively sell off the T-55 fleet . From 2007 to 2016 alone, 110 tanks were sold - 50 to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 60 to Sudan.

T-72 vaunuja käsittelevässä artikkelissa hän kirjoitti Ukrainan vientikaupasta näin (artikkeli julkaistu 29.09.2017): LÄHDE

There is no complete data on export deliveries, but it is known, for example, that in 2005–2011 alone, 487 tanks were sold, which amounts to 79 percent of the total volume of tank deliveries from Ukraine. There were deliveries after 2011, and the total number of cars sold is usually estimated at 870 units.

Nämä kaksi yhdessä eivät toki selitä, mikä määrä T-55 vaunuja heillä oli alunperin ja mitä niille tapahtui. Selvästikin yrittivät myydä niitä, mutta niin yritti moni muukin maa 1990-luvulla ja 2000-luvun alussa, koska näitä vaunuja valmistettiin suuri määrä ja moni maa sai niitä perinnöksi.

Toki jos vaunuja ei saada myytyä kokonaisina, niiden kannibalisointi ja myynti varaosina on yksi vaihtoehto.

Artikkelin alussa pohditaan Ukrainan varastovaunujen myyntiä ja todetaan että virallisia numeroita ei ole, mutta tietyt määrät ovat tiedossa.

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T-80 viennin osalta tiedetään ainakin Pakistanin kanssa solmittu kauppa 320 kpl T-80UD vaunun myymisestä 1990-luvulla, tosin olen myös nähnyt kirjoituksia että määrä olisi ollut suurempi (ilmeisesti virallinen ja epävirallinen ovat kaksi eri asiaa), mutta en ole nähnyt numeroita, kuinka paljon suurempi.

Tämän lähteen mukaan 35 kpl toimitettiin Ukrainan asevoimien varastoista ja loput olisivat uustuotantoa eli tuotantolinja käynnistettiin uudestaan Pakistanin T-80UD tilauksen takia:

They made new ones after 1991, the production line was restarted for that contract.

35 478s from ZSU stocks, the rest new-build 478BEs

Maj. Gen. Syed Ali Hamid, At the Forward Edge of Battle - A History of the Pakistan Armoured Corps, 1938-2016, Vol. 2

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Kuvan teksti:

In 1996, Pakistan signed a contract for 320 T-80UDs in two variants: the standard Ob'yekt 478B and export Ob'yekt 478BE. They were powered by the 6TD1, 1,000hp diesel engine designed by the Morozov Bureau. With a horizontal placement of 6 cylinders and 12 opposed pistons, the 6TD1 was light and compact, and its two-stroke cycles produced a high torque. 35 standard variants were supplied from Ukrainian Army stocks in 1997 for conversion. The Malyshev plant had to replace 70 percent of the components that Russia refused to supply. Since Ukraine had already started designing a better variant-the T-84, its components along with other improvements were used to complete the order by 2002. It was Pakistan's most modern tank and has remained in service with 1st Armoured Division. (Artwork by David Bocquelet)



ELI tämän perusteella Kharkovan tehdas käynnisti uudestaan T-80UD tuotantolinjan joskus 1997 vuoden tienoilla.

Ensimmäisen 35 kpl tilauksesta olivat Ukrainan armeijalta otettuja T-80UD vaunuja jotka muutettiin ainakin joltain osin tilauksen mukaisiksi (lainauksessa käytetään sanaa for conversion) eli Ob'yekt 478B --> Ob'yekt 478BE.

Loput tilauksesta eli 320 - 35 = 285 kpl olivat tämän mukaan uustuotantoa.

Koko tilaus saatiin toimitettu aikavälillä 1997-2002, tosin ei kerrota montako vaunua per vuosi. Tämä aikaväli on kuusi vuotta joten teoriassa, tasan jaettuna määrät voisivat olla 320 / 6 = 53,333 vaunua per vuosi.

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Steven J. Zaloga kirjoittaa Ukrainan ja Pakistanin T-80UD vientikaupasta sekä Kharkovan tehtaan tilasta yleisesti kirjassaan "T-80 standard tank - Soviet armys last champion" (kirja julkaistu 17.2.2009 - lainasin kirjasta pidemmät pätkät aikaisemmassa viestissäni: LINKKI):

The Kharkov plant in newly independent Ukraine attempted to keep T-80 production alive there, but suffered from some unique problems. About 70 percent of the T-80UD came from plants outside Ukraine, mainly Russia. Production was 800 combat vehicles in 1991, but only 43 in 1992 and none in 1993 as the supply of components dried up. Since the Ukrainian state budget was too small to support any extensive production, the plant turned to the export market. In 1993, the Malyshev plant demonstrated the T-80UD to Pakistan and in the summer of 1995, two T-80UD underwent extensive testing there. In August 1996, Pakistan announced plans to purchase 320 T-80UD tanks from Ukraine. One critical component was the cast turret - this came from the Azvostal foundry in Mariupol, which had already ceased production; the other casting facility was at the Omsk plant in Russia. So the Malyshev plant's design bureau developed a new welded turret that resulted in the Obiekt 478BK (BK = Bereza-Katanaya: Rolled-armor birch tree), with the first completed in 1993. Ukraine began manufacturing its own version of the D-81 125mm gun at the KBA-3. Of the 320 tanks delivered to Pakistan in 1997-1999, 145 used the original cast turret, including 52 tanks completed under Soviet contracts but never delivered, plus new tanks built with remaining Soviet-era turrets, and some tanks from Ukrainian army stocks. Ukrainian Army T-80 strength fell from about 350 tanks prior to the sale to 271 afterwards. The remaining 175 tanks were the new production Obiekt 478BE with the welded turret.

Sekä näin:

Although the Ukrainian government made repeated promises to begin purchasing the T-84 tank for the Ukrainian Army, the budget was too small to do so. A total of ten T-84M were ordered and delivered in 2002-2003. However, the government had problems paying for all the tanks, and four were sold off to the United States in 2003. A lack of orders from the Ukrainian government or from export clients left the Kharkov plant in grave economic straits and restricted their development efforts after 2005.

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HUOM: Zalogan kirjassa kirjoitetaan myös näin:

As a result of the Soviet collapse, nearly all of the T-80 tanks were in Russian control except for about 350 tanks, mainly T-80UD, located in Ukraine at the Kharkov plant and less than a hundred in Belarus. The tanks stationed in German and Poland were gradually repatriated back to Russia through the mid-1990s.

Eli hänen mukaansa Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen hetkellä Kharkovan tehtaan pihalla oli noin 350 kpl T-80 perheen panssarivaunuja, joista valtaosa oli T-80UD mallisia. Lisäksi Valko-Venäjällä oli vähemmän kuin 100 kpl T-80 perheen vaunuja.

Tässä on ristiriita Mikhail Zhirokhovin kirjoituksen kanssa, koska hänen mukaansa Ukrainalle jäi 248 kpl T-80 perheen vaunuja joista 60 kpl oli T-80UD.

En tiedä, mihin lähteeseen Zaloga viittaa, joten mahdoton sanoa, kumpi on oikeassa. Olen taipuvaisempi uskomaan Mikhail Zhirokhovia mutta tiedäpä näistä. Parasta vain osoittaa että eri lähteissä on eri numeroita.

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Olisi hyvä vilkaista paremmalla ajalla, mitä SIPRI:n ja UNROCA:n tietokannat kertovat Ukrainan viennistä 1992-2022.

SIPRI:n tietojen haku on selitetty tässä viestissä: LINKKI

 

[Antares]

T-80 panssarivaunujen kokonaistuotanto on ollut mielenpäällä viime aikoina. Lainasin aikaisemmassa viestissäni Steven J. Zalogan kommentin: LÄHDE

Yet according to Zaloga the total number should be about 7 600 T-80s from 1976 to 1996.

Perinteinen, klassinen taulukko joka löytyy mm. tästä viestistä (LINKKI) antaa aikavälin 1976-1990 tuotantomääräksi 7 066 kpl, mutta Zaloga kommentoi numeroa näin:

According to Russian sources the Soviet Union built 7 066 from 1976 to 1990 whereas Zaloga notes 7 111, based on the latest Russian publications.

Täten Zalogan mukaan aikavälin 1976-1990 tuotantomäärän pitäisi olla:

7 111 - 7 066 = 45 kpl enemmän

Tämä sopii yhteen 1980-luvun alkupuolella, todennäköisesti vuosina 1983 ja 1985 Kharkovan tehtaalla valmistettujen hyvin aikaisten T-80U panssarivaunujen määrän kanssa (tosin tästä on liikkeellä muitakin numeroita, sekä spekulointia että valmistusta olisi tapahtunut myös vuonna 1984).

JOS otetaan Zalogan numerot todesta, silloin vuoden 1990 jälkeen olisi valmistettu:

"about 7 600" - 7 111 = 489 kpl T-80 perheen vaunuja

Jaoin aikaisemmassa viestissäni (LINKKI) Омский завод транспортного машиностроения - Устьянцев С. - 2018 kirjan datan Omskin tehtaan 1990-luvun tuotantomääristä:



Tämän mukaan Omskin tehdas yksi olisi valmistanut:

381 + 75 = 456 kpl T-80 perheen panssarivaunuja aikavälillä 1991-1996

MUTTA myös Kharkovan tehdas jatkoi T-80UD vaunujen tuotantoa 1990-luvulla. Minun aikaisemmassa viestissäni (LINKKI) on yksi lähde, tosin ei kovin hyvä, joka väittää tuotantomäärien olleen:

1991 - 100 units
1992 - 43 units

Näiden lisäksi he avasivat tuotantolinjan uudestaan 1990-luvun loppupuolella, mahdollisesti 1997 alkaen jotta kykenivät täyttämään Pakistanin tilauksen. Aikaisemman viestini (LINKKI) lähteen mukaan 320 kpl tilauksesta 35 kpl otettiin Ukrainan omista varastoista ja varusteltiin / muutettiin tilausta vastaaviksi vuonna 1997. Tämän jälkeen loput tilauksen panssarivaunut eli 285 kpl valmistettiin uustuotantona. Lähde ei kerro tarkkoja yksityiskohtia uustuotannosta mutta sanoo että tilaus olisi täytetty eli oletan kaikki vaunut toimitettu asiakkaalle vuonna 2002.

Täten Kharkovan tehtaan uustuotannoksi voidaan arvioida aikavälillä 1991-2002 ainakin seuraava määrä:

100 + 43 + 285 = 428

Tässä tietysti sivuutetaan kaikenlaiset prototyypit ja esittelykäyttöön valmistetut vaunut, mutta näiden numeroiden perusteella voidaan arvioida (karkeasti) T-80 vaunujen uustuotanto aikavälillä 1979-2002:

7 111 + 456 + 428 = 7 995 kpl

En olisi yllättynyt jos tämä "noin 8 000 kpl" olisi hyvin lähellä todellisuutta - tosin CFE-sopimuksessa ilmoitettujen ja yllä mainitun "klassisen taulukon" välinen epäsuhta on hyvin epäilyttävä asia. Käytännössä T-80 perheen vaunujen osalta eroa on noin 2 000 kpl, mikä on hyvin suuri määrä kun otetaan huomioon että ensimmäinen CFE ilmoitus annettiin vuonna 1990 ja T-80 perheen vaunujen tuotanto alkoi 1979. Lisäksi tämän perheen vaunut edustivat Neuvostoliiton parasta osaamista ja niillä varusteltiin NATO-maita vastaan sijoitetut joukot eli kaikki nämä olivat sijoitettuna Uralin länsipuolelle.

Kenties vaunujen kova käyttö tarkoittaa nopeampaa kulumista ja siten näitä oli suurempi määrä Category I ulkopuolella eli odottamassa korjausta? Samoin kaasuturbiini on voinut olla ongelma, mikä voi selittää tätä.

Toisaalta toiset ovat spekuloineet että "klassisen taulukon" numeroissa on laskettu yhteen uustuotanto ja kaikenlaiset modernisoinnit yms. Tämä on mahdollista, tosin olen kuvitellut että modernisoinnit olisi tehty erilaisissa "armored repair plant" pajoissa sitä mukaa kun vaunuja saapuu peruskorjattavaksi ELI tätä työtä ei olisi tehty uustuotantoa tekevillä tehtailla. Täten ei oikein voida laskea näitä numeroita mukaan samaan taulukkoon, varsinkin jos puhutaan tiettyjen tehtaiden tuotannosta.

T-80 perheen vaunujen osalta tällaisia modernisointeja voivat olla "Reflection-2" ohjelman mukainen rungon etupeltiin hitsattu ylimääräinen panssariteräslevy, tätä tehtiin 1982 alkaen. Tämän lisäksi, vuodesta 1985 alkaen varastovaunuja alettiin varustelemaan Kontakt-1 elementeillä, tosin missä määrin tätä tehtiin ja kuinka laajasti, sitä en tiedä. Lisäksi kylmän sodan viimeisinä vuosina eli 1989-1991 on ainakin teoriassa ollut mahdollista aloittaa varastovaunujen varustelu Kontakt-5 elementeillä, mutta epäilen että näin ei ole käynyt. Ainakaan sellaisesti ei ole kuulunut eri lähteissä mitään.

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MUOKKAUS: toisaalta lainasin toisessa viestissäni (LINKKI) Steven J. Zalogan kirjasta "T-80 standard tank - Soviet armys last champion" (julkaistu 17.2.2009) seuraavan pätkän:

Of the 320 tanks delivered to Pakistan in 1997-1999, 145 used the original cast turret, including 52 tanks completed under Soviet contracts but never delivered, plus new tanks built with remaining Soviet-era turrets, and some tanks from Ukrainian army stocks. Ukrainian Army T-80 strength fell from about 350 tanks prior to the sale to 271 afterwards. The remaining 175 tanks were the new production Obiekt 478BE with the welded turret.

Tämän mukaan siis Pakistanin tilauksen panssarivaunut olisi toimitettu aikavälillä 1997-1999. Tämä on tietysti mahdollista, mutta aikaväli 1997-2002 tuntuu loogisemmalta, koska kyseessä on kuitenkin vanhan tuotantolinjan uudelleenkäynnistäminen ja Pakistanin T-80UD vaunut vaativat merkittävän määrän muutostöitä, koska piti löytää korvaavat komponentit Venäjältä ostettujen tilalle.

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MUOKKAUS 2: tässä lainaus kirjasta Т72-Т90.Опыт создания отечественных основных боевых танков (Устьянцев С.В., Колмаков Д.Г. - julkaistu vuonna 2013) sivulta 6:

The first modification of the T-64 was put into service in 1966, and in 1987 the tank was finally discontinued. During the post-Soviet period in Russia, the vehicle was not modernized and, with the exception of Transnistria, was not used in combat operations. And in 2011, all the “sixty-fours” of the Russian army were sent for disposal. And even in Ukraine, the program to modernize 400 tanks to the level of the T-64BM Oplot, announced in the early 2000s, ultimately came down to production. as of the beginning of 2013, only 76 vehicles [2]

The T-80 with a gas turbine engine entered service with the Soviet Army in 1976 and was mass-produced until 1992. Today, the vehicles produced in Soviet times are in service with several countries around the world, but the bulk are in the Russian Army.

“Eighties” undergo major repairs as necessary, but serial comprehensive modernization is not carried out and is no longer planned [3]

Only in Ukraine in the 1990s-2000s continued the production and improvement of the diesel version of the Eighty. However, their production in the 1990s-2000s limited to 285 T-80UD tanks for Pakistan and 10 modernized T-84 “Oplot” tanks for the Ukrainian army. Today there is a foreign order for another 200 vehicles but its implementation is a big question, including due to the plight of the Kharkov Transport Engineering Plant named after Malyshev [4]

And only tanks of the T-72/T-90 family continue to live a full life. Dozens of armies around the world and many companies are engaged in the modernization of “seventies”. Serial modernization of T-72B tanks is carried out today in Nizhny Tagil and Omsk; for older modifications, UKBTM OJSC has also prepared options for modernization or conversion into other engineering and combat vehicles. The T-90S tank leads the sales of new MBTs on the world market in the 21st century. And taking into account the appearance at exhibitions and displays of military equipment of its newest variant, the T-90MS, there is no doubt that by the 50th anniversary of the adoption of the “seven ten-twin”, its pathomon will be in the status of a mass-produced vehicle.

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Ustyantsev ei kerro tässä tarkkoja valmistusmääriä per vuosi, mutta kertoo että Pakistanille olisi valmistettu 285 kpl T-80UD vaunuja sekä 10 kpl "modernisoituja" T-84 Oplot panssarivaunuja Ukrainan armeijalle.

Lisäksi hän kirjoittaa että Ukrainan armeijalle oli tarkoitus modernisoida 400 kpl T-64BM Oplot panssarivaunuja, tosin vuoden 2013 alkuun mennessä näistä oli toimitettu 76 kpl.

Näin siis "1990-2000-luvuilla", tosin kirjan julkaisu vuonna 2013 asettaa omanlaisensa takarajan.

Joka tapauksessa tämä lähde, yllä olevan toisen lähteen lisäksi vahvistaa että Ukrainan Kharkovan tehdas todellakin valmisti uustuotantona 285 kpl T-80UD panssarivaunuja Pakistanille (tosin kyseessä on eri versio kuin Neuvostoliiton aikaan valmistettu T-80UD).

 

[SatSotHist]

ChungTzu nimimerkkiä käyttävän twitter-tilin takana on mies joka on kirjoittanut useita kirjoja panssarivaunuista ja niiden käytöstä (mm. Ukrainan sodassa 2014-2015 aktiivisten taistelujen aikana) joten kyseessä ei ole mikä tahansa "mies internetissä". En nyt muista tältä istumalta, mitkä olivat hänen kirjoittamansa kirjat mutta lisään täsmennyksen kun ehdin hakemaan. Joka tapauksessa kyseessä on kirjoittaja, joka tietää aiheesta ja jonka näkemyksiä kannattaa kuunnella - tämä ei tarkoita että hän olisi aina oikeassa.

Tuo käyttäjä on kiinnostava. Hän on muutaman kerran linkannut minun videoihin, ja joka kerta saatteeksi ollut syväluotaavia havaintoja.

Lisäksi hän on muutaman kerran poiminut yksityiskohtia useammalta minun videolta, ja koostanut niistä kokonaiskuvaa.

Eli todistetusti hän on ainakin valmis näkemään vaivaa tietojensa eteen. Ja en nyt ota ollenkaan kantaa kandeeko minun videoita käyttää lähteenä vai ei.

 

[Antares]

T-72 panssarivaunun hyväksynnästä ja alkuvaiheista.

Lähde:

Т72-Т90.Опыт создания отечественных основных боевых танков - Устьянцев С.В., Колмаков Д.Г. - 2013

Lainaus kirjan sivuilta 102-103:

Tests were completed in early May 1975. By this time, each of the cars, as prescribed, had covered ten thousand kilometers. And none of the tanks needed to change the chassis during this time. Meanwhile, the debates in the commission unfolded with even greater ferocity. One side reproached the other for bias, superficial approaches to testing, etc.” To put an end to the protracted discussion, on behalf of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev, a special commission was created headed by the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky, who made the final decision. Now even the powerful D.F. Ustinov could not do anything. On August 7, 1973, by the joint establishment of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers CCCP N№ 554-172, “object 172M” was adopted for service under the name “T-72”, and in the same year an initial batch of 30 vehicles was produced. In 1974, serial production of the new Ural tank was planned. In 1975, it received the symbolic name of the T-72 “Ural” tank [175].

It remains to add that in 1972-1973. The T-72K “command” tank was developed, which had an additional short-wave radio station R150M, an AB-1-P/30 charging unit for power supply when the main engine was turned off, and “Kvadrat” navigation equipment. And in 1976, the production of training aids for the T-72 tank began: operational training stands (UDS), automatic loader stands (SAZ) and training classes (UC) [176].

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T-72 panssarivaunun kehityshistoria lyhyesti.

Lainaus kirjan sivuilta 108-109:

Official story

If we follow official government documents, then the improvement of the T-72 tank after the development of serial production began with the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1043-361 of December 16, 1976, which ordered work to create a new modification with increased characteristics. The customer of the work was the Directorate of the Chief of Tank Troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense [1]. The result of this was the appearance and adoption by the Soviet Army (Order of the Minister of Defense CCCP No. 0103 of June 22, 1979) of the T-72A tank. Also in 1979, production of new machines began [2].

The T-72A differed from its predecessor “Ural” by a laser rangefinder and a new gunner’s night sight, a turret with multi-layer armor, onboard anti-cumulative screens, road wheels with increased dynamic travel, more energy-intensive hydraulic shock absorbers, an improved 2445 gun and a double system. my installation of smoke screens, which included both the usual thermal smoke equipment and 12 launchers [3].

Further development work on the topic “Improving the T-72A” was carried out out in accordance with the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated July 5, 1981 No. 635-188 and the order of the Minister of Defense Industry No. 510 dated September 8, 1981. The topic was carried out in two stages, differing in the level of modernization [4].

As a result, “object 184” appeared, also known as the T-72B tank, adopted by the Soviet Army by decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1183-300 of December 27, 1984 [5].

The vehicle was equipped with mounted dynamic protection and a V-84 diesel engine with a power of 840 hp. s., a 9K120 “Svir” guided weapons complex with laser guidance of a missile at a target and a range of action from 100 m to 4 km, a 1440-1 sighting system [6].

In 1988, the T-72B tank with more advanced built-in dynamic protection was put into service [7].

R&D work “Improving the T-72B” to create a new modification “object 188” was started in accordance with Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 741-208 dated June 19, 1986. 4 prototypes were built in 1988 [8].

In January 1989, two “Object 188” tanks were submitted for state testing. For a year and a half, combat vehicles were tested in the Moscow, Kemerovo and Dzhambul regions of the USSR, as well as at the Uralvagonzavod testing ground [9].

According to the directive documents of the end of 1989, the “object 188” tank, also known as the T-72BM, was supposed to differ from its predecessor in the presence of mass production. the following systems and materials [10]

- D-91 high-power gun;
- fire control complex 1445;
- devices for built-in control of alignment
- information input equipment for detonating a projectile on the Ainet trajectory;
- optical-electronic suppression complex “Shtora-1”;
- high-strength armor steels of electroslag remelting 22Sh and 24Sh in the hull and turret structures;
- additional anti-neutron protection shields:
- deforming painting and thermal masking agents.

At the end of 1989, in accordance with the decisions of the ministries of defense and defense industry, Uralvagonzavod began preparations for the production of T-72BM tanks. They were supposed to be released from the 1st quarter of 1991. But the political confusion that began did not allow this to happen. March 27, 1991 by joint decision No. R3-203-91 The Ministry of Defense and the Defense Industry recommended the tank for adoption [11]. It was up to the new government, not the USSR, but the Russian Federation, to implement the recommendation.

This is the brief history of the development of the tank.

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T-72 perheen vaunujen suojauksen parantamisesta 1980-luvulla.

Lainaus on kirjan sivuilta 138-140:

The army had just received the first batches of T-72 tanks with reinforced hull armor and new turrets with a sand layer, and UKBTM and Uralvagonzavod had already started new projects. To reflect those that appeared in the second half of the 1970s. In NATO countries, swept-shaped armored personnel carriers, specially designed to defeat the first generation of multi-layer protection of Soviet MBTs, the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Steel, together with UKBTM, developed a new type of tank armor filled in the form of plane-parallel plates and inserts made of high-hardness steel [81].

During the experimental work, more than 30 full-size prototype units in various designs were built. To shoot armored barriers of various designs it was necessary to use more than 2.5 thousand shots of different calibers and types. The Nizhny Tagil Metal Testing Institute, at whose test site the shelling was carried out, provided enormous assistance in the project [82]

In April 1980, preparations began for the production of towers with a new design of combined protection; a little later, hulls of a similar type were laid down. They were put into serial production on July 1, 1983 (by Ministry Order No. 620 of November 4, 1982). From January 1, 1984, all tanks for the Soviet Army were produced at Uralvagonzavod with new multi-layer protection [83]

According to calculated data in 1982, the measures taken ensured protection of the T-72A tank in the frontal projection from BPS with armor penetration up to 500-520 mm of homogeneous armor steel and from a cumulative projectile up to 600-620 mm [84].

By the way, the new armor scheme used in Nizhny Tagil turned out to be very successful also from the point of view of reducing the non-penetrating effect of anti-tank shells. The energy of the cumulative jet or the BPS core is dissipated during the destruction and displacement of the plates, and therefore has a lesser effect on the internal armor plate and, accordingly, on the crew and equipment of the tank [85].

In the post-Soviet period, T-72B tanks with armor of the type described above somehow found their way to the west and were “dissected” there. The May 2002 issue of the Journal of Military Ordnance published the results with photographs and explanations. - In particular, the tower body with a cut off roof and internal cavities open to view was demonstrated. Each of them contained 19-20 three-layer blocks with a total thickness of 30 mm (21 mm and 3 mm steel plates plus 6 mm rubber between them). The blocks were installed with 22 mm gaps and secured in this position using intermediate, perpendicularly installed 3 mm metal jumpers. The NATO military classified this design as the “Non-Energetic Reactive Armor” type, which can be translated as “semi-active armor” [86]. This design, which did not contain a single gram of explosives, destroyed the BPS cores and the cumulative jet due to their own energy.

By the way, in a number of publications the work on creating a new version of protection is for some reason connected with the events of 1982 in Lebanon, when the Israelis first and successfully used the new finned 105-mm BPS M111 [87]. Of course, this event accelerated the deployment of mass production, but had nothing to do with the beginning of the development work, since in 1982 they were already in full swing. That is, we are not dealing with a response to events, but with prediction and warning.

And the M111 projectile itself was not a surprise. Information about the American analogues of the finned 105-mm BPS M735 with a tungsten carbide core and M774 with a depleted uranium core was received by UKBTM in the spring of 1981 in the form of a brochure “American main tank XM-1”. And they were not all considered a particularly formidable means. The main concerns were caused by the German 120-mm smoothbore gun of the Leopard-2 tank and its feathered BPS. The new Tagil armor was developed against them [88].

Another interesting nuance: while radical measures were taken to protect Soviet Army tanks from feathered NATO BPS, for export vehicles until the end of the 1980s. everything was limited to welding a 16-mm armor plate to the upper frontal part of the hull [89]. This event actually limited the range of effective use of the 105-mm M111 type BPS, but no more.

It remains to add that in October 1987, turrets and hulls for T-72B tanks with an improved package of “semi-active armor”, characterized by an increased level of protection, went into mass production [90].

With the advent of multilayer protection, the role of armor steel has decreased somewhat, but also from its qualities. a lot still depended. Therefore, the USSR continued to improve armor grades of metals. They also appeared on “seventy-twos”. Beginning in 1976, rolled sheets of BTK-1 steel began to be used for the manufacture of armored hulls. In 1982, towers were cast from experimental steel 791 [91].

Meanwhile, a new class of high-strength armor steel, a metal of electroslag remelting, has appeared in the country. His first stamp BTK-1Sh was created through the joint efforts of the All-Russian Research Institute of Steel, the Paton Institute of Electric Welding, the Central Research Institute of Chermet and specialists from the Azovstal plant and the Dneprospetsstal plant. Since 1980, it has been used to manufacture parts of the T-80 tank. Later, in 1988, new grades of electroslag remelting armor SK-ISh, SK-2Sh and SK-ZSh were created. The production of rolled sheets from them was mastered by the Azovstal metallurgical plant [92].

The allocation of expensive metal for the “seventy-two” was initially considered unnecessary in Moscow. And only in 1986, for the first time, two hulls of the T-72B tank were made from armor steel grades 24Sh and 22Sh. In 1989, it was planned to produce 50 T-72B tanks with armor parts from the specified steels 22Sh and 24Sh. It was planned to put them into serial production on the “Object 188” tanks [93]

The creation of welded turrets from rolled armor steel with an increased level of protection for the T-72 and T-80 tanks began at the All-Russian Research Institute of Steel back in the 1970s. In Nizhny Tagil, this work was continued in 1984, and UKBTM. UV VNITI and Uralvagonzavod were simultaneously developing the design and production technology of a welded tank turret made of rolled armor. However, in the 1980s. the welded tower turned out to be unclaimed [94], but it was a good start for the future.

In the book “Research Institutes have become 60 years in the field of protection. Historical Sketches" it is reported that the Kontakt-1 R&D project to create dynamic protection for tanks was carried out in the period from June 1982 to January 1983. Officially, the Kontakt mounted DS complex with element 4S20 was adopted by the Soviet Army in 1985 [95]

It is impossible to contradict the creators of dynamic protection, but you can’t argue with the facts. The factory documentation mentions several times the preparation of the T-72A tank for the installation of the Kontakt remote sensing device in the first half of 1981... in the summer the vehicle was sent to the disposal of the institute. Moreover, the UKBTM designers worked not only on the machine, but and developed a unified container: for remote sensing [96].

Since January 1, 1984 dynamic protection became a standard feature of serial T-72 tanks; at the end of the year the same sets began to be supplied to tank repair plants for installation on previously released vehicles [97].

Built-in dynamic protection with element 4S22 was developed by the Steel Research Institute as a result of two research projects: “Kontakt-4” and “Kontakt-5”. In Nizhny Tagil, the first project of the T-72B tank with VDZ appeared in 1984. Serial production of such vehicles began in March 1989 [98]

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T-72 perheen vaunujen yksikköhinnat (ruplina).

Taulukko on kirjan sivulta 192.


Google Translate konekäännös:

 

[Antares]

T-72 panssarivaunujen viennistä:

Lähde:

Т72-Т90.Опыт создания отечественных основных боевых танков - Устьянцев С.В., Колмаков Д.Г. - 2013

Lainaus kirjan sivuilta 194-196.

Tanks for friends and allies

It is likely that the idea of developing an export version of the T-72 and supplying it to the countries of the socialist camp and the third world stemmed from the same struggle of regional party and economic clans for the right to equip the Soviet Army. There is some evidence of this. For example, the story told in the memoirs of the director of Uralvagonzavod in 1969-1979. I. F. Krutyakova: “D. F. Ustinov, having become the Minister of Defense of the USSR, made a visit to India and donated a large batch of T-72 tanks, and also gave an obligation to build and equip a tank plant in India for large-scale production of T-72 tanks. Upon returning from India, the Minister of Defense convened the Military Council of the USSR, to which I was invited. At this Military Council, he announced that the Indian government had signed an agreement to supply 5,000 T-72 tanks to India... I was obliged to urgently begin all the necessary work, including sending the best specialists of the plant to India... However, in India in 1977 a new party came to power, the government changed. The new government refused to pay, citing the mistake of its predecessors” [1].

It cannot be ruled out that the plot described by I.F. Krutyakov does not reveal the whole picture. At the same time, it is obvious that the production of 5,000 export tanks for several years would eliminate Uralvagonzavod from the list of suppliers of military equipment for the Soviet armed forces. Let us remember that production in 1976 was 1017 tanks [2]. By completely switching Uralvagonzavod to export and gradually transferring the Kharkov plant to the production of T-80 tanks, D. F. Ustinov turned the “eighty” into the only MBT of the USSR. But India refused Ustinov’s “gift,” and the organization of T-80 production in Kharkov encountered great difficulties and dragged on for almost a decade. It was necessary to continue production and deliveries to the Armed Forces of the USSR of both the gradually becoming obsolete “sixty-fours” and the “seventy-twos” that Ustinov disliked.

But even after the failure with the first Indian contract, Uralvagonzavod retained the obligation to arm the allies under the Warsaw Pact and "friendly Third World countries". The joint protocol of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the CPSU of January 5, 1978 authorized the sale of T-72 tanks and the transfer of technical documentation to the CMEA countries and developing states [3].

In this regard, all T-72 modifications created in Nizhny Tagil had their own export version with a lower level of shields, as well as a different set of sights and ammunition compared to vehicles for the Soviet Army of the same time. For the first time, the design of the “seventy-twos” was redesigned for export deliveries back in 1975. But officially, the first version of the export tank “object 172M-E” was created on the basis of a joint decision of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Defense Industry, the State Committee for Economics economic cooperation and the USSR State Planning Committee dated January 13, 1978. The way for external supplies was opened by the decision of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 259-RS dated February 10 of the same 1978. Later, the export analogs of the T-72A were the T-72M and T-72M1, sold starting from since 1980 and 1983 respectively. Instead of the T-72B, starting in 1987, the T-72S was supplied abroad. In fact, there were many more export versions of the T-72; they had the factory code “E” with the number of the T-72S development number, manufactured for Iran, designated "172M-E8" i.e., an export tank of the eighth modification. There were many differences between them: monolithic and sand-layered towers, optical and laser rangefinder sights, etc., etc., and all this in different combinations for different countries [4].

Uralvagonzavod sent its first export vehicles in 1978 to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, India and Algeria. In total, during the period 1978-1981 it was planned to produce about 500 combat vehicles for foreign consumers. By the beginning of the 21st century, export modifications of the T-72 tank, produced by Uralvagonzavod alone, were in service with the armies of 16 countries around the world [5].

The scale and directions of export supplies of Uralvagonzavod are presented in table [6]:




Taulukon tekstien Google Lens konekäännös:

* in the factory report for 1979 there is no data on the supply of tanks abroad; only the export of spare parts and training equipment is indicated.

** kits and tanks of varying degrees of 20 grade together.



In 1990, the supply of tanks abroad became chaotic due to the collapse of the USSR foreign trade system, resulting in the workshops accumulated 119 hulls and 268 turrets of export tanks. Regarding the recipient countries, it is known that it was this year that Finland received its last machines [7].

It is also possible that in the second half of the 1980s, T-72 tanks of their own assembly were exported by the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant. In any case, in 1987, the USSR State Planning Committee voiced the idea in 1990-1991 that the production of export vehicles will be completely transferred to ChTZ [8].

And finally, a very significant, but unknown to us, number of T-72 tanks was sent abroad in Soviet times from army stock. For this purpose, tank repair plants of the armed forces selected tanks from storage bases or from active units to meet export standards. As a rule, these were cars of earlier modifications than those newly produced. According to the testimony of the head of the GABTU General Yu. M. Potapov in 1978-1987, army enterprises prepared up to one and a half thousand tanks a year for these purposes. Of course, this number included not only “seventy-twos” [9]. It should be noted that Uralvagonzavod provided significant assistance to the army in this matter. For example, in 1979, the enterprise sent its employees to one of the military units to prepare a large batch of T-72 and T-72K tanks, which were in storage, for export. The size of the batch is indicated by the following fact: the brigade received 305 pieces of covering tarpaulins [10].

In general, it is not possible to establish today the exact number of T-72 tanks delivered abroad without disclosing the still secret materials of foreign trade organizations. According to open press data, the USSR sold approximately 8 000 "seventy-twos" abroad [11].

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T-72 panssarivaunujen ulkomailla tapahtuneesta lisenssituotannosta.

Lainaus kirjan sivuilta 196-199:

Tagil "seedlings"

The history of the transfer of Soviet engineering technologies abroad requires a separate and very thorough study. An obvious feature of domestic industrial culture is its high adaptability, understood in two senses: both as the ability to accept and assimilate other people’s achievements, and as the ability to instill one’s technologies on foreign soil. Moreover, it should be fully grafted, and not in the form of the notorious “screwdriver assembly.”

The Tagil T-72 tank is a classic example of this. Its design and production technology are clearly a domestic product, but at the same time they were perfectly transplanted to foreign soil. For twenty years, since the late 1970s and until the end of the 1990s, Uralvagonzavod and UKBTM, together with several domestic technological institutes, managed to grow a whole “flower garden” of foreign enterprises capable of independently producing T-72 tanks and improving their design. However, we will turn to the latter topic in the next chapter.

Now let’s return to the very beginning of this transfer of licenses and technical documentation for the production of T-72 tanks, and only to the Polish People’s Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was first approved by order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1420-rs dated June 24, 1976. The corresponding order from the Ministry of Defense Industry was issued on July 14 of the same 1976. Uralvagonzavod began preparing documentation in August. It was planned that the task would be completed by the end of April 1977 [12].

The next official step was the joint protocol of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated January 5, 1978, which approved and allowed the transfer of technical documentation to some countries for organizing their own production of export modifications of the T-72 tank [13].

At UVZ in March 1978, a special bureau for the preparation of export technological documentation for licensed sales was formed as part of the UVZ technical department. During the year, the plant trained a reserve of specialists and engineers to work abroad [14].

According to General Yu. M. Potapov, who participated in the transfer of technological and design documentation for T-72 tanks to socialist countries, the corresponding factories in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were designed to produce up to 250 vehicles per year [15]. Poland and Czechoslovakia were the first to organize their own production. It’s curious, but the West learned about this back in 1978, although Czechoslovak and Polish “seventy-two” began to leave factories in 1981 and 1982, respectively [16].

In Czechoslovakia, two ZTS factories were involved in the production of “seventy-twos”: in Dubnitsa (turret production) and Martin (chassis and final assembly). In total, during the period from 1981 to 1991, they managed to assemble 1,782 tanks [17].

In Poland, until 1994, the Urzadzen Mechanicznych Bumar-Labedy armored vehicle production plant in Gliwice produced 1,610 T-72 tanks [18].

Yugoslavia received about 50 Tagil-built T-72 tanks back in 1979, but its own production of a slightly modified version, called M-84, began in 1983. In total, according to Western data, Yugoslavia had build about 700 tanks [19].

In 1988, by order of the Ministry of Defense Industry No. 423 dated July 8, the sale of a license for the T-72M to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the organization of mass production in 1991 was allowed, but the project was not implemented and remained on paper [20].

The turn of the non-socialist partners in the tank business came a little later. The sale of the license and technical documentation for the T-72 tank to India was approved by Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 464 dated March 13, 1982. UVZ got down to business in earnest in 1984. In May, in order to promptly resolve issues related to the development of tank production T-72 in India, a brigade of main specialists [21].

The first T-72M1 type tanks of our own assemblies rolled off the assembly line of the plant in Indian town of Avadi at the turn of 1987-1988. Kits of components and parts were supplied from the USSR but it was planned to gradually bring reduction in the share of Indian-made parts
up to 97%. Apparently, this task is completely was never resolved until the end production of T-72 in 1994. Total plant in Avadi collected 1068 "seventy-twos" [22].

The next license for the “seventy-two” received by Iraq. Uralvagonzavod started working on preparation of documentation based on the order
by the Ministry of Defense Industry from No. 384 of July 27, 1986 in addition to drawings and technical descriptions, in 1988-1990. UVZ should have send up to 100 sets of units to Iraq and units, but we have no confirmation of this. In 1990, the plant in Taji already began the assembly of tanks began, but it was almost immediately was curtailed due to international sanctions after the attack on Kuwait [23].

The USSR helped other countries that did not have their own production of T-72 tanks, but had a fleet of such vehicles, in setting up repair facilities. Thus, at the beginning of 1982, Uralvagonzavod received the task (according to the order of the Minister of Defense Industry No. 703 of December 8, 1981) to provide technical assistance in retrofitting and transferring technical documentation to tank repair plants in Bulgaria and the GDR. Another Ministerial Order No. 702 of December 8, 1981 ordered to do the same in relation to developing countries that received “seventy-two” [24].

Separate topic - tank production T-72 in Iran.

Negotiations on the transfer of licenses proposals for the T-72M1 and T-72M1K tanks have already begun in 1985, but the matter dragged on, and ultimately account, this country has received documentation on more advanced model T-72S with containers of dynamic protection and a complex of controlled weapons. On November 13, 1991 it was concluded intergovernmental agreement, preliminary maturing transfer of license and technical assistance in organizing production from Russian sets of 1000 tanks. However due to the fault of the Russian side (or rather, following the effect of restrictions imposed by the joint US-Russian memorandum OT June 30, 1995, also known as the agreement decision "Gor Chernomyrdin"), during 1993-2000 only 422 were sent to Iran kit in various stages of readiness. The reason for the restrictions was accusations
Iran in support of international terrorism rism [25].

I wonder who will be supported today? Do Americans live in Syria?

The progress and some results of the project, which culminated in the creation of tank production in the Iranian city of Dorud, were told by a direct participant and one of the leaders from the Russian side, the director of the Ural Scientific and Technical Complex (as the recipient has been called since the 1990s). independence and corporatized UV VNITI) V.P. Mozolin:

“The first work on the development of design technology under an agreement with GSPI Transmashproekt was completed in the shortest possible time, and we provided for the customer development of the plant project. But the payment came with great difficulty. Only with a delay of six months was it possible to receive the funds earned. During 1994-1996, hard work was going on to design technology and production for Iranian factories. The volume of work performed exceeded $5 million. This was the decisive factor in saving the team of technologists and designers. In the development of technology, the most modern achievements in equipment, equipment, and materials were taken into account, so that sometimes the created production was superior to our production in some respects.

Almost all departments were involved in working with Iran, and the funds received from this work made it possible to completely re-equip and radically change the work of the designers...

After completing the development of technological documentation, a large group of technologists was sent for implementation at Iranian factories... During the same period, a significant amount of production of technological equipment was completed, designed by our employees for foundries, forges and machining shops of Iranian factories. We supplied processing stands and tilters for the cap, a casting conveyor, molding machines, a large number of dies and tools and other equipment...

The highest peak of work on Iran occurred in 1995-1998; in subsequent years, work on this order was sporadic. Nevertheless, this work provided useful experience in working with film customers in terms of conducting negotiations, justifying goals and conditions, experience in maintaining and requirements for documentation, communicating with banks and transferring currencies, with customs, etc.

All this seriously helps now that we have constant communication with foreign companies” [26]

 

[Antares]

T-90 panssarivaunujen alkuhistoria:

Lähde:

Т72-Т90.Опыт создания отечественных основных боевых танков - Устьянцев С.В., Колмаков Д.Г. - 2013

Lainaus kirjan sivuilta 211-213.

The first tank of the Russian Federation

Early 1990s Tagil tank builders greeted it with cautious optimism. After several years of confusion, the situation with “object 188” has become clearer. Things got off the ground after the first President of the Russian Federation, B.N. Yeltsin, arrived at the Uralva Gonzavod on July 8, 1992, and inspected the tank in the workshop and during a run on the factory road. And already on September 30, the first T-90 tank in the pilot batch entered the field tests. And finally. On October 5, 1992, the Government of the Russian Federation issued Decree No. 759-58 on the adoption of the “Object 188” tank under the name “T-90 tank” into service by the Russian Army and on the approval of the sale abroad of its export version T-90C [19].

In its final form, “object 188” was supposed to be equipped with a remote-controlled launcher, an improved chassis and a 1445T “Irtysh” fire control complex, including the 1442 control system, the PNK-4S commander’s sighting and observation system, as well as a thermal imaging tank sight "Agava-2" (option - night sight TPN-4). The 9K119 Reflex guided weapon system made it possible to increase the fire range to 5000 m against targets moving at speeds of up to 70 km. Unlike the T-72B, “object 188” could fire guided weapons on the move at a speed of up to 30 km/h. By the way, the new TUR "Invar" created in the second half of the 1980s with a tandem warhead and armor penetration of 700 mm BEHIND THE DYNAMIC PROTECTION could well hit M1A1 Abrams tank in frontal view.

Penetrate the turret armor of the M1A1HA tank Invar could not, but this was not required: high-precision ammunition could be aimed at the forehead hulls, where there was no uranium armor. And this not an exaggeration: certified gunner could easily fit on a standard distance of tank combat, a series of five tours per sheet AZ format. And lastly: the machine is installed an optical-electronic complex was poured suppression of TSHU-1 (theme “Blind-1”) [20]

In December 1992, the first batch of 13 T-90 tanks was assembled at Uralvagonzavod. During its production, problems arose with the Agava-2 thermal imager. It was very expensive, and by the end of 1992 the plant had lost its working capital and could not afford to purchase such products at its own expense. As a result, only 2 tanks in the pilot batch had a thermal imager [21].

The command version of the T-90K was adopted by order of the Minister of Defense No. 034 of June 3, 1994 [22]

In 1993, serial production of T-90 tanks began. In accordance with the old and faithful tradition, only domestic materials and components were used to manufacture tanks of the main model intended for the Russian army. We do not have exact data. How many of these vehicles were built and delivered to the Russian armed forces, but it is obvious that by Soviet standards there are very few. Information from the public press is very contradictory; the figures for total production fluctuate between 120 and 250 cars. In fact, all of them were concentrated in two Siberian divisions [23]

There is still no consensus on the name of the T-90 tank today. In fact, in foreign correspondence it was first called T-72BM, i.e. “T-72B modernized.” At the end of 1991, another name appeared: T-72BU, i.e. “T-72B improved.” In some publications, the appearance of the name “T-90” is attributed solely to the desire of the first President of the Russian Federation, B. N. Yeltsin, to have the “first Russian tank” in service with the army [24]. The discussion on the question of whether the T-90 is a modernization of the “seventy-two” or is this really a new tank, is still dwindling today. Convincing arguments each party has. Genetic kinship and continuity of the T-72 even the most the first modifications and the T-90 obviously. On the other hand, in full accordance with laws of dialectics accumulated in the model number of tanks “object 172M”, T-72A, T-72B and in the T-90 itself quantitative changes led to the creation of something truly new quality. T-90 differs from T-72 sample 1974 even larger than the American M26 release in 1945 from its undoubted “po-Tomna" M60A1 model 1963, although between they are the same 18-19 years old. However, in the USA M26 and M60 are considered not just as different tanks, but even as representatives different generations of combat vehicles.

UKBTM, according to an established tradition, collected information about the service of its products. The news was mostly encouraging. Russian tankers who were lucky enough to deal with the “nineties” give them the highest reviews. Senior Warrant Officer S. Shklyaruk, who had previously dealt with many Soviet tanks “This is the most reliable of all the vehicles I know. How many problems did my colleagues experience with the gas turbine engine! Especially on sandy terrain. At least this car has something! Neither cold nor heat are scary. If you properly service it on time, adjust it, you won’t know grief for years. We've been together with this car for five years now. About 5000 km passed. The only thing that had to be changed was the injectors.” Junior Sergeant D. Dombrovan: “She is so smart that she even corrects the mistakes of an inexperienced driver. It won’t allow you to switch gears out of sequence, you forgot that your heater is working, it will turn it off, and the buzzer in your headset will remind you of the insufficient level of lubrication” [25].

As for fire capabilities, tankers called the T-90 nothing more than “clever” or “sniper” [26].

During a visit to Uralvagonzavod, the President of the Russian Federation. B. N. Yeltsin also promised to allocate funds for the further development of the “nineties” [27].

The program was not implemented in full, but some things were accomplished. Throughout the 1990s, work continued on fine-tuning and installing a more powerful engine on the tank. The Barnaul diesel KD-34 appeared on the Object 188 tank back in the late 1980s, and testing of the Chelyabinsk V-92 diesel began in the early 1990s. In February 1993, at a meeting on improving the T-90, the prospects for installing these engines were discussed. The KD-34 had the highest stage of readiness, but it was created as an alternative and did not have the support of the Ministry of Defense. In addition, the production of even prototypes was possible only in cooperation with Chelyabinsk manufacturers, who, naturally, were not interested in helping competitors [28].

In turn, in Chelyabinsk they created and tested two versions of the V-920 engines with a power of 1000 hp. With. The first of them, the B-92C1, had a centrifugal supercharger with dual drive: from the crankshaft gear and from the turbine. Such a system promised good engine response, but turned out to be too complex and therefore not reliable enough. The second version of the B-92C2-C with one turbocharger in the camber of the cylinder block required more rearrangement of the engine, but in the end it turned out to be more successful. By the way, changes in the gas exhaust system ensured a significant reduction in resistance [29].

The V-92S2 diesel engine compared favorably with contemporary Western tank engines. With more than half the weight, it exceeded its rivals in overall power by 1.5-4.5 times. The torque increased by 1.18 times compared to its predecessor, the V-84 diesel engine, made it easier to control the tank and accordingly increased its maneuverability and average speed [30]

Development of the welded tower began in Nizhny Tagil back in the 1980s. The new “cap” provided not only increased security characteristics with the same weight, but also a larger reserved volume. By 1996, the welded tower had been developed, as well as the technology for its production, but the plant did not have an order at that time for the Russian Army. Therefore, welded turret No. 1, manufactured in September 1998, was installed on one of the three T-90S being prepared for testing in India [31].

With an increased level of resistance to weapons and the same mass as that of the other, the welded turret had a number of significant characteristics. benefits. The internal reserved volume increased by 160 liters, mainly in the crew working area, which significantly improved the ergonomic performance of the commander and gunner’s workplaces. The height of the turret and, accordingly, the entire tank was reduced by 35 mm. But what is most surprising is that the labor intensity decreased by about 7% compared to cast, and the manufacturing cycle was reduced by 3-4 times [32].

In 1996, the production of a new caterpillar was mastered (the Omsk plant stopped their production), and the introduction of technology and equipment for welding and machining of a welded tower from unified technological bases was completed [33].

Meanwhile, due to the lack of mass production of tanks, Uralvagonzavod and UKBTM slowly but steadily lost people and serial production technologies.

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Intian T-90S tilauksesta.

Lähde:

Т72-Т90.Опыт создания отечественных основных боевых танков - Устьянцев С.В., Колмаков Д.Г. - 2013

Lainaus kirjan sivuilta 213-220.

Indian order

Today there is no longer any secret that tank building in Nizhny Tagil was saved by the “Indian order”, namely the contract dated February 15, 2001 for the supply of 310 T-90S tanks to India. This was preceded by a very long and difficult work, which cost the life of the chief designer V.I. Potkin. In the 1990s. The leadership of the Indian Armed Forces, realizing that the T-72 tanks at their disposal were becoming obsolete, carefully searched for a replacement. In 1993, two tanks were tested in the Thar Desert: the T-80U gas turbine tank and the T-72S diesel tank. Both cars were rejected: the “eighty” due to insufficient reliability of the MTO, and the “seventy-two” due to insufficient separation from previous modifications. The Indian military also contacted the newly independent Ukraine regarding the possibility acquisition of T-80UD diesel tanks [34].

The T-90S tanks first attracted the attention of Indian representatives at the 1997 arms exhibition in Abu Dhabi. The Indian side announced the possibility of acquiring them during a meeting of the Russian-Indian working group on ground forces armaments, held at the very beginning of 1998 [35].

The main precondition was the installation of a 1000-horsepower engine on the tank. As a result, in 1998, a decision was made to use the V-92S2 diesel engines, which had not yet been fully tested [36].

At the end of 1998 and beginning of 1999, the hasty finishing of three tanks for shipment to India. Chief designer V.I. Potkin felt bad, but he kept strong and only said to his loved ones: “We’ll send the products, I’ll go to the doctor.” On May 13, Potkin died at his workplace. And on May 17, three T-90S tanks went on trailers to Yekaterinburg, to the airport, where two Ruslan aircraft were waiting for them. Later, the Indian Minister of Defense will propose giving the T-90S tank the name “Vladimir” in memory of its creator. Testing in India lasted for two months, under the most difficult conditions imaginable. It should be noted that the T-90S model of 1999 was significantly different from the basic version developed in the early 1990s. The changes affected the tank chassis, control system, protective equipment, and turret design. As already mentioned, a B-92S2 diesel engine was installed. All three tanks during testing had different sighting and observation systems. One was equipped with a Buran tank night sight from the Krasnogorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant, and the other two were equipped with Nocturne and Essa thermal imaging sights. In total, this provided the T-90S tank with approximately one and a half superiority in the level of technical specifications over the base model T-72B [37]

The strength test to which I subjected. If the Indian military had used three Tagil T-90S tanks in the summer of 1999, no other combat vehicle in the world could have withstood it. In the Thar Desert, with a daytime air temperature of up to 53 degrees and a night temperature of about 30, with an almost complete absence of roads, each tank traveled more than 2000 km, overcoming sand dunes 10-15 m high. After completing this run, one of the T-90S was sent to Malaysia for the DSA-2000 exhibition, after which he again went on a run, this time through the damp and stuffy tropical jungle [38].

It was after the 1999 tests that the military attache at the Indian Embassy in Moscow Brigadier General D. Singh stated: “In terms of effectiveness, the T-90S can be called the second deterrent factor after nuclear weapons” [39].

The T-90S tank with a 1000-horsepower engine was first publicly presented to the domestic public in Nizhny Tagil at an arms exhibition in 1999. A characteristic detail: at the 2000 exhibition, the T-90S tank was examined and photographed for more than an hour by a famous American designer and developer "Abrams" Philip Lett [40].

Registration of the contract was long and difficult. In the spring of 2000, the Indian Ministry of Defense informed the parliament of the republic of its intention to purchase more than 300 T-90S tanks for an amount exceeding $700 million. But soon there was a message that the parliamentary defense committee blocked the deal, and blamed it on the Russian side, which raised the cost of the contract per tank from $2.1 to $2.8 million. All price issues were finally agreed upon during the visit of Russian President V.V. Putin to India on October 2-5 2000. This fact of the president’s personal participation in the conclusion of the most important contract for UVZ is still remembered at the plant today [41].

124 T-90S tanks were sent to India assembled. The remaining 186 are in the form of kits for subsequent assembly at the Avadi plant. According to media reports, on January 7, 2004, the first Indian-assembled T-90S rolled off the assembly line of a heavy engineering plant in the Indian city of Avadi (Tamil Nadu). It was named “Bishma” in honor of the legendary wrestler from the epic Mahabharata. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Nirwal Chand Vij, spoke at the ceremony and highly appreciated the technical capabilities of the Russian vehicle entering service. [42].

According to some reports, by this time the T-90S tanks had already proven themselves excellent in conflicts on the Indo-Pakistani border [43].
It should be noted that the serial T-90S were equipped with the Essa thermal imaging sight, developed by the Belarusian company Peleng using the Catherine-FC thermal imaging camera of the French company Thales Optronic. The final assembly of the sights was carried out by the Vologda Optical-Mechanical Plant [44]

Along with tanks, the Indian military has the opportunity to acquire the latest tank ammunition such as, for example, the nan TUR 9M119M1 with a tandem warhead, capable of penetrating armor equivalent to 870-920 mm of steel [45].

Further cooperation was determined by an agreement on the licensed production of 1000 tanks over 15 years. Thus, the T-90S in the future will form the basis of India’s mobile ground defense. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee called the Russian-Indian contract on the T-90S “a manifestation of stable and rapidly developing cooperation with the Russian Federation in the military and military-technical fields” [46]. The Indian contract attracted everyone's attention in the world: other countries began to look at the T-90S tanks and order them. Unexpectedly, the prospects for the foreign economic activity of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise PA Uralvagonzavod were predicted in 2004 by the American agency Forecast International. Calculating the prospects for global production of tanks for ten years in advance, analysts from the United States came to the conclusion that the leading manufacturer would be Uralvagonzavod. It will account for more than 15% of newly assembled combat vehicles and most of those sold on the open market. Two Western corporations will retain their positions: the American General Dynemics and the German Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, as well as Chinese enterprises. But all of them will work only for their own armies, or for the armed forces of securely “tied” satellites [47].

That's exactly what happened. We will provide only some information about contracts obtained in the open press. In 2009, the first contract (prepared around 2006-2007) for the supply of 185 tanks to Algeria was completed; and in the fall of 2011 a new one was concluded for another 120 tanks. Its implementation continued throughout 2012. We especially note that Algeria acquired T-90S tanks with an improved fire control system, including, among other things, an automatic target tracking system [48]. These cars also have air conditioning.

In 2010, a contract was signed for the supply of T-90S tanks to Turkmenistan [49].

Under the 2010 contract, Uganda received 2011-2012 batch of T-90S [50].

As a result, the Tagil “product” became the best-selling among newly manufactured MBTs in the world for the period 2001-2010. In total, more than a thousand “nineties” went abroad! Thanks to the T-90 tank, in 2008 the Ural Carriage Plant took 90th position in the world list of the largest arms exporting companies, and in 2009 it rose to 67th place [51].

Based on those concluded in 2011-2012. Under the contract, Azerbaijan purchased 94 T-90S tanks in the most advanced configuration, including the installation of a new modification of the Shtora KOEP, automatic target tracking and air conditioning [52].

A few words about the improved COEP. It includes a new station. optical-electronic countermeasures TSHU-1-7M, the production of which began in Zelenograd near Moscow. Thanks to the new element base, the number of station blocks was reduced from 7 to 3, and the weight - from 95.4 kg to 72 kg. The time for the station to enter operating mode has radically changed from 60 to 3 seconds. In addition to countering ATGMs with an infrared guidance system, the station provides target illumination when used use of night vision devices and at the same time reduces the IR signature of the tank by a third due to the selection of optimal operating modes [53].

The T-90S still attracts the attention of potential buyers today. In the spring of 2013, it was presented at the SITDEF exhibition in the capital of Peru, Lima. The tank was inspected by both cadets from the local Academy of Armored Forces and the Deputy Minister of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Ricardo Moncada Novoa. By mutual agreement of the Russian and Peru parties, after the end of the exhibition, the tank was left for display to the top leadership of Peru and testing [54].

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Panssarivaunujen hinnoista:

Lähde:

Т72-Т90.Опыт создания отечественных основных боевых танков - Устьянцев С.В., Колмаков Д.Г. - 2013

Lainaus kirjan sivuilta 191-193.

Price matters

As you know, any success has its price. The production achievements of Uralvagonzavod in this regard are no exception, as evidenced by the cost figures given in the table products, i.e. one linear tank as configured for the Soviet army [97].

The Soviet leadership did not indulge its industry with profits, so the selling price exceeded the full cost by no more than 15-20%. Pricing and the real value of the Soviet ruble are difficult to compare with Western indicators, and it is impossible to achieve complete accuracy here, but we will still give some figures, taking as an example the most popular NATO tanks produced in large series.

It is known that the M60A1 tank cost 220 thousand dollars in the early 1970s. In terms of VTU coefficients, the Soviet T-72 was superior to the American, and in price after the development period it was approximately equal to it, even if we use not the market, but the official exchange rate of that time: 1 dollar - 90 kopecks. [98].

Realizing that modernization of the M60 tank alone would not be able to maintain parity of forces with Soviet armored vehicles, the Americans during the 1970s. developed and in 1980 began production of the new M1 Abrams tank. Thanks to the use of thermal imagers and other state-of-the-art electronics according to VTU, it was significantly ahead of its peer T-72A, but the price did not justify its advantages at all. According to Soviet intelligence, the cost of one M1 tank was 1.55 million dollars; in Jane's Directory 2007-2008 there is a slightly lower figure: 1.479 million [99]. In other words, the Soviet tank was 5-6 times cheaper than its main competitor.

The price of the next T-72B tank increased, but the American M1A1, its peer, was also more expensive than the MT, so the price gap remained virtually unchanged. But the gap in VTU coefficients has narrowed significantly: the Soviet tank demonstrated great modernization capabilities. From the above it follows that the adoption and further development of the T-72 tank was an economically justified measure that made it possible to maintain parity with the main enemy at significantly lower costs.

Unfortunately, our country also did not escape the “American” mistake. We are talking about the T-80 tank with a gas turbine engine. At the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s, the “eighties” first of all and in full received the most modern fire control systems, armor steels from electroslag remelting, etc., etc. The T-72 received what was left, or cheaper substitutes. As a result, tanks with gas turbine engines invariably had, although not too large, an undeniable advantage in VTU coefficients compared to their diesel peers. The first to doubt the infallibility of established estimates was one of the prominent figures in the Soviet Tank Industry, Yu. P. Kostenko. No, he did not dispute the data VNII Transmash, but considered the criteria used and, in particular, ignoring the cost factor, insufficient. We believe it is necessary to present Yu. P. Kostenko’s reasoning in more detail: “Let’s evaluate the specific situation in domestic tank building. which took place at the beginning of 1989. Let us consider two tanks of the same type that were in mass production and in service. Let us conventionally designate them as tanks No. 1 and No. 2. In accordance with the then existing methodology, the technical level coefficient of tank No. 1 is 1.25, and that of tank No. 2 is 1.15. Without taking into account the economic characteristics, tank No. 1 has some advantage. What are the meanings of these characteristics? The cost of tank No. 1 is 824 thousand rubles, including the engine 104 thousand rubles. The cost of tank No. 2 is 280 thousand rubles, including the engine 15 thousand rubles. The serial production of tanks No. 1 is significantly less than that of tanks No. 2, but this circumstance does not determine the high cost of tank No. 1, but its structural and technological complexity" [100].

Yu. P. Kostenko’s designations “tanks No. 1 and No. 2” are not too complex camouflages for the T-80U and T-72B. Only one Soviet tank engine GTD-1000TF cost 104 thousand rubles; and the wholesale price of the T-72B tank according to data for 1988 was 271,100 rubles, i.e. even less than the figure accepted in the calculations of Yu. P. Kostenko. It turns out an interesting picture for the amount required to produce ONE tank. T-80U, it was possible to build THREE T-726 tanks. Therefore, Yu. P. Kostenko introduced another cost indicator into the calculation of the VTU and obtained the following figures: if the VTU of the T-80U tank is 1.25, the T-726 tank is 3.38. In other words, within the framework of the “cost efficiency” criterion, the T-72B is 2.7 times higher than the T-80U [101]. To the above, we can add that in Soviet times, cost was directly related to labor intensity. This means that the labor and power required to produce 3 T-72B tanks ensured the production of only one T-80. Of course, in battle one “eighty” cannot replace three “seventy-two”.

The gap in operating costs for the T-80 and T-72 is not as large as in production costs, but is also expressed in convincing figures. According to calculations made in 1997 for the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the cost of major repairs and depreciation and operating costs per 1 km of run for the “eighty” are tens of percent higher than for the T-72 [102].

In general, no matter how you think about it, price matters.

 

[Antares]

Tuo käyttäjä on kiinnostava. Hän on muutaman kerran linkannut minun videoihin, ja joka kerta saatteeksi ollut syväluotaavia havaintoja.

Lisäksi hän on muutaman kerran poiminut yksityiskohtia useammalta minun videolta, ja koostanut niistä kokonaiskuvaa.

Eli todistetusti hän on ainakin valmis näkemään vaivaa tietojensa eteen. Ja en nyt ota ollenkaan kantaa kandeeko minun videoita käyttää lähteenä vai ei.

Otetaanpa muistin aikana talteen nämä kaksi hänen kirjoittamaansa kirjaa. Muistin nähneeni nämä jo aikaisemmin mutta en ole ehtinyt tutustumaan niiden sisältöön (tästä selviää myös että Chung-Tzu twitter-tilin kirjoittaja on nimeltään Wen Jian Chung):

Should be on Amazon or via my publisher Helion

https://helion.co.uk/military-histo...mbts.php?sid=7dfdc7464639366eb8853f69631d1f4f

https://helion.co.uk/military-histo...ence.php?sid=7dfdc7464639366eb8853f69631d1f4f

https://twitter.com/x/status/1775281397550272795

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Tosin hän kirjoittaa myös näin: It's not my job, it's just a hobby LÄHDE

Eli vaikka onkin julkaissut kaksi kirjaa, pitää sitä harrastuksena eikä työnään.

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Viestiin tullut kommentti: @AndreiBtvt (eli Andrei Tarasenko)

Johon Chung-Tzu vastasi näin: He helped me a lot with the book, along with Vasiliy Chobitok LÄHDE