Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Uudesta maailmanjärjestyksestähän se putin on paasannut jo pitkään ja sitä hän tavoittelee. Mutta toivotaan tosiaan, ettei nämä konfliktit perkelöidy ihan totaalisesti.

Kyllähän se uusi maailmanjärjestys tulee. Siinä ryssien valta on olennaisempi vähäisempi ja sotilaallinen peloite pienempi mitä ennen sotaa. Ehkä Putler ei tätä tavoitellut.. :D
 
Väsyneeltä vaikuttaa tuo ryssien yritys saada kunnon pusku aikaiseksi. Varmaankin kuvittelivat, että kun saivat Hamasin huijattua aloittamaan hyökkäyksen Israelia vastaan ja aiheuttivat kaasuputkirikon Itämerellä, olisi koko läntinen tiedustelu niin sekaisin ja peukalo perseessä, että ryssät pääsisivät vaivihkaa raivolla kurittamaan ukrainalaisia.

Lopputuloksena ihan v*tusti kalusto- ja miestappioita ryssän Ukrainan rintamalla sekä se, että USA:ssa alettu koplata Ukrainan ja Israelin apupaketit yhteen, joten USA:n apu on mahdollisesti paljon helpompi saada läpi kongressissa.

Helpottui tuleva Ukrainan talvihyökkäys taas hieman.
 
Aika konkreettinen negatiivinen asia Israel hommassa joka vaikuttaa suoraan Ukrainaan. Israel pyytää ammuksia Saksalta. Tässä ei tietty eritellä että mitä mutta todennäköisesti jatkossa vähiä jaetaan kahden saajan kesken...
Israel on pommittanut Gazaa sen verran kovaa viime päivinä, että siellä saattavat olla lentopommit vähenemässä täsmäaseiden kohdalla:

Saksassa on jotain USA:n/Nato ammusvarastoja, joita voidaan tarvittaessa ottaa käyttöön, mutta käsittääkseni niiden tyhjentämiseen tarvitaan myös Saksan lupa. Israelissa on paljon omaa puolustusteollisuutta, eikä ammuskulutus varmaan ainakaan tykistön kohdalla nouse lähellekään Ukrainan lukemia, koska rintaman laajuus on sen verran pienempi.

Ainakin yksi syy lisää EU:n sotateollisuudelle alkaa rakentaa lisää kapasiteettia.
 
Aika konkreettinen negatiivinen asia Israel hommassa joka vaikuttaa suoraan Ukrainaan. Israel pyytää ammuksia Saksalta. Tässä ei tietty eritellä että mitä mutta todennäköisesti jatkossa vähiä jaetaan kahden saajan kesken...
Voi olla että on vähän muotoiltu erilailla toi pyyntö
https://apnews.com/article/germany-scholz-israel-aid-hamas-b38a3cf34895fbfc0c966bb27413886f

Puolustusministeriö ilmoitti hyväksyvänsä Israelin pyynnön käyttää enintään kahta viidestä Saksan armeijan tällä hetkellä vuokraamasta Heron TP -taisteludroneesta, jotka olivat jo Israelissa saksalaisten sotilaiden koulutukseen. Ja puolustusministeri Boris Pistorius sanoi Brysselissä, että Israel on pyytänyt ammuksia sotalaivoille, pyyntö, josta nyt keskustellaan.

Scholz kertoi Saksan parlamentille, että hän on pyytänyt Israelin pääministeriä Benjamin Netanjahua ilmoittamaan Saksalle kaikista tarpeista, "esimerkiksi haavoittuneiden hoidosta".

"Tällä hetkellä Saksalle on vain yksi paikka - paikka Israelin puolella", hän sanoi lainsäätäjille. "Oma historiamme, holokaustista johtuva vastuumme tekee meille ikuisena tehtävänä puolustaa Israelin valtion turvallisuutta."
 

Kybersoturit -dokumenttisarja seuraa Ukrainaa auttavia norjalaisia hakkereita​

Kaksiosainen norjalainen dokumenttisarja on äärimmäisen mielenkiintoinen sukellus tämän päivän sodankäyntiin.


Kybersoturit, torstai 12.10. klo 21.00, TV2
 

Viitatun linkin (LINKKI) takaa selviää, että he lainaavat Ukrainan Pravdan alkuperäistä ja pidempää Budanovin haastattelua. Lainaan sen tekstin kokonaisuudessaan spoilerin taakse, konekäännös englanniksi. Ukrainan Pravdan kysymykset lihavoituna ja Budanovin vastaukset normaalina tekstinä (artikkeli julkaistu 12.10.2023 tosin sisältö perustuu kahteen haastatteluun, toinen vanhempi, ennen Israeliin hyökkäämistä eli ainakin viikon vanha ja toinen osa on tuoreempi): LÄHDE

Kyrylo Budanov: We are fast approaching a global war

ROMAN KRAVETS — THURSDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2023, 05:30
PHOTO: NAZARIY MAZILYUK

https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2023/10/12/7423740/

Kyrylo Budanov: We are fast approaching a global war

ROMAN KRAVETS — THURSDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2023, 05:30
PHOTO: NAZARIY MAZILYUK


For the completeness of this interview, "Ukrainian Pravda" had to meet with the head of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense Kyril Budanov twice.

When we recorded the main part of the conversation, it was not yet known that there would be a brutal war in Israel . To ask additional questions about the events in the Middle East, we came to GUR again.

If we compare with our previous interviews , now Budanov is much more cautious in his predictions.

You will not find answers to questions about when the Armed Forces will enter Crimea or when the war will end.

Instead, we talked about how the war in Israel will affect Ukraine, what will happen next with military aid to our country, about the urgent need for air defense for the winter period.

The UP asked about the current situation at the front, how a terrorist attack on the ZNPP was avoided, and how long the Russian Federation has resources for a war with Ukraine.

Kyrylo Budanov also talked about Ramzan Kadyrov's illness , the situation with the "Wagner" PMC after the death of Yevhen Prigozhin, and about the most dangerous enemy for us in the Russian Federation.

If you are interested in the full version of the interview, watch it in video format.




- In your opinion, what is happening in Israel now?

- Israel's operation to regain control over its territories, counter-terrorist operation to release captured hostages and repulse terrorist attack is ongoing.

The situation is dangerous because, in addition to the problems in the southwest of the country, there is also a problem in the north of Israel from the Hezbollah group. It still carries out provocative shelling, to which the Israeli armed forces respond with artillery fire.

At the moment, the situation is, let's say, under control for everyone: both for Hezbollah and for Israel. And what will happen next - we'll see.



- After the start of the war in Israel, the world media came out with the headlines "Mossad slept through the attack by Hamas." How did it happen that the Israeli special services, about which books are written and films are made, missed the preparation of such a large attack?

- Listen, it is quite difficult to understand the enemy's intentions in time and give a clear answer that everything will start now.

I would refrain from condemning the Israeli intelligence agencies. Let's wait until it's all over and maybe we'll learn some facts we didn't know.



- Is there a Russian trace in this story?

- So. First of all, we clearly know that trophy weapons from Ukraine were still transferred by the Russians to the Hamas group . It is mostly infantry weapons.

There is some information that something was going to Hezbollah, but we don't know for sure at this point.

Everyone could see the video on social networks - a completely, let's say, natural for our region and completely unnatural for the Middle East tactic, when FPV drones were used against armored vehicles.

This is the know-how of our war after all. No one other than people who passed through our theater of war could do such a thing. Since we were not there, it means that it was the Russians.

Two more interesting facts. First: a little more than a week before the start of these actions, the Russian station "Sputnik" began to officially speak in Arabic on the territory of Lebanon. This is broadcast in an absolutely propagandist style with clear Russian narratives.

Second: on September 24, a Russian spacecraft capable of conducting radio-electronic reconnaissance and intercepting satellite signals was moved to Israel's geostationary orbit.

Let me remind you that in the period from September 22 to 24, there was an official visit of the Russian military delegation to Iran. We know that there were several, shall we say, wishes from the Iranian side. One of them concerned the expansion of intelligence capabilities.

It is now clear what intelligence information the Russians began to provide to all interested parties. I emphasize that it is not Iran alone, but all interested parties.



- Israel is currently conducting an operation in the Gaza Strip and can take it under full control. Under such conditions, how will Lebanon, Iran, Egypt behave?

– ( Pauses ) The most difficult question. What we believe will happen is a more or less rapid entry of the Israel Defense Forces into the Gaza Strip, the restoration of order and, as they usually do, an equally rapid withdrawal.

But the Hezbollah organization, which is mostly based in Lebanon, and certain parts of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from Iran have directly stated that if the Israeli Armed Forces begin to enter the Gaza Strip, they will start their ground operations from the north and northeast. It is meant from the territory of Lebanon and the territory of Syria.

A lot of disparate units are moving across the territory of Syria closer to the border with Israel. Hezbollah is all mobilized now, everyone is also pulling up to the border.

A few days ago, there was a visit of senior representatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is quite clear that their units will also participate in this.



- How will all these events be reflected in the Russian-Ukrainian war, primarily in terms of military aid to us?

- My subjective opinion: if the conflict will be limited in time, up to a few weeks, then in principle there is nothing to worry about.

But if the situation drags on, it is quite clear that there will be certain problems with the fact that it will be necessary to supply weapons and ammunition not only to Ukraine.



- It is obvious that in recent days you had communication with Israeli special services. Will we somehow help them?

- First of all, we have to take care of our citizens.

A significant number of Ukrainians are in Israel and several hundred people in the Gaza Strip - this is a big problem.

The other day, a group of children from the territory controlled by Israel was taken to Ukraine.

What to do with the Gaza Strip is a question we are all trying to solve together now. It is a priority, as, by the way, is the previous issue you voiced, regarding armaments, for our president.

He is making every effort to, firstly, save all our people, and secondly, so that security assistance to Ukraine does not decrease in any way.



- Are we standing on the threshold of the Third World War?

- Rhetorical question ( thinking ). The answer to it will not be so simple.

This is my subjective assessment: based on the totality of geography, we see several conflicts that at first glance seem to be regional, except for Ukraine, but they are all connected by the same countries that are involved in these processes.

So yes, I believe we are approaching global war pretty quickly after all.



- We will meet in October 2023. Last year, during the same period, the Russian Federation carried out massive shelling of our energy infrastructure. What should Ukrainians prepare for in the coming months?

- You mentioned the tragic part of our history, which was connected with the Russians' attempt to blackout us .

Then, thank God, he did not succeed. But there are no special adjustments in their plans, so they will continue to do it this season. Unfortunately, we are once again in the battle for electricity.


- What are their real abilities to attack us? What will they beat?

- They have enough forces and means, because recently they have carried out limited missile strikes.

The enemy recovered a certain supply. This reserve is not very significant, but it is sufficient to create very real problems not only for our energy sector, but also for the oil and gas sector, industrial enterprises, and military facilities.


- What means for the defense forces do we need now, apart from air defense systems?

- Air defense is the most important problem. Because everything they hit with, one way or another flies. So we need a lot more air defense than we have now.


- Can we expect military aid from our partners next year to remain at approximately the same level as now?

- I will answer your question a little indirectly.

Until the middle of next year, we do not see any particular problems with military aid. And then everything will depend on us - how we can correctly communicate, show and explain our needs to everyone, as well as establish an increase in our production.


- The question is somewhat provocative: should we expect blackouts in Moscow this winter?

– ( Pauses and smiles ) Temporary, perhaps.

This is a completely logical phenomenon, when you take some bad steps, sooner or later it will come back to you.


- In a previous interview with "Ukrainian Pravda" you stated that we had every chance to end the war already this year. What went wrong?

- There are objective and subjective reasons - all in a complex. But, sorry, most of the explanations for this are state secrets and are simply not for public discussion. Over time, it will all become clear.


- Then how long are we behind schedule?

- We got out of it. We are not lagging behind, but we have made it out. This is a completely different interpretation.


- That is, everything went to pieces at all?

- Not everything went smoothly. Let's go without clarifying and clarifying all this - we got out of the schedule - let everyone draw their own conclusion.



- Questions for you as a member of the Stavka . What should we expect in the near future in the south and east?

- Our offensive operation continues in the south. How is it there and what is happening - please ask the General Staff.

Further, we have powerful events on the return of Bakhmut. The fact that fierce battles are going on there is certainly not a secret for anyone. But, as you can see, slowly, step by step, it goes there.


- About Bakhmut, in fact, President Zelenskyi said in Washington that we are de-occupying Bakhmut . Will we be able to liberate the city by the end of the year?

- I really hope for that.


- In the context of the south, the situation at the ZNPP is interesting. In the summer, everyone talked about the threat of a terrorist attack at the station . What is the current situation there?

- It is still threatening, as we all have to remember that the station remains occupied. And in principle, nothing globally has changed there.

The only thing is that the moment of crisis, thank God, we passed. I will not reveal to you the data, how and what was done for this. But we passed it at that time.

However, this does not remove the question that if Russia wants to do something similar again, it will have every opportunity to do so.

Can we prevent this from happening again? I hope we can.


- To get through this crisis moment at the ZNPP, did you personally connect?

- Nothing in the world happens by itself - that's all I can say.


- What did they actually plan to do at the ZNPP?

- They wanted to artificially create a man-made disaster. It's not about detonating a nuclear plant in the sense that everyone understands that there was a bang - and radiation flew in all directions. They wanted to do something much more interesting there: artificial overload of the system and controlled emission of radiation. That is, localized by place.

All such games always end very badly. According to our understanding, this would definitely lead to a real nuclear disaster.



- How did the death of the owner of the "Wagner" PVK Prigozhin affect the deployment of forces in the Russian army?

- Regarding the death of Prigozhin, let's say this: all I can tell you is that until now, we do not have a single fact confirming his death.

I don't know if he died or not.

And what was the impact of what was shown? Well, it is quite understandable that there has been a certain weakening within the PMC. It's good for us, what's there to hide. "Wagner" was a very serious adversary when it acted as a PMK.

But you should remember that when they started to leave Bakhmut, I said that we would not see them again as PMC "Wagner" in Ukraine. After all, you can see it now.


- Are they concluding contracts with Rosgvadiya now?

- This is a small percentage - the first thing to say. And the second: they conclude (contracts - UP) as separate natural persons, each separately.


- What does Prigozhin's death change in the context of our war?

- This gives a huge chance and hope that PVK "Wagner" as a single body will not fight here. This was actually a huge problem for Ukraine. No matter what anyone said, they knew how to fight.


- On the eve of Prigozhin's rebellion, did he have any communication with the GUR? Was Ukrainian intelligence somehow involved in the mutiny?

- I am not sure that I will be able to provide you with answers to such questions. Sorry. Let's leave this question open.


- Then the question about Kadyrov. There was a lot of news about his illness, the Secretary of the NSDC Danilov even stated that he could have been poisoned . But at the same time, Kadyrov posted videos and photos, appeared in the media. Can you explain what is happening?

- He has health problems, that's true. That episode you just mentioned, he was really sick, but he recovered.

This too must be admitted whether we like it or not.


- What does sick mean? Did you get sick with Covid or something?

- He has kidney problems. There was a threat to his life, but he passed it.


- General Serhiy Surovikin. How is life for him after Prigozhin?

- He was removed from the position of commander of the Air and Space Forces, given a nominal position.

He lives normally. Of course, it no longer has the same influence as it used to have. But, in the end, again, it is good for Ukraine.

He was quite tough in making decisions and was not afraid to take responsibility. And this is a problem for us.

Now he lives quietly, is engaged in analytical work.


- Was he seriously integrated into the rebellion?

- It cannot be said that he was integrated into the rebellion. It's just that he had a very close relationship with Prigozhin.

He did everything so that, in the eyes of the Russians, he did not issue criminal orders to strike at his own.

And PVK "Wagner" is Russia. His role was there.


- Who in the Kremlin is responsible for Ukraine, who is the most informed?

- Kiriyenko has a real influence on economic issues .

And if in general, any decision in the Russian Federation can be influenced by Mr. Vaino ( chairman of the AP of the Russian Federation – UP ).

Few people in our country know this surname. But in fact, his influence is huge.

There is also a military bloc, where Shoigu maintains his influence.


- After the story with Prigozhin, did his influence increase?

- He exhaled, let's say so ( laughs ).


- Among the Russian generals, who is the most dangerous opponent for us now?

- Not ready to answer. But there is a person who always brought problems to Ukraine. This is General Beseda ( head of the 5th service of the FSB - UP ). A very problematic person. He did a lot of harm to Ukraine. Well, nothing, time will sort everything out.


- Russian media reported that after the start of a full-scale war, Beseda was arrested and sent to a pre-trial detention center . What happened to him?

- Beseda was suspended from his duties for a certain period of time. But then everything got better. Now he is engaged in his work, unfortunately, not at all for the benefit of Ukraine.


- What exactly does he do?

- Active operations on the territory of Ukraine.


- Then explain how the work of the GRU of the Russian Federation in Ukraine differs from the work of the FSB here?

- Radically different approaches, different people, different forms, methods of work. The GRU is more of a military intelligence. The FSB is more civilian work. Generally speaking, politicians, businessmen, and so on.

The GRU should concentrate its efforts more on working with the military.


- Is the FSB now trying to recruit Ukrainian officials?

- This question is not for me, but for the SBU, sorry.


- Then how do you assess the work of Russian intelligence during a full-scale war?

- Agency intelligence has failed, and electronic and cyber intelligence is at a very high level. As high as possible, I would say.


- Were there major special operations of Russian intelligence during a full-scale war, or are they only able to poison their own opposition abroad?

- I don't remember any serious ones. The only thing that can be recognized is the operations of their special intelligence.

Unfortunately, their subversive groups work quite well in our border areas in the north of the country.

They enter through Russia - Bryansk, Kursk regions. They enter there, conduct ambushes very often, sometimes even make raids and go back.


- According to your estimates, how long can the war last?

- Regarding resources, let's talk about the facts.

According to the economic assessment, Russia can afford it until 2025 without any particular problems. By the amount of equipment - until 2026, the maximum. Maybe a little faster, because the rate of technology recovery that they have now is not that high.

That is, we are leaving with you somewhere in 2025. In terms of human resources, it is obvious that they will last for a long time.

But no matter what anyone says, if you evaluate our human resources as a whole, it will be there for a long time, too. Our country is not so small.

Another matter is whether the Russian Federation is ready to go to the upper limit, to the last one?

In fact, they are all fighting mobilized, they feel a lack of ammunition, a lack of weapons.



- But they cover this lack through cooperation with Iran and North Korea?

- And we cover this lack through cooperation with the United States, Britain, the civilized world. And what? However, you must understand that the total cost of arming ammunition is much greater than what can be produced. As for us with our allies, so for them with their allies.

The world was not ready for a war of such intensity. And this, by the way, is one of the conclusions that all countries will definitely draw after that.

Everyone will try to build up their arsenals.


- When will it be time for negotiations in the war?

- What do you mean? Just talk at some point? Freezing the conflict?

This cannot be allowed. First, it will be a betrayal of the people who will remain in the occupied territories. Secondly, it is wrong from the point of view of the memory of those who died and those who are currently fighting.

The opportunity for diplomacy will come when the war is over.

No war in the world has ended without the signing of a bilateral, multilateral treaty to end the war or something similar. There are many formats, but the war always ends - it is necessary to somehow get along with everyone.

But in our case, this is possible only when the occupiers leave or at least begin to leave Ukraine along the borders of 1991.

And the Russians want - let's leave everything as it is now and start a conversation.

No, I'm telling you, it will just be a betrayal of our people.

It should also be remembered that several million people are currently living under occupation, and they are waiting for their release. This, by the way, is one of the main functions of the state.



- On the part of the Russian Federation, there is a real probing of the points precisely on the basis of the negotiations?

- Most likely, you are right.



- Is this happening along the line of intelligence?

- No, there are attempts to probe the international position and the position within Ukraine in completely different ways.



- Come on, your personal opinion: is it realistic, when will the time for negotiations come?

- Either when we return our territories by military means, or when events develop in such a way that there will be a clear certainty that Russia really begins to withdraw its troops from the borders of 1991.

-

Roman Kravets, UP

Photo and video by Nazariy Mazilyuk

-

Paljon mielenkiintoista asiaa, mutta minua henkilökohtaisesti kiinnostaa eniten hänen arvionsa sodan jatkumisesta. Lainaan sen alle. Ukrainan Pravdan kysymykset lihavoituna ja Budanovin vastaukset normaalina tekstinä:

- According to your estimates, how long can the war last?

- Regarding resources, let's talk about the facts.

According to the economic assessment, Russia can afford it until 2025 without any particular problems. By the amount of equipment - until 2026, the maximum. Maybe a little faster, because the rate of technology recovery that they have now is not that high.

That is, we are leaving with you somewhere in 2025. In terms of human resources, it is obvious that they will last for a long time.

But no matter what anyone says, if you evaluate our human resources as a whole, it will be there for a long time, too. Our country is not so small.

Another matter is whether the Russian Federation is ready to go to the upper limit, to the last one?

In fact, they are all fighting mobilized, they feel a lack of ammunition, a lack of weapons.

- But they cover this lack through cooperation with Iran and North Korea?

- And we cover this lack through cooperation with the United States, Britain, the civilized world. And what? However, you must understand that the total cost of arming ammunition is much greater than what can be produced. As for us with our allies, so for them with their allies.

The world was not ready for a war of such intensity. And this, by the way, is one of the conclusions that all countries will definitely draw after that.

Everyone will try to build up their arsenals.


-

Budanovin mukaan sodan jatkaminen nykyisen kaltaisena ei muodosta suurempaa ongelmaa Venäjälle vuoden 2024 osalta / vuoden 2025 alkuun asti.

Kaluston osalta hän asettaa takarajan vuoden 2025 loppuun / vuoden 2026 alkuun, mutta sanoo että tämä on maksimi.

Ihmisten määrän kannalta katsottuna "takaraja" on teoriassa kauempana, mutta samalla talous sukeltaa eikä ole millä aseistaa näitä massoja. Täten hän asettaa "yhdistetyn takarajan" jonnekin vuoden 2025 ajalle.

Lisäksi hän kysyy, kuinka lähelle "takarajaa" Venäjä on halukas menemään. Minun pohdintaa: ollaanko valmiit menettämään esim. kaikki se kalusto, jota on varastoitu ja saatu Neuvostoliiton perintönä? Jos se menetetään, kaikki sen jälkeen pitää valmistaa uutena eli ei ole paluuta entiseen tilanteeseen, koska varastot ovat tyhjät eikä Neuvostoliiton kaltainen sotatalous ole tulossa takaisin. Ei siis ole kapasiteettia täyttää varastoja uusiksi, ei ainakaan kaikkien aseiden osalta eikä siten kuten Neuvostoliiton aikana tehtiin.

Stanimir Dobrev on kirjoittanut aikaisemmin että Venäjän talous kestää sodan vuoden 2023 loppuun, mutta ongelmien pitäisi alkaa näkyä siinä vaiheessa. Ei tarkoita mitään romahdusta, mutta sitä että joudutaan tekemään kipeitä ja näkyviä leikkauksia, koska kaikkeen ei ole varaa (koska sota maksaa). Vuoden 2024 pitäisi olla selvästi vaikeampi vuosi, mutta ei ole odotettavissa romahdusta vaan tasainen kurjistuma. Budanovin kertoman mukaan talouden pitäisi kestää vuoden 2024 loppuun ilman ongelmia, mutta sen jälkeen tilanne on vaikeampi.

Parasta kääntää siis kelloja eteenpäin: katsellaan rauhassa yksi vuosi eteenpäin, sota ei tule päättymään vuonna 2024 (jos ei tapahdu jotain ihmettä). Jos ryssä aikoo todellakin käyttää kaikki varastot tyhjäksi eikä saa lisää tilalle muualta (Pohjois-Korea, Kiina, Iran) niin siinä tilanteessa voi huoletta laittaa herätyskellon soimaan kahden vuoden kuluttua eli vuoden 2025 lopulla. Toki tässä oletetaan se että Ukraina kykenee jatkamaan sotaa sinne asti ja toisaalta se että sota jatkuu aitona kulutussotana kahden vuoden ajan.

-

Meidän Pekka Toveri arvioi Budanovin näkemystä näin:

Kuulostaa realistiselta. Venäjä pystyy jatkamaan sotaa kohtuullisella intensiteetillä hyvinkin pari vuotta. Mutta Venäjä ei pysty jatkamaan sotaa noilla Avdiivkan tappioluvuilla vuosia.

 
Viimeksi muokattu:
RFU:ssa eilisen taisteluista Avdiivkan tienoilla.

Tämän mukaan ryssä vähensi tankkien/IFV käyttöä selvästi toisena päivänä.
Nuo kunniataulun edelleen korkeat luvut saattavat olla nyt ihan "ruuhkan purkua", torjuntataistelut ovat niin massiivisia, ettei välttämättä saada tietoa eteenpäin yhtä nopeasti kuin normaalisti.


 
Mielenkiintoinen pätkä Javelin osumasta. Nimittäin onko tämä nyt nauhoitus Javelinin omasta laukaisuyksiköstä? En ole sellaista aiemmin nähnyt. Ajattelin ensin että olisi Stugna-P:n ruudun läpi kuvattu mutta tekstitys yms. ei vastaa Stugnaa noin äkkiseltään.

 
Tästä on kuultu jo yli vuoden ajan: "ei-askeltakaan-taaksepäin"

Russians are using barrier troops in Avdiivka to push forward those who flee due to losses, says Ukrainian soldier.

After getting shelled with cluster munitions, a group of 40 men in the Storm Z penal battalion started to flee. A Russian BMP arrived and started firing at them to return to the battlefield.

A video has been promised for later.

https://t.me/stanislav_osman/3675

 
RFU:ssa eilisen taisteluista Avdiivkan tienoilla.

Tämän mukaan ryssä vähensi tankkien/IFV käyttöä selvästi toisena päivänä.
Nuo kunniataulun edelleen korkeat luvut saattavat olla nyt ihan "ruuhkan purkua", torjuntataistelut ovat niin massiivisia, ettei välttämättä saada tietoa eteenpäin yhtä nopeasti kuin normaalisti.



Edelleen RFU:n mukaan aluepuolustusprikaati (sodan alkupuolen "makkaranpaistajat" ... varusteet nykyään ihan jotain muuta) nimenomaan kohtasi toisen lännestä tulevan pääiskun. 129. Aluepuolutusprikaatin videota alla.

 
Paljon mielenkiintoista asiaa, mutta minua henkilökohtaisesti kiinnostaa eniten hänen arvionsa sodan jatkumisesta. Lainaan sen alle. Ukrainan Pravdan kysymykset lihavoituna ja Budanovin vastaukset normaalina tekstinä:

- According to your estimates, how long can the war last?

- Regarding resources, let's talk about the facts.

According to the economic assessment, Russia can afford it until 2025 without any particular problems. By the amount of equipment - until 2026, the maximum. Maybe a little faster, because the rate of technology recovery that they have now is not that high.

That is, we are leaving with you somewhere in 2025. In terms of human resources, it is obvious that they will last for a long time.

But no matter what anyone says, if you evaluate our human resources as a whole, it will be there for a long time, too. Our country is not so small.

Another matter is whether the Russian Federation is ready to go to the upper limit, to the last one?

In fact, they are all fighting mobilized, they feel a lack of ammunition, a lack of weapons.

- But they cover this lack through cooperation with Iran and North Korea?

- And we cover this lack through cooperation with the United States, Britain, the civilized world. And what? However, you must understand that the total cost of arming ammunition is much greater than what can be produced. As for us with our allies, so for them with their allies.

The world was not ready for a war of such intensity. And this, by the way, is one of the conclusions that all countries will definitely draw after that.

Everyone will try to build up their arsenals.


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Budanovin mukaan sodan jatkaminen nykyisen kaltaisena ei muodosta suurempaa ongelmaa Venäjälle vuoden 2024 osalta / vuoden 2025 alkuun asti.

Kaluston osalta hän asettaa takarajan vuoden 2025 loppuun / vuoden 2026 alkuun, mutta sanoo että tämä on maksimi.

Ihmisten määrän kannalta katsottuna "takaraja" on teoriassa kauempana, mutta samalla talous sukeltaa eikä ole millä aseistaa näitä massoja. Täten hän asettaa "yhdistetyn takarajan" jonnekin vuoden 2025 ajalle.

Lisäksi hän kysyy, kuinka lähelle "takarajaa" Venäjä on halukas menemään. Minun pohdintaa: ollaanko valmiit menettämään esim. kaikki se kalusto, jota on varastoitu ja saatu Neuvostoliiton perintönä? Jos se menetetään, kaikki sen jälkeen pitää valmistaa uutena eli ei ole paluuta entiseen tilanteeseen, koska varastot ovat tyhjät eikä Neuvostoliiton kaltainen sotatalous ole tulossa takaisin. Ei siis ole kapasiteettia täyttää varastoja uusiksi, ei ainakaan kaikkien aseiden osalta eikä siten kuten Neuvostoliiton aikana tehtiin.

Stanimir Dobrev on kirjoittanut aikaisemmin että Venäjän talous kestää sodan vuoden 2023 loppuun, mutta ongelmien pitäisi alkaa näkyä siinä vaiheessa. Ei tarkoita mitään romahdusta, mutta sitä että joudutaan tekemään kipeitä ja näkyviä leikkauksia, koska kaikkeen ei ole varaa (koska sota maksaa). Vuoden 2024 pitäisi olla selvästi vaikeampi vuosi, mutta ei ole odotettavissa romahdusta vaan tasainen kurjistuma. Budanovin kertoman mukaan talouden pitäisi kestää vuoden 2024 loppuun ilman ongelmia, mutta sen jälkeen tilanne on vaikeampi.

Parasta kääntää siis kelloja eteenpäin: katsellaan rauhassa yksi vuosi eteenpäin, sota ei tule päättymään vuonna 2024 (jos ei tapahdu jotain ihmettä). Jos ryssä aikoo todellakin käyttää kaikki varastot tyhjäksi eikä saa lisää tilalle muualta (Pohjois-Korea, Kiina, Iran) niin siinä tilanteessa voi huoletta laittaa herätyskellon soimaan kahden vuoden kuluttua eli vuoden 2025 lopulla. Toki tässä oletetaan se että Ukraina kykenee jatkamaan sotaa sinne asti ja toisaalta se että sota jatkuu aitona kulutussotana kahden vuoden ajan.

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Meidän Pekka Toveri arvioi Budanovin näkemystä näin:

Kuulostaa realistiselta. Venäjä pystyy jatkamaan sotaa kohtuullisella intensiteetillä hyvinkin pari vuotta. Mutta Venäjä ei pysty jatkamaan sotaa noilla Avdiivkan tappioluvuilla vuosia.


Kirjoitin aikaisemmassa viestissäni näin: LINKKI

Ukrainalaisen vishun OSINT-ryhmän 20.8.2023 julkaisema arvio ryssän panssarivaunujen määrästä Ukrainassa sekä kyvystä valmistaa uusia / modernisoida ja aktivoida vanhoja varastovaunuja (heidän arvio: 90-130 kpl per kuukausi ja tätä tahtia voidaan jatkaa (ainakin?) vuoden loppuun asti): LÄHDE

⚡️Military Fortune Teller

⚡️How many tanks does the enemy have now? Analysis of machine losses and recovery.

Losses and the number of tank troops of the Russian Federation. Enemy losses from April 8 to August 6 — 608 tanks. Taking into account the losses and completion of units during this time, the enemy increased its grouping from 1,650 to 2,200 tanks — 550 units (about 20% were already available in other parts), that is, the enemy grouping during this time was replenished by more than 1,100 units. tanks (Tanks from bases, factories in this case amount to 850-900 units.
In particular:

How many tanks does deconservation give?

The deconservation of up to 100 units of T-55 tanks (from 400-600 at storage bases) was visually recorded. More than 600 units were also handed over from autumn. T-62 tanks (there were 1300-1400). It can be said for sure that now these tanks will be delivered to the front every month in batches of up to 30-40 units. Now the Russians began to actively empty storage bases with T-80 tanks - according to our data, there were about 1,000-1,500 of them in Russia. (On BZVT to full-scale), you can already see these tanks more often at the front.

How long can the trend of compensating for tank losses last?

Russia's ability to restore, repair, and produce tanks is 90-130 units per month, and such trends will persist until the end of the year.


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Tehdäänpä huvikseen karkea ns. tupakka-askin kansi -laskelma:

1) Yllä lainattu vishun-ryhmän arvio sanoo että ryssällä olisi ollut 2 200 kpl panssarivaunuja Ukrainassa arvion julkaisun aikaan eli 20.8.2023

2) Ukrainan ilmoittama "päivän numero" 20.8.2023 eli ryssän menettämien panssarivaunujen määrä oli 4 346 kpl LÄHDE

3) Oletetaan että ryssällä oli karkeasti ottaen 3 + 3 + 3 eli 9 000 kpl käyttökelpoisia panssarivaunuja sodan alussa: noin 3 000 kpl aktiivijoukoilla, noin 3 000 kpl varastoissa nopeahkosti aktivoitavissa ja noin 3 000 kpl hitaasti aktivoitavissa. Oletetaan että kaikki muut "varastovaunut" ovat verrattavissa romurautaan eli niistä ei olisi apua tämän sodan osalta. Oletetaan myös että panssarivaunujen uustuotantoa ei tapahdu.

Eli tämän perusteella 20.8.2023 tienoilla ryssällä olisi ollut 9 000 - 2 200 - 4 346 = 2 454 kpl panssarivaunuja joko modernisoitavana, aktivoitavana tai varastotukikohdassa odottamassa vuoroaan.

Vishun ryhmä arvioi että ryssä kykenee tuottamaan korvaavaa kalustoa 90-130 panssarivaunua per kuukausi. Kauanko varastovaunut riittävät tällä tahdilla?

2 454 / 90 = 27,26667...
2 454 / 130 = 18,8769....

Kerrotun vaihteluvälin keskiarvo on 110, joten sillä laskien saadaan:

2 454 / 110 = 22,3090909...

Varastojen tyhjennys voisi siis jatkua 22 kuukauden ajan tai hieman pyöristäen noin kahden vuoden ajan. Tuo on hyvin linjassa sen kanssa mitä Budanov kommentoi.

Toki jos kaikki yllä tehdyt numerot ja oletukset pitäisivät paikkansa, niin tuossa vaiheessa varastot olisivat tyhjät. Mikä määrä ryssällä olisi vaunuja Ukrainassa, se riippuu siitä, millaisella tahdilla vaunuja menetetään JA pysyykö kyseinen tahti vakiona (tuskin).

Sanomattakin selvää että tässä on kyseessä karkea yksinkertaistus, jota ei pidä ottaa liian tosissaan.

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MUOKKAUS: Voidaan myös laskea yhtä karkeasti vaunumenetysten perusteella: aikaväli 24.2.2022 - 20.8.2023 on karkeasti ottaen 18 kuukautta.

4 346 / 18 = 241,1111 per kuukausi, pyöristetään 240

(2 200 + 2 454) / 240 = 19,391666...

Tällä keskiarvoisella tahdilla jäljellä oleva vaunumäärä loppuisi hieman vajaassa 20 kuukaudessa. Tämäkin on linjassa Budanovin tuumailun kanssa että vuoden 2025 lopulla tulisi vastaan eräänlainen takaraja - olettaen että meno jatkuu tällaisena loppuun asti.

Molempien osalta tulee muistaa: numerot ovat 20.8.2023 eli kohta kaksi kuukautta vanhoja. Molemmista laskelmista voi siis halutessaan vähentää kaksi kuukautta pois. Ei vaikuta suuremmin lopputulemaan, tosin jälkimmäisen osalta 17 kuukautta tästä päivästä eteenpäin osuisi keväälle 2025, maalis-huhtikuun seudulle. Jos tahdin olettaa hidastuvan vuoden 2024 ja varsinkin vuoden 2025 aikana, niin silloin voi huoletta merkitä kalenteriin vuoden 2025 lopun / vuoden 2026 alun.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
FPRI-ajatuspajan vanhempi asiantuntija Rob Lee on koonnut yhteen ja jakanut laajaa video- ja kuva-aineistoa, joissa näkyy venäläisten hyökänneen Avdijivkaan molemmilta sivustoilta panssarivaunujen, tykistön ja ilma-alusten tukemina.

Samalla näkyvät hyökkääjän kärsimät tappiot.

 
Horlivkan silta tämän mukaan tuhottiin JDAM:lla.

Aika riskikkäitä lentoja nämä kyllä, pommit pitänee tiputtaa pikaisella "loftauksella" läheltä etulinjaa. Bakhmutiin näitä on ainakin aiemmin tiputettu. Wikipedian mukaan Ukrainalla olisi käytössä JDAM-ER, jossa on jonkinlainen oma boosteri eli ei mene pelkällä siipikitillä. Tuo antanee enemmän pelivaraa.

 
Myroshnykovilta pikakommentti Avdiivkasta. Tarkempaa raporttia myöhemmin
----

The occupiers in the Avdiivka area did NOT seize the slag accumulator near the AKHZ.

Also, they did NOT break through to Berdychi.

All this is hostile disinformation, which for some reason we still drag into our infospace.

The enemy had only local successes of a tactical nature, and even then, he was far from able to gain a foothold everywhere.

I will give a full picture of the situation and the enemy's advance sometime during the night.

 
Duuma hyväksyi lakiehdotuksen jonka mukaan Venäjän sankareille annetaan viljelysmaata. Liekö viljelysmaan antaminen lahjaksi merkki sotilaiden taustasta eli suurkaupunkien ulkopuolelta vai jonkinlainen yritys palata vanhaan hyvään aikaan esim. roomalaislegioonalaisten saamiin maatiloihin.

The bill on the allocation of land plots to Heroes of Russia was adopted in the first reading​

The State Duma adopted in the first reading a bill on the allocation of land plots to Heroes of the USSR, Heroes of Russia and full holders of the Order of Glory. Information about this was posted on the website of the lower house of parliament on October 12.

The bill proposes to supplement the benefits of Heroes of the USSR, Heroes of Russia and full holders of the Order of Glory, as well as members of their families in terms of providing them with land plots in state or municipal ownership for the implementation of peasant (farm) activities. In addition, relatives of deceased heroes are given the right to a one-time grant of ownership of a property.

As State Duma deputy (United Russia Faction), member of the Budget and Tax Committee Nikita Chaplin noted, this initiative is needed primarily to support military families.

“Now the law only provides for the right to receive a land plot for individual housing construction, gardening and vegetable gardening, and private household plots. As of January, there were more than 600 Heroes of Russia in our country. Can you imagine how their number has grown in another six months of conducting the SVO,” Chaplin emphasized.

In his opinion, it would also be appropriate to expand this support measure for holders of the Order of Courage and provide them with the right to receive land plots for farming.

“Families will be able to start farming while they wait for their heroes from the front line, and the participants of the SVO will have income upon their return. It would also be important to give the families of holders of the Order of Courage the right to receive land plots in the event of the death of a participant in hostilities. It is very important now to fully support the families of our heroes and take care of their well-being,” the deputy noted.

It was reported the day before that the Russian government was proposed to reduce the mortgage rate to 2% for mobilized SVO participants. Anatoly Vyborny, deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee on Security and Anti-Corruption, made such a request to Deputy Prime Minister and Chief of Staff of the Cabinet of Ministers Dmitry Grigorenko. The document is at the disposal of Izvestia.
https://iz.ru/1588260/2023-10-12/za...stkov-geroiam-rossii-priniat-v-pervom-chtenii
 
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