– Once upon a time, during the 2022-2023 heating season, the Russians first launched these "X-shki" or "kalibry" missiles every 7 days, during the day, 50-100 missiles at our energy facilities. Then this interval increased to 10 days, then to 14 days. At night, they also launched "shahedi" missiles - not every night - which also finished off our energy facilities.
It was more or less clear that there was a certain systematicity to their strikes, which they inflicted in March of last year. They relied on regularity, mass attacks, and short intervals between attacks. And they really created a difficult situation for us in 3-4 weeks – there was little light.
Now they are launching "shaheeds", and they are using a minimum of missiles to strike our energy sector. What is their plan and intention now? Maybe they have given up on leaving us without electricity and causing a blackout here? I don't understand their plan.
– And the military intelligence of Ukraine understands. First, the strikes have become combined. Second, both the Russians and we have learned to properly plan the destruction of objects, while spending fewer missiles and unmanned aerial systems to achieve maximum results. Third, those priority objects are selected, the destruction of which will have the greatest effect.
Moreover, the strikes are not just combined – they are coordinated in time: missiles, drones, missiles again. This overloads the air defense system. The Russians understand what our capabilities are, where our air defense systems are located, in order to bypass them.
If 70 missiles were actually launched earlier, they all flew along the same route: they entered through the Luhansk region and headed straight for Kyiv. Now you won't see such a picture anymore. Missiles enter from any direction, fly across the territory of Ukraine, bypass all air defense facilities and areas and try to reach the target.
Therefore, now, on the contrary, everything has become much more complicated. We need to conduct maneuvers of air defense forces and means. Secondly, we understand when the Russians conduct reconnaissance of objects, which objects they are observing. After the strike, they immediately conduct additional reconnaissance and in a short time re-strike. This is, in fact, finishing off those objects that they did not hit during the first and second strikes.
At the same time, when they struck with 70 missiles, the effectiveness was not always high. Our air defense system worked very well when it had a sufficient number of anti-aircraft missiles. In addition, I repeat, these were simple straight-line strikes. Now it is completely different.
Plus, if then they could use 20-30 drones in one strike, now it is 150. This approach of the enemy requires a completely different attention of the air defense system and this is a completely different load on the system. Previously, they launched drones late at night and they arrived by morning. And now they can launch drones starting in the morning. The latest trends are the launch of drones in the evening, which begin to reach the target on our territory, starting from 11 p.m. until the very morning. That is, this is already happening continuously, which increases the level of the existing threat.
– What do the Russians have to do with the production of missiles?
– Compared to 2024, missile production has not increased significantly. But there has been a redistribution. They began to produce more Kh-101 cruise missiles, but less for the Caliber system, having assessed where the efficiency is greater. The enemy also plans to increase the production of Daggers and ballistic missiles for the Iskander - this is the very weapons that have proven to be more effective. But if we speak in absolute figures, then the increase in missile production compared to 2024 is no more than 1.2 times, and in some cases - one and a half times, if we are talking specifically about high-precision missile weapons.
– Tell me, what new information is there about soldiers from the DPRK? Are they at the front, are they not there, are they almost not there? In what number? And how would you characterize them as soldiers?
– Since mid-December 2024, they have been directly involved in combat operations. At the first stage, they suffered heavy losses. They were then taken out for recovery, for rest. The losses are about 4 thousand out of 11. These are very large losses for this period. However, from about the first decade of February, they began to be actively used again on the front in the Kursk region.
But that's not even important. What we need now is information on whether additional forces will be sent, whether there will simply be a rotation or replenishment of losses at the expense of other servicemen who will be brought in to replace the dead and wounded.
And the main thing – both for North Korea and for the countries of the Far East region – is that the DPRK military personnel have gained real experience of participating in combat operations with new technologies, with new tactics of conducting combat operations, with the use of artillery in combination with unmanned aerial vehicles, with the widespread use of FPV drones, new means of electronic warfare and new means of reconnaissance. This is a very powerful experience that few countries in the world have: we, the Russians, now – North Korea, and that's it. There is already a demand for this experience among many of our partners.
– Were these North Korean soldiers seen only in battles in the Kursk region, or somewhere else on the front?
– Directly recorded – only in the Kursk region. But we are already observing some weapons systems from the DPRK, primarily 170-mm artillery systems, multiple launch rocket systems from North Korea, on our territory. Are there their instructors there? Probably not, since the Russians have specially created a training center at the artillery school, where the calculations of the armed forces of the Russian Federation are directly trained to use North Korean systems.
We had confirmed information that North Korean military personnel provided assistance and participated in planning strikes using ballistic missiles of their own production, because this is a more complex complex, but it took place from Russian territory.
– Whose initiative was it in general – to send North Korean troops to help Russia in the fighting? This was an initiative that came from Russia, which asked for help. Or did the leader of the DPRK want it himself, for some of his own motives – for example, to gain experience?
– It is difficult to say, since both sides are interested in such cooperation. They signed a strategic agreement, by which they pledged to help each other. They benefit from this – both Russia and the DPRK. The Russian Federation will get what they need to wage war, and North Korea will increase its combat potential.
When I talk about North Korea, I'm talking about technology, new weapons, aviation, replenishment of ammunition. They give Russia their old ammunition, but in return they have launched the production of new ones and are simply updating their arsenals. And the most valuable thing that Pyongyang gets is technology and experience of military personnel in the introduction of modern combat operations.
Russia, in turn, received what it needs in war. Ammunition of various calibers, in particular 122 mm, 152 mm, rockets for multiple launch rocket systems. This is what the Russian Federation lacks, since Moscow cannot significantly increase the production of these ammunition by its military-industrial complex.
We are still recording the supply of ammunition from the DPRK to the territory of Russia. They go both by sea and by rail, then are sent to arsenals located closer to Ukraine (Moscow District, Southern Military District), and from there - directly to the battlefield.
– Something regularly flies into Russian refineries. We regularly see in the news that something flew into one refinery, and someone attacked another. Do we have any idea what proportion of their oil refining capacity has been knocked out as a result of these damages and flights?
– Yes. We are currently working according to NATO standards. NATO standards clearly provide for certain stages of such work. This includes the analysis of centers of gravity, and the direct targeting or determination of targets, the most critical places where strikes need to be carried out. Then the analysis of the results of the strikes. This forms the whole picture of the effect we have achieved. We are trying to achieve the greatest effect on those critical objects that are selected for strikes.
And in fact, it is not only about refineries or fuel and lubricant storage bases. We have a different range of targets that we choose for strikes. If we are talking about military facilities, our task is to destroy them. If we are talking about the military-industrial complex, the task is either to destroy them or to interrupt the production line, that is, to postpone this production for a certain period of time. Since it is very difficult to completely destroy a facility, and even more so - such powerful facilities of the defense-industrial complex that are on the territory of Russia. After all, these are very large and voluminous enterprises. However, we determine those critical elements that need to be struck.
These are also other military facilities, for example, the same enemy air defense facilities, because without their destruction we will not be able to deliver our strikes – the so-called deep strike. This is a set of measures carried out by all our Defense Forces under the coordination of the General Staff.
And we have the result – there is a decrease, for example, in production at oil refineries. It is not as significant as we would like, but it still has its impact. This decrease affects the supply of critical fuels and lubricants for enemy troops and aviation.
The results are reflected in the enemy's military facilities, for example, the Russian Black Sea Fleet. We forced all warships and submarines to completely move from the territory of Crimea directly to the territory of Russia. This also includes strikes on storage sites for ammunition, guided bombs and missiles, which does not allow the Russians to fully use their combat potential. That is, oil refineries, storage sites for fuels and lubricants are only one of the groups of targets that need to be hit to reduce the combat potential and ensure the grouping of Russian troops on our territory.
– During these three years of the Great War, were there any operations that the Russians planned, but which they managed to avert, to prevent?
– It is still too early to talk about this, because most of the operations that were planned to be carried out and did not take place were operations of the second half of 2024 - early 2025. The timely exposure of these plans occurred only because all military intelligence tools worked in one direction, and, as a result, we managed to take adequate measures. We became aware of the preparation and development by the enemy of a direct plan for conducting offensive actions in at least two directions, which did not take place during the second half of 2024 - early 2025.
Along with this, there is another important point: due to the fact that we can timely expose these plans, regrouping and an appropriate response from our forces are carried out. Now the most critical direction - the direction of concentration of the main efforts of the Russian Federation - is the Donetsk region, in particular - the southwestern part of the Donetsk region, Pokrovsk and the entire agglomeration of our settlements, so that in case of success the Russians can continue offensive actions in various directions. Including in the direction of the Dnipropetrovsk region, to the north - in the direction of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk.
But even after the plans of the Russian Federation become known and they understand that they will no longer be able to carry out this or that operation, this does not mean that they refuse to carry out such an operation. They carry out regrouping, other preparatory measures, the troops begin to engage in combat training, training specifically for the implementation of the plans that have been developed. So exposing the enemy's plans does not mean that the Russian Federation completely refuses to implement them.
t.me
WAR & SANCTIONS ― ULKOMAISET KOMPONENTIT VENÄLÄISESSÄ RAKETTINHEITINJÄRJESTELMÄSSÄ “TORNADO-S”
Tutkituista ohjattavista raketeista, joita Venäjän aggressiivinen valtio on käyttänyt Ukrainaa vastaan “Tornado-S” -raketinheittimen järjestelmässä, on löydetty samanaikaisesti käytössä kaksi kuituoptista gyroskooppia:
️ Kahden gyroskoopin samanaikainen käyttö on tarkoitettu lisäämään osumatarkkuutta, sillä se mahdollistaa kahden tietomassan saamisen kohteen tilasta ja asennosta avaruudessa.
Ulkomainen ja venäläinen laite ovat rakenteeltaan samankaltaisia: ne sisältävät kolme Sagnacin rengasinterferometriä, jotka on sijoitettu kolmen ortogonaalisen akselin suuntaisesti, sekä elektroniset piirilevyt.
Venäläisen laitteen elektroniikka on koottu käyttäen Altera Cyclone (USA) -ohjelmoitavaa logiikkamatriisia (FPGA), kun taas ulkomainen yksikkö perustuu STMicroelectronics (Sveitsi) -mikrokontrolleriin.
Lisäksi venäläinen yksikkö sisältää komponentteja seuraavilta valmistajilta:
Täydellinen lista komponenteista sekä niiden valokuvat on jo julkaistu War&Sanctions -portaalissa.
Tankit palavat, panssariajoneuvot räjähtävät – “Magura” torjui uuden moskoviittien hyökkäyksen!
Ensimmäinen aalto: 3 tankkia ja 2 BTR:ää – vain 1 BTR selvisi.
Vihollisen hyökkäys torjuttiin!
4 tankkia tuhottu (yli 8 miljoonan dollarin tappio)
