https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/vadim-skibitskiy-gur-plani-rosiyi-zminilisya-1740949422.html
Vadym Skibitsky, GUR: Russia's plans have not changed - complete occupation or control of Ukraine
UKRAINE, MONDAY 03 MARCH 2025 08:00
ENENEN
Deputy Chief of the Military Development Command of the Ministry of Defense, Major General Vadim Skibitsky (all photos: RBC-Ukraine)
AUTHOR:
ULYANA BEZPALKO
Deputy Chief of the Defense Ministry's GUR, Major General Vadim Skibitsky, in an interview with RBC-Ukraine - about Russia's plans at the front, the tactics and goals of Russian shelling and "shaheed" attacks, as well as North Korea's participation in the war.
For several months now, Russia's main efforts have been focused on the Pokrovsk region. And although the occupation forces have managed to approach this city within a few kilometers, their offensive there seems to have slowed down in recent weeks. Moscow has recently achieved slightly more results on the battlefield in the Kursk region, where the enemy, with the support of North Korean soldiers, has been trying to dislodge our units for over six months.
In parallel, the Russians launch swarms of "shaheeds" every night in the rear areas of Ukraine and, less frequently and in smaller numbers, missiles. The target of these attacks is our critical infrastructure, energy, gas transportation system, military facilities and defense industry enterprises, Major General Vadim Skibitsky clarifies.
In an interview with RBC-Ukraine, the deputy head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense spoke about how Russia has changed its approach to shelling and what the enemy is planning on the front.
– Given the course of this war, given that the Russians also had many failures and, perhaps, they were unable to achieve all of their goals, how would you assess whether Putin's goals, objectives, and ambitions in the war have changed over these three years?
– If we talk about the strategic plans of the Russian Federation, they have remained unchanged. This is also spelled out in their documents, which they developed to plan the further development and combat potential of the Russian Armed Forces. This is complete occupation or complete control, if it is not possible to immediately occupy the territory of our state in order to have a very powerful ally first of all. In their documents, they already determine that the leadership in Ukraine and Ukraine in general must be neutral or pro-Russian.
This is the change that occurred after the start of the large-scale invasion. At the initial stage, they planned and thought that they would be able to capture the entire territory of Ukraine in a very short time. But after the fighting began, after they felt the resistance of our people, our state, the plans began to change. The plans of the Russian leadership are adjusted all the time. Today, the main goal set by the Russian Federation for 2025 is to capture the entire territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, fulfill the tasks of the so-called "special military operation" of the Russian Federation, and maintain control over the territories that were captured (Kherson, Zaporizhia regions and directly occupied Crimea).
But if we talk about the Kremlin's essential, global plans, they have remained unchanged since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992. Because taking control and having a direct influence on our state has been one of the Kremlin's main goals for many years. Ukraine is a powerful defense-industrial complex, industry, a sufficient human resource of the Slavic population, which has a similar language and significant historical achievements over this entire period. And besides, it is a large territory that would allow the Russian Federation to create a so-called buffer zone on its borders with NATO countries.
– You mentioned that Russian plans are being adjusted. What was the reason for the breakdown of their initial plans, which they had drawn up before the start of the major invasion?
– The first is Kyiv. They failed to capture the capital in three days. The second is Mariupol. This is a hero city that actually detained the entire group of enemy troops, which at that time was supposed to reach our southern territories and then advance north to connect with the group of Russian troops that was going to Kharkiv, with the aim of completely surrounding our troops in the area of the then Joint Forces Operation. This is the first stage that the Russian Federation failed to fully implement.
The third stage is, accordingly, the liberation of our territories that were captured in the first days of the war. The Kharkiv region and the city of Kherson completely thwarted all of Russia's plans to advance its troops deep into our territory.
The next stage is the hostilities that are currently taking place along the entire line of combat contact. After all, the enemy is constantly postponing the deadlines for the implementation of its combat missions due to the actions of our troops. The Ukrainian Defense Forces are holding their positions, pushing the enemy back and preventing the Kremlin from fulfilling the plans that it has outlined for itself for a month, for six months, for a year.
– But why, despite the fact that they constantly have some setbacks, their plans are being postponed, and they are being stretched out for years, all this time they still do not give up on continuing hostilities and war?
– You see, Putin needs a result. There is no result of the so-called "special military operation". And what is this result? It is "providing assistance", as they said at the beginning, "liberating" the Luhansk and Donetsk regions from the "Ukrainian occupation", within their administrative borders. The task set for the Russian occupiers has not yet been completed. The entire Luhansk region is not occupied, and the task regarding the Donetsk region at the pace of offensive actions that the Russian Federation has, they are unlikely to be able to complete in the near future.
– Some military observers and OSINT channels have noted that in recent weeks, according to their assessment, there has been a slight decrease in the number of attacks, the number of assault operations, and the dynamics of the Russian advance on the front. Is this true or not?
– Indeed, we are recording a decrease in the activity of hostilities, and above all, a decrease in clashes. But the grouping of their troops still remains powerful – it is more than 620 thousand servicemen of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, who are stationed in our temporarily occupied territories, in the Kursk region. Regrouping is taking place, the combat losses of the Russian Federation are being replenished. The weather also has a direct impact on the conduct of hostilities.
If we talk about the ground component, it is approximately 620 thousand, and more than 200 thousand are assault units that participate in hostilities and are on the front line. In addition, there are 35 thousand servicemen of the Russian Guard who provide occupation authorities, protect the most important facilities in the temporarily occupied territories and, in fact, according to their plans, if necessary, can perform tasks in the second echelon of the enemy during the organization of defense.
It is also necessary to add those troops that provide logistical support, units of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and aviation that is not directly based, for example, in combat areas, but is involved in delivering combat strikes. After all, the aggressor currently uses more than 20 airfields and air bases on the territory of Russia to deliver both bombing and missile strikes on our territory.
But one should not think that the reduction in combat activity will change the enemy's plans. After all, they use this time to work out plans for the next offensive, train personnel, replenish ammunition, and, accordingly, prepare for further assault and offensive operations.
We analyze based on how active the recruitment campaign for military personnel for the armed forces of the Russian Federation is now. By the way, in January they fulfilled their recruitment plans by 107%. This issue remains relevant, and the Russian authorities have no problem with staffing the troops and replenishing losses.
Secondly, they have clearly defined for themselves the most critical and most relevant directions of combat operations. First of all, these are the Pokrovsky direction, Toretsk and Chasiv Yar to complete all the operations they have planned. In addition, this is Kupyansk. We know the plans that the Russian Federation has in mind, including the possibility of conducting assault and offensive operations in both the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions.
– So, do such plans really exist and the threat remains?
– Yes, the threat remains. Let's look at the statements made by the leadership of the Russian Federation. Kremlin representatives have repeatedly stated that both Kherson and Zaporizhia regions are "new territories" of Russia, which are "incorporated into the Russian constitution," and that they will do everything to ensure that these territories are under Russian control.
– And speaking of the Dnipropetrovsk region, is there a threat of any offensive actions by Russia towards the territory of the Dnipropetrovsk region?
– First, let's start from the fact that the Russian Federation will fulfill the task of reaching the borders of the Dnipropetrovsk region. If Russia succeeds, the threat of conducting any assault operations, reconnaissance operations increases, and in addition, this reduces the radius of combat use of the enemy's artillery and multiple launch rocket systems to strike our infrastructure.
– You also said that they are okay with the recruitment of volunteers. Are these people who are voluntarily leaving, or are they voluntarily and forcibly taken from prisons? Who are these people?
– This is a very interesting picture. By 2025, according to Russian plans, approximately 30% of those people who supposedly voluntarily join the army will be those people who are under investigation, are in prisons, or are serving suspended sentences. And this problem is already arising for the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation – what to do with these people, how to work with them. In 2024, such a contingent – they are called special contingents – was 15%, and now it will be 30%.
However, they are offered high salaries, a very large down payment that they receive for signing their first contract. In most regions of Russia, it is over 2 million rubles, meaning that a Russian serviceman who signs a contract, depending on the region, can receive from 20 to 25 thousand dollars literally at a time.
For the Russian Federation, these are very large amounts. As a result, we see that in 2024, the plan for staffing through recruitment for contract service was not just fulfilled, but exceeded by at least 10 thousand servicemen. For our understanding, this amount, firstly, includes one-time payments from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation for signing a contract, payments from local authorities, payments from enterprises where this serviceman works. After all, for each region of the Russian Federation, for each subject of the Russian Federation, a clear plan has been established for how many they should recruit into the armed forces. And Russia is provided with very serious responsibility if this plan is not implemented.
– What are Russia's plans for 2025 regarding military recruitment?
– If we talk about plans, it is 343 thousand servicemen, we are talking about recruitment under contract. But from the experience of 2024, we know that these plans are changing – in a larger direction. For example, last year the goal was to recruit approximately 375-380 thousand, then the plans changed to 430 thousand, and as a result they recruited 440 thousand servicemen under contract.
It is important to understand that almost 80% of those recruited under contract are used to replace combat losses. Accordingly, if the pace of offensive operations and the losses suffered by the enemy are maintained, these plans will mostly allow for replacing losses on the battlefield.
In addition, Moscow has current plans to form new formations and units. First of all, in the Moscow, Leningrad, Southern and Central Military Districts, the creation of new formations and units is currently underway and will continue throughout the year. Formations - for example, divisions - are formed on the basis of existing brigades that directly participate in combat operations on our territory. This is, in fact, the replenishment of the brigade to the size of a division. And it is also assumed that personnel will be involved in these events, who will sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense.
– Every night, the Russians have been launching UAVs, probably since September – some of them are “shaheeds”, some of them are some “dummies”. But still, this flock flies into the territory of Ukraine every night, in different regions. It is clear that they are not flying anywhere, they probably have some goals. Why do these drones fly every night, what is the goal and what objects are they usually aimed at?
– Let's start with why they fly every night. First, the Russians have significantly increased the production of unmanned aerial vehicles of various types. If earlier, in 2023 - early 2024, we knew only one "Shahed", then "Geran-1", "Geran-2" and that's it. Today, the range of these unmanned aerial vehicles is so large that it is not always possible to count them on the fingers of one hand: "Geran-1", "Geran-2", "Harpy", "Gerbera", "Parody" and others.
At the same time, the types of drones that are currently used include combat strike, reconnaissance, false targets, which are drones, but without a combat load, there are simulated targets. In fact, all this in general simply overloads our air defense system. It is very difficult to distinguish where a drone is flying with a warhead and where without it.
Secondly, regarding the production of unmanned aerial vehicles on the territory of the Russian Federation. This is Izhevsk, this is Yelabuga, this is the Kalashnikov concern. Now they have significantly increased the production of unmanned aerial vehicles. And this is what allows them to use from 150 to 200 unmanned aerial vehicles in one strike.
By the way, their plans include increasing the number of launch pads from which they will launch drones over our territory. According to the Russian command, if the plans for the first half of the year are implemented, they will be able to launch approximately 500 drones simultaneously.
Next – about possible targets. The targets have not changed. I remember the documents of the Russian Federation, which date back to the fall of 2023, where the main targets for which unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise and ballistic missiles will be used were clearly defined. This is the control system of the Armed Forces, the Defense Forces, this is everything that concerns aviation and our airfields. These are the most critical elements of our infrastructure, including the energy system, the gas transportation system – what we are observing now. And one of the priorities is our enterprises of the defense-industrial complex – where weapons are manufactured, where we have increased the production of many types of weapons, ammunition, unmanned aerial vehicles and systems.
The main priorities remain. We have already seen attacks on the energy sector, on thermal power plants - you remember how powerful the strikes were in the Kharkiv region, to knock out the entire system of providing heat to our population. There were strikes on the energy system, and the aggressor somewhat changed his tactics and approaches, which he is also using very actively now. This is an approach that involves clear definition and planning - the so-called targeting, to achieve the greatest effect.
And recently, our gas transportation system and our gas fields have been suffering. The enemy understands that this is what is needed for our population, to provide their needs with gas. Recently, they have been trying to destroy this very ability of Ukraine.
– Regarding the attacks on the gas transportation system. Do they simply want to leave us without gas or do they want to additionally force us to somehow restore the transit of their gas?
– Perhaps, but, for example, if we talk about the Lviv region, attacks were made on our underground gas storage facilities, where gas is stored. There have already been three attacks on our fields in order to deprive us of the opportunity to extract gas. And at the same time, attacks are being made on the ground infrastructure – on compressor stations, gas pumping stations – on the one that allows either to raise gas to the surface, if it is in storage, or to pump gas from our subsoil.
And this is another very powerful element of pressure not only on the government of Ukraine, but also on our population. Look at what is happening in Odessa, when it is almost completely left without electricity. I remember 2023, when you come to Odessa, walk along Deribasovskaya, and everything there is humming from generators to provide light. This is very difficult for the population. And the Russians are counting on this to affect the population. And the Russian Federation will definitely use this in terms of information to destabilize the situation.
ARTIKKELI JATKUU TOISESSA VIESTISSÄNI -
LINKKI
defence-industry.eu
Etusivun uutinen!!! Ukrainalaiset ovat alkaneet mobilisoida mehiläisiä Ukrainan asevoimiin
