Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Tämä tässä juuri ihmetyttää.
Ei muuta kun dronea ja sirpalekranaattia rysyjen stadioneille ja kansankokouksiin. Kyllä ne siitä saisi oikeasti mietittävää, että onko koko sotahomma minkä arvoista.

Kun sadastatuhannesta jalkopallon katseliasta tulisi tuhat ruumista joista puolet vain tallaantuneet kuoliaaksi ja muutama tuhat hiuan sirpaleita maistanutta kyllä ryssäkin alkaisi oppia.
Tämähän olisi likimain tyhmintä mitä Ukraina voisi tehdä.

Ryssän sotilailla on perinteisesti ollut vain yksi etu muihin verrattuna ja se on ollut halu kuolla Rodinan puolesta. Nyt kun tuota halua vaihtaa ryysyläiselämä sankarkuolemaan ei Putlerkaan ole saanut myytyä kansallensa, ei ainakaan toisen maailmansodan mittakaavassa, niin sinusta Ukrainan kannattaisi auttaa bunkkerirunkkaria tässä? Tapettaisiin muutama sata siviiliä ja saataisiin sillä motivoitua satoja tai tuhansia tai jopa kymmeniä tuhansia vapaaehtoisia rintamalle lisää ukrainalaisten riesaksi?
 

Massatuotantoon siirtynyt Sapsan-ohjus voi iskeä satojen kilometrien päähän...

Niin kyllä moskovassa ja sen lähi ypäristossä täytyy olla sotilas kohteita ja niihin liittyvää teollisuutta. Joten sinne vaan iskuja.
Moskovassa asustavia niissä töissä käy joten se sota siirtyy näin paremmin moskovalaisten tietoisuuteen.
 
Mielenkiintoinen Kyiv Independent -artikkeli jossa käsitellään ryssän Votkinskissa sijaitsevan ohjustehtaan laajennustöitä sota-aikana. Tämä tehdas valmistaa mm. ICBM-ohjuksia mutta myös Iskander-M ballistisia ohjuksia (artikkeli julkaistu 24.6.2025):

Very good article on how RU ramps up production of ballistic missiles despite sanctions.

Worth the read.


https://kyivindependent.com/investi...tegic-plant-producing-icbms-with-chinas-help/

Investigation: How Russia prepares its strategic missile plant for ‘eternal war’​


Russia bypassed sanctions to import Chinese machinery and dramatically boost missile production (Nataliia Shulga/The Kyiv Independent)


During its war in Ukraine, Russia quietly imported millions in advanced equipment — mostly from China — to expand a key missile plant in Votkinsk.



by Alisa Yurchenko

June 24, 2025 5:45 PM


Key findings:​

  • Despite international sanctions, Russia's strategic missile plant was able to import complex machinery to dramatically increase missile production.
  • The Kyiv Independent has identified the equipment supplied to the plant, as well as the supply chains, mostly from China.
  • We located the plant's new premises, built to house the new machinery.
  • We obtained a document confirming that the plant received an order to produce intercontinental missiles capable of reaching the U.S. shortly after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

As Russia wages its full-scale war against Ukraine, one of its most important missile plants is quietly expanding, bypassing international sanctions.

The Votkinsk Plant, also known as the Votkinskiy Plant, — a strategic, state-owned facility serving Russia’s nuclear forces — has hired thousands of new workers, added new buildings, and brought in advanced machinery to significantly increase its missile production.

Ukrainians have felt it firsthand. Iskander-M ballistic missiles, with a range of up to 500 kilometers and assembled at Votkinsk, have been increasingly hitting Kyiv and other cities.

But the plant’s core mission is even more threatening: manufacturing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of delivering nuclear warheads across continents.

Among them are the Yars and Bulava — missiles designed to reach the United States — and likely the Oreshnik, reportedly capable of striking anywhere in Europe.

According to Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (known by its Ukrainian acronym HUR), Russia is not just replacing missiles lost in its current war with Ukraine — it is stockpiling for a prolonged conflict.

“They are preparing for a long war,” a senior official from Ukraine’s HUR told the Kyiv Independent. “According to our data, Russia is building up a stockpile of missiles of various types.”

All of this expansion is occurring despite sweeping international sanctions against the plant and the Russian missile industry. The Votkinsk Plant is officially blacklisted as an entity by the U.S. and its allies, and selling any materials, machinery, and microelectronics to Russia that are required to build missiles is banned.

Yet, production continues to rise.

The Kyiv Independent examined the internal business operations of the Votkinsk Plant to find out how the sanctioned arms manufacturer has managed to expand.

The key finding: Russia hasn’t done so on its own.

Companies in China, Taiwan, and Belarus — countries that didn’t join Western sanctions against Moscow over its war in Ukraine — supplied the strategic Russian missile factory with critical manufacturing equipment funneled through private Russian intermediaries.

The Kyiv Independent identified millions worth of machinery supplied to the Votkinsk plant this way.

These shipments ultimately strengthened one of Russia’s most dangerous military production sites.

The growth of the missile stockpile produced by the Votkinsk Plant​

“Putin's policy is our policy,” read the banners held by Votkinsk Plant's employees on April 5, 2022, at a special rally organized by the plant in support of Russia's war against Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin had announced his country was launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022.

1-1.jpg
Employees and the director general of the Votkinsk Plant, Igor Churbanov, at a rally in support of Russia's war against Ukraine on April 5, 2022. (Screenshots from a Russian television segment titled “Votkinsk Plant”)


They likely didn’t yet realize how right they were.

Full-scale war has been a boon for Votkinsk: Since its start, the plant has expanded and increased output.

In 2024, Russia produced nearly three times more Iskander-M ballistic missiles than in 2023 — 700 compared to 250, according to RUSI, a London-based defense and security think tank.

Ukraine's military intelligence agency, HUR, agrees with this assessment, its representatives told the Kyiv Independent.

As production at the plant grows, so do the attacks.

Russia has been striking Ukraine with Iskander-Ms and similar missiles 4.5 times more in 2024 than the year before — 245 strikes in 2024 compared to around 55 in 2023. The increase is only partly explained by the supply of North Korean missiles to Russia.

Moscow has already launched more than 180 of those missiles so far this year.

It was with Iskander-type ballistic missiles that Russia launched its bloodiest attacks on Ukrainian cities far from the front line in 2025.

But even with the intensified attacks, Russia is far from using all the Iskander missiles it’s now producing. The considerable gap between production and the number of missiles used in strikes shows that Russia is building a stockpile.

According to the HUR intelligence, provided to the Kyiv Independent in early June, Russia managed to stockpile some 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and another 300 Iskander-K cruise missiles. At the current pace of attacks, it’s a two-year stock.

But the Votkinsk Plant has another line of production: intercontinental missiles.

The Kyiv Independent was unable to find out the exact number of intercontinental missiles currently being produced at the plant. However, a document uncovered by the Kyiv Independent did reveal some traces that Russia was investing in this arsenal of intercontinental missile production.

According to it, one month into the full-scale war against Ukraine, on March 31, 2022 — around the time of Russia’s first defeat near Kyiv — the Russian Defense Ministry ordered the Votkinsk Plant to produce parts for Bulava intercontinental missiles, which are deployed on nuclear submarines, for over $13 million. The plant was to fulfill the contract from 2022 to 2024.

The order is bound to be one of many. Most Russian defense contracts are classified.

A large plant becomes even larger​

The Kyiv Independent found that Russian authorities planned the expansion of the Votkinsk missile hub in 2022, after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The process began the following year, from 2023 to 2024, during which the arms manufacturer built new premises, renovated existing ones, hired additional staff, and procured new equipment for missile production.

Using satellite imagery provided by Planet Labs, we identified the location of the plant’s largest new facility: a sheet metal fabrication shop.

In 2023, the site was bare ground; by 2024, a new workshop had risen to house additional machinery.

Satellite imagery of the biggest site for the new Votkinsk missile plant's shop in 2023 and 2024.
Satellite imagery shows a new building constructed at the Votkinsk missile plant in 2024. (Planet Labs PBC)

Footage of the new Votkinsk missile plant's shop in 2023 and 2024.
Photos of the new shop at the Votkinsk missile plant, constructed in 2024, and the satellite imagery showing its location. (Votkinsk Plant, Zvezda TV channel, Planet Labs PBC, Google Street View).


The plant’s management announced the construction of four additional smaller buildings. At least one of them is complete, and we were able to locate it.

Satellite imagery and footage of another Votkinsk Plant's new building in 2023 and 2024.
Satellite imagery and photos of another new building, added to the Votkinsk Plant in 2024. (Google Earth, Votkinsk Plant, Planet Labs PBC)


Simultaneously, the missile producer launched a recruitment drive, hiring an additional 2,500 employees during the first 2.5 years of Russia’s full-scale war, according to the plant’s director general.

The total number of employees now exceeds 12,000.

The search for workers continues. As of May 2025, the plant had more than 100 job openings, seeking CNC machine operators, engineers, electromechanics, milling and lathe operators, fitters, and other workers.

But even with more staff and expanded facilities, the plant would not have been able to increase missile output without acquiring new equipment. The Votkinsk Plant ordered a large volume of new machinery for metal processing — a key component of missile production.

According to documents reviewed by the Kyiv Independent, most equipment contracts were signed in the first half of 2023. Given the time needed for manufacturing or importing the machinery, most of it arrived at the plant in 2024.

In addition to Russian-made equipment, the sanctioned facility imported substantial quantities of foreign machine tools.

The Kyiv Independent identified more than 10 contracts signed by the Votkinsk Plant in 2023 for the purchase of dozens of imported metal-processing machines. Their total value exceeds $11 million, which only represents a portion of the plant’s broader investment in expansion.

The plant allegedly bought a total of 7,000 units of new equipment as part of the post-invasion expansion plan — according to the figure the plant’s management shared with Russian media.

Documents reviewed by the Kyiv Independent suggest that this number includes not only computer-controlled milling and lathe machines, but also metal heating furnaces, stamping presses, and a range of other tools and devices.

The purchases were financed through a state subsidy provided by the Russian government. Russia’s Industry and Trade Ministry signed an agreement to fund the plant’s procurement on Dec. 26, 2022 — nine months after the Russian army failed in its attempt to capture Kyiv, when it became clear that the war wouldn’t be a quick one.

Chinese and Taiwanese equipment for the production of Russian missiles​

The sanctioned plant used intermediaries — little-known Russian private companies, some specializing in machine tools — to purchase imported equipment. This method is commonly employed by Russian arms manufacturers to hide the final buyer and ease the transaction for the supplier.

Imported equipment came primarily from mainland China. Of the 10 contracts we identified, eight involved products supplied from China. In one of them, the goods came from a Chinese factory owned by a Taiwanese manufacturer.

In May 2023, the Votkinsk Plant signed a $2.5 million contract with the Russian firm Ural Machine Tool Company, which is engaged in the wholesale trade of machine tools. The company was tasked with sourcing and supplying the plant with two models of imported equipment.

The first model is a CNC milling center for metal processing branded by Taiwanese company Ecom Precision Machinery Co., which uses the Japanese Fanuc CNC system.

Eight months later, in January 2024, the equipment was delivered to the plant, according to Russian documents obtained by the Kyiv Independent.

Reviewing Russian customs records, we found that the Taiwan-branded equipment intended for the missile plant was shipped to Russia by a Chinese company named Zhangzhou Donggang Precision Machinery Company, also known as Zhangzhou Dong Iron Precision Machinery Co.

This company operates as a subsidiary of the Taiwanese manufacturer Ecom — effectively, its Chinese production facility.

Example of imported machinery supplied to the Votkinsk missile plant in 2023-2024.
Example of imported machinery supplied to the Votkinsk missile plant in 2023-2024. (Lisa Kukharska/The Kyiv Independent)
With assistance from the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), we identified the key figure behind the producer.

Ecom is a private company linked to Taiwanese businessman Lin Tz-ming (or Lin Ziming, following mainland Chinese romanization). He graduated from the University of California and previously worked in mainland China, according to media reports. Ecom was founded by his father in 1976.

We reached out to both the Taiwanese manufacturer and its Chinese subsidiary for comment but received no response.

The second model ordered by the missile plant is a CNC lathe for metal processing, manufactured by the Chinese producer WMT CNC Industrial Co.

According to the contract, Ural Machine Tool Company was to supply the plant with eight numerically controlled lathes.

Additionally, around the same time in May 2023, the Votkinsk Plant ordered nine more similar machines from WMT CNC through the Russian First Construction Company under a contract valued at nearly $2 million.

Customs records indicate that WMT CNC repeatedly shipped these machines and other equipment to Russian trading firms that supplied them to the Votkinsk Plant.

Example of imported machinery supplied to the Votkinsk missile plant in 2023-2024.
Example of imported machinery supplied to the Votkinsk missile plant in 2023-2024. (Lisa Kukharska/The Kyiv Independent)
WMT CNC Industrial is also a private company, primarily owned by Chinese businessman, Gui Shuanglong.

Neither the Chinese manufacturer nor its Russian partners, Ural Machine Tool Company and First Construction Company, responded to written requests for comment.

The Kyiv Independent identified additional machines and supply chains that brought new missile production equipment to Russia during its war with Ukraine. Beyond several more Chinese machines, the plant has purchased at least one other type of Taiwanese machines, as well as Belarusian equipment.

To explore the details, scroll through the cards.

1 / 7 (lainaan alle yhden kuvista, mutta artikkelissa on kuusi muuta tilattua konetta - katso siis ne linkin takaa jos kiinnostaa)


Card-3.png
Example of imported machinery supplied to the Votkinsk missile plant in 2023-2024. (Lisa Kukharska/The Kyiv Independent)

China provides more than machines​

It is no secret that China is the largest supplier of equipment, electronic components, and materials that Russia seeks for weapons production.

The Kyiv Independent has reviewed the latest non-public report by the Ukrainian think tank Economic Security Council of Ukraine (ESCU) on the production of Iskander missiles, which are assembled at the Votkinsk Plant.

The report examined the supply of titanium, carbon fiber, and missile fuel components for Iskander production in 2024.

“Titanium is used to make the aerodynamic rudders that control a missile at launch, as well as for the body, nozzles, and combustion chambers of the engine,” explained Denys Hutyk, ESCU’s executive director.

The organization’s researchers found that the main flow of titanium products reached the Votkinsk Plant through a supply chain originating in China.

Russia’s largest titanium producer, VSMPO-AVISMA Corporation, operates a subsidiary in Beijing — VSMPO Tirus Beijing Metallic Materials — which imports titanium ore from major Chinese manufacturers.

In addition, the Russian producer purchased primary titanium products through China’s Tianjin Chengan International Trading Company and India’s DCW. It then supplied Russian military plants, including Votkinsk, through a subsidiary trading house in Russia.

None of the companies responded to a written request for comment.

China, along with some other countries, has not imposed sanctions on Russia, leaving local companies to decide individually whether to comply with American and European restrictions.

As a result, despite China’s declared neutrality in the Russian war, both private and state-owned companies there have effectively become a lifeline for Russian arms manufacturers.

Expansion of Russian missile production: How serious is it?​

Although the current increase in production at the Votkinsk Plant is primarily aimed at enlarging the stockpile of short-range missiles for strikes against Ukraine, the plant's new equipment is universal.

In other words, Russia is expanding its capabilities to produce intercontinental missiles, as well.

"Yars and Bulava, both capable of carrying nuclear warheads, are produced by this enterprise. These missiles are no longer aimed at Ukraine, but at Washington, New York, other American cities, other European cities," says Oleh Katkov, editor-in-chief of the Ukrainian military portal Defense Express.

He adds that missiles contain multiple metal parts, "and the new machines can be used to produce any missile manufactured at this enterprise. In addition, the plant can produce components for other types of missiles assembled at other Russian missile plants."

At the same time, no Russian missile is produced by a single plant. An entire network of enterprises makes different parts of the weapon — its body, guidance systems, and the fuel needed to power it — before it is assembled at a plant like Votkinsk.

In total, more than 10 Russian military enterprises are involved in making an Iskander missile.

The growing number of Russian Iskanders stockpiles and the statistics of attacks mean that Russia has increased the capacity of not only the Votkinsk Plant, but also of other enterprises supplying parts for these missiles.

The growth at Votkinsk is just one part of a wider effort — one that now spans dozens of enterprises and includes both short-range missiles for use in Ukraine and intercontinental systems capable of striking far beyond it.

The buildup shows no sign of slowing — or of being limited to a single war.


Note from the author:

Hey, this is Alisa Yurchenko, the author of this story.

When Russian missiles and drones strike Kyiv and our apartments shake from the blasts, I find some reassurance in knowing that we can name those who are helping Russia ramp up its weapons production to prolong this bloody war.

If you want to support such investigative work, become a member of the Kyiv Independent. Your contributions help us produce investigations like this one.








Alisa Yurchenko

Alisa Yurchenko
Investigative Reporter

Alisa has been working as an investigative journalist and editor in Ukraine for over 10 years. She joined the Kyiv Independent in 2024. Before that Alisa worked at the anti-corruption investigative project Bihus.Info as editor, journalist and presenter. She is the winner of a number of Ukrainian investigative journalism prizes. Additionally, Alisa works as a media trainer. She created several courses, helping journalists and civil activists to find information using open-source intelligence.Read more


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Votkinsk kaupungin sijainti kartalla (etäisyys Ukrainan rajalle noin 1300km ja Kiovaan noin 1750km):

1750861795777.webp

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Lainaan alle yhden erityisesti minun silmään osuneen pätkän:

In 2024, Russia produced nearly three times more Iskander-M ballistic missiles than in 2023 — 700 compared to 250, according to RUSI, a London-based defense and security think tank.

Ukraine's military intelligence agency, HUR, agrees with this assessment, its representatives told the Kyiv Independent.

As production at the plant grows, so do the attacks.

Russia has been striking Ukraine with Iskander-Ms and similar missiles 4.5 times more in 2024 than the year before — 245 strikes in 2024 compared to around 55 in 2023. The increase is only partly explained by the supply of North Korean missiles to Russia.

Moscow has already launched more than 180 of those missiles so far this year.

It was with Iskander-type ballistic missiles that Russia launched its bloodiest attacks on Ukrainian cities far from the front line in 2025.

But even with the intensified attacks, Russia is far from using all the Iskander missiles it’s now producing. The considerable gap between production and the number of missiles used in strikes shows that Russia is building a stockpile.

According to the HUR intelligence, provided to the Kyiv Independent in early June, Russia managed to stockpile some 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and another 300 Iskander-K cruise missiles. At the current pace of attacks, it’s a two-year stock.


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GUR:n julkisuuteen kertomien numeroiden perusteella on ollut jo pidemmän aikaa selvää että ryssä ei käytä ohjustensa uustuotantoa kokonaan ELI tietty osa siitä menee varastoihin.

Kh-101 ohjukset ovat ainoa malli joita on käytetty tiettyinä aikoina melkein suoraan kädestä suuhun, mutta niitäkin on GUR:n arvion mukaan kertynyt varastoihin ja kenties Ukrainan tekemän strategisten pommikoneiden tuhoamisen jälkeen tämä määrä tulee kasvamaan selvästi?

Yllä lainatussa artikkelissa viitataan toiseen, jossa kerrotaan nämä GUR:n arvioimat numerot paitsi uustuotannosta niin myös eri ohjusmallien varastomääristä, lainaan sen seuraavassa viestissäni.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Naton kokouksessa meni läpi ajatus, että Ukrainan tukeminen on osa jokaisen Nato-maan puolustusbudjettia. Erinomainen asia Ukrainan kannalta! Investointeja Ukrainaan tulee, kun maat nostavat puolustusmenoja kohti 3,5 prosenttia BKT:sta.



Suora lainaus: ... todetaan, että Nato-maat pysyvät Ukrainan tukena, koska sen turvallisuus "edistää omaa turvallisuuttamme". Jäsenmaat sisällyttävät tätä varten puolustusmenoihinsa suorat avustukset Ukrainan puolustukselle ja puolustusteollisuudelle.
 

Professorin mukaan hyökkääjän haavoittuvuus on paljastunut...
Mielestäni parhaita tiivistelmiä koskaan sodan syystä ja jatkosta:

"Iranin kannalta ongelma on Israelin olemassaolo. Putinin kannalta ongelma on Ukrainan olemassaolo. Niin kauan kuin Putin on vallassa, sota jatkuu. Ja minusta tuntuu, että se jatkuu jopa Putinin jälkeenkin, hän arvioi. Medvedev sanoo, että Venäjän on muututtava täysin, radikaalisti ja perusteellisesti, jotta yhteiselo Ukrainan kanssa onnistuu.

– Olemme kolmen vuoden aikana tajunneet, että sotaresurssi on paljon suurempi ja että sota voi kestää vuosia. Keväällä 2022 tätä ei osannut vielä nähdä, hän jatkaa ja viittaa hyökkäyssodan alkuun."
 
Kyiv Independent -artikkeli jossa kerrotaan GUR:n arvio ryssän ohjusten uustuotannosta sekä eri ohjusmallien varastomääristä (artikkeli julkaistu 3.6.2025):

https://kyivindependent.com/exclusi...st-year-according-to-ukrainian-intel-figures/

Exclusive: Russia’s ballistic missile production up at least 66% over past year, according to Ukrainian intel figures​


A Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile is launched at the Kapustin Yar proving ground on March 2, 2018. (Wikimedia)

by Kollen Post

June 3, 2025 4:43 PM



Russia's production of ballistic missiles has increased by at least 66% over the past year, according to data from Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) shared with the Kyiv Independent.

According to data obtained by HUR, Moscow is now producing 60 to 70 Iskander-M — the ballistic version of the missile — and 10 to 15 hypersonic Kinzhals per month.

This compares to a reported 40 Iskander-Ms in May 2024, and a reported 4–5 Kinzhals in April 2024.

At the lower range, this is an increase in production of 66.67%. At the higher range, 88.89%.

Missile-production--1-.jpg
Russian monthly missile production (Nizar al-Rifai/The Kyiv Independent)
Ballistic attacks on Ukraine have become more deadly in recent months as stockpiles of air defense missiles, particularly for U.S.-made Patriots, have dwindled.

The figures shared with the Kyiv Independent show Russian stockpiles of "almost 600 Iskander-Ms" and "over 100" Kinzhals.

At the end of 2022, Military Intelligence Chief Kyrylo Budanov claimed Russia was almost out of Iskander ballistic missiles. By December 2024, HUR spokesperson Andriy Yusov noted that Russia had increased production to somewhere between 40 and 50 Iskander missiles per month.

Russia’s expanded production is a cause for alarm in Ukraine.

If HUR's figures are correct, Russia’s production of ballistic missiles today outnumbers total production of PAC-3 MSE missiles for Patriot air defense systems, the preferred anti-ballistic defenses for much of Europe, which Lockheed Martin hopes to boost to 650 per year by 2027.

Other Western systems like the SAMP/T and IRIS-T have not proved effective against ballistic missiles.

Russia has moreover reportedly outfitted the newest Iskanders with radar decoys and less predictable flight paths, making them harder to shoot down even with Patriot systems.

Missile-stockpile.jpg
Russian missile stockpiles (Nizar al-Rifai/The Kyiv Independent)
Ukraine’s military intelligence has also estimated that Russia is holding a stockpile of 60 North Korean KN-23s. These missiles are similar to the Iskander-Ms, but carry a one-ton warhead, more powerful than their Russian equivalents.

The figures shared with the Kyiv Independent further show that total production for cruise missiles has also continued to grow.

Russia can produce 20 to 30 Iskander-Ks, 60 to 70 X-101s, 25 to 30 Kalibrs, up to 10 X-32s and 20-30 Onyx and Zircon anti-ship missiles.

A massive Ukrainian attack on Russian airfields on June 1 may have restricted Russia’s ability to launch several of these cruise missiles.

Tu-95M3s often carry Kh-55/Kh-555 or the newer Kh-101 and Kh-102 air-launched cruise missiles. The Tu-22 carries the Kh-22 missiles.Both of these types of aircraft are among those reported to have been damaged in Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb.

During wartime, Ukraine has also built out its production of its own cruise and ballistic missiles.

But large-scale production of types of missiles depend on major industrial zones that often fall victim to Russian air strikes — particularly when limited air defenses are being rationed.




Kollen Post

Defense Reporter

Kollen Post is the defense industry reporter at the Kyiv Independent. Based in Kyiv, he covers weapons production and defense tech. Originally from western Michigan, he speaks Russian and Ukrainian. His work has appeared in Radio Free Europe, Fortune, Breaking Defense, the Cipher Brief, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, FT’s Sifted, and Science Magazine. He holds a BA from Vanderbilt University.

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HUOM: samaan aikaan julkaistiin tämä ISW:n twiitti, jossa lainattiin melkein samoja numeroita - paitsi Kh-101 risteilyohjusten uustuotanto, jonka määräksi kerrottiin tässä 20-30 kpl per kuukausi eikä 60-70 kpl per kuukausi kuten yllä lainatussa artikkelissa (tässä kerrotaan arvion ajanhetkeksi "mid-May 2025" eli kenties 15.5.2025):

1750858567996.webp


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Tässä on siis tuorein GUR:n julkisuuteen kertoma ryssän ohjustuotannon tila:

1750858983669.webp

HUOM: Kh-101 uustuotannoksi on arvioitu jo pidemmän aikaa 40-50 kpl per kuukausi (esimerkiksi 19.9.2024 ja 11.11.2024).

Tämä ei sinänsä ole uutta tai erikoista, ryssällä on ollut jo pidemmän aikaa useita satoja ohjuksia varastoissaan (ainakin jos uskotaan GUR:n kertomaa ja niistä laadittuja laskelmia). Ohjusten käyttö on ollut paljon pienempää kuin uustuotanto.

Jos ohjuksia on useita satoja, niin miksei niitä käytetä enempää ja useammin? Yksi selvä rajoittava tekijä on laukaisualustojen määrä, ohjuksia on selvästi enemmän. Logistiikka voi osaltaan rajoittaa ohjusten käyttöä myös. Eikä ryssä halua tietysti ampua varastojaan täysin tyhjäksi, koska nämä ohjukset muodostavat osaltaan strategisen pelotteen Venäjälle hyökkäämistä vastaan (enkä tarkoita pelkästään taktisten ydinaseiden käyttöön soveltuvia ohjuksia).

Joku kommentoi aina että "ryssä säästää ohjuksia seuraavaa merkittävää ohjusiskua varten" mutta tätä samaa on kuultu yli 1200 päivän ajan. Suurempia ohjusiskuja on tietysti nähty aina toisinaan, mutta ei mitään massiivista (vrt. Iranin muutamat ballististen ohjusten iskut Israeliin). Perinteisesti ryssä on myös valmistanut ohjuksia varastoon seuraavaa talvikautta varten, tosin näiden numeroiden perusteella varastojen luulisi olevan "riittävällä tasolla" jo nyt.

ELI kenties nyt kesällä tullaan näkemään suurehkoja ohjusiskuja? Kh-101 risteilyohjusten laukaisua rajoittaa Tu-95MS ja Tu-160 pommikoneiden määrä, Ukraina tuhosi ja vaurioitti merkittävää määrää Tu-95MS koneita. Iskander-M käyttöä rajoittaa ohjuslavettien määrä. Kalibrien käyttöä rajoittaa pinta-alusten ja sukellusveneiden määrä. Kh-22/32 käyttöä rajoittaa Tu-22M3 pommikoneiden määrä. Kinzhalien käyttöä rajoittaa MiG-31K hävittäjien määrä.

Kh-101 on ollut perinteinen työrukkanen mutta tällä hetkellä valtaosa Tu-95MS pommikoneista on sijoitettu kauas Venäjän itään Ukrainka sotilaslentokentälle ja sieltä on pitkä matka Engels-2 ja Olenya kentille. Se vaikeuttaa operaatioiden tekoa.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Olenkin odottanut, milloin Ukraina kopioi tai tekee oman versionsa ryssän KAB- eli ohjautuvien liitopommien kitistä. Tässä se on:

Declared as: Ukrainian KAB with an analogue of UMPK. Range 60 kilometers. Price for the module itself "planning and correction" - $ 25,000.

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Ukraine has created an analogue of Russian KABs with a range of 60 km, — Defense Express.

▪️ The developers are actually repeated the appearance of the Russian UMPK.
▪️ Solutions are already being worked on that will allow hitting targets at a range of 80 km.


 
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