Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Ukrainan erikoisoperaatiojoukot vahvistavat ELOU-AT-6-yksikön tuhoutumisen Ilskin öljynjalostamolla Krasnodarin aluepiirissä.
Laitos, jonka vuosikapasiteetti oli 6 miljoonaa tonnia, hoiti öljyn primääritislauksen ja oli kriittinen Venäjän tuotannolle.
Operaatio toteutettiin yhdessä “Black Spark" vastarintaliikkeen kanssa.

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@Antares tilastonikkarina, olisiko saatavilla graafia/aikasarjaa ”anti-aircraft systems” osiosta?

Alkaa nimittäin tulemaan niin vahvaa viitettä siitä, että it on loppu ja sitä mukaa tämän sodan ratkaisu tulee todnäk taivaalta. Sinänsä se ei ole uutta, mutta tässä maasotakonfliktissa merkkaisi todennäköisesti käännepistettä.

Tätä on nyt seurattava tarkoin.

Vaikka ilmapuolustusta olisi enemmän, Moskova ei pysty täysin suojelemaan:
- Kymmeniä jalostamoja
- Varastolaitoksia ja satamia
- Tuhansia kilometrejä putkistoja 11 aikavyöhykkeen yli



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Kiova tietää, ettei sen droonioffensiivi tule olemaan ratkaiseva, mutta Venäjän energiasektorin iskut työntävät Putinia neuvotteluihin.
Yksinkertaisesti sanottuna taloudellista tuskaa voi olla vaikeampi sivuuttaa kuin taistelukentän tappioita.

Tavalliset ryssätkin tuntevat nyt enemmän tuskaa!
Telegram-kanavat, joilla on 300 000–5 miljoonaa tilaajaa, alkoivat levittää huhuja,
että bensiini alkoi kadota Moskovassa.

Vaikka se ei pitäisi paikkaansa, pelkkä huhu voi aiheuttaa enemmän vahinkoa kuin jos bensiini oikeasti loppuisi.
Tämä luo kilometrien pituisia jonoja huoltoasemille, kun ihmiset alkavat hamstrata bensiiniä.

 

ESIINTYI VENÄLÄISENÄ SOTILAANA JA LIKVIDOI KAKSI MIEHITTÄJÄÄ. OShP “SKELJA”
YuYu on juuri se 425. erillisen hyökkäysrykmentin “Skelja” taistelija, joka Novotoretskin lähellä esiintyi venäläisenä sotilaana ja tuhosi kaksi miehittäjää. Uskomaton tarina uskomattomasta ihmisestä. Hän kertoi yksinoikeudella omasta taistelutiestään: palveluksesta merijalkaväessä, TerO:n riveissä, haavoittumisesta Tšasiv Jarin lähellä. Lisäksi hän jakoi, kuinka säilyttäen kylmäverisyytensä päästi kaksi venäläissotilasta aivan lähietäisyydelle ja ampui heidät.
 
@Antares tilastonikkarina, olisiko saatavilla graafia/aikasarjaa ”anti-aircraft systems” osiosta?

Alkaa nimittäin tulemaan niin vahvaa viitettä siitä, että it on loppu ja sitä mukaa tämän sodan ratkaisu tulee todnäk taivaalta. Sinänsä se ei ole uutta, mutta tässä maasotakonfliktissa merkkaisi todennäköisesti käännepistettä.

Juu, Ukrainan päivän numeroista löytyy "anti-aircraft" kategoria ja sen raaka data näyttää tältä (koko sodan ajalta): LÄHDE

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Tässä samat numerot viimeisen vuoden ajalta eli aikaväli 7.9.2024 - 7.9.2025:

1757249428068.webp

Tässä on tappioita tiuhempaan vielä 16.6.2025 asti mutta sen jälkeen niitä on selvästi harvemmin aina tähän päivään asti.

Toki samassa kuvaajassa on myös hieman "hiljaisempi kausi" loppuvuonna 2024: marraskuu 2024 ja ehkä myös joulu-uusivuosi, mutta nämä eivät ole yhtä pitkiä kuin tämä mitä nyt eletään.

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Seitsemän päivän liukuva keskiarvo näyttää tältä:

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Näiden tappioita tulee aika vähän joten kuvaaja on tuollainen rajusti hyppivä jopa seitsemän päivän liukuvalla keskiarvolla.

Tästäkin on nähtävissä että viime kuukausina tappioita ei ole tullut niin paljon kuin mitä keväällä 2025.

Onko se merkki kaluston vähenemisestä vai varovaisemmasta käytöstä? Vaikea sanoa koska ilmatorjuntakalusto on sellaista jonka käyttöä on vaikea "vähentää", ainakin jos halutaan että suojaus pysyy yhtä hyvänä ja tehokkaana.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Kyseinen jalostamo on myös raakaöljyn syötön suhteen ollut kytkettynä Transneftin putkeen, joten vaikka ryssät yrittäisivät korvata tuotannon jossain muualla niin se tarkoittaa usean miljoonan raakaöljytonnin kuljettamista rautateillä johonkin paikkaan X ja sieltä sitten tuotteiden kuljettaminen tuonne eteläiselle Venäjälle. Jo nyt tiedetään, että rautatielogistiikka etenkin noihin suuntiin on tupella, joten voidaan todeta että ne massat jäävät sekä jalostamatta suurimmilta osin että myös puuttumaan kulutuksesta jos jalostamoa ei kyetä korjaamaan. Ja kauanko se silloinkaan pysyisi ehjänä ennenkuin droonit seuraavan kerran iskisivät? Viikon, kuukauden?

Ei muuta kuin seuraava tuleen aina entisen perään niin jossain vaiheessa ryssätkin tulevat lakki kourassa neuvottelupöytään.

Myös Ilsky jalostamon osalta on merkkejä siitä että osuttiin juuri sinne minne kuuluukin osua:

Ukrainian Special Operations Forces confirm the destruction of the ELOU-AT-6 unit at the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai.

The installation, with an annual capacity of 6 million tons, handled primary oil distillation and was critical to Russia’s production.

The operation was carried out together with the resistance group “Black Spark.”


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Konrad Muzyka kommentoi paria viimeistä iskua näin:

Ukraine continues its rolling-denial campaign against Russian refineries.

🔴 05SEP – Ryazan Oil Refinery: ELOU-AVT-6 (largest CDU, ~6 Mt/yr) struck again after August damage.
🔴 07SEP – Ilsky Refinery: ELOU-AVT-5 (half of plant capacity) hit, following a late-AUG strike.

Ilsky has been hit three times since April and Ryazan twice since August.

Targeting CDUs (primary distillation) is key: without them, crude cannot be processed regardless of downstream units. Repeated hits stop refineries from recovering, locking in capacity losses.

Russia now faces ~25–28% effective outages. At these levels, exportable surplus shrinks, repair costs soar, and crude must be diverted or exported unprocessed...


 
Juu, Ukrainan päivän numeroista löytyy "anti-aircraft" kategoria ja sen raaka data näyttää tältä (koko sodan ajalta):

Katso liite: 124512

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Tässä samat numerot viimeisen vuoden ajalta eli aikaväli 7.9.2024 - 7.9.2025:

Katso liite: 124513

Tässä on tappioita tiuhempaan vielä 16.6.2025 asti mutta sen jälkeen niitä on selvästi harvemmin aina tähän päivään asti.

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Seitsemän päivän liukuva keskiarvo näyttää tältä:

Katso liite: 124514

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Näiden tappioita tulee aika vähän joten kuvaaja on tuollainen rajusti hyppivä jopa seitsemän päivän liukuvalla keskiarvolla.

Tästäkin on nähtävissä että viime kuukausina tappioita ei ole tullut niin paljon kuin mitä keväällä 2025.

Onko se merkki kaluston vähenemisestä vai varovaisemmasta käytöstä? Vaikea sanoa koska ilmatorjuntakalusto on sellaista jonka käyttöä on vaikea "vähentää", ainakin jos halutaan että suojaus pysyy yhtä hyvänä ja tehokkaana.
Trendi on silmämääräisesti lopussa laskeva. Saatko leivottua vielä 30pv liukuvan keskiarvon tuohon tasaamaan pientä havaintomäärää?
 
Trendi on silmämääräisesti lopussa laskeva. Saatko leivottua vielä 30pv liukuvan keskiarvon tuohon tasaamaan pientä havaintomäärää?

Minä lasken näille seitsemän ja neljäntoista päivän liukuvat keskiarvot, en ole laskenut pidempiä.

Tässä seitsemäntoista päivän kuvaaja:

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MUOKKAUS: tosin äkkiähän tuon laskee kun numerot löytyvät. Tässä 30 päivän liukuva keskiarvo:

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Tämä viimeinen "tasainen pätkä" alkaa 26.6.2025 eli tätä on eletty noin 2,5 kuukautta.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Minä lasken näille seitsemän ja neljäntoista päivän liukuvat keskiarvot, en ole laskenut pidempiä.

Tässä seitsemäntoista päivän kuvaaja:

Katso liite: 124516
Minimissä on. Kovin huippu osuu 2023 vastahyökkäyksen alle. Silmämääräisesti 12kk liukuva olisi voimakkaasti laskeva kuten myös ehdottamani 30pv. It on loppu jos ei sitten ole joko Ukrainan kyky tuhota laskenut tai ryssä siirtänyt torjuntaa kotimaan infraa suojaamaan. Jälkimmäistä ei tue kyvyttömyys torjua Ukrainan droneja tai edes väitettyjä varsin bulkkeja Flamingoja Krimillä.

IT on loppu on mun arvio tästä.
 
Vadym Skibitsky (Deputy Head of the GUR) on antanut pitkän haastattelun Ukrinform-nettisivulle, lainaan sen käännöksen spoilerin taakse (artikkeli julkaistu 7.9.2025).

Pitkä artikkeli joten lainaan sen tekstin kahdessa osassa: LÄHDE

https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato...calnika-gur-ministerstva-oboroni-ukraini.html

Vadym Skibitsky, Deputy Head of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

We are strengthening all types of intelligence

07.09.2025 09:00


It is well known that military intelligence is the “eyes and ears” of the army. Without it, successful command of troops and victory in modern wars are impossible. On the eve of the professional holiday, which is celebrated in Ukraine on September 7, Ukrinform asked Vadym Skibitsky, Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, how the intelligence community has changed during the war, what are the enemy’s capabilities in the defense industry and on the battlefield now, whether to expect provocations from military exercises in Belarus, whether the Russian Federation is moving its defense enterprises away from the border with Ukraine, and why European countries are not shooting down “shaheeds” on their territory.



WE ARE STRENGTHENING ALL TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE



- In Ukraine, on September 7, we celebrate Military Intelligence Day, so in this context, I would like to learn about the transformations that have occurred in the work of the intelligence community during the full-scale invasion and especially over the last year - new capabilities, artificial intelligence, human resources, etc.


- The transformation of the Main Intelligence Directorate began very actively back in 2015. With full-scale aggression, after the Russian Federation directly entered the territory of Ukraine with regular armed forces from various directions, we began to further improve our structure, develop all capabilities that relate to all types of intelligence without exception. We have increased the space segment, the intelligence direction, we are actively using cyberspace - these are cyber-active measures, cybersecurity, cyber defense.

In addition, we use not only our domestic developments in analytical work, but also switched to NATO standards, standards of leading countries of the world for close interaction. Regarding the analytical component, since June 2022 we have already been working with our partners on the issues of targets, determining centers of gravity and other areas. This is all based on common standards. In addition, our special units have received a significant boost and significant development. In fact, from a small unit that existed before the full-scale aggression, we now have many units, and they are on everyone's lips - these are "Artan", "Shamanbat", "Kraken", "Timur" and others, our society knows what operations they conducted, they know them by the results of the operations. And we are developing this segment. Today, it is impossible to resist the aggressor with conventional methods and methods of conducting intelligence, as was the case before the war. In addition, we have strengthened (and, I think, our community, our public has felt this) all divisions of our strategic communication.

In my opinion, for today the presence of the Main Intelligence Directorate in the media space is sufficient. Our duty, starting from 2014, and our main goal was to bring to our society, to the Western community the whole truth about the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation, its actions on our territory. After all, in 2014 everyone started saying that this was a "civil war", but in fact it was the beginning of aggression, armed aggression against our state.

Another of the most important areas is patriotic education, which the Main Intelligence Directorate has joined. We have sponsored schools, a very wide range of non-governmental organizations, volunteers who interact with us. We bring patriotism to the masses, all those slogans and developments that contribute to raising the morale of our soldiers. That is why, wherever on the front, when a special unit of the Main Intelligence Directorate appears, believe me, the moral and psychological state of the combat units of the Defense Forces immediately increases. After all, they understand that these are truly professional, trained servicemen who are able to perform any task. As a result, we can say that a lot of effort, resources, and time have been directed in the complex to improve our work and increase its efficiency. I want to emphasize that we are strengthening all types of intelligence.


- How much has the number of GUR increased?

- We cannot name the total number, but I will say that it has increased many times. First of all, our special component has been increased. We have created an active operations department, which deals with all operations carried out both on the front line and in the temporarily occupied territories of our state and on the territory of the enemy. This is a new element that appeared during the war.


- In an interview, the head of the GUR, Kirill Budanov, reported on the increase in the number of women in the GUR structure. How does this affect the quality of work and is this trend regarding gender changes observed in other countries?

- From my experience, I know that in special services, in intelligence organizations of many countries, there are a large number of female analysts. And this is a fact. Let's take other leading armies. A very simple example is Israel. There, women do compulsory military service. Regarding military intelligence, we have indeed increased the number of women, but this trend in Ukraine is observed not only in the Main Intelligence Directorate.

Let's take a broader look. First, we have an increased number of women studying at higher military educational institutions. These are female officers who then go to various structures of both the Armed Forces and the Defense Forces. Secondly, this is a patriotic attitude of women on an equal footing with men to serve, be responsible, and participate in combat operations. As for the Main Intelligence Directorate, women head departments in our country, many women hold the positions of heads of departments. For example, as the head of analytical units, this is a significant part. Up to 25 percent of positions in information units are held by women who perform various duties. In addition, a significant part of women in support units are in logistics, finance, communications, and medicine. We have a powerful diagnostic center, where the vast majority, up to 80 percent, are female military personnel and civilian women. That is, this is a trend that is inherent today not only to the Main Development Directorate, but also to all our units of the Defense Forces.


- How do you see the development of military intelligence in Ukraine in the near future and do changes in geopolitics affect these processes?

- The question is serious, it involves not just development, but also the application of all available new approaches and technologies that have appeared in the world. What is meant by this? New approaches are a completely different perception of many factors today, which are related to the ideological component, the second is the financial component. For example, if earlier the agent was given cash or transferred to an account, now these are completely different methods. This is the use of cryptocurrency, the use of the latest means of communication and lines of communication that did not exist before. Look at what can now be done using Telegram channels, other social networks, which have really made a breakthrough both for managing agent networks and for recruiting agents, and any other actions. And this can be in every corner of the world.



- Can we say that Telegram is now used most actively, for example, for recruitment?

- You understand, today there are so many social networks, different channels used for communication. Let's take the simpler ones - Signal, WhatsApp and others.

That is, this is a big step in communication, but these are also new approaches to using such means of communication directly for our intelligence activities. In addition, if we are talking about information, and you correctly mentioned artificial intelligence, these are new forms, modern methods of information processing. Huge amounts of information have appeared, which today a person is no longer able to fully process. This requires special software, special databases, artificial intelligence. Although I believe that artificial intelligence is specialized software products that allow you to quickly perform primary processing of information and prepare it for further processing.

In addition, when it comes to geopolitics, what has emerged is broad cooperation between intelligence services, special services, and close partnership. Today, it is simply impossible to be alone and fight new challenges and threats that arise before the country. This requires interaction, information exchange, and joint special operations to neutralize the threat. And alone, perhaps, no country in the world can cope without this. For example, the operations that are currently being conducted are the conflict between Israel and Iran. Israel was also helped by partners by providing intelligence information and other things. Therefore, today, close interaction and cooperation with partners and allies are critically important in order to solve any problem through joint efforts.

- How would you assess the level of cooperation between Ukrainian intelligence and international partners? There have been threatening statements that, for example, the US may refuse to provide intelligence to Ukraine.

- There are a lot of different statements, but practical work continues, and it is beneficial for both sides. We have a mutual interest in the information that we receive and that which can be obtained from us. We have built constructive relations and we hope that cooperation will continue in the same direction.



THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION HAS USED 50 TO 75 PERCENT OF FORMER STOCK OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT FROM WAREHOUSES


- Let's analyze the current capabilities of the Russian Federation in the defense-industrial complex and on the battlefield. To what percentage has Russia used its reserves of equipment and weapons that have been stored in warehouses since Soviet times? And accordingly, what are its current capacities in the production of the main types of weapons?


- Indeed, before the war and in general after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation accumulated a significant amount of weapons and military equipment in warehouses and arsenals. And if we talk about how much there is there, then the Russians themselves could not count how many there were. I remember that in the early 2000s there was information that the Russians "lost" 1,000 tanks somewhere beyond the Urals, which were unaccounted for and were standing on the territory of a training center, and no one knew about them. That is, this is a huge amount of weapons that were in warehouses. Already after the beginning of 2014, they systematized all this, created the appropriate Mobilization Deployment Centers, in particular, near our borders in the Southern Military District, the former Western Military District, where they concentrated equipment to ensure mobilization deployment.

Since the beginning of the full-scale aggression, most of the weapons that have entered the units - tanks, artillery systems, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles - have been in storage, have undergone either modernization or restoration, respectively - and have been transferred to the troops for waging war.

As for the quantity in stock today, it is difficult to say, because there are different figures. It was said that the Russian Federation has already used from 50 to 75 percent of the stocks of various weapons from the previous stocks. At the same time, I would like to note that, despite the used stocks, Russia has retained the ability to manufacture new types and new weapons directly in the defense-industrial complex. And, probably, this is due to the fact that most of the defense industry enterprises of the Soviet Union were not closed, they reduced their capacities, but Russia was and is one of the main exporters of weapons abroad.

We clearly understand the figures that the Russian Federation has planned for today regarding the release of new types of weapons. If we talk, for example, about modern aircraft, which are Su-57, Su-35, Su-34 and Su-30, then they have planned 57 units for this year. Almost 250 T-90M tanks are new, not modernized. In addition, about 1,100 new BTR-3, BTR-82A, artillery systems - 365 units are also new, not modernized. At the same time, the modernization and restoration of weapons and military equipment are thousands of units of weapons used by the Russian Federation.

However, both Ukraine and the Russian Federation are currently focusing significant attention on the production of those types of weapons that are effective on the battlefield. We are talking about unmanned systems, FPV drones, various missile systems. Russia is also trying to increase this armament. In 2025, the aggressor planned to produce almost 2.5 thousand so-called high-precision missiles of various classes. These include cruise and ballistic missiles of the Iskander complex, hypersonic missiles "Dagger" and others. Russia intends to increase production. In addition, we have noticed a significant increase in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles, primarily such as "Geran", "Harpy" and FPV drones.

RUSSIA WILL NOT GIVE UP THE PRODUCTION OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN FAVOR OF DRONES AND MISSILES



- Is it correct to say that the Russians will reduce funding for heavy equipment and weapons and direct more of it towards drones and missiles?


- This is absolutely incorrect. Military intelligence has data on the armament program of the Russian Armed Forces for 10 years, from 2026 to 2037. The Russians have clearly stated there the main requirements that they place on the defense-industrial complex regarding heavy weapons, warships, aviation, and missile systems. We know that they will develop strategic and long-range aviation through modernization and the creation of new aircraft.

By the way, the Russian Ministry of Defense has identified three main battle tanks. This will no longer be a wide range, as before. The main battle tanks will be the T-90, Armata, and T-80. In addition, the newest artillery systems are the Coalition, Msta of various types, Malva, Hyacinth, and Magnolia. That is, they will try to introduce this weapon into production, taking into account the experience of using this weapon on the battlefield. In addition, there will be a wide range of missile weapons, starting from the strategic and ending with the tactical level. Moscow is planning new long-range missiles, modern hyper-speed anti-ship missiles. That is, they envisage three areas of improving missile weapons: the first is increasing the range, the second is increasing accuracy, and the third is increasing the warhead.

Because striking the territory of Ukraine is one combat radius, and to prepare for war with NATO countries by 2030, the combat radius of such weapons must be larger. This is what they are putting into their weapons programs.

Regarding new approaches – FPV drones, artificial intelligence. The enemy seeks to increase the share of unmanned and unmanned systems on the battlefield in the future to 40 percent. We record (not only the military, but also our civilians, society feels) how much the number of drones increases during the Russian Federation’s strikes on our territory.

The indicated directions are defined as the main ones. In addition, I emphasize: there will be no abandonment of artillery systems and heavy types of armored vehicles - this is inherent in the classical approach, classical warfare.


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JATKUU OSASSA 2/2
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Tässä toinen osa Vadym Skibitsky (Deputy Head of the GUR) tuoreesta haastattelusta: LÄHDE

https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato...calnika-gur-ministerstva-oboroni-ukraini.html

THE ENEMY WILL DESTROY COMBINED STRIKES AGAINST UKRAINE


- Putin announced new massive attacks on Ukraine's energy facilities. Will the enemy use already known missiles for strikes or could it be something new?


- We are really seeing the modernization and improvement of missile weapons and unmanned aerial systems by the Russian Federation as a result of the attacks on our country, primarily on civilian infrastructure and our enterprises.

Firstly, the strikes will be combined, which will include UAVs of various types, including the so-called false targets, cruise missiles of various types of bases: sea-based - "Caliber", air-based - Kh-101, Kh-32, and ground-based - "Iskander". The enemy can use both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. But what do we see? Firstly, this is a change in strike tactics. Secondly, the use of modernized weapons.

Let's analyze the changes in the tactics of using "Shaheeds". Once they flew straight to the object, and now it can circle around Kyiv for several hours, changing altitude. Next is the modernization of weapons. Next is the Kh-101 cruise missile, which today has new elements, including electronic warfare means, a double warhead, and, accordingly, a larger explosive charge that it carries. Among other things, this is an improvement in the navigation and control system to overcome our electronic warfare system. That is, evolution is underway, the improvement of all means of armed combat and destruction continues.

That is why it would be wrong to say that the enemy will stop at some level. For example, the Comet system was 8-, 12-channel, now it is 16-channel, and in the future it will be 32-channel, which will allow it to overcome the electronic warfare system.

That is, this process will be continuous for the enemy – improvement, increasing the effectiveness of strikes due to accuracy, etc. And accordingly, our task is to effectively counteract this.

- International partners are asking Ukraine to share information about seized enemy weapons?

- Yes, they are. If we are talking about partnership and mutually beneficial cooperation, this is exactly what is supposed to happen. Why? Because they also have powerful laboratories for effective technical expertise of all the means used by the Russian Federation, they give us their recommendations for improving countermeasures. Our partners are also preparing for a possible military conflict. Such work continues and will continue, because the evolutionary approach assumes the emergence of something new every three to four months. And what was in 2022 is already too simple compared to today.


THE THREAT FROM THE TERRITORY OF BELARUS REMAINS AT A LOW LEVEL


- Everyone is closely following the news about the Russian-Belarusian exercises "West-2025". Both the West and Ukraine assure that there are currently no threats, but are provocations from this direction possible and what kind?


- Today, the threat level associated with the possibility of using any group from the territory of Belarus remains low. We clearly understand the goal, plans, and issues that will be worked out within the framework of all exercises that are now being held on the territory of Belarus. This applies to the CSTO exercises, the active phase of the Zapad-2025 exercise. One of the main issues of the exercise is not only the defense of the union state of Belarus and the Russian Federation, but also the working out of all the necessary elements of testing the newly created headquarters of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts. In general, it is necessary to test the activities of their headquarters, planning, and other issues that are inherent in any strategic exercise in this area. The Russian Federation does not have powerful reserves or free military units to show such power as it used to do in such exercises. They are all now involved in hostilities on our territory.


MANY FOREIGN CITIZENS AGREE TO WORK AT RUSSIAN DEFENSE ENTERPRISES


- In a recent interview, you said that the Russian Federation is actively recruiting citizens of other countries to work at its military enterprises. Are you observing an increase in the number of such workers, since there is data not only on hired workers from post-Soviet countries, but also from African countries, North Korea, etc.?


- Such a practice exists, it is used. Let's look at North Korea. There, in general, now plans to send thousands of its representatives of various specialties to work, to study experience in the Russian Federation. And both in the defense-industrial complex, and to provide assistance in construction, in other branches of industry of the Russian Federation.

For example, when we talk about 6,000 North Korean specialists for work in the Kursk region, that’s a lot. We know for sure that more than a thousand have already arrived. They are involved in the restoration of roads, engineering equipment of defense lines in the Kursk region. The next thing is work for the Russian defense industry. This means enterprises that produce ammunition and weapons, in particular tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, that is, armored vehicles. In addition, unmanned aerial vehicles. This same production is now being deployed and improved in North Korea. This is experience, on the one hand, and on the other hand, assistance to the Russian Federation.

We have data on the recruitment of citizens of other countries to work at Russian enterprises. For the zone in Yelabuga. The Russians are developing their production there. If they once started with a thousand employees, today they plan to have 40,000 employees in the Yelabuga zone, which manufactures UAVs. We record many foreign citizens who agree to sign contracts, go to Russia to work. True, many of them then sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense, go to fight.



MOST RUSSIAN DEFENSE ENTERPRISES ARE DEPLOYED MORE THAN 750 KM FROM THE UKRAINIAN BORDER


- Do you observe the relocation of Russian defense enterprises away from the border with Ukraine so that our missiles cannot hit them?



- Most of the powerful enterprises of the Russian defense industry are located 750 km or further from our border. Only 25 percent are located at a distance of 250–500 km.

We do not see the relocation of enterprises, we record the creation of new ones at a distance of 1,500–2,000 km from our border. There are many of them, and our deep strikes are needed to stop or interrupt production processes.

New approaches are needed here. It is necessary to identify the most critical enterprises and the most critical elements in this enterprise in order to destroy them. Because there is a lot of cooperation there. More than 100 enterprises can be involved in one type of weapon. Well, it's like it was in the Soviet Union. The second problem arises - the enemy understands this vulnerability and is strengthening air defense means, developing electronic warfare means. In general, they are now trying to create a powerful system to counter our unmanned systems and missiles. This is a whole program that involves the creation of units, new means of combat. First of all, according to our data, somewhere during September they will test 7 unmanned systems aimed at countering our strikes. That is, these are anti-drones of both the quadcopter type and the aircraft type, in order, again, to protect their facilities, enterprises of the defense-industrial complex.

For this, in addition to our unmanned systems, we also need missile systems. And we clearly understand this from the strikes that Russia inflicts on our infrastructure. We receive the greatest damage precisely from missile weapons, because they have a larger warhead, greater accuracy. And here, the help of our partners is very important for us, and secondly, the development of our own programs, in particular missile ones.


NORTH KOREAN SOLDIERS WILL REMAIN ON RUSSIAN TERRITORY


- The topic of involving North Korean soldiers in the war in Ukraine has now somewhat faded into the shadows. What is known about their possible presence during the enemy's autumn-winter offensive?


- Firstly, their presence is and will be. But we are talking about the territory of Russia. Why has this topic subsided? Now there are no active hostilities in the Kursk region, where they are all concentrated. We see the task set before them - strengthening the border. That is, they will be engaged in engineering equipment of defensive positions and, as they say, maintain the defense of their strategic ally - the Russian Federation. There are no active hostilities there, the North Koreans are not mentioned in the media, but this does not mean that they are not there. Secondly, let's analyze all the events that took place in North Korea. How their leader met them, awarded them, noted those who died, said what a great role they played, and so on. But we understand that if people came to be awarded, then someone replaced them. Our assessment is very simple, and it is confirmed by the documents we have, that the presence of North Korean servicemen and units will continue on the territory of Russia. They have clearly defined tasks for the Kursk region. In addition, it will most likely be carried out on a rotational basis.


SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR, THE KREMLIN HAS CONTRACTED ABOUT 280,000 PEOPLE


- You said that the Russians have no problems with mobilization, because they have operational reserves and the recruitment of Russians who want to make money from the war is constantly ongoing. Has the data on monthly recruitment in the Russian Federation changed, or does the figure of 30,000–35,000 per month remain?


- Unfortunately, they have the opportunity, and it is supported financially and by propaganda. Russia is recruiting at least 35,000 military personnel every month. According to our data, as of September 1, 2025, the Kremlin has called up about 280,000 military personnel under contract.

Let me remind you that the Russian Federation makes large payments to contract workers. Today, it is 2 million rubles for signing the first contract. So there are all signs that by the end of the year they will fully fulfill the recruiting plan.


BEIJING IS FOLLOWING THE WAR VERY CAREFULLY


- I would like to know your impressions of the SCO summit, in particular the military parade. Is China's military potential being analyzed?


- We are working on this, but let's put it this way: what they demonstrated once again indicates that the PRC has a nuclear triad - this is air, land, sea, they have new developments in missile weapons, and China has a large mobilization potential. This is the main thing. In addition, they are clearly studying everything related to new weapons, both from the Russian Federation and new Western weapons that are now being used on the battlefield. Beijing is very meticulously following the war that is going on in our country.

- The issues of prisoner exchange and the return of Ukrainian children are the most sensitive. How has the dynamics of work in this area changed during the war?

- This is everyday work. Something that added some dynamics to this process is Istanbul and all the meetings that were held there. Why? Because new approaches have already been used there - the principle of "all for all", the categories according to which we work are clearly defined. For example, the seriously wounded and sick, people who have been in captivity for a long time, young people - this added dynamics. But the work is routine, and it must be said that it has been going on since 2022. This is a unique experience that has never been done in the world before. There has never been an exchange of prisoners during a war, only after it ends. The positive thing is that our citizens, our servicemen are returning home.


MODERN MILITARY CONFLICTS LAST LESS THAN A MONTH, EXCEPT FOR THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

- What possible scenarios of military conflicts in the world would you highlight in the near future, or is it difficult to predict now?



- You know, when we analyze all the conflicts that have occurred this year, the first question arises: is any country ready to wage a long-term, exhausting war? We and Russia have been at war for three and a half years. Now let's look at what has happened over the past year: India - China, India - Pakistan, Armenia - Azerbaijan, Iran - Israel. All of this lasted less than a month. No one wants a long-term, exhausting war, except for the Russian Federation. Therefore, when we talk about modern conflicts, experience shows that it lasts less than a month. Then the countries agree or postpone the problem, which remains unresolved. But such a large-scale, long-term conflict, which, in essence, is a full-fledged war, does not exist anywhere.


THE EU UNDERSTANDS THE THREATS FROM RUSSIA, THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY ARE ABLE TO NEUTRALIZE THEM IN TIME

- If we talk about the hybrid war that Russia is now waging in EU countries, what would you pay attention to first of all - cyberspace, information campaigns, influence on electoral processes? Does the leadership of EU countries recognize that this war is already underway?



- Analyze all the doctrinal documents of the European Union and NATO countries over the past three years. And what will you see there? The enemy is the Russian Federation. Are the methods of conducting hybrid actions described there? Described. What is the biggest threat? Propaganda, disinformation, cyber, and so on. It's all there. They understand it, it's spelled out in their documents. And the entire system of both security and defense is developing in accordance with these documents. Another question is how capable they are of confronting these threats. However, it already depends on the political will that exists today. Pay attention to what is happening in Europe. They live their own lives. They have a migration problem, a population problem, economic problems, etc. In my opinion, I repeat, they understand the threat, and the question is whether they are able to neutralize it in a timely manner.

That is, it cannot be said that this is something new for Europe. They felt it back in 2022, and they had a unique chance then, when they completely banned all these "Sputniks", Telegram, Russian channels, expelled all the spies who worked under diplomatic cover, but time passed - and it all returned. Unfortunately.


- How can you explain that Russian "shaheeds" are not shot down on the territory of European Union countries?

- We didn't shoot down the "Shaheeds" in October 2022 either. Then we shot down the S-300 air defense system, and now we use a wide range of means. They don't have experience yet, but they will.





Iryna Kozhukhar
Photo: Gennady Minchenko
 
Viimeöisessä iskussa on kuollu 4 ihmistä ja 44 loukkaantunut. Ja Kiovan lähellä ollut hevosfarmi menetti 7 hevosta. Siihen Venäjä käytti kolme Shadehia.

This is how the headquarters of Ukraine’s government now looks after this morning's Russian attack. Our whole team works in this building daily. Fortunately, no one was injured. Russian barbarism will not halt the work of Ukraine’s government.

The walls will be repaired, they are only bricks, but the lives of our people can’t be restored. In this night’s Russian attack 4 people killed and 44 injured.

What is clear is that Russia does not want peace.

I urge the world to turn outrage over Russian crimes into concrete support for Ukraine. Not for the walls of this building, but to protect our people and communities across the country.

We need stronger air defense – more systems and more ammunition – to shield our cities and our energy system as winter approaches. We need tougher sanctions that will deprive the aggressor of oil and gas revenues, the very resources funding its terror.

Only by standing strong and united can we bring an end to Russian aggression and secure peace.
 
Minimissä on. Kovin huippu osuu 2023 vastahyökkäyksen alle. Silmämääräisesti 12kk liukuva olisi voimakkaasti laskeva kuten myös ehdottamani 30pv. It on loppu jos ei sitten ole joko Ukrainan kyky tuhota laskenut tai ryssä siirtänyt torjuntaa kotimaan infraa suojaamaan. Jälkimmäistä ei tue kyvyttömyys torjua Ukrainan droneja tai edes väitettyjä varsin bulkkeja Flamingoja Krimillä.

IT on loppu on mun arvio tästä.

Kyllä Ukrainan kyky tuhota Venäjän IT-kalustoa on jatkuvasti parantunut, mitä todistaa esimerkiksi ne Starlinkin kautta lennettävät kiinteäsiipiset droonit Krimillä joilla on poltettu ties kuinka monta tutkaa tai laukaisualustaa. Lisäksi kiinteiden kaukovalvontatutkien tuhoaminen kertoo myös omaa kieltänsä tilanteesta, niiden menettäminen vie väkisinkin kyvykkyyttä ilmatilan valvontaan.

Muistetaan, että Ukraina iski niihin ohjusvarastoihin aikoja sitten, meni tuhansia tonneja ohjuksia kerralla, nyt reilu kuukausi sitten iskettiin useisiin laitoksiin, jotka tuottavat ohjusten navigointielektroniikkaa ja lisäksi rakettipolttoaineita tuottaviin tehtaisiin ja heliumin tuotantolaitoksiin on isketty.

Riittää, että jostain kriittisestä komponentista tulee selkeästi pulaa ja käytettävissä olevien ohjusten määrä voi laskea samalla kun Ukrainan lähettämien droonien ja ohjusten määrä nousee.

Se tietää sitten kyllä melkoisia kokkoja syksyn mittaan mikäli tämä on taustalla.

Tuskimpa sitä IT-kalustoa on Zapad-harjoitukseenkaan siirretty, piru taitaa olla ryssillä merrassa.
 
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