Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Näennäisesti Ukrainan droonituotannolla menee hyvin mutta valtion hankkeissa tuntuu olevan löysiä. Sternenkon mukaan valtaosa valtion tilaamista FPV-drooneista on kelvottomia tai vaatii reippaasti DIY-henkeä.

According to our estimates, up to 60% of FPVs that are under state order are currently unusable or require serious rework.

Once again: more than half of the 2 million FPVs from the state are unusable and are in warehouses. How much is that in money? Billions.

There are two reasons: logistics from 1 to 6 months and the need that the General Staff forms - they directly give the names of the drones that need to be purchased to the Ministry of Defense.
And what are their characteristics or why the motors were screwed on the wrong side - the General Staff is not interested in this.

There is either enormous corruption here, or abysmal stupidity. Or both in one, I don’t know.
But we have to fix it later.

 
Luulen että uket juoksuttaa örkkien ilmatorjuntaa.
You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.
-
Sun Tzu
 
Venäjän kolmipäiväinen menee niin hyvin että hautausmaitakin pitää jo alkaa piilottelemaan:
"In Russia, cemeteries of "Special Military Operation heroes" are being destroyedIn Yakutsk, a woman went to visit her brother's grave, who had died in the war in Ukraine, but the cemetery no longer exists: everything was leveled with a grader, the plaques are gone, and the area has been flattened as if nothing ever existed. According to her, the authorities plan to create a "Walk of Fame" on the site.The state is erasing traces, acting as if nothing happened- "Vanya? What Vanya? Vanya never existed." Convenient for statistics, and so that thousands of graves with tricolors don't offend the patriotic public."
 
Venäjän kolmipäiväinen menee niin hyvin että hautausmaitakin pitää jo alkaa piilottelemaan:
"In Russia, cemeteries of "Special Military Operation heroes" are being destroyedIn Yakutsk, a woman went to visit her brother's grave, who had died in the war in Ukraine, but the cemetery no longer exists: everything was leveled with a grader, the plaques are gone, and the area has been flattened as if nothing ever existed. According to her, the authorities plan to create a "Walk of Fame" on the site.The state is erasing traces, acting as if nothing happened- "Vanya? What Vanya? Vanya never existed." Convenient for statistics, and so that thousands of graves with tricolors don't offend the patriotic public."
Wagnerien hautausmaillehan tää on jo tehty aiemmin. Ne vedettiin sileäksi ja ainakin muutamaan tuli pysäköintialue päälle...
 
Vadym Skibitsky (Deputy Head of the GUR) on antanut pitkän haastattelun Ukrinform-nettisivulle, lainaan sen käännöksen spoilerin taakse (artikkeli julkaistu 7.9.2025).

Pitkä artikkeli joten lainaan sen tekstin kahdessa osassa: LÄHDE

https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato...calnika-gur-ministerstva-oboroni-ukraini.html

Vadym Skibitsky, Deputy Head of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

We are strengthening all types of intelligence

07.09.2025 09:00


It is well known that military intelligence is the “eyes and ears” of the army. Without it, successful command of troops and victory in modern wars are impossible. On the eve of the professional holiday, which is celebrated in Ukraine on September 7, Ukrinform asked Vadym Skibitsky, Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, how the intelligence community has changed during the war, what are the enemy’s capabilities in the defense industry and on the battlefield now, whether to expect provocations from military exercises in Belarus, whether the Russian Federation is moving its defense enterprises away from the border with Ukraine, and why European countries are not shooting down “shaheeds” on their territory.



WE ARE STRENGTHENING ALL TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE



- In Ukraine, on September 7, we celebrate Military Intelligence Day, so in this context, I would like to learn about the transformations that have occurred in the work of the intelligence community during the full-scale invasion and especially over the last year - new capabilities, artificial intelligence, human resources, etc.


- The transformation of the Main Intelligence Directorate began very actively back in 2015. With full-scale aggression, after the Russian Federation directly entered the territory of Ukraine with regular armed forces from various directions, we began to further improve our structure, develop all capabilities that relate to all types of intelligence without exception. We have increased the space segment, the intelligence direction, we are actively using cyberspace - these are cyber-active measures, cybersecurity, cyber defense.

In addition, we use not only our domestic developments in analytical work, but also switched to NATO standards, standards of leading countries of the world for close interaction. Regarding the analytical component, since June 2022 we have already been working with our partners on the issues of targets, determining centers of gravity and other areas. This is all based on common standards. In addition, our special units have received a significant boost and significant development. In fact, from a small unit that existed before the full-scale aggression, we now have many units, and they are on everyone's lips - these are "Artan", "Shamanbat", "Kraken", "Timur" and others, our society knows what operations they conducted, they know them by the results of the operations. And we are developing this segment. Today, it is impossible to resist the aggressor with conventional methods and methods of conducting intelligence, as was the case before the war. In addition, we have strengthened (and, I think, our community, our public has felt this) all divisions of our strategic communication.

In my opinion, for today the presence of the Main Intelligence Directorate in the media space is sufficient. Our duty, starting from 2014, and our main goal was to bring to our society, to the Western community the whole truth about the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation, its actions on our territory. After all, in 2014 everyone started saying that this was a "civil war", but in fact it was the beginning of aggression, armed aggression against our state.

Another of the most important areas is patriotic education, which the Main Intelligence Directorate has joined. We have sponsored schools, a very wide range of non-governmental organizations, volunteers who interact with us. We bring patriotism to the masses, all those slogans and developments that contribute to raising the morale of our soldiers. That is why, wherever on the front, when a special unit of the Main Intelligence Directorate appears, believe me, the moral and psychological state of the combat units of the Defense Forces immediately increases. After all, they understand that these are truly professional, trained servicemen who are able to perform any task. As a result, we can say that a lot of effort, resources, and time have been directed in the complex to improve our work and increase its efficiency. I want to emphasize that we are strengthening all types of intelligence.


- How much has the number of GUR increased?

- We cannot name the total number, but I will say that it has increased many times. First of all, our special component has been increased. We have created an active operations department, which deals with all operations carried out both on the front line and in the temporarily occupied territories of our state and on the territory of the enemy. This is a new element that appeared during the war.


- In an interview, the head of the GUR, Kirill Budanov, reported on the increase in the number of women in the GUR structure. How does this affect the quality of work and is this trend regarding gender changes observed in other countries?

- From my experience, I know that in special services, in intelligence organizations of many countries, there are a large number of female analysts. And this is a fact. Let's take other leading armies. A very simple example is Israel. There, women do compulsory military service. Regarding military intelligence, we have indeed increased the number of women, but this trend in Ukraine is observed not only in the Main Intelligence Directorate.

Let's take a broader look. First, we have an increased number of women studying at higher military educational institutions. These are female officers who then go to various structures of both the Armed Forces and the Defense Forces. Secondly, this is a patriotic attitude of women on an equal footing with men to serve, be responsible, and participate in combat operations. As for the Main Intelligence Directorate, women head departments in our country, many women hold the positions of heads of departments. For example, as the head of analytical units, this is a significant part. Up to 25 percent of positions in information units are held by women who perform various duties. In addition, a significant part of women in support units are in logistics, finance, communications, and medicine. We have a powerful diagnostic center, where the vast majority, up to 80 percent, are female military personnel and civilian women. That is, this is a trend that is inherent today not only to the Main Development Directorate, but also to all our units of the Defense Forces.


- How do you see the development of military intelligence in Ukraine in the near future and do changes in geopolitics affect these processes?

- The question is serious, it involves not just development, but also the application of all available new approaches and technologies that have appeared in the world. What is meant by this? New approaches are a completely different perception of many factors today, which are related to the ideological component, the second is the financial component. For example, if earlier the agent was given cash or transferred to an account, now these are completely different methods. This is the use of cryptocurrency, the use of the latest means of communication and lines of communication that did not exist before. Look at what can now be done using Telegram channels, other social networks, which have really made a breakthrough both for managing agent networks and for recruiting agents, and any other actions. And this can be in every corner of the world.



- Can we say that Telegram is now used most actively, for example, for recruitment?

- You understand, today there are so many social networks, different channels used for communication. Let's take the simpler ones - Signal, WhatsApp and others.

That is, this is a big step in communication, but these are also new approaches to using such means of communication directly for our intelligence activities. In addition, if we are talking about information, and you correctly mentioned artificial intelligence, these are new forms, modern methods of information processing. Huge amounts of information have appeared, which today a person is no longer able to fully process. This requires special software, special databases, artificial intelligence. Although I believe that artificial intelligence is specialized software products that allow you to quickly perform primary processing of information and prepare it for further processing.

In addition, when it comes to geopolitics, what has emerged is broad cooperation between intelligence services, special services, and close partnership. Today, it is simply impossible to be alone and fight new challenges and threats that arise before the country. This requires interaction, information exchange, and joint special operations to neutralize the threat. And alone, perhaps, no country in the world can cope without this. For example, the operations that are currently being conducted are the conflict between Israel and Iran. Israel was also helped by partners by providing intelligence information and other things. Therefore, today, close interaction and cooperation with partners and allies are critically important in order to solve any problem through joint efforts.

- How would you assess the level of cooperation between Ukrainian intelligence and international partners? There have been threatening statements that, for example, the US may refuse to provide intelligence to Ukraine.

- There are a lot of different statements, but practical work continues, and it is beneficial for both sides. We have a mutual interest in the information that we receive and that which can be obtained from us. We have built constructive relations and we hope that cooperation will continue in the same direction.



THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION HAS USED 50 TO 75 PERCENT OF FORMER STOCK OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT FROM WAREHOUSES


- Let's analyze the current capabilities of the Russian Federation in the defense-industrial complex and on the battlefield. To what percentage has Russia used its reserves of equipment and weapons that have been stored in warehouses since Soviet times? And accordingly, what are its current capacities in the production of the main types of weapons?


- Indeed, before the war and in general after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation accumulated a significant amount of weapons and military equipment in warehouses and arsenals. And if we talk about how much there is there, then the Russians themselves could not count how many there were. I remember that in the early 2000s there was information that the Russians "lost" 1,000 tanks somewhere beyond the Urals, which were unaccounted for and were standing on the territory of a training center, and no one knew about them. That is, this is a huge amount of weapons that were in warehouses. Already after the beginning of 2014, they systematized all this, created the appropriate Mobilization Deployment Centers, in particular, near our borders in the Southern Military District, the former Western Military District, where they concentrated equipment to ensure mobilization deployment.

Since the beginning of the full-scale aggression, most of the weapons that have entered the units - tanks, artillery systems, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles - have been in storage, have undergone either modernization or restoration, respectively - and have been transferred to the troops for waging war.

As for the quantity in stock today, it is difficult to say, because there are different figures. It was said that the Russian Federation has already used from 50 to 75 percent of the stocks of various weapons from the previous stocks. At the same time, I would like to note that, despite the used stocks, Russia has retained the ability to manufacture new types and new weapons directly in the defense-industrial complex. And, probably, this is due to the fact that most of the defense industry enterprises of the Soviet Union were not closed, they reduced their capacities, but Russia was and is one of the main exporters of weapons abroad.

We clearly understand the figures that the Russian Federation has planned for today regarding the release of new types of weapons. If we talk, for example, about modern aircraft, which are Su-57, Su-35, Su-34 and Su-30, then they have planned 57 units for this year. Almost 250 T-90M tanks are new, not modernized. In addition, about 1,100 new BTR-3, BTR-82A, artillery systems - 365 units are also new, not modernized. At the same time, the modernization and restoration of weapons and military equipment are thousands of units of weapons used by the Russian Federation.

However, both Ukraine and the Russian Federation are currently focusing significant attention on the production of those types of weapons that are effective on the battlefield. We are talking about unmanned systems, FPV drones, various missile systems. Russia is also trying to increase this armament. In 2025, the aggressor planned to produce almost 2.5 thousand so-called high-precision missiles of various classes. These include cruise and ballistic missiles of the Iskander complex, hypersonic missiles "Dagger" and others. Russia intends to increase production. In addition, we have noticed a significant increase in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles, primarily such as "Geran", "Harpy" and FPV drones.

RUSSIA WILL NOT GIVE UP THE PRODUCTION OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN FAVOR OF DRONES AND MISSILES



- Is it correct to say that the Russians will reduce funding for heavy equipment and weapons and direct more of it towards drones and missiles?


- This is absolutely incorrect. Military intelligence has data on the armament program of the Russian Armed Forces for 10 years, from 2026 to 2037. The Russians have clearly stated there the main requirements that they place on the defense-industrial complex regarding heavy weapons, warships, aviation, and missile systems. We know that they will develop strategic and long-range aviation through modernization and the creation of new aircraft.

By the way, the Russian Ministry of Defense has identified three main battle tanks. This will no longer be a wide range, as before. The main battle tanks will be the T-90, Armata, and T-80. In addition, the newest artillery systems are the Coalition, Msta of various types, Malva, Hyacinth, and Magnolia. That is, they will try to introduce this weapon into production, taking into account the experience of using this weapon on the battlefield. In addition, there will be a wide range of missile weapons, starting from the strategic and ending with the tactical level. Moscow is planning new long-range missiles, modern hyper-speed anti-ship missiles. That is, they envisage three areas of improving missile weapons: the first is increasing the range, the second is increasing accuracy, and the third is increasing the warhead.

Because striking the territory of Ukraine is one combat radius, and to prepare for war with NATO countries by 2030, the combat radius of such weapons must be larger. This is what they are putting into their weapons programs.

Regarding new approaches – FPV drones, artificial intelligence. The enemy seeks to increase the share of unmanned and unmanned systems on the battlefield in the future to 40 percent. We record (not only the military, but also our civilians, society feels) how much the number of drones increases during the Russian Federation’s strikes on our territory.

The indicated directions are defined as the main ones. In addition, I emphasize: there will be no abandonment of artillery systems and heavy types of armored vehicles - this is inherent in the classical approach, classical warfare.


-

JATKUU OSASSA 2/2

Lainasin eilen Vadym Skibitsky (Deputy Head of the GUR) haastattelua, yksi sen mielenkiintoisimmista palasista on tämä arvio ryssän kalustosta:

As for the quantity in stock today, it is difficult to say, because there are different figures. It was said that the Russian Federation has already used from 50 to 75 percent of the stocks of various weapons from the previous stocks. At the same time, I would like to note that, despite the used stocks, Russia has retained the ability to manufacture new types and new weapons directly in the defense-industrial complex. And, probably, this is due to the fact that most of the defense industry enterprises of the Soviet Union were not closed, they reduced their capacities, but Russia was and is one of the main exporters of weapons abroad.

We clearly understand the figures that the Russian Federation has planned for today regarding the release of new types of weapons. If we talk, for example, about modern aircraft, which are Su-57, Su-35, Su-34 and Su-30, then they have planned 57 units for this year. Almost 250 T-90M tanks are new, not modernized. In addition, about 1,100 new BTR-3, BTR-82A, artillery systems - 365 units are also new, not modernized. At the same time, the modernization and restoration of weapons and military equipment are thousands of units of weapons used by the Russian Federation.

However, both Ukraine and the Russian Federation are currently focusing significant attention on the production of those types of weapons that are effective on the battlefield. We are talking about unmanned systems, FPV drones, various missile systems. Russia is also trying to increase this armament. In 2025, the aggressor planned to produce almost 2.5 thousand so-called high-precision missiles of various classes. These include cruise and ballistic missiles of the Iskander complex, hypersonic missiles "Dagger" and others. Russia intends to increase production. In addition, we have noticed a significant increase in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles, primarily such as "Geran", "Harpy" and FPV drones.

RUSSIA WILL NOT GIVE UP THE PRODUCTION OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN FAVOR OF DRONES AND MISSILES



- Is it correct to say that the Russians will reduce funding for heavy equipment and weapons and direct more of it towards drones and missiles?


- This is absolutely incorrect. Military intelligence has data on the armament program of the Russian Armed Forces for 10 years, from 2026 to 2037. The Russians have clearly stated there the main requirements that they place on the defense-industrial complex regarding heavy weapons, warships, aviation, and missile systems. We know that they will develop strategic and long-range aviation through modernization and the creation of new aircraft.

By the way, the Russian Ministry of Defense has identified three main battle tanks. This will no longer be a wide range, as before. The main battle tanks will be the T-90, Armata, and T-80. In addition, the newest artillery systems are the Coalition, Msta of various types, Malva, Hyacinth, and Magnolia. That is, they will try to introduce this weapon into production, taking into account the experience of using this weapon on the battlefield. In addition, there will be a wide range of missile weapons, starting from the strategic and ending with the tactical level. Moscow is planning new long-range missiles, modern hyper-speed anti-ship missiles. That is, they envisage three areas of improving missile weapons: the first is increasing the range, the second is increasing accuracy, and the third is increasing the warhead.

Because striking the territory of Ukraine is one combat radius, and to prepare for war with NATO countries by 2030, the combat radius of such weapons must be larger. This is what they are putting into their weapons programs.

Regarding new approaches – FPV drones, artificial intelligence. The enemy seeks to increase the share of unmanned and unmanned systems on the battlefield in the future to 40 percent. We record (not only the military, but also our civilians, society feels) how much the number of drones increases during the Russian Federation’s strikes on our territory.

The indicated directions are defined as the main ones. In addition, I emphasize: there will be no abandonment of artillery systems and heavy types of armored vehicles - this is inherent in the classical approach, classical warfare.


-

Näistä numeroista on ollut twitterissä vääntöä eli kuinka vakavasti ne voi ottaa. Lukemani perusteella usea tuntuu arvioivan että T-90M ja IFV-vaunujen numerot voivat olla lähellä totuutta mutta hävittäjien numeroa pidetään aivan liian suurena (paitsi jos siihen on laskettu mukaan Yak-130 koulutushävittäjien määrä, tosin Skibitskyn vastaus sanoo selvästi että hän tarkoittaa Su-57, Su-35, Su-34 ja Su-30 hävittäjiä).

Minäkin olen skeptinen tuon numeron suhteen. Meillä ei ole luotettavia numeroita sodan aikaisilta vuosilta, pelkkiä arvauksia vain mutta tässä venäläisen bmpd-blogin taulukko sotaa edeltäneiltä vuosilta (pidän näitä numeroita luotettavina, ne täsmäävät mm. ilmavoimia seuraavan Guy Plopskyn kertoman kanssa - eivät 100% mutta riittävän tarkasti):

1757337186801.webp

Tästä nähdään että Su-30SM2 ja Su-34M hävittäjien uustuotanto oli vasta alkamassa, eli niiden osalta kasvua oli odotettavissa. Su-35S pysyi tuotannossa mutta vaikea nähdä yli 10-12 kpl per vuosi edes sota-aikana. Su-57 tuotanto oli myös vasta alussa, väitetysti niitä valmistui 6 kpl vuonna 2022. Minun kuvitelmani on että tällainen määrä olisi valmistunut myös sotavuosina muttei suurempaa määrää per vuosi.

Jos kokeillaan näillä numeroilla:

Su-30SM2 = 21 kpl
Su-34M = 16 kpl
Su-35S = 10 kpl
Su-57 = 6 kpl

Näiden summa on 53 kpl.

Ei siis tarvitse viilata numeroita kovin paljoa ylöspäin jotta ollaan kerrotussa tavoitteessa 57 kpl per vuosi. MUTTA toisaalta yhtenäkään sotavuotena ei ole nähty "hävittäjien luovutuksia" tai satelliittikuvia jotka olisivat kertoneet että oikea toimitettu määrä olisi ollut lähelläkään tätä. Videot ovat tietysti tarkkaan editoituja, joten todellinen luovutettujen koneiden määrä on pelkkä arvaus. Silti näiden perusteella kuvitelmani on että realistinen konemäärä olisi ehkä puolet tästä numerosta, ainakin aikaisempina vuosina. Kenties vuosi 2025 on poikkeus?

Eli T-90M uustuotanto olisi tänä vuonna "melkein 250 kpl" ja kaikki näistä ovat todellista uustuotantoa, ei vanhojen vaunujen modernisointia. Tämä tarkoittaisi keskiarvoisesti hieman yli 20 kpl per kuukausi.

IFV-vaunujen osalta on ollut hieman vääntöä twitterissä eli miten luetaan tämä kommentti: about 1,100 new BTR-3, BTR-82A
Tarkoitetaanko että kumpaakin valmistetaan noin 1100 kpl vai onko tämä näiden kahden mallin uustuotannon summa?

Puolalainen Marek Reszka kommentoi numeroita näin: LÄHDE

57 aircraft? Okay, including everything (including the Yak-130). 250 T-90Ms, the most reliable data, I'd assume maybe even 300. 1,100 BMP-3s, yes, but it's worth remembering that KMZ increased BMP-3 production at the expense of BMD-4Ms, so firstly, BTR-82A/AT production is ~60-65% of that number. 365 artillery systems? Including mortars (including towed mortars).

Hänen tulkintansa on että BTR-82A/AT uustuotanto olisi ~60-65% tuosta numerosta mikä tarkoittaisi noin 660 - 715 kpl per vuosi.

Tämä tarkoittaisi että BMP-3 vaunujen uustuotanto olisi noin 385 - 440 kpl per vuosi.

Hän myös kirjoittaa että "tykistön" uustuotanto 365 kpl per vuosi, tämän hän hyväksyy jos numero sisältää "perässävedettävät kranaatinheittimet".

-

Vertailun vuoksi tässä se mitä Jompy arvioi ryssän teollisuuden kapasiteetiksi tällä hetkellä (tässä on APC- ja IFV-vaunujen taulukot, sekä varastovaunujen aktivointi ja/tai modernisointi sekä aito uustuotanto, hän ei antanut vastaavaa arvioita panssarivaunuille missään vaiheessa):

1757336730244.webp

1757336742358.webp

Jompyn arvio oli että BTR-82A/AT uustuotanto olisi noin 500 - 700 kpl per vuosi ja BMP-3 vaunujen uustuotanto olisi noin 400 - 480 kpl per vuosi. Näiden summa on 900 - 1 180 kpl per vuosi. Sanoisin että Jompyn arvio osuu kohtuu lähellä Vadym Skibitskyn kertoman arvion kanssa.

Näiden lisäksi Kurganmashzavod valmistaisi BMD-4M vaunuja noin 100 - 120 kpl per vuosi ja BTR-MDM vaunuja noin 20 - 30 kpl per vuosi. Vadym Skibitsky ei kommentoinut näiden uustuotantoa haastattelussaan, joten ei tästä enempää.

-

Lainasin tuon tulevaisuuteen katsovan tekstiosuuden tästä syystä:

The main battle tanks will be the T-90, Armata, and T-80.

T-80 sisällyttäminen tähän kertoo siitä että GUR uskoo / tietää että ryssä on vakavissaan Omsktransmashin kanssa ELI heidän on oikeasti aikomus aloittaa T-80 vaunujen uustuotanto "jossain vaiheessa" seuraavan kymmenen vuoden aikana. Tämä tarkoittaa tietysti modernia versiota, koska varastovaunut tullaan käyttämään tämän sodan aikana. Yhtäkään tällaista vaunua ei ole todistetusti nähty joten pitkähkö tie kuljettavana ennen kuin uustuotanto saadaan rullaamaan. Toki tässä on mahdollisuus tehdä tiivistä yhteistyötä UVZ:n kanssa ja pyrkiä yhdenmukaistamaan suuri määrä komponentteja. Sama koskee tuotantolinjoja ja -koneita, joten teoriassa tämä voidaan saada rullaamaan jos sille on tarpeeksi aikaa ja rahaa ja resursseja.

Tämän sanotaan olevan osa Venäjän aseistautumissuunnitelmaa ja aikaväli on 2026-2037 eli seuraavat kymmenen vuotta. Suunnitelmat ovat tietysti vain suunnitelmia ja taloudelliset sekä poliittiset muutokset voivat muuttaa asioita.

Silti minä luen tuota siten että ryssä hyväksyy Neuvostoliiton perintönä saatujen varastojen tuhlaamisen tässä sodassa ja suunnittelee pärjäävänsä jatkossa / sodan jälkeen valtaosaksi tai kokonaan tehtaidensa uustuotannolla.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
ERAM-toimitusten aikataulusta lisätietoa, käytännössä koska kyseessä on uusi tuote, tuotannon käynnistäminen vie vuoden verran joten kunnon toimituseriä kannattaa odottaa vasta kesällä / loppuvuodesta 2026 (Aviation Week artikkeli julkaistu 5.9.2025):

"Although Ukraine is cleared to buy up to 3,550 #ERAM missiles, the first production run is smaller. The first 10 are scheduled for delivery in October. The plan now is to deliver a first lot of 840 ERAMs, split between two designs separately produced by Virginia-based CoAspire and California-based Zone 5 Technologies, by the end of October 2026" ~ Aviation Week

The Air Force expects to buy the ERAM, as do at least three foreign military sales customers, including Ukraine. The other two potential foreign buyers have not been identified.


https://aviationweek.com/defense/mi...innovation-hurries-new-cruise-missile-ukraine

U.S. Innovation Hurries New Cruise Missile To Ukraine​

Steve Trimble September 05, 2025

Rendering of an ERAM

CoAspire has designed this ERAM for the U.S. Air Force.

Credit: CoAspire

Ukraine is poised to receive an influx of low-cost, long-range, air-launched cruise missiles from the U.S. as the embattled country looks to counter Russia’s invasion by hitting high-value targets behind enemy lines.

Deliveries of the Extended-Range Attack Munition (ERAM) do not only open a new pipeline of long-range weapons expected to be delivered to Ukrainian and U.S. forces in large numbers. They also represent a novel paradigm for speed in air-launched weapons acquisition, development and mass production for the Pentagon.

The ERAM has emerged within a mere 14 months since the release of solicitation in August 2024—the prototype air-launched cruise missiles have a scheduled delivery in October. It is the product of a new organization the U.S. Air Force established several years ago within its Life Cycle Management Center’s Armament Directorate.

Armed with a $225 million budget and a fast-track acquisition process, the Weapons Capacity Task Force took a little over a year to release the ERAM solicitations, award contracts to two nontraditional defense companies, demonstrate the weapons on a U.S. Douglas A-4 testbed and a Ukrainian Mikoyan MiG-series fighter and receive the prototypes, according to Air Force documents obtained by Aviation Week.


The plan now is to deliver a first lot of 840 ERAMs, split between two designs separately produced by Virginia-based CoAspire and California-based Zone 5 Technologies, by the end of October 2026, the documents say. The ERAM also represents a piece of a larger portfolio within the Weapons Capacity Task Force.

U.S. government officials in late August formally cleared the sale of up to 3,550 ERAMs to Ukraine. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of the export deal, setting up a 30-day deadline for lawmakers to review the proposed sale. The notification confirms that the family of cruise missiles is usable from Ukraine’s Lockheed Martin F-16 and MiG-29 fighters.

Although Ukraine is cleared to buy up to 3,550 missiles, the first production run is smaller. The first 10 are scheduled for delivery in October.

The Air Force office is working on other projects, too. Among them are a new class of palletized munitions similar to the ERAM, a potential follow-on buy of low-cost air-to-air missiles and a still-classified project known as Sunrise. Additional prototyping projects for hypersonic and subsonic missiles could begin in the third quarter of fiscal 2026.

The Weapons Capacity Task Force’s work caught the attention of lawmakers this summer. The House Armed Services Committee passed a defense authorization bill for fiscal 2026 that includes special praise for the Armament Directorate organization. “The Task Force has taken a fundamentally different approach to weapons development by embracing nontraditional vendors with expertise in digital engineering, modular design and the ability to scale up production rates rapidly,” a congressional report states.

The yearlong turnaround between contract award to CoAspire and Zone 5 and delivery contrasts with traditional cruise missile procurement. For example, the Air Force launched the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile program in 1995 and fielded the Lockheed Martin stealthy cruise missile eight years later. But both ERAM designs completed a first flight four months after a Phase 1 contract award in October 2024, Air Force documents state.

The program benefited from leveraging designs developed under the Enterprise Test Vehicle program, which included the CoAspire Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile and the Zone 5 Rusty Dagger.

The ERAM requirement calls for a traditional air-launched cruise missile. The weapon’s two lug bolts are loaded onto a standard bomb rack unit, which attaches to a pylon under the wing or inside the weapon bay of a fighter or bomber. The weapon can either be integrated into the host aircraft’s mission systems through a universal armament interface or communicate directly with the pilot through a federated system in the cockpit.

The Air Force expects to buy the ERAM, as do at least three foreign military sales customers, including Ukraine. The other two potential foreign buyers have not been identified. A second Air Force requirement for a Family of Affordable Mass Missiles (FAMM) anticipates ordering thousands of cruise missiles that can be loaded onto special pallets and dropped in flight from the rear door of a Lockheed C-130 or Boeing C-17 (AW&ST July 28-Aug. 10, p. 24). Anduril and Zone 5 are competing to produce the 3,010 FAMM units in the Air Force’s fiscal 2026 budget proposal.


Trimble_Steve_sized_0.jpg

Steve Trimble
Steve covers military aviation, missiles and space for the Aviation Week Network, based in Washington DC.


-

Pari poimintaa viestin kommenteista, laitan ne spoilerin taakse:

Kysymys: Can the ERAMs be integrated to F-16 Blk 70 or Gripen E?

Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: Yes. It can be integrated on any platform that can carry a similarly sized 500 lb weapon.

Tähän tullut lisäkommentti: Yes but the requirement for Gripen was a Swedish made version of ERAM I recall

Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: That is for Sweden to decide. Certainly not a limitation of the OEM to integrate a weapon on a platform.

Tähän tullut lisäkommentti: It actually is as the OEM does not own the right to do so without approval ofcourse

Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: I meant it is not a weapon or weapon developer limitation. The weapon can be integrated and carried by a Gripen. It is compliant with USAF WOSA standards. If Sweden choses to do it a certain way that is its decision. Ukraine will integrate on its F-16s if not already done.

Tähän tullut lisäkommentti: The F -16 in Ukraine is supported by LM through European offices, also Stockholm?

Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: I am not sure exactly. I am pretty confident that Ukraine will be launching these things soon after it begins taking deliveries (if it isn't quietly already doing this to support testing).

-

Kommentti: Both of these companies are small startups. I doubts they have experience to organize mass production at 3rd parties. Look at how big names f*cked up at boosting artillery shells manufacturing. We are still at around ~40,000 shells/month. Why expecting better outcome with ERAMs?

Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: The example you cited, and the claims you are making have absolutely nothing to do with each other. The eco system to make something like this exists in abundance in the US and with partners. The companies have matured and developed both the product and production plan and that was used as a criteria for awarding contract. The volumes are relatively small. Its just 3K missiles for Ukraine. 30K would have required more help from more mature OEMs perhaps.

Tähän tullut lisäkommentti: My example shows how over-regulated and inefficient DoD has become—what was simple in WWI or WWII is now impossible. GLSDBs were promised in late 2022, failed in 2024, and 2.5 years later remain in limbo. Why should we believe ERAMs from no-name vendors will be any different?

Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: Your example is completely unrelated and irrelevant. If you actually knew what you were talking about, you would not be citing it. GL SDB is not a DOD weapon. It was an industry developed solution to no US service program requirements. SDB otoh is a service program. Ukraine could obviously refuse to accept ERAM. No one forced it to buy these missiles.
 
Lainasin eilen Vadym Skibitsky (Deputy Head of the GUR) haastattelua, yksi sen mielenkiintoisimmista palasista on tämä arvio ryssän kalustosta:

As for the quantity in stock today, it is difficult to say, because there are different figures. It was said that the Russian Federation has already used from 50 to 75 percent of the stocks of various weapons from the previous stocks. At the same time, I would like to note that, despite the used stocks, Russia has retained the ability to manufacture new types and new weapons directly in the defense-industrial complex. And, probably, this is due to the fact that most of the defense industry enterprises of the Soviet Union were not closed, they reduced their capacities, but Russia was and is one of the main exporters of weapons abroad.

We clearly understand the figures that the Russian Federation has planned for today regarding the release of new types of weapons. If we talk, for example, about modern aircraft, which are Su-57, Su-35, Su-34 and Su-30, then they have planned 57 units for this year. Almost 250 T-90M tanks are new, not modernized. In addition, about 1,100 new BTR-3, BTR-82A, artillery systems - 365 units are also new, not modernized. At the same time, the modernization and restoration of weapons and military equipment are thousands of units of weapons used by the Russian Federation.

However, both Ukraine and the Russian Federation are currently focusing significant attention on the production of those types of weapons that are effective on the battlefield. We are talking about unmanned systems, FPV drones, various missile systems. Russia is also trying to increase this armament. In 2025, the aggressor planned to produce almost 2.5 thousand so-called high-precision missiles of various classes. These include cruise and ballistic missiles of the Iskander complex, hypersonic missiles "Dagger" and others. Russia intends to increase production. In addition, we have noticed a significant increase in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles, primarily such as "Geran", "Harpy" and FPV drones.

RUSSIA WILL NOT GIVE UP THE PRODUCTION OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN FAVOR OF DRONES AND MISSILES



- Is it correct to say that the Russians will reduce funding for heavy equipment and weapons and direct more of it towards drones and missiles?


- This is absolutely incorrect. Military intelligence has data on the armament program of the Russian Armed Forces for 10 years, from 2026 to 2037. The Russians have clearly stated there the main requirements that they place on the defense-industrial complex regarding heavy weapons, warships, aviation, and missile systems. We know that they will develop strategic and long-range aviation through modernization and the creation of new aircraft.

By the way, the Russian Ministry of Defense has identified three main battle tanks. This will no longer be a wide range, as before. The main battle tanks will be the T-90, Armata, and T-80. In addition, the newest artillery systems are the Coalition, Msta of various types, Malva, Hyacinth, and Magnolia. That is, they will try to introduce this weapon into production, taking into account the experience of using this weapon on the battlefield. In addition, there will be a wide range of missile weapons, starting from the strategic and ending with the tactical level. Moscow is planning new long-range missiles, modern hyper-speed anti-ship missiles. That is, they envisage three areas of improving missile weapons: the first is increasing the range, the second is increasing accuracy, and the third is increasing the warhead.

Because striking the territory of Ukraine is one combat radius, and to prepare for war with NATO countries by 2030, the combat radius of such weapons must be larger. This is what they are putting into their weapons programs.

Regarding new approaches – FPV drones, artificial intelligence. The enemy seeks to increase the share of unmanned and unmanned systems on the battlefield in the future to 40 percent. We record (not only the military, but also our civilians, society feels) how much the number of drones increases during the Russian Federation’s strikes on our territory.

The indicated directions are defined as the main ones. In addition, I emphasize: there will be no abandonment of artillery systems and heavy types of armored vehicles - this is inherent in the classical approach, classical warfare.


-

Näistä numeroista on ollut twitterissä vääntöä eli kuinka vakavasti ne voi ottaa. Lukemani perusteella usea tuntuu arvioivan että T-90M ja IFV-vaunujen numerot voivat olla lähellä totuutta mutta hävittäjien numeroa pidetään aivan liian suurena (paitsi jos siihen on laskettu mukaan Yak-130 koulutushävittäjien määrä, tosin Skibitskyn vastaus sanoo selvästi että hän tarkoittaa Su-57, Su-35, Su-34 ja Su-30 hävittäjiä).

Minäkin olen skeptinen tuon numeron suhteen. Meillä ei ole luotettavia numeroita sodan aikaisilta vuosilta, pelkkiä arvauksia vain mutta tässä venäläisen bmpd-blogin taulukko sotaa edeltäneiltä vuosilta (pidän näitä numeroita luotettavina, ne täsmäävät mm. ilmavoimia seuraavan Guy Plopskyn kertoman kanssa - eivät 100% mutta riittävän tarkasti):

Katso liite: 124552

Tästä nähdään että Su-30SM2 ja Su-34M hävittäjien uustuotanto oli vasta alkamassa, eli niiden osalta kasvua oli odotettavissa. Su-35S pysyi tuotannossa mutta vaikea nähdä yli 10-12 kpl per vuosi edes sota-aikana. Su-57 tuotanto oli myös vasta alussa, väitetysti niitä valmistui 6 kpl vuonna 2022. Minun kuvitelmani on että tällainen määrä olisi valmistunut myös sotavuosina muttei suurempaa määrää per vuosi.

Jos kokeillaan näillä numeroilla:

Su-30SM2 = 21 kpl
Su-34M = 16 kpl
Su-35S = 10 kpl
Su-57 = 6 kpl

Näiden summa on 53 kpl.

Ei siis tarvitse viilata numeroita kovin paljoa ylöspäin jotta ollaan kerrotussa tavoitteessa 57 kpl per vuosi. MUTTA toisaalta yhtenäkään sotavuotena ei ole nähty "hävittäjien luovutuksia" tai satelliittikuvia jotka olisivat kertoneet että oikea toimitettu määrä olisi ollut lähelläkään tätä. Videot ovat tietysti tarkkaan editoituja, joten todellinen luovutettujen koneiden määrä on pelkkä arvaus. Silti näiden perusteella kuvitelmani on että realistinen konemäärä olisi ehkä puolet tästä numerosta, ainakin aikaisempina vuosina. Kenties vuosi 2025 on poikkeus?

Eli T-90M uustuotanto olisi tänä vuonna "melkein 250 kpl" ja kaikki näistä ovat todellista uustuotantoa, ei vanhojen vaunujen modernisointia. Tämä tarkoittaisi keskiarvoisesti hieman yli 20 kpl per kuukausi.

IFV-vaunujen osalta on ollut hieman vääntöä twitterissä eli miten luetaan tämä kommentti: about 1,100 new BTR-3, BTR-82A
Tarkoitetaanko että kumpaakin valmistetaan noin 1100 kpl vai onko tämä näiden kahden mallin uustuotannon summa?

Puolalainen Marek Reszka kommentoi numeroita näin: LÄHDE

57 aircraft? Okay, including everything (including the Yak-130). 250 T-90Ms, the most reliable data, I'd assume maybe even 300. 1,100 BMP-3s, yes, but it's worth remembering that KMZ increased BMP-3 production at the expense of BMD-4Ms, so firstly, BTR-82A/AT production is ~60-65% of that number. 365 artillery systems? Including mortars (including towed mortars).

Hänen tulkintansa on että BTR-82A/AT uustuotanto olisi ~60-65% tuosta numerosta mikä tarkoittaisi noin 660 - 715 kpl per vuosi.

Tämä tarkoittaisi että BMP-3 vaunujen uustuotanto olisi noin 385 - 440 kpl per vuosi.

Hän myös kirjoittaa että "tykistön" uustuotanto 365 kpl per vuosi, tämän hän hyväksyy jos numero sisältää "perässävedettävät kranaatinheittimet".

-

Vertailun vuoksi tässä se mitä Jompy arvioi ryssän teollisuuden kapasiteetiksi tällä hetkellä (tässä on APC- ja IFV-vaunujen taulukot, sekä varastovaunujen aktivointi ja/tai modernisointi sekä aito uustuotanto, hän ei antanut vastaavaa arvioita panssarivaunuille missään vaiheessa):

Katso liite: 124550

Katso liite: 124551

Hänen arvionsa oli BTR-82A/AT uustuotanto olisi noin 500 - 700 kpl per vuosi ja BMP-3 vaunujen uustuotanto olisi noin 400 - 480 kpl per vuosi. Näiden summa on 900 - 1 180 kpl per vuosi. Sanoisin että Jompyn arvio osuu kohtuu lähellä Vadym Skibitskyn kertoman arvion kanssa.

Näiden lisäksi Kurganmashzavod valmistaisi BMD-4M vaunuja noin 100 - 120 kpl per vuosi ja BTR-MDM vaunuja noin 20 - 30 kpl per vuosi. Vadym Skibitsky ei kommentoinut näiden uustuotantoa haastattelussaan, joten ei tästä enempää.

-

Lainasin tuon tulevaisuuteen katsovan tekstiosuuden tästä syystä:

The main battle tanks will be the T-90, Armata, and T-80.

T-80 sisällyttäminen tähän kertoo siitä että GUR uskoo / tietää että ryssä on vakavissaan Omsktransmashin kanssa ELI heidän on oikeasti aikomus aloittaa T-80 vaunujen uustuotanto "jossain vaiheessa" seuraavan kymmenen vuoden aikana. Tämä tarkoittaa tietysti modernia versiota, koska varastovaunut tullaan käyttämään tämän sodan aikana. Yhtäkään tällaista vaunua ei ole todistetusti nähty joten pitkähkö tie kuljettavana ennen kuin uustuotanto saadaan rullaamaan. Toki tässä on mahdollisuus tehdä tiivistä yhteistyötä UVZ:n kanssa ja pyrkiä yhdenmukaistamaan suuri määrä komponentteja. Sama koskee tuotantolinjoja ja -koneita, joten teoriassa tämä voidaan saada rullaamaan jos sille on tarpeeksi aikaa ja rahaa ja resursseja.

Tämän sanotaan olevan osa Venäjän aseistautumissuunnitelmaa ja aikaväli on 2026-2037 eli seuraavat kymmenen vuotta. Suunnitelmat ovat tietysti vain suunnitelmia ja taloudelliset sekä poliittiset muutokset voivat tuoda uusia, yllättäviä muutoksia.

Silti minä luen tuota siten että ryssä hyväksyy Neuvostoliiton perintönä saatujen varastojen tuhlaamisen tässä sodassa ja suunnittelee pärjäävänsä jatkossa / sodan jälkeen valtaosaksi tai kokonaan tehtaidensa uustuotannolla.
Hävittäjien osalta myös pitänee huomioida lentotuntipoistot ja realisoituneet tappiot. Tosin tappiot pienenlaisia viime aikoina ja ryssän kirjanpidossa lentotunnit tulevat todnäk täyteen siinä kohtaa kun kone putoaa maahan.

Otaksun, että rajumpaa yhteenottoa ilmassa on tulossa vielä tämän sodan aikana. Ainakin jos huhut super-it:n raskaasta harvenemisesta pitää paikkansa. Jos Ukraina voimistaa ilmakampanjaansa ei venäjällä jää muuta vaihtoehtoa kuin vastata siihen hävittäjillä.

Ottaen huomioon Ukrainan kyvyn iskeä droonein syvälle venäjälle, hävittäjälaivueet eivät voi olla kovin kummoisessa hapessa kun helpoilta maaleilta tulee jatkuvia läpäisyjä.
 
Hävittäjien osalta myös pitänee huomioida lentotuntipoistot ja realisoituneet tappiot. Tosin tappiot pienenlaisia viime aikoina ja ryssän kirjanpidossa lentotunnit tulevat todnäk täyteen siinä kohtaa kun kone putoaa maahan.

Otaksun, että rajumpaa yhteenottoa ilmassa on tulossa vielä tämän sodan aikana. Ainakin jos huhut super-it:n raskaasta harvenemisesta pitää paikkansa. Jos Ukraina voimistaa ilmakampanjaansa ei venäjällä jää muuta vaihtoehtoa kuin vastata siihen hävittäjillä.

Ottaen huomioon Ukrainan kyvyn iskeä droonein syvälle venäjälle, hävittäjälaivueet eivät voi olla kovin kummoisessa hapessa kun helpoilta maaleilta tulee jatkuvia läpäisyjä.

Yli kolme ja puoli vuotta kovaa suursotaa vaatii varmasti veronsa. Eikä hävittäjäkalustosta tai mistä tahansa kalustosta oli muutenkaan 100% koskaan käytettävissä. Lentävästä kalustosta 50% lienee realistisempi arvio, varsinkin ryssän osalta (ehkä jopa alle tuon).

Tässä kuvaajassa Air strikes = "jets, helicopters & drones" joten numeroiden jakautuminen näiden kesken on epäselvää, mutta ohjautuvia liitopommeja voivat viedä vain tietyt hävittäjät:

1757338511982.webp

Ohjautuvien liitopommien punainen kuvaaja (seitsemän päivän liukuva keskiarvo) on pysytellyt jo pitkään 100-120 kpl per päivä -tasolla tosin välillä on käyty selvästi se yli. Teoriassa yksi hävittäjä, ainakin Su-34, voi kuljettaa jopa 6 kpl näitä pommeja per lentosuorite (tosin tämäkin riippuu liitopommin koosta) mutta minun kuvitelmani on että yleensä pommeja vietäisiin vain 2 kpl. Ehkä olen väärässä.

Joka tapauksessa pelkästään näiden pommien päivittäinen kuskaaminen syö pommijuhtien lentotunteja rajulla kädellä. Samaan aikaan muiden hävittäjien pitää olla valmiudessa, jos on tarve torjuntatehtävälle. Eli käytännössä ne lentävät ilmavalvontalentoja. Sitten on erikseen eräänlainen AWACS-koneiden korvaaminen, MiG-31 koneissa on kauimmaksi näkevä tutka joten niitä on käytetty näissä tehtävissä. Kevyet taktisen tason risteilyohjukset eli Kh-59 / Kh-69 (ja niiden vanhemmat sukulaiset) laukaistaan myös hävittäjistä, joten tässä on oma työsarkansa.

On siinä tunti jos toinen, että kaiken saa tehtyä. Osaavasta korjaushenkilökunnasta ja varasosista on varmasti kova kysyntä. Lentäjien jaksamisen perään tuskin kysellään.

-

Lentävästä kalustosta puheenollen, tämän mukaan päätös A-50 AWACS koneiden "massatuotannon" uudelleenkäynnistämisestä tehdään joskus tulevaisuudessa:

A-50 U UAC, a subsidiary of Rostec, will make the decision to mass-produce the A-50 airborne early warning and control once the ongoing work is completed. This was announced to TASS by the chief designer and deputy general director of UAC.

https://tass.ru/ekonomika/24986969

 
Back
Top