Kiusankpl
Respected Leader
Oottakaa vaan, kohta ne panssariarmeijakunnat Uralin takaa lähtee liikkeelle...
"Silloin tulee tuhotuksi!"
Viimeksi muokattu:
Ukrainan konflikti/sota
Oottakaa vaan, kohta ne panssariarmeijakunnat Uralin takaa lähtee liikkeelle...
"Silloin tulee tuhotuksi!"
Näennäisesti Ukrainan droonituotannolla menee hyvin mutta valtion hankkeissa tuntuu olevan löysiä. Sternenkon mukaan valtaosa valtion tilaamista FPV-drooneista on kelvottomia tai vaatii reippaasti DIY-henkeä.
According to our estimates, up to 60% of FPVs that are under state order are currently unusable or require serious rework.
Once again: more than half of the 2 million FPVs from the state are unusable and are in warehouses. How much is that in money? Billions.
There are two reasons: logistics from 1 to 6 months and the need that the General Staff forms - they directly give the names of the drones that need to be purchased to the Ministry of Defense.
And what are their characteristics or why the motors were screwed on the wrong side - the General Staff is not interested in this.
There is either enormous corruption here, or abysmal stupidity. Or both in one, I don’t know.
But we have to fix it later.
According to our estimates, up to 60% of FPVs that are under state order are currently unusable or require serious rework.
Once again: more than half of the 2 million FPVs from the state are unusable and are in warehouses. How much is that in money? Billions.
There are two reasons: logistics from 1 to 6 months and the need that the General Staff forms - they directly give the names of the drones that need to be purchased to the Ministry of Defense.
And what are their characteristics or why the motors were screwed on the wrong side - the General Staff is not interested in this.
There is either enormous corruption here, or abysmal stupidity. Or both in one, I don’t know.
But we have to fix it later.
Venäjän kolmipäiväinen menee niin hyvin että hautausmaitakin pitää jo alkaa piilottelemaan:
"In Russia, cemeteries of "Special Military Operation heroes" are being destroyedIn Yakutsk, a woman went to visit her brother's grave, who had died in the war in Ukraine, but the cemetery no longer exists: everything was leveled with a grader, the plaques are gone, and the area has been flattened as if nothing ever existed. According to her, the authorities plan to create a "Walk of Fame" on the site.The state is erasing traces, acting as if nothing happened- "Vanya? What Vanya? Vanya never existed." Convenient for statistics, and so that thousands of graves with tricolors don't offend the patriotic public."
"In Russia, cemeteries of "Special Military Operation heroes" are being destroyedIn Yakutsk, a woman went to visit her brother's grave, who had died in the war in Ukraine, but the cemetery no longer exists: everything was leveled with a grader, the plaques are gone, and the area has been flattened as if nothing ever existed. According to her, the authorities plan to create a "Walk of Fame" on the site.The state is erasing traces, acting as if nothing happened- "Vanya? What Vanya? Vanya never existed." Convenient for statistics, and so that thousands of graves with tricolors don't offend the patriotic public."
ddude
Majuri
Wagnerien hautausmaillehan tää on jo tehty aiemmin. Ne vedettiin sileäksi ja ainakin muutamaan tuli pysäköintialue päälle...
Elokuussa Ukraina onnistui ottaamaan maata enemmän takaisin kuin menetti.
Pokrovskin suunnalla on jo pidempään ollut tämä motintapainen, mutta Ukrainalla ei välttämättä ole kykyä sulkea sitä. Droneaikakaudella motteja pystytään myös huoltamaan välttävästi ilmateitse. Ruokaa, vettä ja panoksia ainakin.
Pokrovskin suunnalla on jo pidempään ollut tämä motintapainen, mutta Ukrainalla ei välttämättä ole kykyä sulkea sitä. Droneaikakaudella motteja pystytään myös huoltamaan välttävästi ilmateitse. Ruokaa, vettä ja panoksia ainakin.
Antares
Respected Leader
Lainasin eilen Vadym Skibitsky (Deputy Head of the GUR) haastattelua, yksi sen mielenkiintoisimmista palasista on tämä arvio ryssän kalustosta:
As for the quantity in stock today, it is difficult to say, because there are different figures. It was said that the Russian Federation has already used from 50 to 75 percent of the stocks of various weapons from the previous stocks. At the same time, I would like to note that, despite the used stocks, Russia has retained the ability to manufacture new types and new weapons directly in the defense-industrial complex. And, probably, this is due to the fact that most of the defense industry enterprises of the Soviet Union were not closed, they reduced their capacities, but Russia was and is one of the main exporters of weapons abroad.
We clearly understand the figures that the Russian Federation has planned for today regarding the release of new types of weapons. If we talk, for example, about modern aircraft, which are Su-57, Su-35, Su-34 and Su-30, then they have planned 57 units for this year. Almost 250 T-90M tanks are new, not modernized. In addition, about 1,100 new BTR-3, BTR-82A, artillery systems - 365 units are also new, not modernized. At the same time, the modernization and restoration of weapons and military equipment are thousands of units of weapons used by the Russian Federation.
However, both Ukraine and the Russian Federation are currently focusing significant attention on the production of those types of weapons that are effective on the battlefield. We are talking about unmanned systems, FPV drones, various missile systems. Russia is also trying to increase this armament. In 2025, the aggressor planned to produce almost 2.5 thousand so-called high-precision missiles of various classes. These include cruise and ballistic missiles of the Iskander complex, hypersonic missiles "Dagger" and others. Russia intends to increase production. In addition, we have noticed a significant increase in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles, primarily such as "Geran", "Harpy" and FPV drones.
RUSSIA WILL NOT GIVE UP THE PRODUCTION OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN FAVOR OF DRONES AND MISSILES
- Is it correct to say that the Russians will reduce funding for heavy equipment and weapons and direct more of it towards drones and missiles?
- This is absolutely incorrect. Military intelligence has data on the armament program of the Russian Armed Forces for 10 years, from 2026 to 2037. The Russians have clearly stated there the main requirements that they place on the defense-industrial complex regarding heavy weapons, warships, aviation, and missile systems. We know that they will develop strategic and long-range aviation through modernization and the creation of new aircraft.
By the way, the Russian Ministry of Defense has identified three main battle tanks. This will no longer be a wide range, as before. The main battle tanks will be the T-90, Armata, and T-80. In addition, the newest artillery systems are the Coalition, Msta of various types, Malva, Hyacinth, and Magnolia. That is, they will try to introduce this weapon into production, taking into account the experience of using this weapon on the battlefield. In addition, there will be a wide range of missile weapons, starting from the strategic and ending with the tactical level. Moscow is planning new long-range missiles, modern hyper-speed anti-ship missiles. That is, they envisage three areas of improving missile weapons: the first is increasing the range, the second is increasing accuracy, and the third is increasing the warhead.
Because striking the territory of Ukraine is one combat radius, and to prepare for war with NATO countries by 2030, the combat radius of such weapons must be larger. This is what they are putting into their weapons programs.
Regarding new approaches – FPV drones, artificial intelligence. The enemy seeks to increase the share of unmanned and unmanned systems on the battlefield in the future to 40 percent. We record (not only the military, but also our civilians, society feels) how much the number of drones increases during the Russian Federation’s strikes on our territory.
The indicated directions are defined as the main ones. In addition, I emphasize: there will be no abandonment of artillery systems and heavy types of armored vehicles - this is inherent in the classical approach, classical warfare.
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Näistä numeroista on ollut twitterissä vääntöä eli kuinka vakavasti ne voi ottaa. Lukemani perusteella usea tuntuu arvioivan että T-90M ja IFV-vaunujen numerot voivat olla lähellä totuutta mutta hävittäjien numeroa pidetään aivan liian suurena (paitsi jos siihen on laskettu mukaan Yak-130 koulutushävittäjien määrä, tosin Skibitskyn vastaus sanoo selvästi että hän tarkoittaa Su-57, Su-35, Su-34 ja Su-30 hävittäjiä).
Minäkin olen skeptinen tuon numeron suhteen. Meillä ei ole luotettavia numeroita sodan aikaisilta vuosilta, pelkkiä arvauksia vain mutta tässä venäläisen bmpd-blogin taulukko sotaa edeltäneiltä vuosilta (pidän näitä numeroita luotettavina, ne täsmäävät mm. ilmavoimia seuraavan Guy Plopskyn kertoman kanssa - eivät 100% mutta riittävän tarkasti):
Tästä nähdään että Su-30SM2 ja Su-34M hävittäjien uustuotanto oli vasta alkamassa, eli niiden osalta kasvua oli odotettavissa. Su-35S pysyi tuotannossa mutta vaikea nähdä yli 10-12 kpl per vuosi edes sota-aikana. Su-57 tuotanto oli myös vasta alussa, väitetysti niitä valmistui 6 kpl vuonna 2022. Minun kuvitelmani on että tällainen määrä olisi valmistunut myös sotavuosina muttei suurempaa määrää per vuosi.
Jos kokeillaan näillä numeroilla:
Su-30SM2 = 21 kpl
Su-34M = 16 kpl
Su-35S = 10 kpl
Su-57 = 6 kpl
Näiden summa on 53 kpl.
Ei siis tarvitse viilata numeroita kovin paljoa ylöspäin jotta ollaan kerrotussa tavoitteessa 57 kpl per vuosi. MUTTA toisaalta yhtenäkään sotavuotena ei ole nähty "hävittäjien luovutuksia" tai satelliittikuvia jotka olisivat kertoneet että oikea toimitettu määrä olisi ollut lähelläkään tätä. Videot ovat tietysti tarkkaan editoituja, joten todellinen luovutettujen koneiden määrä on pelkkä arvaus. Silti näiden perusteella kuvitelmani on että realistinen konemäärä olisi ehkä puolet tästä numerosta, ainakin aikaisempina vuosina. Kenties vuosi 2025 on poikkeus?
Eli T-90M uustuotanto olisi tänä vuonna "melkein 250 kpl" ja kaikki näistä ovat todellista uustuotantoa, ei vanhojen vaunujen modernisointia. Tämä tarkoittaisi keskiarvoisesti hieman yli 20 kpl per kuukausi.
IFV-vaunujen osalta on ollut hieman vääntöä twitterissä eli miten luetaan tämä kommentti: about 1,100 new BTR-3, BTR-82A
Tarkoitetaanko että kumpaakin valmistetaan noin 1100 kpl vai onko tämä näiden kahden mallin uustuotannon summa?
Puolalainen Marek Reszka kommentoi numeroita näin: LÄHDE
57 aircraft? Okay, including everything (including the Yak-130). 250 T-90Ms, the most reliable data, I'd assume maybe even 300. 1,100 BMP-3s, yes, but it's worth remembering that KMZ increased BMP-3 production at the expense of BMD-4Ms, so firstly, BTR-82A/AT production is ~60-65% of that number. 365 artillery systems? Including mortars (including towed mortars).
Hänen tulkintansa on että BTR-82A/AT uustuotanto olisi ~60-65% tuosta numerosta mikä tarkoittaisi noin 660 - 715 kpl per vuosi.
Tämä tarkoittaisi että BMP-3 vaunujen uustuotanto olisi noin 385 - 440 kpl per vuosi.
Hän myös kirjoittaa että "tykistön" uustuotanto 365 kpl per vuosi, tämän hän hyväksyy jos numero sisältää "perässävedettävät kranaatinheittimet".
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Vertailun vuoksi tässä se mitä Jompy arvioi ryssän teollisuuden kapasiteetiksi tällä hetkellä (tässä on APC- ja IFV-vaunujen taulukot, sekä varastovaunujen aktivointi ja/tai modernisointi sekä aito uustuotanto, hän ei antanut vastaavaa arvioita panssarivaunuille missään vaiheessa):
Jompyn arvio oli että BTR-82A/AT uustuotanto olisi noin 500 - 700 kpl per vuosi ja BMP-3 vaunujen uustuotanto olisi noin 400 - 480 kpl per vuosi. Näiden summa on 900 - 1 180 kpl per vuosi. Sanoisin että Jompyn arvio osuu kohtuu lähellä Vadym Skibitskyn kertoman arvion kanssa.
Näiden lisäksi Kurganmashzavod valmistaisi BMD-4M vaunuja noin 100 - 120 kpl per vuosi ja BTR-MDM vaunuja noin 20 - 30 kpl per vuosi. Vadym Skibitsky ei kommentoinut näiden uustuotantoa haastattelussaan, joten ei tästä enempää.
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Lainasin tuon tulevaisuuteen katsovan tekstiosuuden tästä syystä:
The main battle tanks will be the T-90, Armata, and T-80.
T-80 sisällyttäminen tähän kertoo siitä että GUR uskoo / tietää että ryssä on vakavissaan Omsktransmashin kanssa ELI heidän on oikeasti aikomus aloittaa T-80 vaunujen uustuotanto "jossain vaiheessa" seuraavan kymmenen vuoden aikana. Tämä tarkoittaa tietysti modernia versiota, koska varastovaunut tullaan käyttämään tämän sodan aikana. Yhtäkään tällaista vaunua ei ole todistetusti nähty joten pitkähkö tie kuljettavana ennen kuin uustuotanto saadaan rullaamaan. Toki tässä on mahdollisuus tehdä tiivistä yhteistyötä UVZ:n kanssa ja pyrkiä yhdenmukaistamaan suuri määrä komponentteja. Sama koskee tuotantolinjoja ja -koneita, joten teoriassa tämä voidaan saada rullaamaan jos sille on tarpeeksi aikaa ja rahaa ja resursseja.
Tämän sanotaan olevan osa Venäjän aseistautumissuunnitelmaa ja aikaväli on 2026-2037 eli seuraavat kymmenen vuotta. Suunnitelmat ovat tietysti vain suunnitelmia ja taloudelliset sekä poliittiset muutokset voivat muuttaa asioita.
Silti minä luen tuota siten että ryssä hyväksyy Neuvostoliiton perintönä saatujen varastojen tuhlaamisen tässä sodassa ja suunnittelee pärjäävänsä jatkossa / sodan jälkeen valtaosaksi tai kokonaan tehtaidensa uustuotannolla.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
ERAM-toimitusten aikataulusta lisätietoa, käytännössä koska kyseessä on uusi tuote, tuotannon käynnistäminen vie vuoden verran joten kunnon toimituseriä kannattaa odottaa vasta kesällä / loppuvuodesta 2026 (Aviation Week artikkeli julkaistu 5.9.2025):
"Although Ukraine is cleared to buy up to 3,550 #ERAM missiles, the first production run is smaller. The first 10 are scheduled for delivery in October. The plan now is to deliver a first lot of 840 ERAMs, split between two designs separately produced by Virginia-based CoAspire and California-based Zone 5 Technologies, by the end of October 2026" ~ Aviation Week
The Air Force expects to buy the ERAM, as do at least three foreign military sales customers, including Ukraine. The other two potential foreign buyers have not been identified.
https://aviationweek.com/defense/mi...innovation-hurries-new-cruise-missile-ukraine
CoAspire has designed this ERAM for the U.S. Air Force.
Credit: CoAspire
Ukraine is poised to receive an influx of low-cost, long-range, air-launched cruise missiles from the U.S. as the embattled country looks to counter Russia’s invasion by hitting high-value targets behind enemy lines.
Deliveries of the Extended-Range Attack Munition (ERAM) do not only open a new pipeline of long-range weapons expected to be delivered to Ukrainian and U.S. forces in large numbers. They also represent a novel paradigm for speed in air-launched weapons acquisition, development and mass production for the Pentagon.
The ERAM has emerged within a mere 14 months since the release of solicitation in August 2024—the prototype air-launched cruise missiles have a scheduled delivery in October. It is the product of a new organization the U.S. Air Force established several years ago within its Life Cycle Management Center’s Armament Directorate.
Armed with a $225 million budget and a fast-track acquisition process, the Weapons Capacity Task Force took a little over a year to release the ERAM solicitations, award contracts to two nontraditional defense companies, demonstrate the weapons on a U.S. Douglas A-4 testbed and a Ukrainian Mikoyan MiG-series fighter and receive the prototypes, according to Air Force documents obtained by Aviation Week.
The plan now is to deliver a first lot of 840 ERAMs, split between two designs separately produced by Virginia-based CoAspire and California-based Zone 5 Technologies, by the end of October 2026, the documents say. The ERAM also represents a piece of a larger portfolio within the Weapons Capacity Task Force.
U.S. government officials in late August formally cleared the sale of up to 3,550 ERAMs to Ukraine. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of the export deal, setting up a 30-day deadline for lawmakers to review the proposed sale. The notification confirms that the family of cruise missiles is usable from Ukraine’s Lockheed Martin F-16 and MiG-29 fighters.
Although Ukraine is cleared to buy up to 3,550 missiles, the first production run is smaller. The first 10 are scheduled for delivery in October.
The Air Force office is working on other projects, too. Among them are a new class of palletized munitions similar to the ERAM, a potential follow-on buy of low-cost air-to-air missiles and a still-classified project known as Sunrise. Additional prototyping projects for hypersonic and subsonic missiles could begin in the third quarter of fiscal 2026.
The Weapons Capacity Task Force’s work caught the attention of lawmakers this summer. The House Armed Services Committee passed a defense authorization bill for fiscal 2026 that includes special praise for the Armament Directorate organization. “The Task Force has taken a fundamentally different approach to weapons development by embracing nontraditional vendors with expertise in digital engineering, modular design and the ability to scale up production rates rapidly,” a congressional report states.
The yearlong turnaround between contract award to CoAspire and Zone 5 and delivery contrasts with traditional cruise missile procurement. For example, the Air Force launched the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile program in 1995 and fielded the Lockheed Martin stealthy cruise missile eight years later. But both ERAM designs completed a first flight four months after a Phase 1 contract award in October 2024, Air Force documents state.
The program benefited from leveraging designs developed under the Enterprise Test Vehicle program, which included the CoAspire Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile and the Zone 5 Rusty Dagger.
The ERAM requirement calls for a traditional air-launched cruise missile. The weapon’s two lug bolts are loaded onto a standard bomb rack unit, which attaches to a pylon under the wing or inside the weapon bay of a fighter or bomber. The weapon can either be integrated into the host aircraft’s mission systems through a universal armament interface or communicate directly with the pilot through a federated system in the cockpit.
The Air Force expects to buy the ERAM, as do at least three foreign military sales customers, including Ukraine. The other two potential foreign buyers have not been identified. A second Air Force requirement for a Family of Affordable Mass Missiles (FAMM) anticipates ordering thousands of cruise missiles that can be loaded onto special pallets and dropped in flight from the rear door of a Lockheed C-130 or Boeing C-17 (AW&ST July 28-Aug. 10, p. 24). Anduril and Zone 5 are competing to produce the 3,010 FAMM units in the Air Force’s fiscal 2026 budget proposal.
Steve Trimble
Steve covers military aviation, missiles and space for the Aviation Week Network, based in Washington DC.
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Pari poimintaa viestin kommenteista, laitan ne spoilerin taakse:
"Although Ukraine is cleared to buy up to 3,550 #ERAM missiles, the first production run is smaller. The first 10 are scheduled for delivery in October. The plan now is to deliver a first lot of 840 ERAMs, split between two designs separately produced by Virginia-based CoAspire and California-based Zone 5 Technologies, by the end of October 2026" ~ Aviation Week
The Air Force expects to buy the ERAM, as do at least three foreign military sales customers, including Ukraine. The other two potential foreign buyers have not been identified.
https://aviationweek.com/defense/mi...innovation-hurries-new-cruise-missile-ukraine
U.S. Innovation Hurries New Cruise Missile To Ukraine
Steve Trimble September 05, 2025
CoAspire has designed this ERAM for the U.S. Air Force.
Credit: CoAspire
Ukraine is poised to receive an influx of low-cost, long-range, air-launched cruise missiles from the U.S. as the embattled country looks to counter Russia’s invasion by hitting high-value targets behind enemy lines.
Deliveries of the Extended-Range Attack Munition (ERAM) do not only open a new pipeline of long-range weapons expected to be delivered to Ukrainian and U.S. forces in large numbers. They also represent a novel paradigm for speed in air-launched weapons acquisition, development and mass production for the Pentagon.
The ERAM has emerged within a mere 14 months since the release of solicitation in August 2024—the prototype air-launched cruise missiles have a scheduled delivery in October. It is the product of a new organization the U.S. Air Force established several years ago within its Life Cycle Management Center’s Armament Directorate.
Armed with a $225 million budget and a fast-track acquisition process, the Weapons Capacity Task Force took a little over a year to release the ERAM solicitations, award contracts to two nontraditional defense companies, demonstrate the weapons on a U.S. Douglas A-4 testbed and a Ukrainian Mikoyan MiG-series fighter and receive the prototypes, according to Air Force documents obtained by Aviation Week.
The plan now is to deliver a first lot of 840 ERAMs, split between two designs separately produced by Virginia-based CoAspire and California-based Zone 5 Technologies, by the end of October 2026, the documents say. The ERAM also represents a piece of a larger portfolio within the Weapons Capacity Task Force.
U.S. government officials in late August formally cleared the sale of up to 3,550 ERAMs to Ukraine. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of the export deal, setting up a 30-day deadline for lawmakers to review the proposed sale. The notification confirms that the family of cruise missiles is usable from Ukraine’s Lockheed Martin F-16 and MiG-29 fighters.
Although Ukraine is cleared to buy up to 3,550 missiles, the first production run is smaller. The first 10 are scheduled for delivery in October.
The Air Force office is working on other projects, too. Among them are a new class of palletized munitions similar to the ERAM, a potential follow-on buy of low-cost air-to-air missiles and a still-classified project known as Sunrise. Additional prototyping projects for hypersonic and subsonic missiles could begin in the third quarter of fiscal 2026.
The Weapons Capacity Task Force’s work caught the attention of lawmakers this summer. The House Armed Services Committee passed a defense authorization bill for fiscal 2026 that includes special praise for the Armament Directorate organization. “The Task Force has taken a fundamentally different approach to weapons development by embracing nontraditional vendors with expertise in digital engineering, modular design and the ability to scale up production rates rapidly,” a congressional report states.
The yearlong turnaround between contract award to CoAspire and Zone 5 and delivery contrasts with traditional cruise missile procurement. For example, the Air Force launched the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile program in 1995 and fielded the Lockheed Martin stealthy cruise missile eight years later. But both ERAM designs completed a first flight four months after a Phase 1 contract award in October 2024, Air Force documents state.
The program benefited from leveraging designs developed under the Enterprise Test Vehicle program, which included the CoAspire Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile and the Zone 5 Rusty Dagger.
The ERAM requirement calls for a traditional air-launched cruise missile. The weapon’s two lug bolts are loaded onto a standard bomb rack unit, which attaches to a pylon under the wing or inside the weapon bay of a fighter or bomber. The weapon can either be integrated into the host aircraft’s mission systems through a universal armament interface or communicate directly with the pilot through a federated system in the cockpit.
The Air Force expects to buy the ERAM, as do at least three foreign military sales customers, including Ukraine. The other two potential foreign buyers have not been identified. A second Air Force requirement for a Family of Affordable Mass Missiles (FAMM) anticipates ordering thousands of cruise missiles that can be loaded onto special pallets and dropped in flight from the rear door of a Lockheed C-130 or Boeing C-17 (AW&ST July 28-Aug. 10, p. 24). Anduril and Zone 5 are competing to produce the 3,010 FAMM units in the Air Force’s fiscal 2026 budget proposal.
Steve Trimble
Steve covers military aviation, missiles and space for the Aviation Week Network, based in Washington DC.
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Pari poimintaa viestin kommenteista, laitan ne spoilerin taakse:
Kysymys: Can the ERAMs be integrated to F-16 Blk 70 or Gripen E?
Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: Yes. It can be integrated on any platform that can carry a similarly sized 500 lb weapon.
Tähän tullut lisäkommentti: Yes but the requirement for Gripen was a Swedish made version of ERAM I recall
Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: That is for Sweden to decide. Certainly not a limitation of the OEM to integrate a weapon on a platform.
Tähän tullut lisäkommentti: It actually is as the OEM does not own the right to do so without approval ofcourse
Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: I meant it is not a weapon or weapon developer limitation. The weapon can be integrated and carried by a Gripen. It is compliant with USAF WOSA standards. If Sweden choses to do it a certain way that is its decision. Ukraine will integrate on its F-16s if not already done.
Tähän tullut lisäkommentti: The F -16 in Ukraine is supported by LM through European offices, also Stockholm?
Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: I am not sure exactly. I am pretty confident that Ukraine will be launching these things soon after it begins taking deliveries (if it isn't quietly already doing this to support testing).
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Kommentti: Both of these companies are small startups. I doubts they have experience to organize mass production at 3rd parties. Look at how big names f*cked up at boosting artillery shells manufacturing. We are still at around ~40,000 shells/month. Why expecting better outcome with ERAMs?
Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: The example you cited, and the claims you are making have absolutely nothing to do with each other. The eco system to make something like this exists in abundance in the US and with partners. The companies have matured and developed both the product and production plan and that was used as a criteria for awarding contract. The volumes are relatively small. Its just 3K missiles for Ukraine. 30K would have required more help from more mature OEMs perhaps.
Tähän tullut lisäkommentti: My example shows how over-regulated and inefficient DoD has become—what was simple in WWI or WWII is now impossible. GLSDBs were promised in late 2022, failed in 2024, and 2.5 years later remain in limbo. Why should we believe ERAMs from no-name vendors will be any different?
Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: Your example is completely unrelated and irrelevant. If you actually knew what you were talking about, you would not be citing it. GL SDB is not a DOD weapon. It was an industry developed solution to no US service program requirements. SDB otoh is a service program. Ukraine could obviously refuse to accept ERAM. No one forced it to buy these missiles.
Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: Yes. It can be integrated on any platform that can carry a similarly sized 500 lb weapon.
Tähän tullut lisäkommentti: Yes but the requirement for Gripen was a Swedish made version of ERAM I recall
Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: That is for Sweden to decide. Certainly not a limitation of the OEM to integrate a weapon on a platform.
Tähän tullut lisäkommentti: It actually is as the OEM does not own the right to do so without approval ofcourse
Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: I meant it is not a weapon or weapon developer limitation. The weapon can be integrated and carried by a Gripen. It is compliant with USAF WOSA standards. If Sweden choses to do it a certain way that is its decision. Ukraine will integrate on its F-16s if not already done.
Tähän tullut lisäkommentti: The F -16 in Ukraine is supported by LM through European offices, also Stockholm?
Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: I am not sure exactly. I am pretty confident that Ukraine will be launching these things soon after it begins taking deliveries (if it isn't quietly already doing this to support testing).
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Kommentti: Both of these companies are small startups. I doubts they have experience to organize mass production at 3rd parties. Look at how big names f*cked up at boosting artillery shells manufacturing. We are still at around ~40,000 shells/month. Why expecting better outcome with ERAMs?
Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: The example you cited, and the claims you are making have absolutely nothing to do with each other. The eco system to make something like this exists in abundance in the US and with partners. The companies have matured and developed both the product and production plan and that was used as a criteria for awarding contract. The volumes are relatively small. Its just 3K missiles for Ukraine. 30K would have required more help from more mature OEMs perhaps.
Tähän tullut lisäkommentti: My example shows how over-regulated and inefficient DoD has become—what was simple in WWI or WWII is now impossible. GLSDBs were promised in late 2022, failed in 2024, and 2.5 years later remain in limbo. Why should we believe ERAMs from no-name vendors will be any different?
Johon AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) vastasi näin: Your example is completely unrelated and irrelevant. If you actually knew what you were talking about, you would not be citing it. GL SDB is not a DOD weapon. It was an industry developed solution to no US service program requirements. SDB otoh is a service program. Ukraine could obviously refuse to accept ERAM. No one forced it to buy these missiles.
Hävittäjien osalta myös pitänee huomioida lentotuntipoistot ja realisoituneet tappiot. Tosin tappiot pienenlaisia viime aikoina ja ryssän kirjanpidossa lentotunnit tulevat todnäk täyteen siinä kohtaa kun kone putoaa maahan.
Otaksun, että rajumpaa yhteenottoa ilmassa on tulossa vielä tämän sodan aikana. Ainakin jos huhut super-it:n raskaasta harvenemisesta pitää paikkansa. Jos Ukraina voimistaa ilmakampanjaansa ei venäjällä jää muuta vaihtoehtoa kuin vastata siihen hävittäjillä.
Ottaen huomioon Ukrainan kyvyn iskeä droonein syvälle venäjälle, hävittäjälaivueet eivät voi olla kovin kummoisessa hapessa kun helpoilta maaleilta tulee jatkuvia läpäisyjä.
Antares
Respected Leader
Yli kolme ja puoli vuotta kovaa suursotaa vaatii varmasti veronsa. Eikä hävittäjäkalustosta tai mistä tahansa kalustosta oli muutenkaan 100% koskaan käytettävissä. Lentävästä kalustosta 50% lienee realistisempi arvio, varsinkin ryssän osalta (ehkä jopa alle tuon).
Tässä kuvaajassa Air strikes = "jets, helicopters & drones" joten numeroiden jakautuminen näiden kesken on epäselvää, mutta ohjautuvia liitopommeja voivat viedä vain tietyt hävittäjät:
Ohjautuvien liitopommien punainen kuvaaja (seitsemän päivän liukuva keskiarvo) on pysytellyt jo pitkään 100-120 kpl per päivä -tasolla tosin välillä on käyty selvästi se yli. Teoriassa yksi hävittäjä, ainakin Su-34, voi kuljettaa jopa 6 kpl näitä pommeja per lentosuorite (tosin tämäkin riippuu liitopommin koosta) mutta minun kuvitelmani on että yleensä pommeja vietäisiin vain 2 kpl. Ehkä olen väärässä.
Joka tapauksessa pelkästään näiden pommien päivittäinen kuskaaminen syö pommijuhtien lentotunteja rajulla kädellä. Samaan aikaan muiden hävittäjien pitää olla valmiudessa, jos on tarve torjuntatehtävälle. Eli käytännössä ne lentävät ilmavalvontalentoja. Sitten on erikseen eräänlainen AWACS-koneiden korvaaminen, MiG-31 koneissa on kauimmaksi näkevä tutka joten niitä on käytetty näissä tehtävissä. Kevyet taktisen tason risteilyohjukset eli Kh-59 / Kh-69 (ja niiden vanhemmat sukulaiset) laukaistaan myös hävittäjistä, joten tässä on oma työsarkansa.
On siinä tunti jos toinen, että kaiken saa tehtyä. Osaavasta korjaushenkilökunnasta ja varasosista on varmasti kova kysyntä. Lentäjien jaksamisen perään tuskin kysellään.
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Lentävästä kalustosta puheenollen, tämän mukaan päätös A-50 AWACS koneiden "massatuotannon" uudelleenkäynnistämisestä tehdään joskus tulevaisuudessa:
A-50 U UAC, a subsidiary of Rostec, will make the decision to mass-produce the A-50 airborne early warning and control once the ongoing work is completed. This was announced to TASS by the chief designer and deputy general director of UAC.
https://tass.ru/ekonomika/24986969
September 7, 09:50,
updated 7 September, 10:17
Airborne early warning and control aircraft A-50
© Valery Sharifulin/ TASS
The work has not been completed, and some systems do not have a final conclusion, clarified the general designer and deputy general director of UAC, Sergei Korotkov.
YUZHNO-SAKHALINSK, September 7. /TASS/. The United Aircraft Corporation (UAC, part of Rostec) will make a decision on serial production of the A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft after the completion of the work being carried out. This was reported to TASS by Sergei Korotkov, General Designer and Deputy General Director of UAC.
"We have concluded contracts that we are currently implementing. And, of course, we need such means (A-50 - TASS note) today, especially to obtain the information that is required. But this work has not yet been completed, and these systems do not have a final conclusion yet. We will receive them, and then a decision will be made on <...> scalable and serial production," he said, answering a corresponding question.
As Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov reported in February 2024, Rostec plans to resume the previous production of A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, as it is needed by the Russian Armed Forces and "is very well exported." Earlier, it was reported that the next A-50 AEW&C aircraft complex would be upgraded to the A-50U level.
The A-50U aircraft is designed to detect, track and identify the affiliation of air, large land and sea targets, provide information about them to command posts, guide fighters to air targets and frontline aircraft to land and sea targets.
updated 7 September, 10:17
The decision on serial production of A-50 aircraft will be made after the completion of the work
Airborne early warning and control aircraft A-50
© Valery Sharifulin/ TASS
The work has not been completed, and some systems do not have a final conclusion, clarified the general designer and deputy general director of UAC, Sergei Korotkov.
YUZHNO-SAKHALINSK, September 7. /TASS/. The United Aircraft Corporation (UAC, part of Rostec) will make a decision on serial production of the A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft after the completion of the work being carried out. This was reported to TASS by Sergei Korotkov, General Designer and Deputy General Director of UAC.
"We have concluded contracts that we are currently implementing. And, of course, we need such means (A-50 - TASS note) today, especially to obtain the information that is required. But this work has not yet been completed, and these systems do not have a final conclusion yet. We will receive them, and then a decision will be made on <...> scalable and serial production," he said, answering a corresponding question.
As Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov reported in February 2024, Rostec plans to resume the previous production of A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, as it is needed by the Russian Armed Forces and "is very well exported." Earlier, it was reported that the next A-50 AEW&C aircraft complex would be upgraded to the A-50U level.
The A-50U aircraft is designed to detect, track and identify the affiliation of air, large land and sea targets, provide information about them to command posts, guide fighters to air targets and frontline aircraft to land and sea targets.
Viimeksi muokattu:
teknohippi
Ylipäällikkö
Näissä ryssän varustautumissuunnitelmissa se tärkein kysymys on: mitä tämä maksaa ja miten se rahoitetaan. Ihan perusinfrakin on jätetty pitkälle huoltamatta kun kaikki rahat uppoaa kolmenpäivän erikoiseen. Tähän asti kaikkea on pyöritetty öljyrahastoilla ja sotateollisuuden lainoituksella. Tämä reitti tosiaan katkeaa kun se rahasto on tyhjennetty.
Antares
Respected Leader
Mark Galeotti muistuttaa että Gerasimov täyttää tänään 70 vuotta, mikä tarkoittaa Venäjän lain mukaan automaattista eläkkeelle jäämistä, paitsi jos presidentti määrää toisin asetuksella.
Tämä olisi tilaisuus laittaa epäsuosittu kenraali sivuun ja tehtävään olisi muutama looginen vaihtoehto, mutta minä epäilen ettei Gerasimovia korvata. Kuten hän kirjoittaa, Putin on äärimmäisen varovainen ja pelkää muutoksia rauhan aikana joten tämä lienee totta kahta kauheammin sota-aikana. Ei siis mitään muutoksia, mitä ei ole ehdottoman pakko tehdä.
Tässä se mitä Galeotti pohti ketjussaan:
It's Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov's 70th birthday.
That means automatic retirement... unless the president issues a decree extending your term.
Will Putin hang on to his loyal but vastly unpopular top soldier?
Or will he take a chance and promote someone else?
At the best of times, Putin is risk-averse and fears churn and change.
These are not the best of times.
Since 2022, he has desperately held on his ageing siloviki like Bastrykin (72), Bortnikov (73 and ill), Naryshkin (70) - even Lavrov (75).
There was something of an heir apparent, Sergei Surovikin (now a 58 y/o stripling), but too close an association with Prigozhin saw him banished to chairing the CIS Coordinating Committee for Air Defence.
Would Putin be willing to see him not just brought back into the fold but elevated?
The cadaverous but capable ColGen Teplinsky, head of the Air Assault Troops, is also mentioned as a possibility, but I'm not convinced at present he even wants this poisoned chalice.
Ground Forces commander ColGen Mordvichev is generally regarded as having had a 'good war' but at 49, he may not yet have the authority for the position.
There's also some gossip that he is not a yes man, which would sound like a reason for a Putin no.
So while there are, of course, senior officers who are capable and loyal, it would not necessarily be an easy choice for Putin.
If his practice in other such instants is anything to go by, he'll cling to Gerasimov.
His philosophy seems to be better the mediocrity you know to the potential war-winner you aren't wholly sure you can trust.
Hurrah for pensionocracy.
Tämä olisi tilaisuus laittaa epäsuosittu kenraali sivuun ja tehtävään olisi muutama looginen vaihtoehto, mutta minä epäilen ettei Gerasimovia korvata. Kuten hän kirjoittaa, Putin on äärimmäisen varovainen ja pelkää muutoksia rauhan aikana joten tämä lienee totta kahta kauheammin sota-aikana. Ei siis mitään muutoksia, mitä ei ole ehdottoman pakko tehdä.
Tässä se mitä Galeotti pohti ketjussaan:
It's Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov's 70th birthday.
That means automatic retirement... unless the president issues a decree extending your term.Will Putin hang on to his loyal but vastly unpopular top soldier?
Or will he take a chance and promote someone else?
At the best of times, Putin is risk-averse and fears churn and change.
These are not the best of times.
Since 2022, he has desperately held on his ageing siloviki like Bastrykin (72), Bortnikov (73 and ill), Naryshkin (70) - even Lavrov (75).
There was something of an heir apparent, Sergei Surovikin (now a 58 y/o stripling), but too close an association with Prigozhin saw him banished to chairing the CIS Coordinating Committee for Air Defence.
Would Putin be willing to see him not just brought back into the fold but elevated?
The cadaverous but capable ColGen Teplinsky, head of the Air Assault Troops, is also mentioned as a possibility, but I'm not convinced at present he even wants this poisoned chalice.
Ground Forces commander ColGen Mordvichev is generally regarded as having had a 'good war' but at 49, he may not yet have the authority for the position.
There's also some gossip that he is not a yes man, which would sound like a reason for a Putin no.
So while there are, of course, senior officers who are capable and loyal, it would not necessarily be an easy choice for Putin.
If his practice in other such instants is anything to go by, he'll cling to Gerasimov.
His philosophy seems to be better the mediocrity you know to the potential war-winner you aren't wholly sure you can trust.
Hurrah for pensionocracy.
Antares
Respected Leader
Donetskin ja Luhanskin alueella valitetaan korkeista polttoaineen hinnoista (85-90 ruplaa per litra, silloin kun bensaa on saatavilla).
Tämän lisäksi kirotaan "jälleenmyyjiä" jotka myyvät bensiiniä hintaan 200 ruplaa per litra (mikä tarkoittaa nykykurssilla yli kaksi euroa per litra):
Russia's puppet republics in eastern Ukraine are suffering a 'gasoline collapse' as a result of Ukraine's recent refinery attacks. Civilians are queuing for hours to buy expensive fuel, and the Russian military is also short of gasoline.
As previously reported, disruption to fuel supplies has spread across Russia as a result of the Ukrainian drone strike campaign against Russian refineries. Russian warblogger Anastasia Kashevarova reports on the situation in occupied Ukraine:
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Vaan tämäpä on villiä, jos totta: bensiini on Pietarissa yhtä kallista kuin Donetskin ja Luhanskin alueella (90 ruplaa per litra) - ainakin tämän yhden videon perusteella:
The gasoline crisis has reached every Russian city, all the territories occupied by Russia, and even the only cities the Kremlin cares about: Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Russians have realized that things will only get worse.
Leikkasin lyhyeltä videolta muutaman kuvakaappauksen, laitan ne spoilerin taakse:
Tämän lisäksi kirotaan "jälleenmyyjiä" jotka myyvät bensiiniä hintaan 200 ruplaa per litra (mikä tarkoittaa nykykurssilla yli kaksi euroa per litra):
Russia's puppet republics in eastern Ukraine are suffering a 'gasoline collapse' as a result of Ukraine's recent refinery attacks. Civilians are queuing for hours to buy expensive fuel, and the Russian military is also short of gasoline.
As previously reported, disruption to fuel supplies has spread across Russia as a result of the Ukrainian drone strike campaign against Russian refineries. Russian warblogger Anastasia Kashevarova reports on the situation in occupied Ukraine:
https://t.me/akashevarova/8174
Gasoline collapse in the DPR and LPR.
Huge 2-3 hour queues at gas stations. Resellers sell a liter for 200 rubles. A liter of 95th gasoline reaches 90 rubles at gas stations, or even more.
In May 2024, I wrote that Ukraine was methodically knocking out oil refineries, gas stations, and fuel depots in the frontline and near-front zones. Because of this, a gasoline collapse is being created.
Despite the fact that regional authorities report that the problem has been eliminated, this is not true. Now there are queues at gas stations in the LPR and DPR, gasoline is expensive, you can’t fill up a full tank.
But the issue is acute regarding the military. There is no military gasoline either, sometimes they bring something, but the evacuation groups are the first to fill up. The military refuel at general gas stations and at their own expense. Because the enemy knocked out many warehouses and military gas stations. Since no one really hid them. They did not change the locations of gas stations. They stored fuel and lubricants in one place, without even trying to change these locations.
But in these territories there are many waiters, many traitors - and all the coordinates are transmitted and surrendered. As soon as gasoline is delivered, even to a secret gas station, a crowd of military vehicles begins there and the coordinates are immediately transmitted to the enemy. Well, we have been fighting for the fourth year - we need to be smarter, more cunning. Do not keep all your eggs in one basket.
Plus the question of oil and gas companies - they also suffer losses. And we need to work out an approach to protecting oil refineries and gas stations together with them.
Now it is a good target for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to strike at the gas station in turn. They are hitting markets, kindergartens, they do not care when and where to kill Russians. And we need to think about not exposing people, not crowding, not creating targets for the enemy ourselves.
And, of course, fight against those who sell plain tap water for 7 rubles per liter, and who bring gasoline for 200 rubles per liter.
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55.2Kviewsedited
Sep 8 at 14:00
Gasoline collapse in the DPR and LPR.
Huge 2-3 hour queues at gas stations. Resellers sell a liter for 200 rubles. A liter of 95th gasoline reaches 90 rubles at gas stations, or even more.
In May 2024, I wrote that Ukraine was methodically knocking out oil refineries, gas stations, and fuel depots in the frontline and near-front zones. Because of this, a gasoline collapse is being created.
Despite the fact that regional authorities report that the problem has been eliminated, this is not true. Now there are queues at gas stations in the LPR and DPR, gasoline is expensive, you can’t fill up a full tank.
But the issue is acute regarding the military. There is no military gasoline either, sometimes they bring something, but the evacuation groups are the first to fill up. The military refuel at general gas stations and at their own expense. Because the enemy knocked out many warehouses and military gas stations. Since no one really hid them. They did not change the locations of gas stations. They stored fuel and lubricants in one place, without even trying to change these locations.
But in these territories there are many waiters, many traitors - and all the coordinates are transmitted and surrendered. As soon as gasoline is delivered, even to a secret gas station, a crowd of military vehicles begins there and the coordinates are immediately transmitted to the enemy. Well, we have been fighting for the fourth year - we need to be smarter, more cunning. Do not keep all your eggs in one basket.
Plus the question of oil and gas companies - they also suffer losses. And we need to work out an approach to protecting oil refineries and gas stations together with them.
Now it is a good target for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to strike at the gas station in turn. They are hitting markets, kindergartens, they do not care when and where to kill Russians. And we need to think about not exposing people, not crowding, not creating targets for the enemy ourselves.
And, of course, fight against those who sell plain tap water for 7 rubles per liter, and who bring gasoline for 200 rubles per liter.
53
2.09K257181❤1086360181275t.me/akashevarova/8174
55.2Kviewsedited
Sep 8 at 14:00
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Vaan tämäpä on villiä, jos totta: bensiini on Pietarissa yhtä kallista kuin Donetskin ja Luhanskin alueella (90 ruplaa per litra) - ainakin tämän yhden videon perusteella:
The gasoline crisis has reached every Russian city, all the territories occupied by Russia, and even the only cities the Kremlin cares about: Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Russians have realized that things will only get worse.
Leikkasin lyhyeltä videolta muutaman kuvakaappauksen, laitan ne spoilerin taakse:
Viimeksi muokattu:
StepanRudanskij
Respected Leader
Surovikin olisi mun valinta ilman varauksia, jos tuolla puolella pelaisin. Onneksi ukko on hiukan epäilyttävä.Mark Galeotti muistuttaa että Gerasimov täyttää tänään 70 vuotta, mikä tarkoittaa Venäjän lain mukaan automaattista eläkkeelle jäämistä, paitsi jos presidentti määrää toisin asetuksella.
Tämä olisi tilaisuus laittaa epäsuosittu kenraali sivuun ja tehtävään olisi muutama looginen vaihtoehto, mutta minä epäilen ettei Gerasimovia korvata. Kuten hän kirjoittaa, Putin on äärimmäisen varovainen ja pelkää muutoksia rauhan aikana joten tämä lienee totta kahta kauheammin sota-aikana. Ei siis mitään muutoksia, mitä ei ole ehdottoman pakko tehdä.
Tässä se mitä Galeotti pohti ketjussaan:
It's Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov's 70th birthday.
Will Putin hang on to his loyal but vastly unpopular top soldier?
Or will he take a chance and promote someone else?
At the best of times, Putin is risk-averse and fears churn and change.
These are not the best of times.
Since 2022, he has desperately held on his ageing siloviki like Bastrykin (72), Bortnikov (73 and ill), Naryshkin (70) - even Lavrov (75).
There was something of an heir apparent, Sergei Surovikin (now a 58 y/o stripling), but too close an association with Prigozhin saw him banished to chairing the CIS Coordinating Committee for Air Defence.
Would Putin be willing to see him not just brought back into the fold but elevated?
Katso liite: 124554
The cadaverous but capable ColGen Teplinsky, head of the Air Assault Troops, is also mentioned as a possibility, but I'm not convinced at present he even wants this poisoned chalice.
Katso liite: 124555
Ground Forces commander ColGen Mordvichev is generally regarded as having had a 'good war' but at 49, he may not yet have the authority for the position.
There's also some gossip that he is not a yes man, which would sound like a reason for a Putin no.
Katso liite: 124556
So while there are, of course, senior officers who are capable and loyal, it would not necessarily be an easy choice for Putin.
If his practice in other such instants is anything to go by, he'll cling to Gerasimov.
His philosophy seems to be better the mediocrity you know to the potential war-winner you aren't wholly sure you can trust.
Hurrah for pensionocracy.
Tässä Syrskyin sanomiset kokonaisuudessaan. Eli 58 neliökilometriä jäi Ukraina voitolle.
Antares
Respected Leader
Venäjän ilmavoimia lähellä oleva Fighterbomber telegram-kanava välittää eteenpäin "mainoksen" että ryssän ilmavoimat pyytää kansalaisilta lahjoituksena lentokuntoisia Yak-52 tai Yak-18T potkurikoneita.
MUOKKAUS: kenties tulkitsin tämän väärin: pyytäjä ei ole suoraan ryssän ilmavoimat vaan jokin "yritys"? Hänen sarkastinen kirjoitustyylinsä hämäsi, tulkitsin "the organisation" = ryssän ilmavoimat. Viestissä on kuitenkin linkitetty @yakkimotorsport. Sopii toki kysyä, onko tämä firman oma-aloitteisuutta vai onko tästä tullut kyselyä ryssän MoD taholta ELI onko tälle aito ja kiireinen tarve? Selvästi droneja pääsee torjunnasta läpi, joten "jotain tartteis keksiä".
Käännöksen lähde: LÄHDE
MUOKKAUS: kenties tulkitsin tämän väärin: pyytäjä ei ole suoraan ryssän ilmavoimat vaan jokin "yritys"? Hänen sarkastinen kirjoitustyylinsä hämäsi, tulkitsin "the organisation" = ryssän ilmavoimat. Viestissä on kuitenkin linkitetty @yakkimotorsport. Sopii toki kysyä, onko tämä firman oma-aloitteisuutta vai onko tästä tullut kyselyä ryssän MoD taholta ELI onko tälle aito ja kiireinen tarve? Selvästi droneja pääsee torjunnasta läpi, joten "jotain tartteis keksiä".
Käännöksen lähde: LÄHDE
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Ukraina hyökkää ainakin Donetskin alueelle droneilla ja väitetysti myös Storm Shadow ohjuksilla (Makeevka on toistaiseksi ainoa paikka joka on mainittu nimeltä):
Ukraine is hitting Donetsk region now with drones and something else unknown.
More from Makeevka, Donetsk region
Storm shadow cruise missile strikes in Donetsk
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Näkyy olevan laajempi hyökkäys käynnissä (HUOM: näissä kuvissa yksi nuoli on yksi havainto, eli yksi drone voi olla usean havainnon lähde - ei siis voi laskea nuolien määrää ja päätellä siitä dronejen määrää, toisaalta jokaisesta dronesta ei tehdä havaintoja):
UAVs attack! DroneBomber
And more from Donetsk!
Ukraine is hitting Donetsk region now with drones and something else unknown.
More from Makeevka, Donetsk region
Storm shadow cruise missile strikes in Donetsk
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Näkyy olevan laajempi hyökkäys käynnissä (HUOM: näissä kuvissa yksi nuoli on yksi havainto, eli yksi drone voi olla usean havainnon lähde - ei siis voi laskea nuolien määrää ja päätellä siitä dronejen määrää, toisaalta jokaisesta dronesta ei tehdä havaintoja):
UAVs attack!
DroneBomber And more from Donetsk!
Antares
Respected Leader
Tässä yksi nopea geopaikannus joka perusteella arvioidaan ainakin yhtä kohdetta Donetskin alueella:
In Donetsk, the former Topaz plant was hit by cruise missiles, - Dnipro Osint
The territory of the Topaz industrial zone was repeatedly used by the occupiers as a base for military equipment and personnel.
In Donetsk, the former Topaz plant was hit by cruise missiles, - Dnipro Osint
The territory of the Topaz industrial zone was repeatedly used by the occupiers as a base for military equipment and personnel.
Antares
Respected Leader
Donetskin kaupungin seudulla useita osumia, ei vielä tiedossa mitkä ovat kohteet:
Footage of multiple Ukrainian drones and cruise missiles slamming into Russian targets across occupied Donetsk city this evening.
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Tämän videon perusteella kirjoitetaan myös että olisi käytetty mahdollisesti jotain tuntematonta risteilyohjusta (tai ainakaan tätä ei ole toistaiseksi tunnistettu):
Footage of a previously unseen Ukrainian cruise missile flying at low altitude over Donetsk Oblast tonight, heading towards a Russian target.
t.me/exilenova_plus/12260
Footage of multiple Ukrainian drones and cruise missiles slamming into Russian targets across occupied Donetsk city this evening.
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Tämän videon perusteella kirjoitetaan myös että olisi käytetty mahdollisesti jotain tuntematonta risteilyohjusta (tai ainakaan tätä ei ole toistaiseksi tunnistettu):
Footage of a previously unseen Ukrainian cruise missile flying at low altitude over Donetsk Oblast tonight, heading towards a Russian target.
t.me/exilenova_plus/12260
