The two regimes do not perceive their respective conflicts on the same timescale. Most interpret Putin as motivated by a fear of a closing window of influence on the Ukrainian state, as it draws closer and closer to NATO and the West (in large part accelerated by his seizure of Crimea and other acts of aggression). Although China views “reunification” with Taiwan as a core interest and refuses to renounce a military option, this goal is not necessarily as urgent, all the more so because its military, political, economic and cultural power continues to grow in a way that Russia’s does not. If Beijing does not see an immediate need to act within the next few months or does not yet feel assured of a rapid victory, it is unlikely to allow Russia’s unrelated European ambitions to influence its own timetable.
More concretely, much as Russia’s
military moves in the last several weeks telegraphed the crisis in Europe, any large-scale action against Taiwan would require weeks, if not months, of moving units into place in a way that would be impossible to hide. No mobilization of this scale has yet been seen. Finally, sea and weather conditions in the Taiwan Strait are
abysmal in February, a major obstacle to invasion at this time.
In short, the publicly available evidence does not suggest that China is being drawn into the Russia-Ukraine conflict. China is unlikely to offer direct support for any Russian invasion of Ukraine, nor to bind its own Pacific military objectives or timeline to Russia’s European ones. Despite the close ties between Beijing and Moscow, the two partners understand that their alignment only extends as far as their shared interests.