Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Trolli infoa.
This paper explains how the elves have played and will play an essential role in countering Russian information operations, and it provides Western stakeholders with recommendations for how to enhance the activities of the elves. The data for this paper were collected for over a year, including through semi-structured interviews with the elves, visiting their cyber world and working with the data they have gathered, and attending their biggest international event—the Elves Academy. This paper provides a unique and comprehensive insight into the elves’ cyber realm and activities.

The elves operate anonymously and focus on fighting hybrid threats conducted primarily by the Kremlin and its proxies. Their work is voluntary, unpaid, and independent from states and governments. Their activities are strictly legal—they strongly denounce any form of criminal activity such as hacking or cyber espionage, and they mostly limit themselves to monitoring Russian disinformation and its perpetrators, such as the trolls. Most of the data they generate is shared with the public, either as media outputs produced by the elves or through articles by local media.
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www.gmfus.org

The Role of Cyber “Elves” Against Russian Information Operations

www.gmfus.org www.gmfus.org
Having started in 2014 as a group of less than 20 individuals in Lithuania, the movement had expanded to 13 countries and counted about 4,000 volunteers by 2021. Given the size and the pace of growth of the elves, together with their many successful if yet unadvertised missions, it would be unwise to overlook or underestimate this movement as it may (and in many cases does) play a crucial role against Russian information operations against Western democracies, which will grow in number, scale, and sophistication in the coming years. Already short of capacity to effectively to do so, Western stakeholders must look for innovative ways to counter Russian information war. Cyber activism is one of them.
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The Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battle space is the mind of the civilian population. Thus, hybrid warfare is dominated by information operations in which reducing the necessity of deploying hard military power and encouraging an opponent’s military and population to support the attacker to the detriment of their government and country is regarded as one primary goal.
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Russian actors have a holistic understanding of cyberspace. They tend to conceptualize it as the intersection between hardware, software, infrastructure, and content. By contrast, in the West these are seen as separate elements and rarely regarded as a part of a broader whole. Thus, the term “cyber” in Russian is used solely to speak about Western threats and activities, whereas in the West it is used in a more general sense
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Nationalistic/patriotic hackers act based on their attachment to the Russian state. As they are usually less skilled and experienced, they are primarily used to conduct more basic campaigns such as “distributed denial of service” attacks, stealing and leaking emails, and hacking into news outlets to modify what they publish or to deny access to specific stories.

Professional trolls are the most important group in the context of information and cyber war. They are creatures of chaos who prey on the frustration and anger of others. They do it by deliberately disrupting, attacking, or generally causing trouble on social networks or other user-generated-content platforms by posting comments, photos, videos, GIFs, or other forms of unwanted online content. According to one investigation, an average troll in Russia was paid about €400 a month in 2017, an above-average reward for a comfortable “office” job in the country. As one former troll describes, he was paid to write about 135 online commentaries per day, primarily about the conflict in Ukraine.
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Trolls refers to human-operated, non-automatized accounts that can be either created anonymously or under a made up or real identity engaging in targeted harassment. Their objective is to dissuade or dismay the target. Their methods include bad-faith arguments, logical fallacies, doxing (publicly revealing private information about an individual or organization, usually through the internet), and rude behavior. Trolls usually congregate around topics or individuals and usually have a disproportionate level of engagements.
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The first example of a large, coordinated personal attack by pro-Kremlin trolls was the one starting in 2014 against the Finnish journalist Jessikka Aro, who first discovered the existence of “troll factories”: office buildings where the trolls create their toxic content.1414Jessikka Aro, “Yle Kioski Traces the Origins of Russian Social Media Propaganda – Never-before-seen Material from the Troll Factory,” Kioski News, 2015. She provided the first evidence of Russian trolls being not only very well organized but also connected to the Kremlin as an integral part of its information warfare. As an act of revenge, the trolls launched an intensive harassment campaign against Aro, effectively forcing her out of the virtual and for some time public space. Besides making rape and death threats, the trolls called her and pretending to be her dead father.
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Another important variable for the future of trolling and Russian information operations in general is the existence of new and increasingly sophisticated technologies for personalizing, targeting, and scaling up online content to maximize its impact.2121Antonio Missiroli, “Game of Drones? How new technologies affect deterrence, defence, and security,” NATO Review, 2020. Trolls usually work in 12-hour shifts and are required to meet quotas in terms of producing comments, blog posts, or page views.2222Sarah Kreps, The Role of Technology in Online Misinformation, Brookings Institution, 2020. This work can get tedious and writing new content about the same topics—for example, elevating the image of Russia or increasing division or confusion in the European political landscape—has its challenges. However, artificial intelligence can help overcome these creativity obstacles.
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Lainattu www.russiandefence.net-sivustolta:


Interview with Colonel of the Central Office of the Russian Defense Ministry Vladimir Trukhan:

Very many points are clarified very clearly:

1. There are NO conscripts in the military operation. Only contractors who have received appropriate training. Therefore, Belarusians do not participate

2. There is no question of any 3.5 thousand killed Russian servicemen - roads would be clogged with ambulances in the opposite direction, plus the massive deployment of field hospitals

4. abandoned empty columns are burned by the APU retroactively for staged commercials.

5. Military operations of this level are prepared for at least several months,

6. The main leitmotif of the actions of the Russian Armed Forces: "we are not Americans."

8. The distribution of weapons to the untrained population, as well as all sorts of "Molotov cocktails", in opposition to professionals - enchanting dolboyashcherism.

9. Kadyrov's men, trained in the fight against terrorists in urban conditions and trained accordingly, will clean up the uporotyshs.

10.Russian Armed Forces units participating in the operation do not use mortars. All mortar attacks, all mortar explosions are provocations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

In general, to sum up, there are no non-professionals in the operation. The operation was prepared well in advance in all its parameters, and the plan has a lot of ramifications for the various course of events.
 
Kiusankpl kirjoitti:
Lainattu www.russiandefence.net-sivustolta:


Interview with Colonel of the Central Office of the Russian Defense Ministry Vladimir Trukhan:

Very many points are clarified very clearly:

1. There are NO conscripts in the military operation. Only contractors who have received appropriate training. Therefore, Belarusians do not participate

2. There is no question of any 3.5 thousand killed Russian servicemen - roads would be clogged with ambulances in the opposite direction, plus the massive deployment of field hospitals

4. abandoned empty columns are burned by the APU retroactively for staged commercials.

5. Military operations of this level are prepared for at least several months,

6. The main leitmotif of the actions of the Russian Armed Forces: "we are not Americans."

8. The distribution of weapons to the untrained population, as well as all sorts of "Molotov cocktails", in opposition to professionals - enchanting dolboyashcherism.

9. Kadyrov's men, trained in the fight against terrorists in urban conditions and trained accordingly, will clean up the uporotyshs.

10.Russian Armed Forces units participating in the operation do not use mortars. All mortar attacks, all mortar explosions are provocations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

In general, to sum up, there are no non-professionals in the operation. The operation was prepared well in advance in all its parameters, and the plan has a lot of ramifications for the various course of events.
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Eli kaikki menee aivan juuri niin kuin on suunniteltu. Siltä näyttää.
 
Kiusankpl kirjoitti:
UA:n parhaita joukkoja jäämässä mottiin. Määrä varmaan 8-10 prikaatia kaikkiaan. Tuo onnistuessaan voi olla ryssille voiton avain.
Miten tuosta ukrainalaiset selviävät? Järjestäytynyt vetäytyminen Dneprin taakse? Onko edes mahdollista enää..
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Toisaalta rintamalinja on valtava ja myöskin motitettava alue. Tämä on siitä erikoinen sota, että motitetut sotilaat voivat periaatteessa kiskaista siviilivaatteet päälle ja mennä normaalin liikenteen mukana taas oikealle puolelle rintamaa. Eri asia sitten tekevätkö he näin. Vaikeuksia tuottaa jos tuolta Donbassin suunnalta pyritään sitomaan Ukrainan joukkoja taisteluun ja käytetään paljon ilmavoimaa, jolloin irtautuminen ei onnistu.
 
Harvapartio kirjoitti:
Toisaalta rintamalinja on valtava ja myöskin motitettava alue. Tämä on siitä erikoinen sota, että motitetut sotilaat voivat periaatteessa kiskaista siviilivaatteet päälle ja mennä normaalin liikenteen mukana taas oikealle puolelle rintamaa. Eri asia sitten tekevätkö he näin. Vaikeuksia tuottaa jos tuolta Donbassin suunnalta pyritään sitomaan Ukrainan joukkoja taisteluun ja käytetään paljon ilmavoimaa, jolloin irtautuminen ei onnistu.
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Ei taida olla mahdollista tässä tapauksessa 50 000 miehen esiintyä pakolaisina pelkkä reppu selässä. Joukot olisivat käytännössä hajotetut ja kaikki aseistus & materiaali menetetty. Sama kuin olisivat antautuneet...
 
Von der Leyen: Ukrainan tulee liittyä EU:n jäseneksi. Sanoo että luottamus Putikkaan meni lopullisesti. Nyt on sitten poliittinen tavoite sanottu ääneen. Sodan lopputulos saattaisi olla se, että Venäjästä tulee pitkällä aikavälillä Euroopan hylkiö ja Zimbabwe. Ukraina saa itse valita kohtalonsa haluaako länsi-integraation tielle.

www.is.fi

Ursula von der Leyen haluaa Ukrainan liittyvän EU:hun: ”Yksi meistä”

EU-komission puheenjohtaja kertoo, että luottamus Venäjän presidentti Vladimir Putiniin on mennyt täysin.
www.is.fi www.is.fi
 
Lento Moskovasta jonnekin Väli-Amerikkaan kiersi Suomen mutta jatkoi matkaa Norjan ilmatilaan. En ymmärrä
 
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