Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Ovatkohan ne ryysät oikeasti livistämässä Khersonista joen toiselle puolelle? Ihmeellisiä huhuja liikkuu ympäriinsä. Onhan ryssän asema väärällä puolella jokea ollut tukala jo pitkään, mutta tiedotuslinja on outo ja poikkeava. Kyllähän se ryssä sieltä vielä tämän vuoden puolella, vaikka nyt olisi pelkkiä valeuutisia liikkeellä vetäytymisestä.

Minä en usko että lähtisivät ilman yritystä pitää se, Kherson oli ensimmäinen suuri Ukrainan kaupunki jonka valtasivat joten sillä on tiettyä symboliarvoa. Lisäksi se on "anneksoidun" alueen hallinnollinen keskus ja samalla antaa nimen koko alueelle.

Toisaalta vaikea nähdä miten kestäisivät kovin pitkään: huoltolinjat ovat olleet poikki jo pidempään ja Arestovychin arvion mukaan saisivat joen yli vain kolmasosan joukkojen tarvitsemasta materiaalista. Tätä on jatkunut jo useamman kuukauden ajan.

Loogisesti jos asiaa miettii niin nämä puheet voisi nähdä yrityksinä pehmentää sitä iskua, jonka alueelta vetäytyminen aiheuttaa heidän kansan keskuudessa. Taas yksi tappio lisää. Ryssä ei silti usein toimi loogisesti vaan ovat äärimmäisen tunteilla käyviä: nopeita kiivastumaan, pitkävihaisia ja saatuaan jotain päähänsä, siitä on vaikea irroittautua. En siis pitäisi ihmeenä vaikka tartuisivat Dnieprin pohjoispuoliseen alueeseen kaiken järjen vastaisesti ja uhraisivat siellä olevat joukkonsa epämääräinen "kunnian" takia - lopputulos olisi silti sama, tuossa vain menetetään suurempi määrä omia joukkoja. En pitäisi ihmeenä vaikka käsky tuohon tulisi ylimmältä mahdolliselta taholta, edellä mainituista tunnesyistä johtuen.

-

Tuossa yllä oli viesti, jonka mukaan "voisi uskoa että Iran kykenisi valmistamaan tai ostamaan Kiinasta kaiken droneissa tarvittavan". Aikaisemmin oli yksi arvio, jonka mukaan tuo ei pidä paikkaansa, vaan niissä olisi paljon länsimaisia komponentteja joista osa ilmeisesti jopa pakotteiden alaisia.

Toinen kulma asiaan: vaikka kykenisivätkin valmistamaan suuremmat osat, eivät kykene valmistamaan työstökoneiden työkaluja ja niiden teriä:


https://intellinews.com/long-read-russia-s-sanctions-soft-underbelly-precision-machine-tools-213024/

LONG READ: Russia’s sanctions soft underbelly: precision machine tools​


By Ben Aris in Berlin June 13, 2021

The West has been struggling to change the Kremlin’s behaviour and hold it to account for the annexation of the Crimea in 2014 and a host of other misdemeanours with a sanctions regime that has proved to be almost entirely ineffective. Oligarchs have been targeted; visa bans and asset freezes doled out; Russia’s debt made out of bounds for international investors. Yet thanks to President Vladimir Putin’s fiscal fortress, all these measures have slid off the Kremlin’s back like water off a duck's back.

However, there is one place that Russia is truly vulnerable. It imports almost all of its precision machine tools and the majority of them come from Western Europe and the US, as its own once legendary machine tool sector was destroyed in 1991 and never rebuilt.

Machinery and tools remains by far Russia’s largest import category, but precision tools are more important than just the money they cost. High-quality machine tools lie at the heart of Russia’s efforts to modernise itself. It can’t build an autonomous competitive economy without precise machine tools and they are also the wellspring of innovation. Without access to quality machine tools Russia would still earn money from oil, gas and metal exports, but all the Kremlin’s ambitions to develop a modern highly competitive economy would be badly hobbled and nigh on impossible.

Collapse of the machine tool industry

At the start of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic Russia covered itself in glory. The development of the Sputnik V vaccine, which appears to be one of the safest and most effective in the world, was developed with amazing speed. The rollout of a mass inoculation programme began in December 2020 when most other vaccine candidates were still in trials.

Russia is good at the science. It put the first man into space under a totalitarian regime. Where it has always fallen down is on high-quality production. The vaccine's development was fast, but the construction of the factories to make Sputnik V in large amounts has been painfully slow. By the end of May Russia had met only 8% of its export orders despite the vaccine having been approved in over 60 countries and orders for hundreds of millions of doses worth billions of dollars.

Since then the production bottlenecks are slowly being circumnavigated. As of the middle of June Russian factories have been cranking out 30mn doses a month and are beginning to be able to meet the demand. But it has taken longer to build the factories than it has taken to develop the drug in the first place.

There are two problems that have held back a faster rollout of mass production: the lack of qualified staff and the lack of the basic machine building technology to manufacture the intricate machines needed to produce a complicated drug like Sputnik V.

Russia is famously bad at making anything other than space rockets and fighter jets. The Soviet Union had exploding tellies and opaque sunglasses. Quality consumer goods didn't exist.

The irony is the Russia revolution was built on the back of an industrial revolution powered by a huge machine tool industry under Stalin that embraced mechanisation and transformed the Russian empire from a bucolic backwater to an industrial superpower by the outbreak of the Second World War.

Machine building and the revolution were synonymous. “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country!” went the famous slogan. Soviet machine building exploded in the 1980s, but the USSR quickly fell behind after the advent of more precise “numerical” machine engineering – pioneered by the Japanese and Germans. Even the US struggled to keep up with this first innovation.

Since then machine tool production has taken several more technological leaps upwards, thanks to the advent of the computer and now the internet. Today it's all about “mechatronics” – a marriage between machines, electronics and the internet. As most of these huge changes happened in the 1990s when Russia was flat on its economic back, it simply missed out on all of it.

“After decades of neglect and weak demand for its products, the Russian machine tool industry is in a deep crisis,” says Tomas Malmlöf of the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) in a recent report. “The great demand for machine tools that nevertheless exists in the Russian industry, not least within the defence industry, is now mostly covered by imports, and Russia has become the fourth-largest importer of machine tools in the world.”

That’s a big problem. While tool-making contributes only a tiny share of GDP – in Japan, a world leader, machine tool making accounts for 1.9% of GDP – the machine tool industry provides the principal industrial equipment base for all other manufacturing industries.

Everything is affected by the quality of the tools used to make things: heavy industry, the machinery industry, the car industry, power engineering business, shipbuilding, the aircraft industry and the entire defence sector. Being entirely reliant on imported tools is not a good place to be for a country like Russia that aspires to become autonomous in industry and defence.

Russian machine tool industry was already falling behind in the 1980s, but following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it simply disappeared. In 1990, production of metal-cutting machine tools amounted to 74,000 pieces. In the next five years, output fell to 18,000 components, according to official statistics. In 2009, this figure had shrunk to 2,000. Since then, the situation has somewhat stabilised, and in 2016 production of metal-cutting machine tools reached almost 4,400 components – a 16-fold decline. But just because Russia wasn't making tools any more didn't mean it wasn't using tools.

“The crisis in the Russian machine tool industry was not a crisis for the Russian machine tool market, as such. What happened was that the domestic machine-building industries increasingly turned to foreign machine tool providers,” says Malmlöf.

Russia major import products October 2021.jpg

Today Russia

During the noughties Russia’s economy boomed, doubling in size, funded by a torrent of inbound petro-dollars. The government invested heavily in rebuilding infrastructure but things like the new high-speed rail link between Moscow and St Petersburg was built by Siemens, as was nearly every new gas turbine in every new power station in the country.

In a more recent high-tech example, the head of Roscosmos Dmitry Rogozin complained that while Russia has plenty of rockets, and may build its own version of the International Space Station if the rows with the US continue, it can’t launch any new satellites, as they are missing a high-tech chip that is only produced in the West. Although there are no official sanctions on the chip, Western manufacturers are refusing to sell it to Russia. Roscosmos has tried sourcing analogues from markets like India and Brazil, but the quality is simply not good enough.

Even in the car industry Russia is now home to five big car companies with extensive manufacturing plants, but despite energetic programmes to force foreign carmakers to increase the share of locally made parts to at least 60%, the car plants in Russia are still heavily dependent on imports. Part of the problem here is the foreign manufacturers are reluctant to share their technology for fear of creating a rival, but local part-makers are not good enough to offer a viable alternative.

The dearth of the domestic production of high-quality machine tools is both a strategic and economic threat to the country. And yet little has been done to address the problem.

Mechatronics

Russia now has a lot of catching up to do, but developing the tech will be very hard.

One example is the five axis grinders”: special grinders that can cut and shape metal into complicated shapes. These machines are core to dozens of industries, including weapons manufacture, and the dual-use implications mean the manufacturers routinely build in special controls that disable the machine if it is moved from its original location.

The recent integration of digital control technology and computers into machine tools hit the industry in three waves of technology shocks that lasted about ten years each and all of them simply washed over Russia.

“The introduction of numerical controls (NC) for machine tools in the 1950s and 1960s enabled some degree of automation of production processes. The second wave, in the 1970s and 1980s, entailed the use of microcomputers for numerical control (CNC). CNC machines offered new features, were more flexible and led to a substantial drop in price,” says Malmlöf.

“The present, third wave is comprised of the PC-based CNC machine and began around 1990…. The introduction of digital controls had a disruptive market impact. Numerical control enabled fundamental changes in product architecture as several processes [that] converged into multi-purpose machines. Flexibility in design, development and production increased, which resulted in shorter product cycles, faster product development and a push for speedier order delivery… The core competence of manufacturing therefore shifted from accurate mechanics to electrical engineering and programming.”

What used to be tools are now mechatronics, a whole new class of tools – the combination of mechanical engineering and electronics that is wrapped up in the “Internet of Things” to come.

In terms of output by value and consumption then Japan and Germany are still the giants in the business. China is also high in the list, but its tools tend to be at the low-end of the sophistication spectrum, although the government has been investing massively in R&D in an effort to catch up. America is a huge consumer and a big producer, but even the US imports about 60% of its tool needs, while China imports about a third of its tools. By contrast, Russia produces a tiny amount of tools and imports almost 100% of its requirements.

Table 2 - Global machine tool consumption, millions of US dollars, constant value.jpg
Table 1 - Global machine tool production, millions of US dollars, constant value.jpg

Machine Tools trade & sanctions

Russia’s total dependence on imports makes specialised machine tools a candidate for sanctions that would be highly effective, as they would bring Russian economic development to a standstill, or at least severely slow the pace of growth. A blanket ban on any exports of any precision machine tools to Russia would have devastating effects.

The trouble is sanctions on tool exports to Russia would also have devastating effects on the European and US industries. As the machine tool-making business is not particularly capital intensive the business is dominated by specialist small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). There are a few large corporates with deep pockets that can ride out swings in demand, but most are not. Moreover, as machine tools are in effect investment capital, the industry is very sensitive to the vagrancies of the economic cycle.

“An important feature of the machine tool industry is its highly volatile cyclicity. This is because machine tools are not just another primary input in the production process, but are used to produce other investment goods,” says Malmlöf. “It therefore suffers a double effect of the accelerator principle: when demand in final products decreases, demand for investment goods falls even more, and demand for machine tools falls the most.”

Given that a country like Germany has so many SMEs in this sector, cutting them off from the huge lucrative Russian market would be politically very difficult indeed.

For its part Russia has already been trying to actively break its dependence on EU and US machine tools. Now it now imports from over 70 countries, but all that has happened is Russia increasingly buys the low tech tools from developing markets while the share of the most sophisticated and most expensive tools from countries like Germany, Italy, Japan and the US has actually increased.

“From the late 2000s, Russia has diversified its imports of machine tools, either voluntarily or as a necessity, due to its deteriorating relationships with the [liberal Western countries],” says Malmlöf. “Yet in 2017, this group still provided 57% of Russian machine tool imports in the sample based on import value… The quantity of Russian import from potentially unfriendly countries has diminished significantly during the ten years in the sample, at the same time as friendly countries have increased their market share… Russia has substituted a noticeable share of its import of high-end machine tools from the most advanced machine tool-producing countries for less expensive Chinese, Turkish and Belarusian machine tools.”

Figure 5 - Russia providers of machine tools 2008-2017, imported value in current dollars, 100...jpg
Figure 6 - Russia providers of machine tools 2008-2017, imported quantities in metric tons, 10...jpg
Point of no return?

What’s left of Russia’s machine tool business is mostly focused on the defence sector, as some military production is considered so sensitive that it is inconceivable that any foreign-tech would be allowed on the premises.

There have been a couple of attempts to revive the machine tool industry but it simply didn't get much attention during the first two decades following the fall of the Soviet Union. After comprehensive military modernisation programme was launched in 2011 that has changed, and a more serious attempt to revive the business is underway.

In the late 2010s, Russia’s machine tool industry accounted for 0.02% of GDP. This is a low figure compared to some of the leading producing countries: China (0.2%), Japan (0.33%) and Germany (0.37%).

According to the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade, there were 80 domestic machine tool firms in total, and 29 tool companies, in 2017. The output of its top six companies accounted for 54% of Russia’s domestic production.

In June 2017, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, under Minister Denis Manturov, proposed a new comprehensive development strategy for the machine tool and tool industries 2018-2030 that was based on a much more thorough study of the international business.

“The primary goal of the proposed strategy is to increase the competitiveness of the Russian machine tool industry and to restore their position on the home market,” says Malmlöf. “By 2030, the share of Russian machine tools on the domestic market should increase to 50% and the yearly growth rate should be 15%, on average, according to the proposed target indicators.”

According to the Ministry proposal, the strategy should be implemented in two stages. During the first stage, up to 2021, all state policies for the machine tool industry ought to focus on strengthening the position of a few strong market actors among current companies and turn them into national champions.

The state should also stimulate the emergence of new market participants in those market niches where the current companies are not active.

The purpose of state policy during this stage is thus to bring about intensive economic growth within the industry, to empower existing companies to fully exploit their potential, to develop new technologies and to seize broad market niches.

During the second stage, 2022-2030, the industry should be capable of shifting towards extensive growth. Production volumes would increase as a result of the active state support during the previous stage.

The Ministry expects new actors to enter those market segments for final products, sub-components and instruments that the national champions have not already seized. Among them will be technology owners, modernised defence firms and companies from the nuclear industry.

The jury remains out on whether this programme will be a success. The Chinese have been pouring money into its R&D sector and actively hiring “turtles” – Chinese workers that cut their teeth in foreign R&D departments, but have been lured home to develop Chinese tech. The Russian government has earmarked RUB63.5bn ($910mn) for the programme, with most of the spending frontloaded to be spent in the next two years. Added to that, Russia has never been a slouch when it comes to science.

Kuten Venäjän junanvaunujen laakeriongelmat, tämäkin näkyy vasta viiveellä mutta jos näiden toimitusketjut kykenisi katkaisemaan, se tuottaisi suuren määrän harmaita hiuksia turbaanin alle. Toki voi kierrellä ja kaarrella: ostetaan bulvaanien kautta tai korvataan kiinalaisella. Silloinkin kysymys on: kuinka nopeasti ja millä laajuudella tuo onnistuisi? Mahdoton tietää varmaa vastausta joten esitin tuon lähinnä pohdittavaksi.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Poikkeustila ilmeisesti oikeuttaa myös ryöstämään siviileiltä kaiken "armeijan käyttöön". Helvetti että sylettää tuo touhu. Ensin vallataan alue, sitten ulistaan että Ukraina ampuu meijän alueita ja samalla ryöstetään ja tuhotaan kaikki mitä voi, ja kirjaimellisesti paskotaan.
 
Poikkeustila ilmeisesti oikeuttaa myös ryöstämään siviileiltä kaiken "armeijan käyttöön".
Käytännössä tässä mm kielletään varastettujen alueiden asukkaiden siirtyminen ulkomaille siis Ukrainan puolelle!

Kyllä, kaikki yllä mainittu ja muuta.

1666181693682.png


edit.
Tässä pitempi versio. Yllämainittu on ns. lyhennelmä.
Putin signed the Decree “On measures taken in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation in connection with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of October 19, 2022 No. 756”.

In order to improve the efficiency of the activities of senior officials (executive authorities) of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation in connection with the introduction of martial law in the territories of the Donetsk People's Republic, Luhansk People's Republic, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, I decide:

1. Introduce in the territories of the Donetsk People's Republic, Luhansk People's Republic, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions a regime (maximum level of response), under which the highest officials (executive authorities) of these constituent entities of the Russian Federation exercise the powers provided for by the Federal Constitutional Law of January 30, 2002 No. 1-FKZ "On martial law", powers to carry out mobilization measures in the economic sphere, in the executive authorities of these constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local governments, civil defense measures, protection of the population and territories from natural and man-made emergencies , as well as the authority to implement measures to meet the needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations,organs and the needs of the population.

2. In the territories of the subjects of the Russian Federation named in paragraph 1 of this Decree, in accordance with the Federal Law of May 31, 1996 No. 61-FZ "On Defense" and other regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation, territorial defense is carried out and interdepartmental coordinating bodies are created ( territorial defense headquarters).

3. Introduce in the territories of the Republic of Crimea, Krasnodar Territory, Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kursk, Rostov regions and the city of Sevastopol a regime (medium level of response), under which the highest officials (executive authorities) of these constituent entities of the Russian Federation exercise powers to carrying out mobilization measures in the economic sphere, in the executive authorities of these constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local governments, individual measures for territorial defense, civil defense measures, protection of the population and territories from natural and man-made emergencies, as well as the authority to implement measures to meeting the needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and needs of the population.The highest officials (executive authorities) of these constituent entities of the Russian Federation also implement the following measures:

a) strengthening the protection of public order and ensuring public security, the protection of military, important state and special facilities, facilities that ensure the vital activity of the population, the functioning of transport, communications and communications, energy facilities, as well as facilities that pose an increased danger to human life and health and to the natural environment;

b) introduction of a special operating regime for facilities that ensure the functioning of transport, communications and communications, energy facilities, as well as facilities that pose an increased danger to human life and health and to the natural environment;

c) temporary resettlement of residents to safe areas with the obligatory provision of such residents with stationary or temporary living quarters;

d) introduction and maintenance of a special regime for entry into and exit from the territory, as well as restriction of freedom of movement on it;

e) restriction of the movement of vehicles and their inspection;

f) introduction of control over the operation of facilities that ensure the functioning of transport, communications and communications, over the operation of printing houses, computer centers and automated systems, and the use of their work for defense needs.

4. Introduce on the territories of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation that are part of the Central Federal District and the Southern Federal District, with the exception of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation named in paragraph 3 of this Decree, a regime (high alert level), within which senior officials (executive authorities ) the said constituent entities of the Russian Federation exercise the authority to take decisions on carrying out individual measures for territorial defense and civil defense, measures to protect the population and territories from natural and man-made emergencies, as well as the authority to implement measures to meet the needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, others troops, military formations, bodies and needs of the population.The highest officials (executive authorities) of these constituent entities of the Russian Federation also implement the following measures:

a) strengthening the protection of public order and ensuring public security, the protection of military, important state and special facilities, facilities that ensure the vital activity of the population, the functioning of transport, communications and communications, energy facilities, as well as facilities that pose an increased danger to human life and health and to the natural environment;

b) introduction of a special operating regime for facilities that ensure the functioning of transport, communications and communications, energy facilities, as well as facilities that pose an increased danger to human life and health and to the natural environment;

c) restriction of the movement of vehicles and their inspection;

d) introduction of control over the operation of facilities that ensure the functioning of transport, communications and communications, over the operation of printing houses, computer centers and automated systems, and the use of their work for defense needs.

5. Introduce on the territories of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation not named in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of this Decree, a regime (level of basic readiness), under which the highest officials (executive authorities) of the said constituent entities of the Russian Federation exercise the authority to make decisions on conducting measures to protect the population and territories from natural and man-made emergencies, as well as the authority to implement measures to meet the needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and needs of the population. The highest officials (executive authorities) of these constituent entities of the Russian Federation also implement the following measures:

a) strengthening the protection of public order and ensuring public security, the protection of military, important state and special facilities, facilities that ensure the vital activity of the population, the functioning of transport, communications and communications, energy facilities, as well as facilities that pose an increased danger to human life and health and to the natural environment;

b) the introduction of a special operating regime for facilities that ensure the functioning of transport, communications and communications, energy facilities, as well as facilities that pose an increased danger to human life and health and to the natural environment.

6. Establish that the list of measures to be implemented, the timing, features and procedure for their implementation are determined by the decisions of the highest official of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation independently, taking into account the current situation and emerging risks on the territory of this constituent entity of the Russian Federation.



7. For the highest officials of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, to create operational headquarters for the constituent entities of the Russian Federation to implement the measures provided for by this Decree. The head of the operational headquarters of the subject of the Russian Federation is the highest official of the subject of the Russian Federation. The operational headquarters of a subject of the Russian Federation includes representatives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, heads of the relevant territorial bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Relief, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, the Federal Service of the National Troops guards of the Russian Federation,

8. Decisions of the highest official of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation (operational headquarters), adopted within the framework of his competence in accordance with this Decree, are binding on the executive authorities of the corresponding constituent entity of the Russian Federation, local self-government bodies, territorial bodies of federal executive authorities that carry out activities on the territory of the corresponding subject of the Russian Federation, other bodies, including collegiate, organizations operating in the territory of the corresponding subject of the Russian Federation, citizens registered at the place of residence (place of stay) and (or) located on the territory of the corresponding subject of the Russian Federation.

9. This Decree shall enter into force on the day of its official publication.
Ja sama, mutta toisen tahon puhtaaksikirjoittamana (lyhennelmä):
‼️ Partial martial law. What will change after Putin introduces special regimes in the European regions of Russia and the occupied regions of Ukraine

Vladimir Putin, as expected by the MO , introduced martial law in four occupied regions of Ukraine (DPR, LPR, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions) and special regimes in dozens more regions European part of the country. The channel "We can explain" found out what threatens the decision of the Russian president.

❗️ Ukrainians living in the occupied territories may be forcibly interned (isolated). The law provides for such a rule in relation to citizens of countries with which the Russian Federation has a conflict.

❗️During martial law, the rights and freedoms of citizens, as well as the activities of various organizations, may be limited. Property can be confiscated from people with subsequent payment by the state of its value.

❗️Economic, social and cultural facilities can be evacuated. Residents can be temporarily relocated to safer areas (as is currently happening in Kherson). But by law they are required to provide housing.

❗️ The law provides for a special regime of entry and exit to the territory. This is not necessarily the closure of borders, but freedom of movement may be limited.

❗️Under martial law, the activities of political parties, public associations, religious associations conducting propaganda and agitation are suspended. Rallies and strikes are prohibited.

❗️Ordinary people can be involved in "performing work for the needs of defense, eliminating the consequences of the use of weapons by the enemy, restoring damaged (destroyed) economic facilities, life support systems and military facilities."

❗️Under martial law, the sale of alcoholic beverages is prohibited.

❗️ "Military censorship" is introduced. The authorities will monitor postal items and messages on the Internet, as well as monitor telephone conversations. Increased control over the media.

❗️ Residents of the occupied territories can be forcibly mobilized. But this requires a separate presidential decree.

As follows from Putin's decrees, in the Crimea, Sevastopol, Krasnodar Territory, Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kursk, Rostov regions, regimes close to a state of emergency are being introduced. Residents will be relocated to safe areas and vehicles will be searched.

Similar, but slightly lighter special regimes will be in all regions of the Central and Southern Districts, including Moscow. The heightened level of preparedness implies the introduction of all the same measures, with the exception of the restriction of freedom of movement and the forced eviction of people.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Poikkeustila ilmeisesti oikeuttaa myös ryöstämään siviileiltä kaiken "armeijan käyttöön". Helvetti että sylettää tuo touhu. Ensin vallataan alue, sitten ulistaan että Ukraina ampuu meijän alueita ja samalla ryöstetään ja tuhotaan kaikki mitä voi, ja kirjaimellisesti paskotaan.
Tässähän ei ole mitään uutta, siviilien ryöstäminen ja kaiken tuhoaminen alkoi jo ensimmäisenä päivänä. Nyt vain on kyseessä eri paikka, jota ei heti tuhottu kun pääsivät valtaamaan alueen ilman vastarintaa.
 
Eli käytännössä voivat käskeä ihmisiä orjatyöhön ja varastaa samalla henkilökohtaisen omaisuuden. Vaikea kuvitella, mikä voisikaan mennä pieleen kun venäläiselle viranomaiselle annetaan tuollaiset valtaoikeudet.

Ei tarvitse ihmetellä, miksi ukrainalaisilla on maanpuolustustahtoa. Venäjän valta on yhtä kuin orjuus ja kuolema.
 
Lisää ryssähuhuja Hersonin ehkä hyökkäyksestä. Upotettu twiitti sisältää aiemman huhun 2 pataljoonasta + tankkipataljoona, uudempi että myös 28. prikaati liittynyt hyökkäykseen.

Näiden huhujen arvo on lähellä nollaa, mutta mahdollista kuitenkin. Muita ryssähuhuja: että UA yritti kymmenillä kumiveneillä Dnipron yli ja tuhottiin viimeiseen mieheen (:poop:) ja että UA on tuonut merimiinoja Dnipron tekoaltaaseen ja aikovat räjäyttää padon, siksi urheat ryssät nyt siellä touhuaa jotain (:poop:). Tämän tasoista skebeliä siis ryssähuhut, joten ota sitten selvää yhtään mistään.

 
Zaporitzzjan kaupungin eteläpuolella on väitetysti Ukrainan vastatykistö tehnyt hyvää työtä:



Edelleen, ei kannata villiintyä liikaa, mutta ryssän milbloggerit juttelivat Khersonin sillan iskun jälkeen siitä, miten Ukraina olisi tuonut tälle seudulle lisäjoukkoja, osan ehkä joka Khersonin suunnalta. Rybar kirjoitti paniikilta haiskahtavan arvion siitä, mitä voisivat yrittää.

Sitten myrsky laantui ja tuli taas hiljaista, ei ole kuulunut tältä suunnalta mitään. Ehkä jotain voisi tapahtua, ehkä ei. Andrew Perpetua oli sitä mieltä että Ukrainalla ei riitä tykistö kolmannen väkevän läpimurron tekemiseen ja tukemiseen. Ehkä tarkoitus ei olisi tällä kertaa nopea läpimurto vaan perinteisempi hidas hivuttautuminen? Ehkä voima riittäisi sellaiseen? Tai ehkä mitään ei tule tapahtumaan ja hiljaisuus jatkuu?
 
Ovatkohan ne ryysät oikeasti livistämässä Khersonista joen toiselle puolelle? Ihmeellisiä huhuja liikkuu ympäriinsä. Onhan ryssän asema väärällä puolella jokea ollut tukala jo pitkään, mutta tiedotuslinja on outo ja poikkeava. Kyllähän se ryssä sieltä vielä tämän vuoden puolella, vaikka nyt olisi pelkkiä valeuutisia liikkeellä vetäytymisestä.
Eivät ole. Tässä luodaan tilanne jonka avulla on helppo tuoda vahvistuksia, kun UA ei voi tulittaa vastakoottua ponttoonisiltaa.
 
Teknologiayritykset on monikansallisia, Venäläisiä työskentelee myös telekommunikaatio firmoissa ympäri maailmaa.
Ihan normaalia. NSN,.llä oli muistaakseni suunnilleen jotain myyntikonttoreita Venäjällä.
Nokialla on ollut Venäjällä parituhatta työntekijää. Yhtiön mukaan sen jäljellä olevat toiminnot maassa liittyvät kriittisten verkkojen rajalliseen ylläpitoon sekä ”sopimusten ja inhimillisten velvoitteiden” täyttämiseen.

 
Nokialla on ollut Venäjällä parituhatta työntekijää. Yhtiön mukaan sen jäljellä olevat toiminnot maassa liittyvät kriittisten verkkojen rajalliseen ylläpitoon sekä ”sopimusten ja inhimillisten velvoitteiden” täyttämiseen.

Inhimillisistä syistä, tavarat olisi pitänyt pakata jo helmikuussa.
 
Sotatieteen tohtori Jarno Limnell povaa Twitterissä Ukrainalle suurta voittoa Hersonin alueella etelässä.

Vajaa kuukausi sitten Putin seremoniallisesti kertoi liittävänsä Hersonin Venäjään. Nyt Ukraina valtaamassa Hersonin kaupungin.

Merkittävä voitto tulossa, jopa sodan käännekohta. Herson merkittävin kaupunki, jota Venäjä pitänyt hallussaan, ja symboliarvo tärkeä.
Krim lähestyy.

— Jarno Limnell (@JarnoLim) October 19,2022

Viimeisen vuorokauden aikana miehityshallinto on tehnyt useamman ulostulon liittyen Ukrainan vastahyökkäykseen. Siviilejä on kehotettu poistumaan alueelta ja alueelle pääsy on evätty. Venäjän asettama johtaja Kirill Stremousov hätäili Telegramissa Ukrainan hyökkäävän jo keskiviikkona.

Venäjän asettaman hallinnon on niin ikään kerrottu lähteneen pakoon Dnipro-joen toiselle puolelle.
 
Ei tuon olisi pitänyt tulla yllätyksenä. Jenkeillä oli torjuntaohjelma noita vastaan jo 90-luvulla:




Sinänsä arvelen, että noiden valmistus ei välttämättä edes vaadi mitään ihmeellisiä peiteoperaatioita osien hankkimiseksi. Iranin kaltainen maa pystynee helposti valmistamaan lennokinmoottoreita (sähkö- tai polttomoottori), servoja ja rungon osia. Elektroniikka voi olla ongelma tai sitten ei - satasen älypuhelin on tietokone, jonka päällä ajaa ohjelmia, ja niitä voinee tilata Kiinasta merikontillisen ilman mitään ongelmia. Älypuhelimessa on myös hyödyllisiä komponentteja:

-Kamera (voi hyödyntää suunnistamisessa (verrataan ilmakuviin/karttoihin) ja maaliinhakeutumisessa hyvissä näkyvyysolosuhteissa)
-Satelliittipaikannusvastaanotin (siviililaatuisena altis häirinnälle, mutta sopivissa olosuhteissa voi toimiakin)
-Gyroskooppisensorit (saadaan tieto lennokin asennosta ja voidaan sen perusteella kontrolloida ohjainpintoja halutun lentotilan ylläpitämiseksi)

Suurin kysymysmerkki on mielestäni kyky kehittää toimiva ohjelmisto kuvantunnistusalgoritmeineen, jotta laite kykenisi toimimaan itsenäisesti. Nettiresepteillä rakennettu laite, joka suunnistaa satelliittipaikannuksen varassa, ei ole minkään arvoinen sotakentillä. Paikannussatelliittien omistaja voi heikentää signaalin tarkkuutta tietyllä alueella tai ottava osapuoli yksinkertaisesti häiritsee paikannussignaalia, mille paikannussignaalin siviilivastaanotin on hyvin altis.
Kännykkä voi olla ihan hyvä platform tuollaisen dronen pohjaksi.

Kännykässä on lisäksi kompassi, jolloin kompassisuunnalla voi lennellä jos satelliittipaikannusta häiritään. Tällöin drone saadaan lentämään ainakin suunnilleen oikeaan suuntaan. Jos/kun lentonopeus tiedetään, niin lennetty etäisyys voidaan määrittää ja karkea navigointi on mahdollista pelkän kompassitiedon pohjalta.

Paineanturin kun laittaa mukaan, niin korkeuden säilyttäminen onnistuu ainakin jollakin tarkkuudella.

Matkapuhelinverkon tukiasematietoja on mahdollista hyödyntää navigoinnissa.

Nuohan voivat pyöriä ilmassa ja odotella kunnes riittävän tarkka paikkatieto saadaan määritettyä tavalla tai toisella.

Jos satelliittisignaali on saatavissa edes välillä reitin varrella niin kurssin korjaaminen on mahdollista.

Jos satelliittisignaali on käytettävissä lennon lopussa, niin tarkkuuttakin voidaan saada.

Kameraa noissa ei taida olla kun lentävät yölläkin.

Erinäisiä komponentteja on saatavissa runsaasti ja helposti bulvaanien kautta, koska eivät ole mitään korkean teknologian erikoiskomponentteja. Komponenttien salakuljetus kohdemaahan onnistunee diplomaattirahtina tms. tai ihan vaan piilotettuna rahtilaivaan. Riski jäädä kiinni on varsin olematon.

Lisäys:
Kännykässä on kamera, mitä voi käyttää karkeaan navigoimiseen.

Jos taivas on kirkas, tai drone lentää tarpeeksi korkealla, niin aurinkoa ja tähtiä voi käyttää navigoimisessa.

Esim.
DAYTON, Ohio – Who needs GPS when you can navigate using the stars and your smartphone?

On Tuesday, the Air Force Research Laboratory was assigned U.S. Patent 10,323,939. Invented by Eric Vinande, an electronics engineer at the lab’s Sensors Directorate, the smartphone sextant is officially titled “Navigation Apparatus,” and unlike traditional sextants, doesn’t need to be pointed at the horizon.

Smartphone cameras are wide angle, which means they can’t focus on faint stars, making them unsuitable for sextant aiming. But they do contain a magnetic compass and gyroscope. So, the Air Force invention works by clamping a small telescope to your smartphone which is pointed at the heavens.

“Traditional celestial navigation requires measuring the elevation angle of a celestial object such as a star, planet, sun, moon, and the like or a combination thereof, above the horizon. An accurate time estimate to within a few seconds is required along with a rough estimate of position, and tabulated positions of celestial objects,” according to the Air Force patent.

Koko artikkeli:
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Sakuilta saatu IRIS-T on ilmeisesti saanut jo pudotettua ekat puikot. Tämä on mainittu parissakin eri lähteessä, mutta näissä on myös todisteita mukana.
Edit lisätty väitetysti pudotuksen jäänteet.




Tuo risteilyohjuksen raato on mainittu olleen jossain Tshernihivin lähellä. Assosiaatio IRIS-T:hen voi olla väärä, kuten näissä usein käy.
 
Back
Top