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War Notes from Illia Ponomarenko
Friday, June 16, 2023.
Hello everyone!
I hope you’re all having an excellent Friday.
So — now we can be sure the Ukrainian counteroffensive that we’ve expected for so long has finally begun.
Or, to be precise, the whole thing reached the phase when large military forces started moving following months of political and tactical preparations.
Roughly ten days after the H-hour, we’re seeing Ukrainian moves in the Zaporizhzhia axis, notably near Orikhiv and Velyka Novosilka, between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts.
As of now, Ukrainian forces have advanced by some six kilometers south of Velyka Novosilka and retaken control of at least seven villages in the area.
Also, we’re seeing that Ukrainian forces continue rendering pressure and making incremental gains at Bakhmut flanks — but that’s likely being done separately from the current counteroffensive campaign.
Many of those following the war are confused or even upset over the fact that we’re seeing very specific losses — and not seeing a sweeping, overwhelming Ukrainian rush that smashes Russians and throws them out into the sea.
As much as I’d love to see things happening exactly this way, here’s what we need to say about the first 10 days of the operation realistically:
- This is just the very beginning. So far, we have seen activities at one axis in two locations. And it’s way too early to tell if that’s the main axis or if there will be the main strike somewhere else.
The Ukrainian command has currently involved just three or four out of some 12 brigades prepared specifically for the operation. It holds the bulk of its power far.
And instead of bold moves that the media want, it does its best to carefully probe Russian defenses in search of weak spots to move in with full power. Our resources are obviously very limited and very dependent on Western supplies.
So far, the operation is about a limited and cautious effort. The Ukrainian command can’t afford to fight the war the Russian way and ride hell for leather in frontal meat-grinding assaults.
Soldier of the 68th Jaeger Brigade "Oleksa Dovbush" walks in the newly liberated village on June 10, 2023, in Blahodatne, Ukraine. The village Blahodatne is located on the border between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. (Photo by Serhii Mykhalchuk/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)
It’s obvious that the ultimate goal is to advance down to the Azov Sea and sever Russia’s strategic communications in Ukraine’s south. But again — we can’t be 100% what we’re seeing now is not a secondary strike.
- As always, some things go wrong. Battle plans always look great and neat on paper, but on the ground, things never run as smooth as we wish them to be. Yeah, I’m talking about the sad loss of our Leopard 2s and Bradleys on their combat debut in Ukraine at Orikhiv.
The 47th Brigade’s failed assault on June 8 likely happened due to ineffective engineer reconnaissance, because of which the armored group got stuck in a minefield. Inevitably, there are, and there will be losses, no matter what.
What’s good is that the Orikhiv failure remained an isolated incident, although Russia is doing its very best to relish the loss of Leopards from every possible angle and present it as the complete failure of the whole Ukrainian campaign.
Among other things, it’s fair to say that Russians are offering very strong resistance and that Ukrainian forces seem to have serious problems with counter-battery activities and air cover.
Quite expectedly, insanely thick and wide Russian minefields remain the worst problem.
What is good is that new Western machines are keeping up with high expectations in terms of their crew survivability. We lose vehicles in combat, but we’re also seeing more of our troops surviving as compared to what’s generally expected with Soviet-made vehicles.
As of now, amid unfavorable weather, Ukrainian forces at Velyka Novosilka seem to have taken a short break to regroup and move on.
- This is going to be a long fight. What lies ahead is the hardest — the much-discussed grand grid of field fortifications erected by Russia. Many kilometers of defenses stand between the Ukrainian lines and the Azov Sea.
The current stage of the war is a situation when both sides had a lot of time to get prepared.
When it comes to Ukraine, things took much more time than they should have, obviously due to slow and limited resources coming from the West.
So we’re at the beginning of a long and very painful battle.
It will take months before the Ukrainian military runs out of offensive capabilities generated over the previous months or even down to a new rainy season in the fall.
When it comes to Russia, it’s completely exhausted its offensive capability as a result of its failed winter offensive, for the sake of which it had launched a large mobilization and the mass recruitment of suicidal convicts, with the ruins of Bakmut being the only result.
Any Russian attempts to wage any large offensive operations are out of the question now.
Generally speaking, the Russian military needed yet another mobilization wave as far back as early 2023, but Putin did not resolve to take the decision.
But they have prepared for a long-lasting, strategically defensive posture in this war to try and exhaust Ukraine and the West.
So now, it’s crucial for Ukraine to break through the stalemate — again — and disrupt Russia’s military presence in the south and, therefore, again show that a complete Ukrainian victory is possible.
Editor’s Note: This newsletter reflects the opinions of its author, not the views of the Kyiv Independent.
This is the eight War Notes newsletter, thank you for reading.
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