Ukrainan konflikti/sota


Mielenkiintoista kehitystä täällä Khersonin vasemmalla rannalla. Tuosta kun saataisiin laajennettua sillanpäätä niin että saataisiin useampi silta rakennettua yli joen (onko mahdollista rakentaa noin pitkää siltaa tuohon?), olisi aikalailla "vapaata" maastoa katkoa Krimin kautta tapahtuva huolto ns. takaapäin.

Katso liite: 82053

Tuossa vielä hiukan kuvaa, josta näkee missä päin liikutaan tällä kertaa. Linnoituksia ei ole ainakaan niin paljoa mitä muualla on.
Miksei lainatun viestin twiitit näy? En ymmärrä.

Noh, kuitenkin, kyllä tuolla kasakki bayssä on nyt jotain yritystä:

 
Joo olet väärässä. Tässä on kyse Amerikan vaaleja isommasta asiasta, paljon isommasta.

Mahdoton toki ennustaa tulevaisuutta 100% varmuudella, mutta joko tämä on unohdettu: republikaanit voittivat enemmistä Yhdysvaltain edustajainhuoneen vaaleissa 8.11.2022.

Ennen näitä vaaleja nähtiin myrskypilviä taivaalla ja ukkosti ja salamoi: varo vain, jos republikaanit voittavat, se tietää Ukrainan tuen päättymistä tai vähintäänkin rajua leikkausta!

Vaaleista on nyt 273 päivää aikaa, kenties riittävän pitkä aika jotta voidaan tehdä alustavia johtopäätöksiä?

Loppuiko tuki? Vähenikö tuki? Onko merkkejä kummastakaan?

Minusta toistaiseksi näyttää siltä, että olipa millä tahansa päättävällä portaalla kumpi tahansa puolueista vallassa, Ukrainan tuki jatkuu. Toki, kuten sanottua, mahdoton ennustaa tulevaa 100% varmuudella.
 
Mahdoton toki ennustaa tulevaisuutta 100% varmuudella, mutta joko tämä on unohdettu: republikaanit voittivat enemmistä Yhdysvaltain edustajainhuoneen vaaleissa 8.11.2022.

Ennen näitä vaaleja nähtiin myrskypilviä taivaalla ja ukkosti ja salamoi: varo vain, jos republikaanit voittavat, se tietää Ukrainan tuen päättymistä tai vähintäänkin rajua leikkausta!

Vaaleista on nyt 273 päivää aikaa, kenties riittävän pitkä aika jotta voidaan tehdä alustavia johtopäätöksiä?

Loppuiko tuki? Vähenikö tuki? Onko merkkejä kummastakaan?

Minusta toistaiseksi näyttää siltä, että olipa millä tahansa päättävällä portaalla kumpi tahansa puolueista vallassa, Ukrainan tuki jatkuu. Toki, kuten sanottua, mahdoton ennustaa tulevaa 100% varmuudella.
Republikaanit voittivat odotettua pienemmin lukemin ja senaatissa säilyi demokraattien valta.

Pahimmat magailijat eivät menestyneet kovin hyvin noissa vaaleissa.
 
Kybersota on toki valtaosan ajasta näkymätöntä sotaa, mutta ryssän paljon pelätyt kyvyt ja aseet ovat osoittautuneet melko hampaattomiksi, ainakin Ukrainan osalta. Toisaalta, kuten monesti aikaisemmin on todettu, Ukraina on joutunut opettelemaan ryssän temppuja vuodesta 2014 lähtien eli heillä on keinonsa suojautua ja tarvittaessa palauttaa järjestelmät onnistuneen iskun jälkeen nopeasti.

Tämä on yksi harvoin mainituista "rintamista" jossa Ukrainalla olisi varmasti runsaasti arvokasta kokemusta jaettavana. Toivottavasti meikäläiset ovat hakemassa oppia ja ottamassa parhaita käytäntöjä käyttöön.

BREAKING: The SBU reveals that it foiled a massive Russian cyberattack on Ukraine's Armed Forces

Russia's hacking team used Sandworm as well as military tables to target the Ukrainian Armed Forces

Russia has also targeted Ukraine's energy sector

Russia's hybrid war capabilities were expected to feature in the war but cyber, in particular, has failed to grain traction


 
Saksaa on parjattu ihan aiheesta (myös allekirjottaneen toimesta) mutta tuo Die Weltin artikkeli ei oo ihan kaikilta osin täysin paikkansapitävä. Alla German aid to Ukraine-projektin kirjottama vastine tälle artikkelille ja ei tuo tilanne nyt ihan niin huono ole kun tuo Die Weltin artikkeli antaa ymmärtää. Etenkin jos viimesimmät huhut pitää paikkansa ja sakemannit on oikeesti lähettämässä Tauruksia ukeille ni voin vilpittömästi sanoo että hunnit on korjannu kelkkansa.



Germany’s military aid to Ukraine in the process of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has always been controversial and probably always will be. Too many mistakes were made in the beginning of the war, hesitant deliveries and lacking communication. This allowed a lot of mistrust and ignorance to circulate.

That is the sad truth that cannot be hidden. However, one must also accept and acknowledge that this situation has already changed significantly in 2022. At the latest since the current Minister of Defence, Boris Pistorius, has been in charge at the Ministry of Defence, Germany has developed into a reliable partner with stable communication.

“In terms of volume, German aid is the second largest after the US”
Volodymyr Zelenskyy — May 14th 2023
However, this fact — for whatever reason — does not seem to go down well with everyone. On August 3rd 2023, the German newspaper “Die Welt” published an article on its website about Germany’s alleged failure to deliver weapons in relation to the weapons package announced in May 2023 shortly before the visit of the Ukrainian president.

The accusations are forceful and resonate even with actually intelligent and well-informed politicians. Hardly anything of the package has been delivered so far and, in general, Germany has provided hardly any military assistance to Ukraine in the last two months.

But is this true? At the request of my community, I have taken a closer look at the claims and accusations made in the article.

Is there any truth to the allegations?​

Before I go into the individual allegations in more detail, I would like to make it clear that the article has a number of errors and certainly deliberately fails to mention important facts.

As a result, the article has a very different effect on the uninformed reader than it would actually have had if all parts of military aid had been examined openly and honestly.

The volume of the weapons package​

The first big mistake in the article is already made in the second sentence. The author writes here that the promised package worth 2.4 billion euros has not been delivered to Ukraine.

However, it is not 2.4 billion euros. This is made clear in the joint press statement by Chancellor Scholz and Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, as well as in the MoD press release announcing the May package.

1*_goPufXZhTOeLFjtQL7uCg.jpeg

Press release German MoD
This is how 300 million euros in military aid were simply not mentioned. Now, of course, it can be argued that the 18 wheeled howitzers (RCH 155) were already announced in September 2022 and for this reason the value of the order was deducted.

However, even then the calculation does not add up. ES&T, a journal in the fields of security policy and military, has put the value of the order at 216 million euros — ironically in relation to data from “Die Welt”.

Note: The error regarding the incorrect value of the May package was corrected by the author of the “Die Welt” article on August 6th, 2023.

Olaf Scholz always among the last?​

The article goes on to claim that Chancellor Olaf Scholz was always among the last of Ukraine’s major allies in providing military aid.

Is that true? Absolutely not! There is a wonderful overview by a German Twitter user that covers the chronological sequence of the announcement and delivery of heavy western weapons systems. Of course, everything is backed up with reputable sources so that everything can be verified.

1*X6xFgDQTwl9ImvaV9_3DQw.png

Source: @Wieseli3
This graph shows very clearly that the Federal Republic of Germany has always been very much among the leaders in the various areas of military support. The first dot indicates the date on which the delivery of the weapon system was announced, while the second dot indicates the official delivery date.

So it may seem that Germany has once again crossed the finish line last, but that is not the case.

The overview — What was delivered from the May package?​

As already mentioned at the beginning, the article is actually about the fact that hardly anything has been delivered from the May package so far.

Before we look at the graphic in detail, however, I would like to point out several things that are not mentioned in the article.

  • Announced delivery date
  • Training of the soldiers
  • Origin of the systems (Bundeswehr / industry)
  • Production volume
Later, I will go into the individual points and explain why it would have been so important to shed more light on these very points.

1*ioReiIlfGnzBzuPBROJsWQ.jpeg

Source: Infographic WELT
This graphic was widely shared on social media. As mentioned at the beginning, even actually intelligent and well-informed politicians such as Dr. Norbert Röttgen or Roderich Kiesewetter reacted to this graphic.

However, this graphic is not really correct! The press release clearly shows that many of the items listed here are not to be found in the press release of the May package.

Of course, it is always possible that a few smaller items were not specifically mentioned and included in the press release, but I don’t see any evidence of this at the moment. Of course, I would be happy to correct myself if someone can provide me with evidence.

Also missing in this graphic are some items mentioned in the press release. For example, the 54 Bandvagn 206 are missing, 18 of which have already been delivered. Also missing are the 66 BATT UMG.

Accordingly, I must assume that the following items were included in the graphic, although they were not part of the May package:

  • 7 Air surveillance radars TRML-4D
  • 3 Drone sensors
  • 100 MG5 machine guns
  • 100 GMW automatic grenade launcher
  • 5 Bridges for bridge-laying tank BIBER
  • 12 Oshkosh heavy-duty tractor units
  • 30 Tankers
  • 13 Ambulances
  • 11,000 Group meals, in rations
I deliberately did not include the Gepard SPAAG because Spiegel had already written in an article shortly before publication that 15 of them were part of the May package. But even if we add the 15, there are still 3 too many listed in the graphic.

An error has also slipped in regarding the Leopard 1A5s. Only 30 Leopard 1A5s are part of the May package. Not 110 as indicated. Let us now look at the previously mentioned points in detail.

Announced delivery date​

In my opinion, the most important point would have made the whole article irrelevant and for this reason, it was probably not mentioned.

The only reference to an alleged delivery date mentioned by the author in the article is a quote on the website of the German MoD.

“The implementation of these measures adopted by the federal government has been initiated”
1*lAcPqh0P5rklCz0ZbfKS0Q.jpeg

Source: bmvg.de
This quote really exists and is also found in the press release. But is there any indication about an alleged delivery date? No! So I really wonder why an article about allegedly missing deliveries is then written based on this quote.

Because one thing must not be forgotten. Many listed items from the May package could not be delivered until August 2023. For example, the wheeled howitzers are not expected in Ukraine until the beginning of 2024, which is because they are so modern that not a single country currently has them in service. Ukraine will be the first user.

The 4 IRIS-T SLM air defence systems and the 30 Leopard 1A5 main battle tanks can only be delivered in 2024 and, in the case of the Leopard 1A5, have also only been announced for 2024. If one had only thought about it for a moment, one would also know why the IRIS-T SLM air defence systems can only be delivered in 2024. But more on this later.

Training of the soldiers​

Another important point that should have been mentioned is the training of the soldiers. It is not enough to produce the systems or to make them ready for combat again and then deliver them. You also have to train the Ukrainian soldiers on the systems.

Depending on the weapon system and the complexity of the training, this takes several weeks, sometimes even a month, until the soldiers have completed the training.

Then one must also not forget that the training of the soldiers is already underway as quickly as possible and has been reduced to a necessary minimum.

The German government can easily deliver the systems to Ukraine a month earlier. It’s just a shame that no one will be able to operate them then.

Origin of the systems (Bundeswehr / industry)​

Let’s move on to the origin of the systems. It is always faster to deliver from Bundeswehr stocks — no question about that. However, this is not possible for various reasons.

On the one hand, the Bundeswehr hardly has enough equipment and ammunition even without the arms deliveries to Ukraine, and on the other hand, it is in fact impossible to deliver a large part of the weapons systems from the Bundeswehr’s stocks because they don't use them in the first place.

The Bundeswehr have neither wheeled howitzers nor the IRIS-T SLM air defence systems, nor the SLS launchers. The SLS launchers have been procured from Sweden.

The Leopard 1A5s were decommissioned 20 years ago. The Bundeswehr does not have the reconnaissance drones either and 66 of the 100 armoured combat vehicles are BATT UMGs, which the Bundeswehr also does not have in its inventory.

1*HMTepZ3Tu6Axh8tDex2Ihw.jpeg

Source: armoredcars.com
So you have to rely on a delivery from the industry. This takes longer and that brings us to the next point.

Production volume​

The production volume is an important factor that determines how often ordered systems can be delivered to the customer, and the industry is making fantastic progress here. I will give two examples.

HENSOLDT now produces one TRML-4D air surveillance radar per month. Next year, they expect to produce 1.5 radars per month. This is a very good achievement for a highly complex radar system.

Rheinmetall has also ramped up its production capacities enormously. In November 2022, for example, the company declared its own production volume of artillery shells at around 80,000. In the meantime, 600,000 are planned for 2024.

But the industry is also limited. Let’s take a closer look at two examples. The IRIS-T SLM air defence system and the Leopard 1A5 main battle tanks.

IRIS-T SLM — It is well known that the industry manages to produce about four systems per year. Two were already in the queue when four more air defence systems were announced in May.

Now someone tell me how anyone can expect all the announced IRIS-T SLM systems to be delivered within three months. These are highly complex weapon systems. There are no shortcuts that can be taken.

However, to be fair, I must also mention that the delivery of at least one system is overdue. Just not of a system that was announced in the May package.

Of course, this can have various causes. I assume that there is a problem with the provision of a sub-component of the system. For example, if the tactical operations center of the system is missing, then the rest of the system is of no use to you.

A good example of this is the Leopard 1A5. The Danish Ministry of Defence announced that a number of technical problems had occurred. As an example, a delay in the delivery of the refurbished turrets of the main battle tank was mentioned.

As a result, the entire project, i.e. repair, training and delivery, has been delayed for a longer period of time. But in my opinion, you can’t point to a single politician like Olaf Scholz and hold him responsible for this.

Leopard 1A5 — So let’s move on to the Leopard 1A5 main battle tank. It is well known that Germany, together with Denmark and the Netherlands, wants to hand over 80 Leopard 1A5 main battle tanks to Ukraine by the end of the year. These were the Leopard 1A5s originally announced.

The 30 additional Leopard 1A5s announced in the May package should then (logically) follow in 2024. This chronological sequence was last confirmed again in June 2023 during the visit of NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg and Minister of Defence Pistorius to FFG in Flensburg. A total of about 10 Leopard 1A5 main battle tanks should be delivered to Ukraine per month.

1*wkCB8q3O8DWn7v70osZ-uA.jpeg

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius at FFG

Conclusion of the graphic​

Let’s come to a conclusion of the graphic. In my opinion, the graphic should be redone because it is not meaningful.

It lists weapon systems that are not part of the May package, as well as wrong numbers of weapon systems that are part of the May package. Also missing from the entire article is important context and, in addition, two types of armoured combat vehicles that are actually part of the May package are also missing.

Arms deliveries in the last two months​

In the article, the author goes on to write that the progress of arms deliveries has been “reconstructed” and that, according to this, hardly anything has been delivered in the past two months.

We have already noticed that the context is completely missing and it is only logical that hardly anything has been delivered from the May package.

For this reason, I would like to clarify something. Just because hardly anything was delivered from the May package does not mean that hardly anything was delivered in general!

Every month I publish a list of all deliveries to Ukraine on Twitter. This is what the German government delivered to Ukraine in June and July.

  • 12 Gepard SPAAGs + 17,042 rounds of ammunition
  • 47 Reconnaissance drones (20 RQ-35 Heidrun + 27 Vector)
  • 10 Leopard 1A5 + ammunition + spare parts
  • 18 Bandvagn 206
  • 2 Bridge-laying tanks Biber including bridges + 5 extra bridges
  • 2 WiSENT 1 MC
  • 1 Pionierpanzer 2A1 Dachs AEV
  • 1 Air surveillance radar TRML-4D
  • 100,000 First Aid Kits
  • 48 Mercedes-Benz Zetros
  • 13 HX81 including trailers
  • 8 Mercedes-Benz Unimog ambulances
  • 38 Border protection vehicles
  • 24,192 rounds of 40mm ammunition for automatic grenade launchers
  • 14,000 rounds 155mm artillery shells (smoke)
  • 1,000 rounds 155mm artillery shells
And much more! A detailed overview for June can be found here and for July here. Also, no pledged arms deliveries are included in my list above. All pledged from June and July would amount to over 700 million euros in military aid to Ukraine! These can be found in the tweets I have linked for June and July.

So no one can really say that Germany is not delivering weapons to Ukraine. To be fair, that’s not exactly what the Welt article says either, but that’s how many people interpreted it.

Interestingly, in June I summarised what was publicly announced by the German government or industry for July. Result: Public promises have not only been kept 100%, even more has been delivered!

1*giQxxco9UbVmHub2HU0Mqg.jpeg

Source: @deaidua

850 rounds of artillery ammunition?​

I would like to go into more detail about the artillery ammunition. Even though the author of the article, when he says that only 850 rounds of artillery ammunition were delivered, is of course referring to the May package, one thing is very interesting.

In the last two months alone, Germany has provided Ukraine with 14,000 rounds of 155mm artillery shells (smoke). Smoke artillery shells (DM125) also count as artillery ammunition.

What is particularly interesting about this is that 5,000 of these were announced in the Vilnius package in July. These have already been delivered in their entirety.

1*3PvTX072DQWwMypC_BMGzw.png

DM125 artillery shells (smoke) arrive in Ukraine in July.

Withdrawn delivery commitments​

Furthermore, the author refers to allegedly withdrawn delivery commitments. According to the author, 5032 Man-Portable Anti-Tank Weapons, which were to be delivered, have disappeared.

That was absolutely correct. But is it absolutely necessary to point that out? After all, it is (unfortunately) not uncommon for strange changes to be made. Sometimes the number of systems delivered or pledged are not matching in the different language versions of the list etc.!

This, too, is now made public week by week by me. So you can mention it, but I wouldn’t necessarily call it a withdrawn delivery, but simply assume that it was a mistake.

1*axntJX8b5DmPz4OA1vAKPg.jpeg

Source: @deaidua
For who could have guessed, it was actually a mistake! Thus, due to the last update on Friday evening, one day after the article was published, 18,000 Man-Portable Anti-Tank Weapons suddenly appeared in the list.

To be fair, of course, I must point out that the article has not been edited since 03.08 and therefore could not yet include this change.

Conclusion​

How do you write a conclusion to an article like that? Personally, I am having a hard time finding the right words right now. It is full of errors, taken out of context and important key information is not mentioned.

This results in the reader being given a completely false picture of the German military support to Ukraine.
 
Lisää huhuja "kasakkaleiristä".

----
Cossack Camp (Kherson) UPD
This morning Russians started to report of Ukrainian breakthrough in their defense lines on the left bank.

This afternoon, I am happy to confirm that fights are ongoing in Cossack Camp and that several Russian units are missing mysteriously

Ukraine is expanding its foothold

Cossack Camp is not an uninteresting place half way between Oleshky and Nova Kakhovka

 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Saksalaisen Bildin mukaan Ukraina olisi modannut "tusinan" verran Su-24 hävittäjiä Scalp ja Storm Shadow -risteilyohjusten laukaisuun sopiviksi.

Lisäksi kirjoittavat lentokentän / lentokenttien suojana olisi Patriot ja IRIS-T -ilmatorjuntajärjestelmiä. Edellisen suuremman ohjushyökkäyksen aikana ryssä ampui ainakin 3 kpl Kinzhal-ristelyohjuksia ja Ukraina kieltäytyi kommentoimasta, torjuttiinko niistä yhtäkään. Tämän tuoreen tiedon valossa on mahdollista, että torjuntoja olisi tehty (Patriot kykenee torjumaan Kinzhalin - muista ilmatorjuntajärjestelmistä ei ole tietoa, ehkä kykenevät, ehkä eivät).

"Ukrainian Air Forces converted a "dozen" of Soviet Su-24s to launch Scalp and Storm Shadow", - Bild

Russian leadership considers Western high-precision weapons transferred to Ukraine a "nightmare", so the Russians have been trying to attack Ukrainian air bases for several weeks

But, according to the publication, Ukraine protects its fighters both with the help of the Patriot and IRIS-T air defense systems, and by transferring them from airfield to airfield.


 
Puolan toimittamia KTO Rosomak vaunuja Ukrainassa (ei tietoa paikasta tai videon ajankohdasta). Rosomak on puolalainen lisenssillä valmistettu versio kotimaisesta AMV 8x8 vaunusta. Rosomakit hakivat sotakokemusta Afganistanista ja nyt ovat Ukrainassa, arvokasta tietoa Suomenkin näkökulmasta (hyvää näkyvyyttä myös kotimaiselle sotateollisuudelle, vaikkakin sitten "kiertotien kautta").

Polish-delivered KTO Rosomak APCs/IFVs in service of the Ukrainian military near the frontline somewhere in Ukraine.

In April 2023, it was announced that Kyiv ordered approx. 200 such vehicles from Warsaw. The order was supposed to be financed from US and EU funds.


 
Se vain saattaa alkaa suhina kuulumaan töppösissä kun tuolla lähdetään ajamaan ryssää liikkeelle.

Vaikea sanoa miltä tuo vesistö näyttää näin padon räjäytyksen jälkeen, mutta en näe miten tuonne tuotaisiin isompia joukkoja puhumattakaan kalustosta. Lauttamatkaakin olisi melkein 8 kilometriä lyhyintä järkevää reittiä pitkin. Kyllä taitaa tuo sillanpää olla liian vaikeasti huollettava ja on se vaan tuo Antonovskyn silta ainoa mahdollinen paikka L'voven ja Korsunkan välin ohella, jossa joen ylitys vain 300 metriä, missä molemmilla puolilla oletettavasti kantavaa maata.

Ellei tuolta sitten lähdetä etenemään jalkaväen voimin tuota koko matkan mittaista rantakylää ja sen jokea pitkin Korsunkaan ja suojata sieltä kaluston ylitystä. Mutta tuossa maratoonissa kestäisi kyllä niin kauan että jopa venäjäkin jo haistaisi mitä on tekeillä.

nimetön.png
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Rantautuminen ja jalansijaa Khersonista etelään joen yli + Chongarin seudun sillat rikki = Herkkua nojatuolikenraaleille?

Krim vähän kuin motitettuna, eikä tarvitse väkisin kiireellä tunkea miinojen ja linjojen läpi nykyisillä aktiivisilla alueilla.

En ymmärrä sodankäynnistä juuri mitään, mutta voin aina antaa vinkkejä 😎
 
Republikaanit voittivat odotettua pienemmin lukemin ja senaatissa säilyi demokraattien valta.

Pahimmat magailijat eivät menestyneet kovin hyvin noissa vaaleissa.
Näin hän se on. Periaatteessa jenkeissä on jo kolme puoluetta, demokraatit, republikaanit ja republikaanien sisällä oleva maga porukka. Eli käytännössä republikaanit ovat jo hajonneet kahteen leiriin. Se vaan tuossa systeemissä on perseestä, että pressalla on suhteessa liikaa valtaa, joten jos pienin noista kolmesta saa oman miehen presidentiksi, niin sillä porukalla on suhteessa vähän liikaa valtaa.
 
Minun on vähän vaikeaa kuunnella valituksia ulkoeurooppalaisten maiden mahdollisesta tuesta. On muitakin syitä Euroopalla vihdoinkin lisätä aseistusta kuin nyt tämä sota, esim Naton kasassa pitäminen. Nyt pitää vain lisätä painetta kansanedustajiin ja muihin päättäjiin ja asian ottamista esille, vaikka edes marttakerhon kokouksissa niinkuin minä. Eurooppalaisiin voimme vaikuttaa itse.
Joka centti ja jeni yms mitä ulkopuolelta saadaan ansaitsee kiitokset, ei vinkumista.
Osa ukrainalaisista ymmärtää että paras endgame on jos ryssiä saadaan vedettyä hirmuiset määrät tapetuiksi Ukrainaan , tässä kaikenlainen lisäapu säästää omia kansalaisia. Tämä taas antaa paremman toivon tulevaisuudesta joka taas auttaa ukrainalaisia kestämään tätä helvettiä. Ja antaa osalle sodan uhreista edes jonkinlaisen koston kaikesta paskasta.
 
Jos Dnipron vasemman rannan sillanpääasemia yritetään laajentaa, tulisi yli saada tykistöä ja riittävästi ammuksia. Stetson-Harrison metodilla arvioiden sanoisin että ei onnistu ilman jäykkärakenteista siltaa, ponttoonisillan, useammankaan kapasiteetti ei luultavasti riitä.

Voisikohan Olenskyn sillan korjata elementeillä ja Jeesusteipillä, Vaihtoehtona Kahovkaan patosillan raato.
 
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