Camelot to lose licence to run UK national lottery after 28 years
Gambling Commission names rival Allwyn as its preferred applicant to take over licence
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sanktiot
Lisäksi Puolan puolella on voinut ollakin hävittäjiä taivaalla, valmiina ampumaan ne ohjukset alas sillä sekunnilla jos lipsahtavat rajan yli. Ovat vielä voineet saapua täydellä jälkipoltolla, lieskat näkyvät pilvettömässä yössä korkealta todella kauas.
Vähän analyysiä nykytilanteesta:
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Thread by @WarintheFuture on Thread Reader App
@WarintheFuture: Day 19 of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. Today I examine the implications of Russian personnel commitments and losses, and what this now means for their campaign. 1/25 (Image - @IAPonomarenko) 2/...…
threadreaderapp.com
Day 19 of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. Today I examine the implications of Russian personnel commitments and losses, and what this now means for their campaign. 1/25
2/25 As always, a shout out to those reporting on the Russian invasion. This includes @KofmanMichael @maxseddon @IAPonomarenko @RALee85 @shashj @DanLamothe @ikhurshudyan @IanPannell @ChristopherJM @KyivPost among others. Please follow them.
3/25 Almost a week ago, I explored the Russian campaign, and how it had already absorbed 100% of allocated forces. It is worth revisiting this issue, as we have seen the Russian forces adapt to this reality over the past week.
4/25 Russia committed around 55% of their total regular ground forces to their invasion of Ukraine. It was tactical risk. While there are forces still in Russia for reinforcements, they are either on other missions, in training, or of a lower quality (esp their reserves).
5/25 It is also a strategic risk. Russia has deployed a large proportion of its ground combat power on a single mission that it hoped would be over quickly. This was not a calculated risk by the Russians; it was a gamble. There is a big difference between the two in military ops.
6/25 Plan A was the ‘fast, cheap and easy’ campaign plan. Use light and airborne forces to seize Kyiv and other key points, capture government leaders and force a political accommodation from Ukraine. Within 48 hours, combat losses indicated to Russian commanders this had failed.
7/25 Therefore they needed a Plan B without a massive additional injection of forces. If the Russians had been clever as many thought, they would have wargamed worst case scenarios during the build-up phase of this invasion.
8/25 They clearly did not wargame – or not rigorously enough if they did. But then again, these are the same folks who have talked up concepts like ‘strategies of limited action’.
9/25 So, the Russian campaign Plan B after day 2 of the war has been ‘creeping, multi-axis attrition’. It features lots more firepower, as well as destruction of smaller cities to set an example for Kyiv. Plan B also appeared to hope the Russian Air Force eventually turns up.
10/25 The latest Pentagon background brief notes Russian forces are now at about 90% strength of the original forces that invaded the country. This is optimistic. Even in most benign circumstances, losses to minor medical conditions, psych issues, etc eats away at forces.
11/25 Plan B has not worked out either. They have slowly gained ground, but at massive cost in personnel & equipment. At the same time, rear area security has suffered. This is obviously a trade off by the Russians so they can push forward as much combat power as possible.
12/25 But rear area security is a significant mission, and normally absorbs thousands of troops (infantry, air defence, cavalry, engineers, etc). Because the Russians have incompetently executed this mission, there have been constant ambushes against logistics convoys.
13/25 These ambushes on logistics convoys are another source of attrition in personnel, supplies and equipment to add to combat losses, and (if it is to be believed) combat refusals and desertions from Russian troops.
14/25 As open source, as well as UK and US military briefs, note, the Russian advances in the north, east and south are grinding to a standstill. They have been out fought by the Ukrainians and have not been able to logistically sustain advances on multiple fronts.
15/25 Summing up, Russia has not achieved its key military objectives in the north, east of south. It is conducting concurrent offensives in different, disconnected parts of Ukraine. It has committed all the military forces it had for Ukraine on these missions.
16/25 The Russian campaign, if it has not already, is about to culminate. US doctrine defines this as (for offense) “the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause.”
17/25 So, the Russian high command has had to go back to drawing board (again) with their campaign design. As I noted in an earlier thread, it is through campaign design that commanders and their staffs’ sequence and orchestrate tactical goals and actions.
18/25 Now we see the beginnings of Russia’s ‘Plan C’ campaign in Ukraine. It is an even more ad hoc & brutal plan that their two previous attempts. This demonstrates Putin's frustration, the desperation of Russian military leaders & weakness in the Russian military position.
19/25 Plan C might be described as: hold current gains, long range firepower on cities, foreign fighters as cannon fodder, destroy as much infrastructure and manufacturing capacity as possible, expand the war to the west to deter foreign volunteers & aid providers.
20/25 This will permit the Russians to economise in personnel, trickle in replacements (and foreign mercenaries), while expending large amounts of cheap artillery and rockets in the hope they can terrorise Ukrainian civilians to force a political accommodation.
21/25 Two final issues. First, the number of personnel committed demonstrates that the Russians miscalculated & under resourced the war. Best case planning rarely works. Russia is also now probably suffering from the ‘sunk cost’ fallacy over its Ukraine operations.
22/25 As we have seen in other wars however, countries adapt to wartime crises & survive longer than logic dictates. Under Putin’s leadership, the Russian’s are likely to do this. And the Ukrainians will keep fighting conventionally or in an insurgency. It will be a long war.
23/25 This in turn, leads to the second issue. There may be a requirement for a military intervention if the west doesn’t want a forever war on the doorstep of Europe. The US and NATO may have to start making some hard military choices that they have been delaying.
24/25 Provision of lethal aid is low cost in money and personnel. But to end this war, something more may be needed. Estimates (not fear) of Russian escalation should inform decisions, but not defer them.
America’s Hesitation Is Heartbreaking
As the leader of NATO and of the free world, the United States needs to think much bigger than it has thus far.
www.theatlantic.com
25/25 Russian operations have been compromised by the size of their forces committed, and force attrition. This now has strategic consequences as their campaign culminates, and adapts to be firepower-centric, resulting in mass destruction and deaths of Ukrainian civilians. End.
2/25 As always, a shout out to those reporting on the Russian invasion. This includes @KofmanMichael @maxseddon @IAPonomarenko @RALee85 @shashj @DanLamothe @ikhurshudyan @IanPannell @ChristopherJM @KyivPost among others. Please follow them.
3/25 Almost a week ago, I explored the Russian campaign, and how it had already absorbed 100% of allocated forces. It is worth revisiting this issue, as we have seen the Russian forces adapt to this reality over the past week.
4/25 Russia committed around 55% of their total regular ground forces to their invasion of Ukraine. It was tactical risk. While there are forces still in Russia for reinforcements, they are either on other missions, in training, or of a lower quality (esp their reserves).
5/25 It is also a strategic risk. Russia has deployed a large proportion of its ground combat power on a single mission that it hoped would be over quickly. This was not a calculated risk by the Russians; it was a gamble. There is a big difference between the two in military ops.
6/25 Plan A was the ‘fast, cheap and easy’ campaign plan. Use light and airborne forces to seize Kyiv and other key points, capture government leaders and force a political accommodation from Ukraine. Within 48 hours, combat losses indicated to Russian commanders this had failed.
7/25 Therefore they needed a Plan B without a massive additional injection of forces. If the Russians had been clever as many thought, they would have wargamed worst case scenarios during the build-up phase of this invasion.
8/25 They clearly did not wargame – or not rigorously enough if they did. But then again, these are the same folks who have talked up concepts like ‘strategies of limited action’.
9/25 So, the Russian campaign Plan B after day 2 of the war has been ‘creeping, multi-axis attrition’. It features lots more firepower, as well as destruction of smaller cities to set an example for Kyiv. Plan B also appeared to hope the Russian Air Force eventually turns up.
10/25 The latest Pentagon background brief notes Russian forces are now at about 90% strength of the original forces that invaded the country. This is optimistic. Even in most benign circumstances, losses to minor medical conditions, psych issues, etc eats away at forces.
11/25 Plan B has not worked out either. They have slowly gained ground, but at massive cost in personnel & equipment. At the same time, rear area security has suffered. This is obviously a trade off by the Russians so they can push forward as much combat power as possible.
12/25 But rear area security is a significant mission, and normally absorbs thousands of troops (infantry, air defence, cavalry, engineers, etc). Because the Russians have incompetently executed this mission, there have been constant ambushes against logistics convoys.
13/25 These ambushes on logistics convoys are another source of attrition in personnel, supplies and equipment to add to combat losses, and (if it is to be believed) combat refusals and desertions from Russian troops.
14/25 As open source, as well as UK and US military briefs, note, the Russian advances in the north, east and south are grinding to a standstill. They have been out fought by the Ukrainians and have not been able to logistically sustain advances on multiple fronts.
15/25 Summing up, Russia has not achieved its key military objectives in the north, east of south. It is conducting concurrent offensives in different, disconnected parts of Ukraine. It has committed all the military forces it had for Ukraine on these missions.
16/25 The Russian campaign, if it has not already, is about to culminate. US doctrine defines this as (for offense) “the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause.”
17/25 So, the Russian high command has had to go back to drawing board (again) with their campaign design. As I noted in an earlier thread, it is through campaign design that commanders and their staffs’ sequence and orchestrate tactical goals and actions.
18/25 Now we see the beginnings of Russia’s ‘Plan C’ campaign in Ukraine. It is an even more ad hoc & brutal plan that their two previous attempts. This demonstrates Putin's frustration, the desperation of Russian military leaders & weakness in the Russian military position.
19/25 Plan C might be described as: hold current gains, long range firepower on cities, foreign fighters as cannon fodder, destroy as much infrastructure and manufacturing capacity as possible, expand the war to the west to deter foreign volunteers & aid providers.
20/25 This will permit the Russians to economise in personnel, trickle in replacements (and foreign mercenaries), while expending large amounts of cheap artillery and rockets in the hope they can terrorise Ukrainian civilians to force a political accommodation.
21/25 Two final issues. First, the number of personnel committed demonstrates that the Russians miscalculated & under resourced the war. Best case planning rarely works. Russia is also now probably suffering from the ‘sunk cost’ fallacy over its Ukraine operations.
22/25 As we have seen in other wars however, countries adapt to wartime crises & survive longer than logic dictates. Under Putin’s leadership, the Russian’s are likely to do this. And the Ukrainians will keep fighting conventionally or in an insurgency. It will be a long war.
23/25 This in turn, leads to the second issue. There may be a requirement for a military intervention if the west doesn’t want a forever war on the doorstep of Europe. The US and NATO may have to start making some hard military choices that they have been delaying.
24/25 Provision of lethal aid is low cost in money and personnel. But to end this war, something more may be needed. Estimates (not fear) of Russian escalation should inform decisions, but not defer them.
America’s Hesitation Is Heartbreaking
As the leader of NATO and of the free world, the United States needs to think much bigger than it has thus far.
America’s Hesitation Is Heartbreaking
As the leader of NATO and of the free world, the United States needs to think much bigger than it has thus far.
25/25 Russian operations have been compromised by the size of their forces committed, and force attrition. This now has strategic consequences as their campaign culminates, and adapts to be firepower-centric, resulting in mass destruction and deaths of Ukrainian civilians. End.
Sehän tässä lienee ideana; lausunnot on annettu julkisuuteen juuri sen takia, että markkinat reagoisivat niihin ja näin saadaan varoitettua Kiinaa tekemästä mitään.
China has already decided to send economic aid to Russia in Ukraine conflict, US officials fear
Jake Sullivan’s Rome meeting with Chinese counterpart left US officials pessimistic about steering Beijing away from backing Moscowwww.theguardian.com
Mikään ei sano että kiinalaiset ovat tehneet sopimuksen. Asiasta on olemassa vain spekulaatiota. Jopa jenkkien edustaja tuossa vihjaa että he pitivät 7 tunnin neuvottelut asiasta, ilman ratkaisevaa lopputulosta. Markkinat kuitenkin reakoi kuin se olisi ollut fakta.
teknohippi
Kenraali
https://www.railway-technology.com/uncategorised/newssiemens-jv-supply-675-locomotives-russian-railways/
https://press.siemens.com/global/en/feature/velaro-rus-high-speed-trains-russian-railways
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...lway-cars-in-russia-to-aid-modernization-plan
Siemensin rautatieosaamiseen näyttää pohjautuvan nykyään. Koskee niin vetureita, vaunuja kuin rautatienohjausjärjestelmiä. Yllä siis kolme ekaa googlen osumaan aiheesta, noita näyttää riittävän enemmän kuin jaksaa nyt kahlata. Valmistus varmaan jollain pajalla Venäjällä edelleen mutta tekniikka tulee Siemenssiltä. Voi olla varaosien saanti hapokasta juuri nyt.
Tämä Azovin rykmentin suorittama isku Mariupolissa ei näyttänyt kummoiselta pari päivää sitten julkaistussa dronevideossa, mutta tarkempi kuva paljastaa, että kehveli koitti 13 panssaroidulle ajoneuvolle:
..että mitäs kaikkea tuolla onkaan romurautana: Tigriä, Kamaz Typhoonia..
EDIT: 14, rakennuksen toisella sivulla on vielä yksi tuhottu panssaroitu ajoneuvo, ehkä toinenkin:
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FN4TlRtXwAEpkBu?format=jpg&name=large
..että mitäs kaikkea tuolla onkaan romurautana: Tigriä, Kamaz Typhoonia..
EDIT: 14, rakennuksen toisella sivulla on vielä yksi tuhottu panssaroitu ajoneuvo, ehkä toinenkin:
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FN4TlRtXwAEpkBu?format=jpg&name=large
Viimeksi muokattu:
lsoviha
Majuri
Venäjän hyökkäys runnoi puolueiden Nato-perustelut – keskustaa jarruttanut Kekkosen perintö, vasemmistoa Yhdysvaltojen militarismi
Tutkijoiden mukaan kysymys Natosta on suurista puolueista vaikein SDP:lle ja keskustalle. Perussuomalaisille EU on suurempi mörkö kuin Nato, jonka jäsenyyttä kokoomus taas on kannattanut jo vuosia.
yle.fi
Yleltä hyvä artikkeli eri puoluiden suhtautumisesta Natoon
Natokannatus eri ikäryhmissä, tuloluokissa, asuinpaikoissa ja puolueissa Puolustusministeriön 2021 joulukuussa julkaiseman tutkimuksen mukaan. Tässä KOK, PS ja VIHR näyttävät olevan puolesta. Vastaavasti alhaisin kannatus SDP, jopa alle VAS
koko tutkimus, kuva sivulta 43 https://www.defmin.fi/files/5273/Su...anpuolustuksesta_ja_turvallisuudesta_2021.pdf
Leaderwolf
Respected Leader
https://www.iltalehti.fi/ulkomaat/a/369dcddb-3f99-4df9-ba59-573574f6127d
Onko tästä hyökkäyksestä ja sen torjumisesta Ukrainan helikoptereilla lisää tietoa?
Onko tästä hyökkäyksestä ja sen torjumisesta Ukrainan helikoptereilla lisää tietoa?
En ole tutkinut mutta onko niiden tietoturva parantunut vai onko se vielä sama kuin stuxnetin aikana?
Nuo linkeissä esitellyt uudet nopeat matkustajajunat (moottorijunat) ovat eri asia kuin veturikalusto. Veturikalusto on lähes kokonaan perusvenäläistä jos lukumääriä katsotaan. Tavalliset matkustajajunat ja varsinkaan tavarajunat eivät kovin herkästi lakkaa kulkemasta pakotteista huolimatta.
tviiru
Kapteeni
Kiinan ulkomaan ministeri unohtaa mainita, että Venäjän hyökkäys Ukrainaan on laiton, mutta ei pidä laittomista sanktioista. Diktatuurit ovat niin herttaisen ristiriidassa itsensä kanssa, niin tekojen ja puheiden suhteen.
Siellähän nyt aukeaa uraputkea kunnolla. Toivottavasti seuraajat ovat yhtä hyvin omaksuneet edeltäjän tavat...
OXPAHA
Eversti
Turvallisuuskoneistoon rekrytoidaan poliittisen luotettavuuden ja toissijaisesti lihasvoiman perusteella. Melkein kaikissa vallankumouksissa vastakkain on ollut kansa ja poliisi. Armeija ratkaisee kun se valitsee puolensa. Voi ottaa vallan jopa itse. Ryssissä tilanne on mikä on koska Jeltsinin tankin päälle nousemisen jälkeen valta luisui turvallisuuskoneistolle. Putinin oma kaarti on uskollinen samalla tavalla kuin Neuvostoliitossa. Omat edut ja henki kyseessä, ei siinä omoni paljon pysähdy pohtimaan.
Oikeastaan paskavaltion tunnistaa juuri siitä miten suuri sisäisen turvallisuuden koneisto on. Stasi, Securitate, KGB, Kempeitai, Sicherheitsdienst, Tonton macoute, Vallankumouskaarti, Tasavaltalaiskaarti... USA:nkin todellisen vapauden voi mitata sillä kuinka vahva ja kaikkivoipa "fed" on.
Se lattiatason santarmi ei sitten juuri voi kääntyä koneistoa vastaan. Jopa Kanadassa ja Australiassa poliisi vain tottelee, ja kansalainen ihmettelee miksi se nyt pamputti.
Suomi taas ihan omassa sarjassaan. Onneksi.
Aikaisempien viestien perusteella oli pidätettynä jossain ja nyt kotiarestissa. Asianajajan mukaan 5-10 vuoden vankeustuomio odottaa. Käyttäisikö VPN:ää.
Venäjän hyökkäys runnoi puolueiden Nato-perustelut – keskustaa jarruttanut Kekkosen perintö, vasemmistoa Yhdysvaltojen militarismi
Tutkijoiden mukaan kysymys Natosta on suurista puolueista vaikein SDP:lle ja keskustalle. Perussuomalaisille EU on suurempi mörkö kuin Nato, jonka jäsenyyttä kokoomus taas on kannattanut jo vuosia.
Yleltä hyvä artikkeli eri puoluiden suhtautumisesta Natoon
Natokannatus eri ikäryhmissä, tuloluokissa, asuinpaikoissa ja puolueissa Puolustusministeriön 2021 joulukuussa julkaiseman tutkimuksen mukaan. Tässä KOK, PS ja VIHR näyttävät olevan puolesta. Vastaavasti alhaisin kannatus SDP, jopa alle VAS
Saatanan tunarit, kysyisivät Kekkoselta! Vaikeneminen on myöntyväisyyden merkki.
Taitaa olla feikki. Twitterin kommenteissakin sitä epäillään ja kuva on suoraan samalta videolta.
Todennäköinen tuomio on joutuminen Ukrainaan rintamalle, kadyroviittien kenttäbordelliksi.
Leaderwolf
Respected Leader
Mahtaako kadyroviitit olla hengissä kun kerkiäisi Ukrainaan. Sitä mukaa allahin seuraajia on pistetty pakettiin Ukrainalaisten toimesta tuolla.