Tuo kasa tuntuu olevan vähän niin kuin Käärmesaari tai Summan "Miljoonalinnake" talvisodassa: sitä kulloinkin miehittävät joukot ovat kuin tarjottimella kaikelle mahdolliselle tulelle, jos rintama jää tarpeeksi lähelle.
Tuo kasa tuntuu olevan vähän niin kuin Käärmesaari tai Summan "Miljoonalinnake" talvisodassa: sitä kulloinkin miehittävät joukot ovat kuin tarjottimella kaikelle mahdolliselle tulelle, jos rintama jää tarpeeksi lähelle.
Ilman sarvia ja hampaita: eiköhän tämä hyökkäyksen jumiutuminen ollut selvää heti vastahyökkäyksen alkumetreiltä, kun Ukraina veti suosiolla tappioiden pelossa länsipanssaripelotteensa aikalailla taka-alalle ja ryhtyi häätämään venäläisiä miinoitetuista asemistaan perinteiseen tyyliin tykistön ja paikallisen jalkaväen voimin..Joo ei nuo kovin hääppöisiä tulokset 6kk vastahyökkäyksellä olleet. Jos ei vielä jotain puskuayritä, jää kyllä linjat tuohon. Toki helvetin paljon ryssää kylmänä kaluistoineen, kyllä vähän jäi maku että Ukraina yritti liian laajalla alueella (yli 130km rintama) hyökkäystä yli Zaporizhzhian alueella. Vaikka vaiheittain hyökkäykset tapahtuikin.
Sodanjohtajana olisin vetänyt all-in Tokmak Melitopol välille.
Nähtäväksi jää, mitä Ukraina keksii kevääksi, kaukokiusaamisen lisäksi.
Antares
Respected Leader
Shoigun numerot voivat olla keksittyjä tai mitä vain, mutta kiehtovaa silti verrata Neuvostoliiton Afganistanin sodan numeroihin, seuraava on minun vapaamuotoinen tiivistelmä kirjasta "The Soviet Afghan War: How superpower fought and lost" sivulta 282:
Lentopetrooli ja diesel kuljetettiin kahta linjaa pitkin kumpikin omissa putkissaan, molemmat linjat seurasivat teitä: reitit olivat Khairaton-Puli-Khumri-Bagram ja Turagondi-Shindand. Nämä ovat ns. taktiset tai tässä tapauksessa kenties strategiset polttoainelinjat (näitä putkia oli yhteensä 4 kpl, kaksi per reitti ja toisessa meni diesel, toisessa lentopetrooli) joten POL-materiaalin strateginen siirto tapahtui niitä pitkin. Sen paikallinen jakelu joukko-osastoille piti silti tehdä polttoaineautoilla, joten sen osalta sama tilanne kuin nyt. Heidän polttoainelinjojen vetoon erikoistuneita joukkoja on nähty Ukrainan seudulla joten oletan että jotain paikallisia vetoja on tehty, mutta ei näitäkään ole rajattomasti ja joka paikkaan (enkä muista toistaiseksi kuulleeni linjojen käytöstä tai tuhoamisista, mutta oletan että tällaisia on käytössä jossain päin rintamaa).
5-8% materiaalista kuljetettiiin lennättämällä se suoraan tarvitseville joukoille ja 75-80 % kuljettiin kuorma-autoilla. Materiaali kulki Neuvostoliiton läpi raiteita pitkin (osa myös lautoilla) Termeziin ja Kushkaan, mistä kuorma-autot veivät sen Shindadin ja Kabulin tukikohtiin. Sieltä se jaettiin divisioonien ja rykmenttien jakelukeskuksiin.
Samalla sivulla sanotaan että päivittäinen materiaalin tarve oli 2000-3000 tonnia, josta 60-65 % oli petrol-oil-lubricants (POL), 7 % ammuksia, 20 % ruokaa ja 8-13 % "other cargo". Tavaran kuormaus ja purku tehtiin pääasiassa käsipelillä ja siihen kului 80% matka-ajasta ("time involved in the trip"). Joka päivä 600 sotilasta, 90 BTR:ää, 20 helikopteria ja 140 ilmatorjuntatykkiä (air defence guns) huolehti huoltokolonnien suojaamisesta ja turvallisuudesta. Yksi panssaroitu ajoneuvo 10-15 kuorma-autoa kohden (One armored vehicle was assigned for every 10 to 15 trucks)
Saman kirjan sivulla 291 osiossa Editors comments mainitaan että Neuvostoliiton normien mukaan laskettuna sota Euroopassa olisi vaatinut eri suhteessa tavaraa: 40 % päivittäisestä materiaalintarpeesta olisi ollut ammuksia ja 40% POL. Tämä kuvastaa sodan luonnetta Afganistanissa, ampumatavaran kulutus oli pienempi kuin (laskettu tarve) jos olisi syttynyt sota Euroopassa.
Sama kirja mainitsee sivulla 20 että sodan toisessa vaiheessa (maaliskuu 1980 - huhtikuu 1985) Afganistanissa oli 81,800 neukkusotilasta, joista 61,800 oli taistelevissa joukoissa (combat units of the ground and air forces). Heillä oli käytössä 600 panssarivaunua, 1500 BMP:tä, 2900 BTR:ää, 500 lentokonetta ja helikopteria sekä 500 eri kaliiperien tykkiä.
80% huoltokuljetuksiin kuluneesta ajasta meni kuorman tekemiseen ja purkamiseen, loput 20% oli se varsinainen siirtymä eli matka-aika. Afganistanin sodassa käytännössä kaikki kuormaaminen tehtiin käsipelillä, joten kuvaavaa kuinka tehotonta tuollainen materiaalinkäsittely on. Jos ajomatka on lyhyempi niin siihen kuorman tekemiseen ja purkamiseen menee silti ihan yhtä suuri aika, jolloin vääristymä on vielä suurempi.
-
10-15 tuhatta tonnia per päivä on tasan viisinkertainen määrä Neuvostoliiton Afganistanin sodan lukuihin verrattuna (MUOKKAUS: minun virhe, olin hätäinen: Shoigun mukaan 10-15 tuhatta tonnia on pelkästään polttoaineen ja ammusten kulutus per päivä, siitä puuttuvat kaikki muut). Toki sotilaiden määrä Ukrainassa on eri, mutta sodan luonne on myös täysin erilainen. Mekanisoituja ja panssaroituja joukkoja käytetään kokoajan, joten polttoaineen kulutus on varmasti valtavaa. Samoin ammuskulutus, näitä ei voi verrata alkuunkaan Afganistanin sotaan joka nimestään huolimatta oli valtaosaksi sissien metsästämisestä ja partiointia (toki oli myös kiivaampia kausia).
Mietin tuota havaintoa Neuvostoliiton normeista ja sodasta Euroopassa, heidän arvionsa oli että 40% päivittäisestä materiaalintarpeesta olisi ollut ammuksia ja 40% POL, kaikki muu siis 20%. Tämä lienee lähempänä Ukrainan sodan todellisuutta, tosin kenties tämäkään sota ei ole ollut sellaista liikesodankäyntiä mitä Neuvostoliitossa ennakoitiin? Ainakin rintamalinja on seissyt miltei paikoillaan jo pidemmän aikaa. Toisaalta on hyvin mahdollista että Neuvostoliiton arvio normeineen on enemmän tai vähemmän pielessä, tiedäpä näistä.
-
MUOKKAUS: ei vaan Shoigun mukaan kulutus olisi vielä suurempi, koska hänen mukaansa 10-15 tuhatta tonnia on pelkästään ammusten ja polttoaineenkulutus (alleviivaus minun):
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu told senators that up to 10-15 thousand tons of ammunition and fuel are supplied to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the special operation zone per day.
At the invitation of Shoigu, Chairman of the Federation Council Valentina Matvienko and the Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security held a retreat at the Russian Defense Ministry. The minister drew the senators' attention to the scale of the tasks being solved by the Russian Armed Forces during the special military operation.
“To understand the scale, we only supply 1.5 thousand tons of water to the armed forces every day - this is only drinking water. We wash approximately 350 tons of clothes per day. That is, you need to understand that this is not all happening in one place “This is on a huge front line, which, if we take it in general, is more than 1,000 km,” Shoigu emphasized, noting that “all of this, naturally, must be managed, supplying up to 10 thousand per day to the armed forces. and there are up to 15 thousand tons of various kinds of materials per day.” “This is ammunition, fuel. Everything related to the repair and maintenance of equipment,” he added.
Shoigu also emphasized the importance of the problems solved by industry. “It’s impossible not to talk about what our industry and the industry in the regions are doing. We can give many examples, very striking examples, when young people who have nothing to do with the defense industry raised and promoted production within a month,” the minister noted .
At the end of the meeting, Matvienko thanked Shoigu for the joint work, noting the constructive nature of the meeting.
-
Tuosta voi toki vitsillä laskea Neuvostoliiton "sota Euroopassa" arviolla, että jos 80% on POL+ammuskulutus ja Shoigun mukaan POL+ammuskulutus on 10-15 tuhatta tonnia per päivä, niin silloin 100% olisi:
10 000 x (10 / 8) = 12 500
15 000 x (10 / 8) = 18 750
Näin laskien määrä voisi olla 12 500 - 18 750 tonnia per päivä.
Viimeksi muokattu:
ddude
Majuri
Kulutussotaa käydään ja ei tässä nyt vielä olla vetämässä valkoista lippua salkoon.
Se kuitenkin pakko sanoa että aika ei ole yksin Ukrainan puolella.
Joo totta, Venäjä ei ole = Neuvostoliitto. Venäjän väkiluku kuitenkin 144M vs. Ukrainan 44M. Ukrainan pitäisi päästä 4:1 vaihtosuhteeseen pitkässä juoksussa ja jos muistan oikein se oli jotain 1,5-1,7:1 luokkaa.
Eli suoraan laskettuna Ukrainalta loppuu ensin miehistö. Tässä ei ole huomioitu puolustushalukkuutta kummaltakaan, tuo ero väestössä on mielestäni nykyisellä vaihtosuhteella yksinkertaisesti liian iso että sitä voisi taistelutahdolla kuroa umpeen.
Olin itse kuitenkin sitä mieltä että kaluston määrä tulee molemmilla ensin vastaan.
Alkuun olin luottavainen että kyllä monikertaisen GDP:n omaava länsi hoitaa tän homman helposti kotiin mutta nyt noiden täälläkin jo puhuttujen Viro, Puolan, mitä niitä maita olikaan että "laarin pohjat häämöttää" puheiden jälkeen en olekaan enää ihan niin varma.
Mä en ymmärrä miksi länsi ei osta noista kolmansista maista noita vanhoja "romuja" tonne Ukrainaan. Siis esim vaikka M60 Patton tankkia.
Joo vanhaa mutta lukumääräisesti tuota olisi esim Egyptillä jotain luokkaa 1500 kpl.
Kreikalta ja Portugalilta poistunut rivistä muutama vuosi takaperin,jne...
Kai noita olisi jo tässä 1,5 vuoden aikana ehtinyt jo muutaman kunnostaakin...
Nyt vedetään jollain 100 kpl Leo 1:llä juupas eipäs leikkiä Sveitsin kanssa saako niitä lähettää vai ei...
Se kuitenkin pakko sanoa että aika ei ole yksin Ukrainan puolella.
Joo totta, Venäjä ei ole = Neuvostoliitto. Venäjän väkiluku kuitenkin 144M vs. Ukrainan 44M. Ukrainan pitäisi päästä 4:1 vaihtosuhteeseen pitkässä juoksussa ja jos muistan oikein se oli jotain 1,5-1,7:1 luokkaa.
Eli suoraan laskettuna Ukrainalta loppuu ensin miehistö. Tässä ei ole huomioitu puolustushalukkuutta kummaltakaan, tuo ero väestössä on mielestäni nykyisellä vaihtosuhteella yksinkertaisesti liian iso että sitä voisi taistelutahdolla kuroa umpeen.
Olin itse kuitenkin sitä mieltä että kaluston määrä tulee molemmilla ensin vastaan.
Alkuun olin luottavainen että kyllä monikertaisen GDP:n omaava länsi hoitaa tän homman helposti kotiin mutta nyt noiden täälläkin jo puhuttujen Viro, Puolan, mitä niitä maita olikaan että "laarin pohjat häämöttää" puheiden jälkeen en olekaan enää ihan niin varma.
Mä en ymmärrä miksi länsi ei osta noista kolmansista maista noita vanhoja "romuja" tonne Ukrainaan. Siis esim vaikka M60 Patton tankkia.
Joo vanhaa mutta lukumääräisesti tuota olisi esim Egyptillä jotain luokkaa 1500 kpl.
Kreikalta ja Portugalilta poistunut rivistä muutama vuosi takaperin,jne...
Kai noita olisi jo tässä 1,5 vuoden aikana ehtinyt jo muutaman kunnostaakin...
Nyt vedetään jollain 100 kpl Leo 1:llä juupas eipäs leikkiä Sveitsin kanssa saako niitä lähettää vai ei...
Viimeksi muokattu:
Lisää ryssäkommentia Avdiivkasta. Epäilevät suuren osan toiminnasta olevan maan alla, missä voi olla perääkin. Jos Ukraina on tätä varustanut keskeisenä linnoituksena 2014 jälkeen niin kenties tuolla on ihan oikeita tunneliverkostoja. Niitähän näillä alueilla on myös kaivostoiminnan jäljiltä, joten kenties osin hyödynnetty sellaisia.
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Samasta syystä aikoinaan britit peruivat operaatio Foxleyn. Liittoutuneiden näkökannalta Aatu Hitler itse asiassa kannatti pitää hengissä ja johtamassa Saksan sotaponnisteluja. Sen verran umpipaskoja päätöksiä tämä oli jo tehnyt ja tuli tekemään jatkossakin.
Operation Foxley - Wikipedia
Rambo
Majuri
Unkari esti EU:n Ukraina-avun taas – Orbán vertasi EU:ta Neuvostoliittoon
Unkari on estänyt EU:n 500 miljoonan tukipaketin Ukrainalle taas tänään maanantaina, kertoo ukrainalaislehti Ukrainska Pravda.Unkari vaati aiemmin, että Ukraina poistaa Unkarilaisen OTP-pankin Ukrainan pakotelistalta. Ukraina poisti pankin listaltaan, mutta tämä ei riittänytkään Unkarille.
Unkarissa on vietetty tänään kansallista vapaapäivää Unkarin kansannousun muistoksi. Unkarin kansannousussa vuonna 1956 kuoli noin 3000 unkarilaista vastustaessaan Neuvostojoukkoja.
Unkarin pääministeri Viktor Orbán on halunnut pitää lämpimät välit Venäjään tämän aloitettua hyökkäyssodan Ukrainaan.
Orbán keskittyikin sättimään EU:ta puheessaan tänään, ja vertasi EU:ta Neuvostoliittoon.
– Joskus historia toistaa itseään. Se mikä oli ensin tragediaa, on tällä kertaa parhaimmillaankin farssi. Moskova oli tragedia. Bryssel on epäonnistunut nykyajan parodia, Orbán sanoi noin tuhatpäiselle kannatajajoukolleen Unkarissa.
Lähde: AFP
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Antares
Respected Leader
Kiehtova Washington Post -artikkeli CIA:n ja GUR + SBU yhteistyöstä. Lainaan tekstin spoilerin taakse (artikkeli julkaistu 23.10.2023): LÄHDE
and
Isabelle Khurshudyan
October 23, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EDT
Ukrainian spies with deep ties to CIA wage shadow war against Russia
By Greg Millerand
Isabelle Khurshudyan
October 23, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EDT
https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...9.oCB56JmNLLpQY3YVX6tpk1gWRRfy426EBdlwfLKk_Iw
and
Isabelle Khurshudyan
October 23, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EDT
Russian nationalist Alexander Dugin attends a funeral on Aug. 23, 2022, in Moscow for his daughter Daria Dugina, who was killed in a car explosion. (Evgenii Bugubaev/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)
KYIV — The cluttered car carrying a mother and her 12-year-old daughter seemed barely worth the attention of Russian security officials as it approached a border checkpoint. But the least conspicuous piece of luggage — a crate for a cat — was part of an elaborate, lethal plot. Ukrainian operatives had installed a hidden compartment in the pet carrier, according to security officials with knowledge of the operation, and used it to conceal components of a bomb.
Four weeks later, the device detonated just outside Moscow in an SUV being driven by the daughter of a Russian nationalist who had urged his country to “kill, kill, kill” Ukrainians, an explosion signaling that the heart of Russia would not be spared the carnage of war.
The operation was orchestrated by Ukraine’s domestic security service, the SBU, according to officials who provided details, including the use of the pet crate, that have not been previously disclosed. The August 2022 attack is part of a raging shadow war in which Ukraine’s spy services have also twice bombed the bridge connecting Russia to occupied Crimea, piloted drones into the roof of the Kremlin and blown holes in the hulls of Russian naval vessels in the Black Sea.
These operations have been cast as extreme measures Ukraine was forced to adopt in response to Russia’s invasion last year. In reality, they represent capabilities that Ukraine’s spy agencies have developed over nearly a decade — since Russia first seized Ukrainian territory in 2014 — a period during which the services also forged deep new bonds with the CIA.
The missions have involved elite teams of Ukrainian operatives drawn from directorates that were formed, trained and equipped in close partnership with the CIA, according to current and former Ukrainian and U.S. officials. Since 2015, the CIA has spent tens of millions of dollars to transform Ukraine’s Soviet-formed services into potent allies against Moscow, officials said. The agency has provided Ukraine with advanced surveillance systems, trained recruits at sites in Ukraine as well as the United States, built new headquarters for departments in Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, and shared intelligence on a scale that would have been unimaginable before Russia illegally annexed Crimea and fomented a separatist war in eastern Ukraine. The CIA maintains a significant presence in Kyiv, officials said.
The extent of the CIA’s involvement with Ukraine’s security services has not previously been disclosed. U.S. intelligence officials stressed that the agency has had no involvement in targeted killing operations by Ukrainian agencies, and that its work has focused on bolstering those services’ abilities to gather intelligence on a dangerous adversary. A senior intelligence official said that “any potential operational concerns have been conveyed clearly to the Ukrainian services.”
Many of Ukraine’s clandestine operations have had clear military objectives and contributed to the country’s defense. The car bombing that killed Daria Dugina, however, underscored Ukraine’s embrace of what officials in Kyiv refer to as “liquidations” as a weapon of war. Over the past 20 months, the SBU and its military counterpart, the GUR, have carried out dozens of assassinations against Russian officials in occupied territories, alleged Ukrainian collaborators, military officers behind the front lines and prominent war supporters deep inside Russia. Those killed include a former Russian submarine commander jogging in a park in the southern Russian city of Krasnodar and a militant blogger at a cafe in St. Petersburg, according to Ukrainian and Western officials.
Ukraine’s affinity for lethal operations has complicated its collaboration with the CIA, raising concerns about agency complicity and creating unease among some officials in Kyiv and Washington.
Workers clean debris in the aftermath of a bomb blast in a cafe in St. Petersburg. (Olga Maltseva/AFP/Getty Images)
Even those who see such lethal missions as defensible in wartime question the utility of certain strikes and decisions that led to the targeting of civilians including Dugina or her father, Alexander Dugin — who officials acknowledge was the intended mark — rather than Russians more directly linked to the war.
“We have too many enemies who are more important to neutralize,” said a high-ranking Ukraine security official. “People who launch missiles. People who committed atrocities in Bucha.” Killing the daughter of a pro-war firebrand is “very cynical,” the official said.
Others cited broader concerns about Ukraine’s cutthroat tactics that may seem justified now — especially against a country accused of widespread war atrocities — but could later prove difficult to rein in.
“We are seeing the birth of a set of intelligence services that are like Mossad in the 1970s,” said a former senior CIA official, referring to the Israeli spy service long accused of carrying out assassinations in other countries. Ukraine’s proficiency at such operations “has risks for Russia,” the official said, “but it carries broader risks as well.”
“If Ukraine’s intelligence operations become even bolder — targeting Russians in third countries, for example — you could imagine how that might cause rifts with partners and come into serious tension with Ukraine’s broader strategic goals,” the official said. Among those goals is membership in NATO and the European Union.
This article is based on interviews with more than two dozen current and former Ukrainian, U.S. and Western intelligence and security officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity citing security concerns as well as the sensitivity of the subject. The pressure on Kyiv to score victories against Russia and find ways to deter further aggression create incentives to exaggerate the record and capabilities of Ukraine’s services. The Post vetted key details with multiple sources including Western officials with access to independent streams of intelligence.
The CIA declined to comment.
CIA-Ukraine partnership
SBU and GUR officials describe their expanding operational roles as the result of extraordinary circumstances. “All targets hit by the SBU are completely legal,” the agency’s director, Vasyl Malyuk, said in a statement provided to The Post. The statement did not specifically address targeted killings but Malyuk, who met with top CIA and other U.S. officials in Washington last month, said Ukraine “does everything to ensure that fair punishment will ‘catch up’ with all traitors, war criminals and collaborators.”
Current and former U.S. and Ukrainian officials said both sides have sought to maintain a careful distance between the CIA and the lethal operations carried out by its partners in Kyiv. CIA officials have voiced objections after some operations, officials said, but the agency has not withdrawn support.
“We never involved our international partners in covert operations, especially behind the front lines,” a former senior Ukrainian security official said. SBU and GUR operatives were not accompanied by CIA counterparts. Ukraine avoided using weapons or equipment that could be traced to U.S. sources, and even covert funding streams were segregated.
“We had a lot of restrictions about working with the Ukrainians operationally,” said a former U.S. intelligence official. The emphasis was “more on secure communications and tradecraft,” and pursuing new streams of intelligence inside Russia “rather than ‘here’s how you blow up a mayor.’ I never got the sense that we were that involved in designing their ops.”
Even so, officials acknowledged that boundaries were occasionally blurred. CIA officers in Kyiv were made aware of some of Ukraine’s more ambitious plans for strikes. In some cases, including the bombing of the Kerch Bridge, U.S. officials registered concerns.
Ukraine’s spies developed their own lines about which operations to discuss and which to keep under wraps. “There were some things that maybe we wouldn’t talk about” with CIA counterparts, said a second Ukraine security official involved in such missions. He said crossing those boundaries would lead to a terse reply from Americans: “We don’t want any part of that.”
The CIA’s deep partnership with Ukraine, which persisted even when the country became embroiled in the impeachment scandal surrounding President Donald Trump, represents a dramatic turn for agencies that spent decades on opposing sides of the Cold War. In part because of that legacy, officials said, it was only last year that the CIA removed Ukraine from the agency’s “non-fraternization” list of countries regarded as such security risks that contact with their nationals for agency employees is forbidden without advance permission.
The CIA-Ukraine collaboration took root in the aftermath of 2014 political protests that prompted Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych to flee the country, followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its arming of separatists in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.
The initial phases of cooperation were tentative, officials said, given concerns on both sides that Ukraine’s services were still heavily penetrated by the FSB — the Russian agency that is the main successor to the KGB. To manage that security risk, the CIA worked with the SBU to create an entirely new directorate, officials said, one that would focus on so-called “active measures” operations against Russia and be insulated from other SBU departments.
The new unit was prosaically dubbed the “Fifth Directorate” to distinguish it from the four long-standing units of the SBU. A sixth directorate has since been added, officials said, to work with Britain’s MI6 spy agency.
Training sites were located outside Kyiv where handpicked recruits were instructed by CIA personnel, officials said. The plan was to form units “capable of operating behind front lines and working as covert groups,” said a Ukrainian official involved in the effort.
The agency provided secure communications gear, eavesdropping equipment that allowed Ukraine to intercept Russian phone calls and emails, and even furnished disguises and separatist uniforms enabling operatives to more easily slip into occupied towns.
The early missions focused on recruiting informants among Russia’s proxy forces as well as cyber and electronic eavesdropping measures, officials said. The SBU also began mounting sabotage operations and missions to capture separatist leaders and Ukrainian collaborators, some of whom were taken to secret detention sites.
But the operations soon took a lethal turn. Over one three-year stretch, at least half a dozen Russian operatives, high-ranking separatist commanders or collaborators were killed in violence that was often attributed to internal score-settling but in reality was the work of the SBU, Ukraine officials said.
A 2014 photo of Yevgeny Zhilin, the leader of a pro-Russian militant group in eastern Ukraine, who was gunned down in 2016 in a Moscow restaurant. (Sergiy Bobok/Afp/Getty Images)
Among those killed was Yevgeny Zhilin, the leader of a pro-Russian militant group in eastern Ukraine, who was gunned down in 2016 in a Moscow restaurant. A year later, a rebel commander known as ‘Givi’ was killed in Donetsk as part of an operation in which a woman who accused him of rape was enlisted to plant a bomb at his side, according to a former official involved in the mission.
Ukrainian officials said the country’s turn to more lethal methods was driven by Russian aggression, atrocities attributed to its proxies and desperation to find ways to weaken a more powerful adversary. Many also cited Russia’s own alleged history of conducting assassinations in Kyiv.
“Because of this hybrid war we faced an absolutely new reality,” said Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, a member of Ukraine’s parliament who served as SBU director in 2015, when the Fifth Directorate was created. “We were forced to train our people in a different way.”
He declined to elaborate.
Transforming Ukrainian military intelligence
Even while helping to build the SBU’s new directorate, the CIA embarked on a far more ambitious project with Ukraine’s military intelligence service.
With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the SBU and had a narrower focus on espionage and active measures operations against Russia. It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from Soviet times, while the SBU was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence.
“We calculated that GUR was a smaller and more nimble organization where we could have more impact,” said a former U.S. intelligence official who worked in Ukraine. “GUR was our little baby. We gave them all new equipment and training.” GUR officers “were young guys not Soviet-era KGB generals,” the official said, “while the SBU was too big to reform.”
Even recent developments have seemed to validate such concerns. Former SBU director Ivan Bakanov was forced out of the job last year amid criticism that the agency wasn’t moving aggressively enough against internal traitors. The SBU also discovered last year that Russian-made modems were still being used in the agency’s networks, prompting a scramble to unplug them.
From 2015 on, the CIA embarked on such an extensive transformation of the GUR that within several years “we had kind of rebuilt it from scratch,” the former U.S. intelligence official said. One of the main architects of the effort, who served as CIA station chief in Kyiv, now runs the Ukraine Task Force at CIA headquarters.
The GUR began recruiting operatives for its own new active measures department, officials said. At sites in Ukraine and, later, the United States, GUR operatives were trained on skills ranging from clandestine maneuvers behind enemy lines to weapons platforms and explosives. U.S. officials said the training was aimed at helping Ukrainian operatives protect themselves in dangerous Russian-controlled environments rather than inflicting harm on Russian targets.
Some of the GUR’s newest recruits were transfers from the SBU, officials said, drawn to a rival service flush with new authorities and resources. Among them was Vasyl Burba, who had managed SBU Fifth Directorate operations before joining the GUR and serving as agency director from 2016 to 2020. Burba became such a close ally of the CIA — and perceived Moscow target — that when he was forced from his job after President Volodymyr Zelensky’s election the agency provided him an armored vehicle, officials said. Burba declined to comment for this article.
The CIA helped the GUR acquire state-of-the-art surveillance and electronic eavesdropping systems, officials said. They included mobile equipment that could be placed along Russian-controlled lines in eastern Ukraine, but also software tools used to exploit the cellphones of Kremlin officials visiting occupied territory from Moscow. Ukrainian officers operated the systems, officials said, but everything gleaned was shared with the Americans.
Concerned that the GUR’s aging facilities were likely compromised by Russian intelligence, the CIA paid for new headquarters buildings for the GUR’s “spetsnaz” paramilitary division and a separate directorate responsible for electronic espionage.
The new capabilities were transformative, officials said.
“In one day we could intercept 250,000 to 300,000 separate communications” from Russian military and FSB units, said a former senior GUR official. “There was so much information that we couldn’t manage it ourselves.”
Troves of data were relayed through the new CIA-built facility back to Washington, where they were scrutinized by CIA and NSA analysts, officials said.
“We were giving them the ability — through us — to collect on” Russian targets, the former GUR official said. Asked about the magnitude of the CIA investments, the official said: “It was millions of dollars.”
In time, the GUR had also developed networks of sources in Russia’s security apparatus, including the FSB unit responsible for operations in Ukraine. In a measure of U.S.-Ukraine trust, officials said, the CIA was permitted to have direct contact with agents recruited and run by Ukrainian intelligence.
The resulting intelligence windfall was largely hidden from public view, with intermittent exceptions. The SBU began posting incriminating or embarrassing communications intercepts, including one in which Russian commanders were captured discussing their country’s culpability in the 2014 shoot-down of a Malaysian Airlines passenger jet.
Even so, officials said the intelligence obtained through the U.S.-Ukraine cooperation had its limits. The Biden administration’s prescient warnings about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s determination to topple the Kyiv government, for example, were based primarily on separate streams of intelligence Ukraine wasn’t privy to initially.
In some ways, officials said, Ukraine’s own collection efforts fed the skepticism that Zelensky and others had about Putin’s plans because they were eavesdropping on military and FSB units that themselves were not informed until the eve of the war. “They were getting an accurate picture from people who were also in the dark,” one U.S. official said.
Targeting Moscow with drones
Russian forces never succeeded in taking Kyiv. But both GUR structures that the CIA funded were among dozens of key installations targeted in Russian strikes in the war’s first days, according to officials who said the facilities survived and continue to function.
Ukraine’s new intelligence capabilities proved valuable from the start of the war. The SBU, for example, obtained intelligence on high-value Russian targets, enabling strikes that killed several commanders and narrowly missed Russia’s top-ranked officer, Valery Gerasimov.
Over the past year, the security services’ missions have increasingly centered on targets not only behind enemy lines but well into Russia.
For the SBU, no target has been a higher priority than the Kerch Bridge that connects the Russian mainland to the annexed Crimean Peninsula. The bridge is a key military corridor and also carries such symbolic significance to Putin that he presided over its inauguration in 2018.
The SBU has hit the bridge twice over the past year, including an October 2022 bombing that killed five people and put a gaping hole in westbound traffic lanes.
Zelensky initially denied Ukrainian responsibility. But SBU director Malyuk described the operation in extraordinary detail in an interview earlier this year, acknowledging that his service had placed a powerful explosive inside a truck hauling industrial-size rolls of cellophane.
Like other SBU plots, the operation involved unwitting accomplices, including the truck driver killed in the explosion. “We went through seven circles of hell keeping so many people in the dark,” Malyuk said in an interview about the operation, which he said hinged on the susceptibility of “ordinary Russian smugglers.”
U.S. officials who had been notified in advance raised concerns about the attack, officials said, fearing Russian escalation. Those misgivings had presumably dissipated by the time the SBU launched a second strike on the bridge nine months later using naval drones that were developed as part of a top secret operation involving the CIA and other Western intelligence services.
Malyuk’s highly public account of the operation defies typical intelligence tradecraft but serves Kyiv’s need to claim successes and reflects an emerging rivalry with the GUR. Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, has made a habit of touting his agency’s achievements and taunting Moscow.
The two services overlap operationally to some degree, though officials said the SBU tends to pursue more complex missions with longer lead-times while the GUR tends to work at a faster tempo. Ukraine officials denied that either agency was directly involved in the September 2022 attack on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in the Baltic Sea, though U.S. and other Western intelligence agencies have concluded that Ukraine was linked to the plot.
The GUR has used its own fleet of drones to launch dozens of attacks on Russian soil, including strikes that have penetrated Russian air defenses to hit buildings in Moscow. Among them was a May 2023 operation that briefly set fire to a section of roof in the Kremlin.
Those strikes have involved both long-range drones launched from Ukrainian territory, as well as teams of operatives and partisans working inside Russia, officials said. Motors for some drones were purchased from Chinese suppliers with private funding that couldn’t be traced to Ukrainian sources, according to an official who said he was involved in the transactions.
Assassinations in Russia
GUR has also ventured into assassinations, officials said.
In July, a former Russian submarine commander, Stanislav Rzhitsky, was shot four times in the chest and back in Krasnodar where he reportedly worked as a military recruiting officer. Rzhitsky, 42, was known to use the fitness app Strava to record his daily running routes, a practice that may have exposed his location.
The GUR issued a coy statement deflecting responsibility but citing precise details about the circumstances of Rzhitsky’s death, noting that “due to heavy rain the park was deserted” and there were no witnesses. Officials in Kyiv confirmed the GUR was responsible.
Even while acknowledging responsibility for such actions, Ukrainian officials claim the moral high ground against Russia. The SBU and GUR have sought to avoid harm to innocent bystanders even in lethal operations, officials said, while Russia’s scorched-earth raids and indiscriminate strikes have killed or injured thousands of civilians.
Security officials said that no major operation by the SBU or GUR proceeds without clearance — tacit or otherwise — from Zelensky. A spokesperson for Zelensky did not respond to requests for comment.
Skeptics nevertheless worry Ukraine’s use of targeted killings and drone strikes on Moscow high-rises help neither its cause against Russia nor its longer-term aspirations to join NATO and the E.U.
A senior Ukrainian official who worked closely with Western governments coordinating support for Ukraine said that attacks on noncombatants and bombings of Moscow buildings feed Putin’s false narrative that Ukraine posed a growing danger to ordinary Russians. “It plays into his lies that Ukrainians are coming for them,” the official said.
That view appears to be in the minority. Others see the attacks as boosting morale among besieged Ukrainians and achieving a degree of vigilante accountability for alleged Russian war crimes that many Ukrainians are skeptical will ever lead to adequate sanctions from the United Nations and international courts.
Russian officials investigate the scene after the car bombing that killed Dugina in 2022. (Russian Investigative Committee/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)
The car bombing that killed Dugina last year continues to stand out as one of the more extreme cases of lethal revenge — one that not only targeted noncombatants but involved a Ukrainian woman and a presumably unwitting pre-teenage girl.
Russian authorities had barely finished clearing the debris when the FSB identified Natalia Vovk, 42, as the principal suspect. She had entered Russia from Estonia in July, according to the FSB, took an apartment in the same complex as Dugina, and spent weeks conducting surveillance before slipping back into Estonia with her daughter after the explosion occurred.
The FSB also identified an alleged accomplice who Russia alleged had provided Kazakh license plates for Vovk to use on her vehicle, a Mini Cooper, while traveling in Russia; helped assemble the explosive; and fled to Estonia before the attack.
Ukraine authorities said Vovk was motivated in part by Russia’s siege of her home city, Mariupol. They declined to comment on the nature of her relationship to the SBU or her current whereabouts.
The attack was intended to kill Dugin as he and his daughter departed a cultural festival where the pro-war ideologue, sometimes branded as “Putin’s brain,” had delivered a lecture. The two were expected to travel together, but Dugin stepped into a different vehicle. Vovk also attended the festival, according to the FSB.
At the time, Ukraine vigorously denounced involvement in the attack. “Ukraine has absolutely nothing to do with this, because we are not a criminal state like Russia, or a terrorist one at that,” said Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Zelensky.
Officials acknowledged in recent interviews in Kyiv, however, that those denials were false. They confirmed that the SBU planned and executed the operation, and said that while Dugin may have been the principal target, his daughter — also a vocal supporter of the invasion — was no innocent victim.
“She is the daughter of the father of Russian propaganda,” a security official said. The car bombing and other operations inside Russia are “about narrative,” showing enemies of Ukraine that “punishment is imminent even for those who think they are untouchable.”
Shane Harris in Washington and Mary Ilyushina in Riga, Latvia, contributed to this report.
Ukrainian spies with deep ties to CIA wage shadow war against Russia
By Greg Millerand
Isabelle Khurshudyan
October 23, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EDT
Russian nationalist Alexander Dugin attends a funeral on Aug. 23, 2022, in Moscow for his daughter Daria Dugina, who was killed in a car explosion. (Evgenii Bugubaev/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)
KYIV — The cluttered car carrying a mother and her 12-year-old daughter seemed barely worth the attention of Russian security officials as it approached a border checkpoint. But the least conspicuous piece of luggage — a crate for a cat — was part of an elaborate, lethal plot. Ukrainian operatives had installed a hidden compartment in the pet carrier, according to security officials with knowledge of the operation, and used it to conceal components of a bomb.
Four weeks later, the device detonated just outside Moscow in an SUV being driven by the daughter of a Russian nationalist who had urged his country to “kill, kill, kill” Ukrainians, an explosion signaling that the heart of Russia would not be spared the carnage of war.
The operation was orchestrated by Ukraine’s domestic security service, the SBU, according to officials who provided details, including the use of the pet crate, that have not been previously disclosed. The August 2022 attack is part of a raging shadow war in which Ukraine’s spy services have also twice bombed the bridge connecting Russia to occupied Crimea, piloted drones into the roof of the Kremlin and blown holes in the hulls of Russian naval vessels in the Black Sea.
These operations have been cast as extreme measures Ukraine was forced to adopt in response to Russia’s invasion last year. In reality, they represent capabilities that Ukraine’s spy agencies have developed over nearly a decade — since Russia first seized Ukrainian territory in 2014 — a period during which the services also forged deep new bonds with the CIA.
The missions have involved elite teams of Ukrainian operatives drawn from directorates that were formed, trained and equipped in close partnership with the CIA, according to current and former Ukrainian and U.S. officials. Since 2015, the CIA has spent tens of millions of dollars to transform Ukraine’s Soviet-formed services into potent allies against Moscow, officials said. The agency has provided Ukraine with advanced surveillance systems, trained recruits at sites in Ukraine as well as the United States, built new headquarters for departments in Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, and shared intelligence on a scale that would have been unimaginable before Russia illegally annexed Crimea and fomented a separatist war in eastern Ukraine. The CIA maintains a significant presence in Kyiv, officials said.
The extent of the CIA’s involvement with Ukraine’s security services has not previously been disclosed. U.S. intelligence officials stressed that the agency has had no involvement in targeted killing operations by Ukrainian agencies, and that its work has focused on bolstering those services’ abilities to gather intelligence on a dangerous adversary. A senior intelligence official said that “any potential operational concerns have been conveyed clearly to the Ukrainian services.”
Many of Ukraine’s clandestine operations have had clear military objectives and contributed to the country’s defense. The car bombing that killed Daria Dugina, however, underscored Ukraine’s embrace of what officials in Kyiv refer to as “liquidations” as a weapon of war. Over the past 20 months, the SBU and its military counterpart, the GUR, have carried out dozens of assassinations against Russian officials in occupied territories, alleged Ukrainian collaborators, military officers behind the front lines and prominent war supporters deep inside Russia. Those killed include a former Russian submarine commander jogging in a park in the southern Russian city of Krasnodar and a militant blogger at a cafe in St. Petersburg, according to Ukrainian and Western officials.
Ukraine’s affinity for lethal operations has complicated its collaboration with the CIA, raising concerns about agency complicity and creating unease among some officials in Kyiv and Washington.
Workers clean debris in the aftermath of a bomb blast in a cafe in St. Petersburg. (Olga Maltseva/AFP/Getty Images)
Even those who see such lethal missions as defensible in wartime question the utility of certain strikes and decisions that led to the targeting of civilians including Dugina or her father, Alexander Dugin — who officials acknowledge was the intended mark — rather than Russians more directly linked to the war.
“We have too many enemies who are more important to neutralize,” said a high-ranking Ukraine security official. “People who launch missiles. People who committed atrocities in Bucha.” Killing the daughter of a pro-war firebrand is “very cynical,” the official said.
Others cited broader concerns about Ukraine’s cutthroat tactics that may seem justified now — especially against a country accused of widespread war atrocities — but could later prove difficult to rein in.
“We are seeing the birth of a set of intelligence services that are like Mossad in the 1970s,” said a former senior CIA official, referring to the Israeli spy service long accused of carrying out assassinations in other countries. Ukraine’s proficiency at such operations “has risks for Russia,” the official said, “but it carries broader risks as well.”
“If Ukraine’s intelligence operations become even bolder — targeting Russians in third countries, for example — you could imagine how that might cause rifts with partners and come into serious tension with Ukraine’s broader strategic goals,” the official said. Among those goals is membership in NATO and the European Union.
This article is based on interviews with more than two dozen current and former Ukrainian, U.S. and Western intelligence and security officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity citing security concerns as well as the sensitivity of the subject. The pressure on Kyiv to score victories against Russia and find ways to deter further aggression create incentives to exaggerate the record and capabilities of Ukraine’s services. The Post vetted key details with multiple sources including Western officials with access to independent streams of intelligence.
The CIA declined to comment.
CIA-Ukraine partnership
SBU and GUR officials describe their expanding operational roles as the result of extraordinary circumstances. “All targets hit by the SBU are completely legal,” the agency’s director, Vasyl Malyuk, said in a statement provided to The Post. The statement did not specifically address targeted killings but Malyuk, who met with top CIA and other U.S. officials in Washington last month, said Ukraine “does everything to ensure that fair punishment will ‘catch up’ with all traitors, war criminals and collaborators.”Current and former U.S. and Ukrainian officials said both sides have sought to maintain a careful distance between the CIA and the lethal operations carried out by its partners in Kyiv. CIA officials have voiced objections after some operations, officials said, but the agency has not withdrawn support.
“We never involved our international partners in covert operations, especially behind the front lines,” a former senior Ukrainian security official said. SBU and GUR operatives were not accompanied by CIA counterparts. Ukraine avoided using weapons or equipment that could be traced to U.S. sources, and even covert funding streams were segregated.
“We had a lot of restrictions about working with the Ukrainians operationally,” said a former U.S. intelligence official. The emphasis was “more on secure communications and tradecraft,” and pursuing new streams of intelligence inside Russia “rather than ‘here’s how you blow up a mayor.’ I never got the sense that we were that involved in designing their ops.”
Even so, officials acknowledged that boundaries were occasionally blurred. CIA officers in Kyiv were made aware of some of Ukraine’s more ambitious plans for strikes. In some cases, including the bombing of the Kerch Bridge, U.S. officials registered concerns.
Ukraine’s spies developed their own lines about which operations to discuss and which to keep under wraps. “There were some things that maybe we wouldn’t talk about” with CIA counterparts, said a second Ukraine security official involved in such missions. He said crossing those boundaries would lead to a terse reply from Americans: “We don’t want any part of that.”
The CIA’s deep partnership with Ukraine, which persisted even when the country became embroiled in the impeachment scandal surrounding President Donald Trump, represents a dramatic turn for agencies that spent decades on opposing sides of the Cold War. In part because of that legacy, officials said, it was only last year that the CIA removed Ukraine from the agency’s “non-fraternization” list of countries regarded as such security risks that contact with their nationals for agency employees is forbidden without advance permission.
The CIA-Ukraine collaboration took root in the aftermath of 2014 political protests that prompted Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych to flee the country, followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its arming of separatists in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.
The initial phases of cooperation were tentative, officials said, given concerns on both sides that Ukraine’s services were still heavily penetrated by the FSB — the Russian agency that is the main successor to the KGB. To manage that security risk, the CIA worked with the SBU to create an entirely new directorate, officials said, one that would focus on so-called “active measures” operations against Russia and be insulated from other SBU departments.
The new unit was prosaically dubbed the “Fifth Directorate” to distinguish it from the four long-standing units of the SBU. A sixth directorate has since been added, officials said, to work with Britain’s MI6 spy agency.
Training sites were located outside Kyiv where handpicked recruits were instructed by CIA personnel, officials said. The plan was to form units “capable of operating behind front lines and working as covert groups,” said a Ukrainian official involved in the effort.
The agency provided secure communications gear, eavesdropping equipment that allowed Ukraine to intercept Russian phone calls and emails, and even furnished disguises and separatist uniforms enabling operatives to more easily slip into occupied towns.
The early missions focused on recruiting informants among Russia’s proxy forces as well as cyber and electronic eavesdropping measures, officials said. The SBU also began mounting sabotage operations and missions to capture separatist leaders and Ukrainian collaborators, some of whom were taken to secret detention sites.
But the operations soon took a lethal turn. Over one three-year stretch, at least half a dozen Russian operatives, high-ranking separatist commanders or collaborators were killed in violence that was often attributed to internal score-settling but in reality was the work of the SBU, Ukraine officials said.
A 2014 photo of Yevgeny Zhilin, the leader of a pro-Russian militant group in eastern Ukraine, who was gunned down in 2016 in a Moscow restaurant. (Sergiy Bobok/Afp/Getty Images)
Among those killed was Yevgeny Zhilin, the leader of a pro-Russian militant group in eastern Ukraine, who was gunned down in 2016 in a Moscow restaurant. A year later, a rebel commander known as ‘Givi’ was killed in Donetsk as part of an operation in which a woman who accused him of rape was enlisted to plant a bomb at his side, according to a former official involved in the mission.
Ukrainian officials said the country’s turn to more lethal methods was driven by Russian aggression, atrocities attributed to its proxies and desperation to find ways to weaken a more powerful adversary. Many also cited Russia’s own alleged history of conducting assassinations in Kyiv.
“Because of this hybrid war we faced an absolutely new reality,” said Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, a member of Ukraine’s parliament who served as SBU director in 2015, when the Fifth Directorate was created. “We were forced to train our people in a different way.”
He declined to elaborate.
Transforming Ukrainian military intelligence
Even while helping to build the SBU’s new directorate, the CIA embarked on a far more ambitious project with Ukraine’s military intelligence service.With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the SBU and had a narrower focus on espionage and active measures operations against Russia. It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from Soviet times, while the SBU was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence.
“We calculated that GUR was a smaller and more nimble organization where we could have more impact,” said a former U.S. intelligence official who worked in Ukraine. “GUR was our little baby. We gave them all new equipment and training.” GUR officers “were young guys not Soviet-era KGB generals,” the official said, “while the SBU was too big to reform.”
Even recent developments have seemed to validate such concerns. Former SBU director Ivan Bakanov was forced out of the job last year amid criticism that the agency wasn’t moving aggressively enough against internal traitors. The SBU also discovered last year that Russian-made modems were still being used in the agency’s networks, prompting a scramble to unplug them.
From 2015 on, the CIA embarked on such an extensive transformation of the GUR that within several years “we had kind of rebuilt it from scratch,” the former U.S. intelligence official said. One of the main architects of the effort, who served as CIA station chief in Kyiv, now runs the Ukraine Task Force at CIA headquarters.
The GUR began recruiting operatives for its own new active measures department, officials said. At sites in Ukraine and, later, the United States, GUR operatives were trained on skills ranging from clandestine maneuvers behind enemy lines to weapons platforms and explosives. U.S. officials said the training was aimed at helping Ukrainian operatives protect themselves in dangerous Russian-controlled environments rather than inflicting harm on Russian targets.
Some of the GUR’s newest recruits were transfers from the SBU, officials said, drawn to a rival service flush with new authorities and resources. Among them was Vasyl Burba, who had managed SBU Fifth Directorate operations before joining the GUR and serving as agency director from 2016 to 2020. Burba became such a close ally of the CIA — and perceived Moscow target — that when he was forced from his job after President Volodymyr Zelensky’s election the agency provided him an armored vehicle, officials said. Burba declined to comment for this article.
The CIA helped the GUR acquire state-of-the-art surveillance and electronic eavesdropping systems, officials said. They included mobile equipment that could be placed along Russian-controlled lines in eastern Ukraine, but also software tools used to exploit the cellphones of Kremlin officials visiting occupied territory from Moscow. Ukrainian officers operated the systems, officials said, but everything gleaned was shared with the Americans.
Concerned that the GUR’s aging facilities were likely compromised by Russian intelligence, the CIA paid for new headquarters buildings for the GUR’s “spetsnaz” paramilitary division and a separate directorate responsible for electronic espionage.
The new capabilities were transformative, officials said.
“In one day we could intercept 250,000 to 300,000 separate communications” from Russian military and FSB units, said a former senior GUR official. “There was so much information that we couldn’t manage it ourselves.”
Troves of data were relayed through the new CIA-built facility back to Washington, where they were scrutinized by CIA and NSA analysts, officials said.
“We were giving them the ability — through us — to collect on” Russian targets, the former GUR official said. Asked about the magnitude of the CIA investments, the official said: “It was millions of dollars.”
In time, the GUR had also developed networks of sources in Russia’s security apparatus, including the FSB unit responsible for operations in Ukraine. In a measure of U.S.-Ukraine trust, officials said, the CIA was permitted to have direct contact with agents recruited and run by Ukrainian intelligence.
The resulting intelligence windfall was largely hidden from public view, with intermittent exceptions. The SBU began posting incriminating or embarrassing communications intercepts, including one in which Russian commanders were captured discussing their country’s culpability in the 2014 shoot-down of a Malaysian Airlines passenger jet.
Even so, officials said the intelligence obtained through the U.S.-Ukraine cooperation had its limits. The Biden administration’s prescient warnings about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s determination to topple the Kyiv government, for example, were based primarily on separate streams of intelligence Ukraine wasn’t privy to initially.
In some ways, officials said, Ukraine’s own collection efforts fed the skepticism that Zelensky and others had about Putin’s plans because they were eavesdropping on military and FSB units that themselves were not informed until the eve of the war. “They were getting an accurate picture from people who were also in the dark,” one U.S. official said.
Targeting Moscow with drones
Russian forces never succeeded in taking Kyiv. But both GUR structures that the CIA funded were among dozens of key installations targeted in Russian strikes in the war’s first days, according to officials who said the facilities survived and continue to function.Ukraine’s new intelligence capabilities proved valuable from the start of the war. The SBU, for example, obtained intelligence on high-value Russian targets, enabling strikes that killed several commanders and narrowly missed Russia’s top-ranked officer, Valery Gerasimov.
Over the past year, the security services’ missions have increasingly centered on targets not only behind enemy lines but well into Russia.
For the SBU, no target has been a higher priority than the Kerch Bridge that connects the Russian mainland to the annexed Crimean Peninsula. The bridge is a key military corridor and also carries such symbolic significance to Putin that he presided over its inauguration in 2018.
The SBU has hit the bridge twice over the past year, including an October 2022 bombing that killed five people and put a gaping hole in westbound traffic lanes.
Zelensky initially denied Ukrainian responsibility. But SBU director Malyuk described the operation in extraordinary detail in an interview earlier this year, acknowledging that his service had placed a powerful explosive inside a truck hauling industrial-size rolls of cellophane.
Like other SBU plots, the operation involved unwitting accomplices, including the truck driver killed in the explosion. “We went through seven circles of hell keeping so many people in the dark,” Malyuk said in an interview about the operation, which he said hinged on the susceptibility of “ordinary Russian smugglers.”
U.S. officials who had been notified in advance raised concerns about the attack, officials said, fearing Russian escalation. Those misgivings had presumably dissipated by the time the SBU launched a second strike on the bridge nine months later using naval drones that were developed as part of a top secret operation involving the CIA and other Western intelligence services.
Malyuk’s highly public account of the operation defies typical intelligence tradecraft but serves Kyiv’s need to claim successes and reflects an emerging rivalry with the GUR. Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, has made a habit of touting his agency’s achievements and taunting Moscow.
The two services overlap operationally to some degree, though officials said the SBU tends to pursue more complex missions with longer lead-times while the GUR tends to work at a faster tempo. Ukraine officials denied that either agency was directly involved in the September 2022 attack on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in the Baltic Sea, though U.S. and other Western intelligence agencies have concluded that Ukraine was linked to the plot.
The GUR has used its own fleet of drones to launch dozens of attacks on Russian soil, including strikes that have penetrated Russian air defenses to hit buildings in Moscow. Among them was a May 2023 operation that briefly set fire to a section of roof in the Kremlin.
Those strikes have involved both long-range drones launched from Ukrainian territory, as well as teams of operatives and partisans working inside Russia, officials said. Motors for some drones were purchased from Chinese suppliers with private funding that couldn’t be traced to Ukrainian sources, according to an official who said he was involved in the transactions.
Assassinations in Russia
GUR has also ventured into assassinations, officials said.In July, a former Russian submarine commander, Stanislav Rzhitsky, was shot four times in the chest and back in Krasnodar where he reportedly worked as a military recruiting officer. Rzhitsky, 42, was known to use the fitness app Strava to record his daily running routes, a practice that may have exposed his location.
The GUR issued a coy statement deflecting responsibility but citing precise details about the circumstances of Rzhitsky’s death, noting that “due to heavy rain the park was deserted” and there were no witnesses. Officials in Kyiv confirmed the GUR was responsible.
Even while acknowledging responsibility for such actions, Ukrainian officials claim the moral high ground against Russia. The SBU and GUR have sought to avoid harm to innocent bystanders even in lethal operations, officials said, while Russia’s scorched-earth raids and indiscriminate strikes have killed or injured thousands of civilians.
Security officials said that no major operation by the SBU or GUR proceeds without clearance — tacit or otherwise — from Zelensky. A spokesperson for Zelensky did not respond to requests for comment.
Skeptics nevertheless worry Ukraine’s use of targeted killings and drone strikes on Moscow high-rises help neither its cause against Russia nor its longer-term aspirations to join NATO and the E.U.
A senior Ukrainian official who worked closely with Western governments coordinating support for Ukraine said that attacks on noncombatants and bombings of Moscow buildings feed Putin’s false narrative that Ukraine posed a growing danger to ordinary Russians. “It plays into his lies that Ukrainians are coming for them,” the official said.
That view appears to be in the minority. Others see the attacks as boosting morale among besieged Ukrainians and achieving a degree of vigilante accountability for alleged Russian war crimes that many Ukrainians are skeptical will ever lead to adequate sanctions from the United Nations and international courts.
Russian officials investigate the scene after the car bombing that killed Dugina in 2022. (Russian Investigative Committee/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)
The car bombing that killed Dugina last year continues to stand out as one of the more extreme cases of lethal revenge — one that not only targeted noncombatants but involved a Ukrainian woman and a presumably unwitting pre-teenage girl.
Russian authorities had barely finished clearing the debris when the FSB identified Natalia Vovk, 42, as the principal suspect. She had entered Russia from Estonia in July, according to the FSB, took an apartment in the same complex as Dugina, and spent weeks conducting surveillance before slipping back into Estonia with her daughter after the explosion occurred.
The FSB also identified an alleged accomplice who Russia alleged had provided Kazakh license plates for Vovk to use on her vehicle, a Mini Cooper, while traveling in Russia; helped assemble the explosive; and fled to Estonia before the attack.
Ukraine authorities said Vovk was motivated in part by Russia’s siege of her home city, Mariupol. They declined to comment on the nature of her relationship to the SBU or her current whereabouts.
The attack was intended to kill Dugin as he and his daughter departed a cultural festival where the pro-war ideologue, sometimes branded as “Putin’s brain,” had delivered a lecture. The two were expected to travel together, but Dugin stepped into a different vehicle. Vovk also attended the festival, according to the FSB.
At the time, Ukraine vigorously denounced involvement in the attack. “Ukraine has absolutely nothing to do with this, because we are not a criminal state like Russia, or a terrorist one at that,” said Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Zelensky.
Officials acknowledged in recent interviews in Kyiv, however, that those denials were false. They confirmed that the SBU planned and executed the operation, and said that while Dugin may have been the principal target, his daughter — also a vocal supporter of the invasion — was no innocent victim.
“She is the daughter of the father of Russian propaganda,” a security official said. The car bombing and other operations inside Russia are “about narrative,” showing enemies of Ukraine that “punishment is imminent even for those who think they are untouchable.”
Shane Harris in Washington and Mary Ilyushina in Riga, Latvia, contributed to this report.
teknohippi
Kenraali
Tähän voi vain todeta että tämä on viestintää. Viesti joka menee perille puttelille ja ennenkaikkea hänen hovilleen. Eiköhän näiden muutamien iskujen jälkeen ole todettu että jos olet julkinen keulakuva z-aatteelle niin sitten henkilön suojeluun palaa runsaasti resursseja&ruplia. Samalla nämä erilaiset ryssän vannabee julkikset ovat vähän sulkeneet suitaan eivätkä suitsuta z-aatteen ja puttelismin riemua niin julkisesti. Kyllä siellä on viesti ymmärretty.
-TripleX-
Ylipäällikkö
Tästähän on kätevä arvioida sodan hintaa ryssille.
Jos jako olisi 50/50 niin 5000 t POL ja 5000 t ammuksia per päivä maksaisi:
5000 t × 500 €
/t= 2500000 € polttoaineisiin
5000 000 kg / 80 kg/laatikko x 2 sarjalaukausta per laatikko = 125000 (152 mm laukausta x 2000 € per laukaus= 250 000 000 € eli 250 miljoonaa euroa Eihän ryssät ole noin paljon ampuneet missään vaiheessa tykeillään, mutta Shoigu tarkoittikin kaikkea joten tämä antaa vain suuntia.
Taitaa olla polttoaineen osuus hiukan suurempi kuin ammusten, mutta tästä jo näkee että kymmeniä jos ei satoja miljoonia menee Putlerilla päivittäin sotansa ruokkimiseen.
Tuo polttoaineen kulutuskin on sitä luokkaa, että 20000 ajoneuvoa kaikki kuluttaisivat noin 250 l joka ainoa päivä. On se mahdollista, lukuisat generaattorit, lentokoneet, laivat tuohon mukaan niin ei ole halpaa lystiä.
Antares
Respected Leader
Mielenkiintoinen datapiste, olettaen että pitää paikkansa: viimeisen 12 kuukauden aikana ryssä hyökännyt Kiovaa vastaan yli 300 risteilyohjuksella, 14 ballistisella ohjuksella ja melkein 400 Shahed-136/131 dronella.
Mikä tarkoittaa että kaikki muut ohjuslaukaisut ja dronet on käytetty muita kohteita vastaan:
Over the last 12 month alone, Russia has attacked Kyiv with a total of over 300 cruise missiles, 14 ballistic missiles, and almost 400 Shahed drones.
Mikä tarkoittaa että kaikki muut ohjuslaukaisut ja dronet on käytetty muita kohteita vastaan:
Over the last 12 month alone, Russia has attacked Kyiv with a total of over 300 cruise missiles, 14 ballistic missiles, and almost 400 Shahed drones.
Korpijääkäri
Kapteeni
Samaa mieltä. Kyllä tuo etelä-ukraina pitäs ottaa tavoitteeksi ja ensi kesänä painella mustallemerelle. Helppoa se ei tule olemaan jotain uutta pitää keksiä miinakenttien läpäisemiseksi.Joo ei nuo kovin hääppöisiä tulokset 6kk vastahyökkäyksellä olleet. Jos ei vielä jotain puskua
Sodanjohtajana olisin vetänyt all-in Tokmak Melitopol välille.
Toivottavasti nyt Hersonin alueella Dneprin rantaa saadaan haltuun ennen talvea.
Katso liite: 85754
Muutoin ukrainan pitäisi panostaa myös nykyisten asemien pitämiseen suosien vahvaa linnoittamista ja miinoja pitää kylvää erittäin paljon.
Rankka kertomus Avdiivkan taisteluista poterotasolla. Mielenkiintoisin yksityiskohta olisi että Bradleytä olisi käytetty vetäytymisen tukemiseen. Osia 47. mekanisoidusta tuolla? Käsittääkseni se olisi jo vedetty Robotynen suunnalta osittain lepäämään. Mene ja tiedä.
Ilmeisesti tämä 47. prikaati tosiaan on tuolla (osittain, kokonaan, ei voi tietää), koska muutama päivä sitten tullut video Bradleystä olisi nimenomaan Avdiivkan luoteispuolelta (tämä oli jo täällä, tiedän).
Avdiivka.This is quite a story from Oleg Sentsov, the Ukrainian filmmaker (formerly imprisoned by Russia), now in the UAF.I will paste the whole text from the link below.On October 19th, "we repelled a major assault on the hottest frontline right now. The first group, where I was, managed to gain a foothold in the enemy's trench and immediately engaged in battle on two fronts. The second group also went in, into another trench, eliminated the enemy, but reserve forces brought up by the enemy drove them back out. The third group endured fierce combat and was almost completely killed right at the start of the operation.The orcs were pushing wave after wave of infantry and armored groups, which were largely destroyed by our artillery, drones, and a tank. Of course, the overall picture on this front was much broader, especially when you watch it on livestreams - they say the Russian offensive yesterday was massive. But I saw it all from a smashed-up trench, and the view there isn't great, though there are plenty of other sensations.The enemy infantry was unable to dislodge us, though they squeezed us into a 50-meter strip. The contest of who had more grenades continued. The roar of their armor emboldened the enemy, so shouts of "Surrender!" rang out from both flanks constantly. Out of 13 fighters we had one seriously wounded and several lightly wounded. Then a fragment from an underbarrel grenade launcher caught me under the ribs. It became clear that we were not only unable to accomplish our mission, but also wouldn't last until nightfall.And then we saw a column of enemy tanks barreling right for us along the landing zone. There were six of them, festooned with infantry hanging off them like monkeys in trees. Would I say I got scared? Not exactly. I just vividly realized that death was coming. The only thing I could order was for everyone to take cover, hoping they wouldn't spot us, though I was certain they were making right for us.The lead tank was firing chaotically onto the landing zone, the others following behind. The column was passing our trench, and we opened up on the dismounts of the rearmost vehicles, as we had no antitank weapons left. The tank crews didn't notice us, and the orcs riding atop had no way to report contact. At the edge of the landing zone, the column turned around and headed back. We exchanged fire with their dismounts again (with unpleasant results for some), grasped that this enemy may have a different objective than hunting for our group. Then came the order to pull out.We got lucky. We got lucky many times that day. Including when we escaped that encirclement under cover of two Bradleys that came for us. But not everyone who took part in this operation was so fortunate. Hope still remains that someone from the other groups was captured, or is wandering the landing areas - searches are ongoing.Today there's lots of video and statistics about enemy losses (on October 20th the General Staff reported approximately 1380 enemies destroyed). Lots of rejoicing that we bloodied the enemy again. But there are no statistics about what sacrifices this costs us. Behind every number is someone's life and a universe of grieving loved ones left in ruins. This sorrow remains mostly with the families of the fallen and their comrades-in-arms. Eternal memory to the fallen heroes..."
Viimeksi muokattu:
Tämä on asia joka ei lakkaa minua ihmetyttämästä. Orban on kuin pahainen luokan häirikkö, jonka takia kukaan ei opi mitään. Näille löydettiin kyllä ainakin ennen lääke. Tietämättä sen enempää mitä EU:n pykälät sanoo, niin vaikuttaa siltä, että EU on Orbanin Unkarin suhteen kädetön, jalaton ja munaton. Potkaiskaa nyt Orban sinne itäisen maan tietäjän kaveriksi, prkl sentään. Haluan kuitenkin uskoa, että Unkarin kansa ei ole yhtä kuin Viktor Orban ja hänen ajatuksensa. Vastenmielinen olio.
Antares
Respected Leader
Tämän mukaan ryssällä olisi tällä hetkellä yli 400 000 sotilasta Ukrainassa:
"Russia has concentrated more than 400 thousand soldiers on the territory of Ukraine. At the same time, mobilization continues in Russia , which lasted the entire summer period", - Yusov
-
Lainasin aikaisemmin Afganistanin sodan numeroita. Neuvostoliitolla oli huippuvuosina 81 800 sotilasta Afganistanissa. Lainattujen numeroiden perusteella ja Shoigun kertoman mukaan päivittäinen materiaalintarve olisi yli viisi kertaa suurempi.
81 800 x 5 = 409 000
Tosin, kuten sanottua, nämä kaksi sotaa ovat hyvin erilaisia materiaalintarpeeltaan. JA Shoigun numerot voivat olla mitä sattuu.
Silti kiehtovaa nähdä, että näin karkeasti laskien päästään samoihin numeroihin. Liekö sitten sattumaa vain, tiedäpä näistä.
-
MUOKKAUS: Shoigun haastattelussa oli hieman tulkinnanvaraista, tarkoittiko 10-15 tuhatta tonnia pelkästään POL+ammukset vai kaikkea tarviketta. Artikkelin tekstin käännöksessä näytti siltä että tämä ei ole ihan selvää.
Joka tapauksessa, voidaan laskea eri numeroiden perusteella, mikä olisi keskiarvoinen materiaalintarve per sotilas (nämä ovat tietysti vain karkeita keskiarvoja, eri joukkojen välillä on valtavia eroja kulutuksessa ja sama joukko kuluttaa valtavasti eri määrän riippuen siitä, mitä tekevät ja miten kauan):
10 000 000 / 400 000 = 25 kg per mies per päivä
12 500 000 / 400 000 = 31,25 kg per mies per päivä
15 000 000 / 400 000 = 37,5 kg per mies per päivä
18 750 000 / 400 000 = 46,875 kg per mies per päivä
Tosiaan, riippuen miten haastattelua tulkitsee, saa hieman erilaiset vaihteluvälit. Sanoisin että vähemmän kuin mitä kuvittelin, tosin tässä on hurjasti vaihtelua: raskas, monipäiväinen panssaroidun ja mekanisoidun yksikön hyökkäys kuluttaa aivan erilaisen määrän kaikkea kuin jalkaväkiprikaati puolustamassa juoksuhautaa.
Molemmat kuluttavat osansa ja toki pitkä aikaväli tasaa kulutuksen piikkejä. Samoin joukkojen suuri määrä: läheskään kaikki eivät ole hyökkääviä panssarivaunuprikaateja.
-
Aikaisemmin oli puhetta kulutuksesta per sotilas per päivä, lainaan pari pätkää omasta vanhasta viestistäni (lähteet löytyvät linkistä): LÄHDE
RAND:in arvio 200 kg per sotilas per päivä olettaa oikean, raskaan panssaroidun + mekanisoidun joukon hyökkäyksen, mistä syystä kulutus on huomattavan suurta. Tästä määrästä suuri osa on tietysti POL eli petroleum, oil and lubricants eli kaikkea mitä ajoneuvot tarvitsevat liikkuakseen. Koska kyseessä on väkivaltainen hyökkäys, ammuskulutus on myös suurta, mikä näkyy painossa. Näiden jälkeen tulee tietysti sotilaiden tarpeet eli ruoka, vesi yms.
Suyi kertoo että kiinalaisten 1980-luvulla tekemät laskelmat olettivat Neuvostoliiton sotajoukkojen kulutuksen olevan 70 kg per sotilas per päivä, tosin myöntää että kiinalaiset usein yliarvioivat sen joukon koon, minkä huoltamisen Neuvostoliitto kykeni organisoimaan Siperian radan varrella. Joukkojen koko yliarvioitu, mistä seuraa se että yksittäisen sotilaan "kulutus" on aliarvioitu. Tässäkin puhutaan mekanisoidusta joukosta.
Toki näissä lainauksissa on kyse eräänlaisesta huippukulutuksesta, jota sitten tasaavat rauhallisemmat päivät välissä. Vaikea sanoa, millainen olisi pitkän aikavälin kulutus - varsinkin jos mekanisoidut ja panssaroidut joukot operoivat aina silloin tällöin.
Afganistanin sodasta kerrottiin että 2 000 - 3 000 tonnia per päivä ja joukkojen määrä 81,800 neukkusotilasta, joista 61,800 oli taistelevissa joukoissa (combat units of the ground and air forces), joten keskiarvoinen kulutus oli:
2 000 000 / 81 800 = 24,45 kg per mies per päivä
3 000 000 / 81 800 = 36,67 kg per mies per päivä
Pitäisin hieman outona, jos Ukrainan sodan ja Afganistanin sodan keskikulutukset olisivat käytännössä samat. Joko Shoigun numerot ovat mitä sattuu tai sitten tosiaan niistä pitää valita ainakin ne suuremmat vaihteluväliksi eli 31,25 - 46,875 kg per mies per päivä - ja silti nämä kuulostavat liian pieniltä, kun miettii millainen määrä panssarivaunuja ja muita koneita heillä on Ukrainassa.
"Russia has concentrated more than 400 thousand soldiers on the territory of Ukraine. At the same time, mobilization continues in Russia , which lasted the entire summer period", - Yusov
-
Lainasin aikaisemmin Afganistanin sodan numeroita. Neuvostoliitolla oli huippuvuosina 81 800 sotilasta Afganistanissa. Lainattujen numeroiden perusteella ja Shoigun kertoman mukaan päivittäinen materiaalintarve olisi yli viisi kertaa suurempi.
81 800 x 5 = 409 000
Tosin, kuten sanottua, nämä kaksi sotaa ovat hyvin erilaisia materiaalintarpeeltaan. JA Shoigun numerot voivat olla mitä sattuu.
Silti kiehtovaa nähdä, että näin karkeasti laskien päästään samoihin numeroihin. Liekö sitten sattumaa vain, tiedäpä näistä.
-
MUOKKAUS: Shoigun haastattelussa oli hieman tulkinnanvaraista, tarkoittiko 10-15 tuhatta tonnia pelkästään POL+ammukset vai kaikkea tarviketta. Artikkelin tekstin käännöksessä näytti siltä että tämä ei ole ihan selvää.
Joka tapauksessa, voidaan laskea eri numeroiden perusteella, mikä olisi keskiarvoinen materiaalintarve per sotilas (nämä ovat tietysti vain karkeita keskiarvoja, eri joukkojen välillä on valtavia eroja kulutuksessa ja sama joukko kuluttaa valtavasti eri määrän riippuen siitä, mitä tekevät ja miten kauan):
10 000 000 / 400 000 = 25 kg per mies per päivä
12 500 000 / 400 000 = 31,25 kg per mies per päivä
15 000 000 / 400 000 = 37,5 kg per mies per päivä
18 750 000 / 400 000 = 46,875 kg per mies per päivä
Tosiaan, riippuen miten haastattelua tulkitsee, saa hieman erilaiset vaihteluvälit. Sanoisin että vähemmän kuin mitä kuvittelin, tosin tässä on hurjasti vaihtelua: raskas, monipäiväinen panssaroidun ja mekanisoidun yksikön hyökkäys kuluttaa aivan erilaisen määrän kaikkea kuin jalkaväkiprikaati puolustamassa juoksuhautaa.
Molemmat kuluttavat osansa ja toki pitkä aikaväli tasaa kulutuksen piikkejä. Samoin joukkojen suuri määrä: läheskään kaikki eivät ole hyökkääviä panssarivaunuprikaateja.
-
Aikaisemmin oli puhetta kulutuksesta per sotilas per päivä, lainaan pari pätkää omasta vanhasta viestistäni (lähteet löytyvät linkistä): LÄHDE
RAND:in arvio 200 kg per sotilas per päivä olettaa oikean, raskaan panssaroidun + mekanisoidun joukon hyökkäyksen, mistä syystä kulutus on huomattavan suurta. Tästä määrästä suuri osa on tietysti POL eli petroleum, oil and lubricants eli kaikkea mitä ajoneuvot tarvitsevat liikkuakseen. Koska kyseessä on väkivaltainen hyökkäys, ammuskulutus on myös suurta, mikä näkyy painossa. Näiden jälkeen tulee tietysti sotilaiden tarpeet eli ruoka, vesi yms.
Suyi kertoo että kiinalaisten 1980-luvulla tekemät laskelmat olettivat Neuvostoliiton sotajoukkojen kulutuksen olevan 70 kg per sotilas per päivä, tosin myöntää että kiinalaiset usein yliarvioivat sen joukon koon, minkä huoltamisen Neuvostoliitto kykeni organisoimaan Siperian radan varrella. Joukkojen koko yliarvioitu, mistä seuraa se että yksittäisen sotilaan "kulutus" on aliarvioitu. Tässäkin puhutaan mekanisoidusta joukosta.
Toki näissä lainauksissa on kyse eräänlaisesta huippukulutuksesta, jota sitten tasaavat rauhallisemmat päivät välissä. Vaikea sanoa, millainen olisi pitkän aikavälin kulutus - varsinkin jos mekanisoidut ja panssaroidut joukot operoivat aina silloin tällöin.
Afganistanin sodasta kerrottiin että 2 000 - 3 000 tonnia per päivä ja joukkojen määrä 81,800 neukkusotilasta, joista 61,800 oli taistelevissa joukoissa (combat units of the ground and air forces), joten keskiarvoinen kulutus oli:
2 000 000 / 81 800 = 24,45 kg per mies per päivä
3 000 000 / 81 800 = 36,67 kg per mies per päivä
Pitäisin hieman outona, jos Ukrainan sodan ja Afganistanin sodan keskikulutukset olisivat käytännössä samat. Joko Shoigun numerot ovat mitä sattuu tai sitten tosiaan niistä pitää valita ainakin ne suuremmat vaihteluväliksi eli 31,25 - 46,875 kg per mies per päivä - ja silti nämä kuulostavat liian pieniltä, kun miettii millainen määrä panssarivaunuja ja muita koneita heillä on Ukrainassa.
Viimeksi muokattu:
weasel
Kapteeni
Jotakin kivaa Saksasta tulossa/kuulumassa. Lähdettä en löytänyt Kuleban viimeaikaisista sanomisista, mutta sen verran on ajatuksia herättävä, että laitetaan jakoon muillekin.
Edit: Yksi linkki lisätty ja pala g-käännöstä:
The Minister of Foreign Affairs refused to give details, but assured that tomorrow everything will be known.
On Tuesday, October 24, Germany announces good news for Ukraine. This was stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba on the air of the telethon on Monday, October 23.
Viimeksi muokattu:
ATACMS-toimitus saanut Taurukset liikkeelle?