Ukrainan konflikti/sota
Antares
Respected Leader
MUOKKAUS: ilmeisesti video on kuvattu syyskuussa 2023 (jolloin operaatio tapahtui) eli ei ole tuore tapaus, videon julkaisu on toki tuore.
Toinen twitter-tili kirjoittaa tästä näin:
«DETAILS OF SPECIAL OPERATION "CITADEL"
According to intelligence, one of the illegally seized mining platforms was used by the Russians to enhance the operation of the Iranian-made Mohajer-6 unmanned aerial vehicle. Namely, they installed equipment that increases the range and radius of its operation. This UAV was used by the enemy for reconnaissance and subsequent strikes with Shahed kamikaze drones on critical infrastructure facilities in the south of Ukraine. In addition, the enemy installed a radar station for detecting surface objects (from motor boats to ships) "Neva-B" on the platform. With the help of this radar, the Russians controlled the situation in the northwestern part of the Black Sea. After careful planning and preparation, the group of the 73rd SOF Marine Center began the task of destroying enemy facilities. The special operation was carried out in the zone of constant patrolling by the Russian aviation and navy. At night, the boats of the 73rd Marine Center came close to the mining platform. After carrying out special actions and cleaning, the object was demined. The combat group withdrew to a safe distance and blew up the enemy target. As a result, important enemy equipment was captured and a mast with an antenna was blown up. The successfully conducted special operation ensured safer movement of ships and limited the enemy's capabilities in the northwestern part of the Black Sea.»https://t.me/ukr_sof/932
Viimeksi muokattu:
SBU:n joukoista löytyny jokunen kaksoisagentti
www.pravda.com.ua
Several Ukrainian security service officials revealed to be Russian double agents â photo
The Security Service of Ukraine has neutralised an agent network of the Russian FSB, which included former and current officials of Ukraineâs security services.
www.pravda.com.ua
teknohippi
Ylipäällikkö
Selittäisikö tämä miksi ruohonleikkuripommeja ei ole isommin lennellyt pariin päivään?Toinen twitter-tili kirjoittaa tästä näin:
«DETAILS OF SPECIAL OPERATION "CITADEL"
https://t.me/ukr_sof/932
Sinällään uutinen käy järkeen, eli ruohonleikkuripommi tarvitsee jonkin tavan navigoida maaliin. Kunnon innertiaan ei ole varaa joten jäljelle jää erilaiset radiosuuntimat kuten:
-Sateliittinavigointi, tämä on blokattu häirinnällä
-GSM mastojen mukaan navigointi, tämä paljastui taannoin ja Ukraina osannee sammutella mastot tms. eston
-Tutkaseuranta ja jokin radiolinkki, tuo ylläoleva viesti haisee tälläiselle
Tutkaseurannan saa hyvinkin EW sietoiseksi kun käyttää tosiotutkvastaanotinta joka toimii IFF tyylisesti ja vain halutulla hetkellä. Näin radiospectriä saa kuunnella aika pitkään ennenkuin toiminnallisuus paljastuu. Komennot kurssin korjaukseenkin voi välittää yksisuuntaisesti.
Ostan uutisen kyllä näillä argumenteilla ja havaittu tilanne viittaa kriittisen ruohonleikkuripommin infran vaurioon.
Antares
Respected Leader
Tämän mukaan kyseinen video on kuvattu syyskuussa 2023 (jolloin operaatio tapahtui) eli ei ole tuore tapaus, videon julkaisu on toki tuore:
Archival video (September of 2023) of AFU 73rd Maritime Special Operations Center (Special Operations Center South) commandos capturing and destroying one of the Boyko Towers gas production platforms in the Black Sea that was used by the Russians for surveillance
Butusov Plus: https://t.me/ButusovPlus/7913
Viimeksi muokattu:
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Vakaa Nero ei halua Ukraina -paketin läpimenoa. Ja MAGA-Johnson komppaa messiastaan.
www.is.fi
YHDYSVALTAIN entisen presidentin Donald Trumpin mukaan republikaanien olisi hylättävä esitys, jolla olisi määrä muun muassa jatkaa maan tukea Ukrainalle ja Israelille.
Esityksestä on kiistelty kuukausikaupalla demokraattien ja republikaanien välillä. Republikaanit ovat kytkeneet Ukrainan ja Israelin tuen jatkamisen Yhdysvaltain rajavalvonnan huomattavaan kiristämiseen.
– Älkää olko typeriä! Tarvitsemme erillisen rajavalvontaa ja siirtolaisuutta koskevan lakiesityksen. Sen ei pitäisi olla millään muodolla tai tavalla kytköksissä ulkomaiseen apuun, sanoi republikaanien presidenttiehdokkuutta tavoitteleva Trump maanantaina Truth Social -viestipalvelussaan.
– Tämä lakiesitys on valtava lahja demokraateille ja kuolontoive republikaaneille. Se panee demokraattien siirtolaisuus- ja rahakysymyksissä tekemän hirveän työn myös republikaanien vastuuksi, Trump jatkoi.
YHDYSVALTAIN edustajainhuoneen puhemies Mike Johnson tyrmäsi täysin senaatin julkaiseman tekstiluonnoksen. Hänen mukaansa edustajainhuone ei päästäisi pakettia läpi, jos ehdotus edes selviäisi edustajainhuoneeseen saakka.
Trump jyrähti lakiesityksestä, joka pitäisi sisällään apua Ukrainalle ja Israelille
Esitys kiristäisi samalla merkittävästi maahanmuuttolakeja Yhdysvalloissa. Kongressia hoputtanut presidentti Biden haluaa lakipaketin pöydälleen välittömästi.
www.is.fi
YHDYSVALTAIN entisen presidentin Donald Trumpin mukaan republikaanien olisi hylättävä esitys, jolla olisi määrä muun muassa jatkaa maan tukea Ukrainalle ja Israelille.
Esityksestä on kiistelty kuukausikaupalla demokraattien ja republikaanien välillä. Republikaanit ovat kytkeneet Ukrainan ja Israelin tuen jatkamisen Yhdysvaltain rajavalvonnan huomattavaan kiristämiseen.
– Älkää olko typeriä! Tarvitsemme erillisen rajavalvontaa ja siirtolaisuutta koskevan lakiesityksen. Sen ei pitäisi olla millään muodolla tai tavalla kytköksissä ulkomaiseen apuun, sanoi republikaanien presidenttiehdokkuutta tavoitteleva Trump maanantaina Truth Social -viestipalvelussaan.
– Tämä lakiesitys on valtava lahja demokraateille ja kuolontoive republikaaneille. Se panee demokraattien siirtolaisuus- ja rahakysymyksissä tekemän hirveän työn myös republikaanien vastuuksi, Trump jatkoi.
YHDYSVALTAIN edustajainhuoneen puhemies Mike Johnson tyrmäsi täysin senaatin julkaiseman tekstiluonnoksen. Hänen mukaansa edustajainhuone ei päästäisi pakettia läpi, jos ehdotus edes selviäisi edustajainhuoneeseen saakka.
hyvä, lahtinen! ei tänne ylimääräistä paskaa kaivata.
Yheksän miltsiä on ihan pähkinöitä, jos sieltä miljoonaluokan ammustoimitus on tehty. Miljardejahan se kokoluokka taaloissa olisi. Mikä lie puliveivaus?
Eiköhän nuo ole saaneet ohjustekniikkaan liittyvää konsultointia? Pohjois-Korean track record niissä ohjuslaukaisuissa on niin paska, että jopa ryssän apu on edistystä.
Kun jotain isompaa tapahtuu, jossa on mukana vaikkapa ukrainalaisten erikoisjoukot, niin miksi ette koita tarkistaa asiaa vaikka ukrainalaisten erikoisjoukkojen X/Youtube/Instagram/Telegram-tileiltä? Ei tarvitse arvuutella puhuuko joku anonyymi twitteröijä kukkua vai ei.
SPECIAL OPERATION "CITADEL": the SSO blew up an important facility of the Russian Federation in the Black Sea
SPECIAL OPERATION "CITADEL": the SSO blew up an important facility of the Russian Federation in the Black Sea
Antares
Respected Leader
Hyvin mielenkiintoista, jos totta: kova hinta yhdellä Shahed-136 dronella mutta näin se menee jos on myyjän markkinat ja epätoivoinen ostaja (HUOM: Shahed-131 dronen hinnasta ei ole mainintaa, kuten ei muistakaan droneista kuten Mojaher-3).
Muistan nähneeni hinta-arvioita jotka ovat 40 000 - 60 000 dollaria per drone eli monta kertaa pienempi kuin tässä kerrotut.
Wikipedia on tietysti mitä on, mutta sieltä löytyy lähdeviittausta kera tällainen hinta-arvio / vaihteluväli HESA Shahed 136 -artikkelista: LÄHDE
Ukrainan torjuntailmoituksissa kerrotaan että on torjuttu "Shahed-136/131 drone" eli ei voida olla varmoja, mikä määrä kumpaakin on laukaistu / torjuttu. Ryssä on jatkanut molempien käyttöä (todistetusti) vaikka ovatkin väitetysti kokeneet että raskaampi Shahed-136 on selvästi kevyempää Shahed-131 dronea parempi:
Group of hackers hacked the mail servers of the Iranian company IRGC Sahara Thunder.
Iranians asked Russians for a price of [...] for one Shahed-136. Iranians earned $1.8 billion.
$193k for 1 UAV when purchasing 6000 units;
$290k for 1 UAV when purchasing 2000 units.
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MUOKKAUS: lisää samasta aiheesta:
Internal Iranian and Russian documents with interesting information regarding cooperation between the two countries in the production of UAVs have been leaked online.
The published documents contain data on:
- Shahed-238 (M237) kamikaze jet UAV with satellite guidance.
- The same Shahed-238, but with a thermal imaging optical-electronic guidance station (MC 236);
- Reconnaissance and kamikaze UAVs Shahed-107B and Shahed-107C;
- Kamikaze UAV Shahed-101P.
In addition, the leaked data contains information about the places and methods of production of UAVs, concluded contracts, channels of their supply to Russia, transportation methods, etc. which is a colossal gap in information security.
The documents do not directly mention the type of product being manufactured. Instead, UAVs are listed in documents under a special code as "Dolphin 632 type motor boat."
According to the papers, by 2022, Russia intended to produce 6,000 Iranian UAVs under license at its facilities for 2.5 years.
The total price of the production contract, including the transfer of technologies, equipment, 6,000 sets of UAVs, software, is 108.5 billion rubles ($1.75 billion).
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MUOKKAUS: olisipa mielenkiintoista päästä lukemaan näitä dokumentteja vaan en onnistunut toistaiseksi löytämään kun tein muutaman haun Yandexilla ja Googlella. Toivottavasti tulee jossain vaiheessa twitterissä tai muilla palstoilla linkki vastaan.
LISÄYS: suora linkki yhteen pdf-tiedostoon (internet kyseessä joten jokainen omalla vastuulla): https://simorgh.io/files/Ноябрь_2022 г. Иран.pdf
Tuosta linkistä aukesi lyhyt 3-sivuinen pdf jossa kyrillistä tekstiä, tässä tekstin konekäännös (HUOM: tämä kuulostaa kovasti samalta kuin viime vuoden Washington Post -artikkelin data, liekö jopa sama kyseessä tai muuten vain samanlaista asiaa mutta ehkä uusin maustein?):
Linkin lähde: https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/stalo-vidomo-skilky-koshtuye-shahed-136-dlya-rosiyi/
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MUOKKAUS 2: tällainen löytyi: https://irancybernews.org/irgc-front-company-sahara-thunder-hacked-by-prana-network/
On 4 February 2024, PRANA Network announced that they had successfully hacked the email servers of an IRGC front company called Sahara Thunder who are facilitating the illegal sale of weapons from Iran to Russia.
This data which is nearly 10Gb of files, includes contracts of multi million dollar deals, payments with gold bars, plans for UAVs (seen below), details of an agent in UAE called GENERATION TRADING FZE, a company called ALABUGA, bank account details, factory layouts etc.
We received this email yesterday showing the group had infiltrated Sahara Thunder’s emails.
PRANA Network later confirmed this was their work and that after stealing the data, they emailed Sahara Thunder’s customers, journalists and news agencies to inform them of the data leak and that the stolen data had been uploaded to simorgh.io for the whole world to see.
PRANA Network also confirmed that they deleted all emails from Sahara Thunder’s inbox as well as a list of contacts. They even went further and left a task to “Find your stolen data” and calendar appointments to “expect us”.
We are stilling going through all the data and will publish a more in depth report soon. If you can help let us know what you find by email [email protected]
Muistan nähneeni hinta-arvioita jotka ovat 40 000 - 60 000 dollaria per drone eli monta kertaa pienempi kuin tässä kerrotut.
Wikipedia on tietysti mitä on, mutta sieltä löytyy lähdeviittausta kera tällainen hinta-arvio / vaihteluväli HESA Shahed 136 -artikkelista: LÄHDE
Ukrainan torjuntailmoituksissa kerrotaan että on torjuttu "Shahed-136/131 drone" eli ei voida olla varmoja, mikä määrä kumpaakin on laukaistu / torjuttu. Ryssä on jatkanut molempien käyttöä (todistetusti) vaikka ovatkin väitetysti kokeneet että raskaampi Shahed-136 on selvästi kevyempää Shahed-131 dronea parempi:
Group of hackers hacked the mail servers of the Iranian company IRGC Sahara Thunder.
Iranians asked Russians for a price of [...] for one Shahed-136. Iranians earned $1.8 billion.
$193k for 1 UAV when purchasing 6000 units;$290k for 1 UAV when purchasing 2000 units.-
MUOKKAUS: lisää samasta aiheesta:
Internal Iranian and Russian documents with interesting information regarding cooperation between the two countries in the production of UAVs have been leaked online.
The published documents contain data on:
- Shahed-238 (M237) kamikaze jet UAV with satellite guidance.
- The same Shahed-238, but with a thermal imaging optical-electronic guidance station (MC 236);
- Reconnaissance and kamikaze UAVs Shahed-107B and Shahed-107C;
- Kamikaze UAV Shahed-101P.
In addition, the leaked data contains information about the places and methods of production of UAVs, concluded contracts, channels of their supply to Russia, transportation methods, etc. which is a colossal gap in information security.
The documents do not directly mention the type of product being manufactured. Instead, UAVs are listed in documents under a special code as "Dolphin 632 type motor boat."
According to the papers, by 2022, Russia intended to produce 6,000 Iranian UAVs under license at its facilities for 2.5 years.
The total price of the production contract, including the transfer of technologies, equipment, 6,000 sets of UAVs, software, is 108.5 billion rubles ($1.75 billion).
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LISÄYS: suora linkki yhteen pdf-tiedostoon (internet kyseessä joten jokainen omalla vastuulla): https://simorgh.io/files/Ноябрь_2022 г. Иран.pdf
Tuosta linkistä aukesi lyhyt 3-sivuinen pdf jossa kyrillistä tekstiä, tässä tekstin konekäännös (HUOM: tämä kuulostaa kovasti samalta kuin viime vuoden Washington Post -artikkelin data, liekö jopa sama kyseessä tai muuten vain samanlaista asiaa mutta ehkä uusin maustein?):
During the period from November 5 to November 14, 2022, the delegation of Alabuga JSC including specialists in airframes, avionics, engines and IT visited the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
Goal: acquisition of technology for the production of boats such as Dolphin 632 and components for its speedy localization in the Russian Federation in the amount of 6,000 pieces.
During the visit the following factories were visited:
1. avionics
2. engines
3. gliders
4. assembly production and quality control.
Due to the threat of airstrikes, all factories have two dispersed backups in Iran, the final assembly is located in a secret tunnel under a mountain near Tehran.
Due to the sanctions regime, 90% localization of all components. The imported components used apply only to public, not unique.
Avionics plant:
At the input there is a two-layer substrate, on which on an automated line components made in Korea and China are installed, then avionics elements are assembled from boards (flight control system, power distribution and others).
The board architecture and software were developed independently by the Iranian side.
The TMS 320F28335 processor is not unique and is freely available, for example, in quantity of 10,000 pcs in stock in the Russian Federation.
Capacity is approximately 10,000 boards per year.
Engine plant:
At the entrance are aluminum and steel ingots, then foundry equipment made in China. Further 24 machining machines (3 and 5 axis machines with CNC, turning, milling production of China, Iran, Germany, Taiwan).
Localization 90% with the exception of simple spark plugs of the People's Republic of China and bearings France (available in stores in the Russian Federation).
Detailed documentation of the MD-550 engine in the program was examined
SolidWorks and step-by-step assembly instructions. The plant also produces jet and other engines.
Capacity is approximately 5000 engines per year.
Glider Factory:
At the entrance there is carbon fiber and glass fiber fabric made in China (also produced in Alabuga) HoneyComb Nomex honeycombs, epoxy resin.
Equipment 24 matrices.
The technology is simple and not automated.
Capacity is approximately 500 gliders per year.
An agreement was concluded stipulating:
1. Transfer of technology, design documentation, source code Dolphin632 project.
Glider 632
Engine MD-550
Avionics system:
⁃ AirData navigation system
⁃ FCU flight control system
⁃ Sadro inertial navigation system
⁃ Nassir-2 anti-jamming system
Ground command center
JATO 632 rocket booster
Bumper M632.
Supply of all necessary equipment for 90% localization of production 2400 boats per year (only processors, spark plugs and bearings, all readily available in the Russian Federation in stock, taking into account availability in Alabuga fiberglass and carbon fiber).
6000 components to assemble over 2.5 years.
Full localization schedule:
Transfer of source documentation including source code - on the day of receipt advance
Glider from 4 months.
Avionics engine from 12 months.
Rocket launch system, bumper from 16 months.
Supply of components:
During the first 3 months, 100 sets per month.
4-30 months 211 sets per month.
Spare parts for 6,000 boats in full supply for 30 months.
The first 10 sets will be transferred on the day of the advance and can be assembled in Alabuga for 10 days.
The agreement provides for the training of 300,000 man-hours in Iran and 300,000 man-hours in Alabuga.
The Iranian side announced a starting price of 23 million rubles per piece (375 thousand dollars per piece).
During the negotiations, an agreement was reached at the level of 12 million rubles per 6000 pieces (193 thousand dollars per piece) (either 18 million rubles or 290 thousand dollars for 2000 PC).
Total contract price (technology, equipment, 6000 sets, initial code) is 108.5 billion rubles (1 billion 750 million dollars).
The cost of 6000 products is 72 billion rubles, 50% advance is 36 billion rubles.
Investments of JSC Alabuga amount to 48 billion rubles (36 billion rubles + 12 billion rubles complex of buildings and structures).
To accommodate production, 160,000 sq. m of ready-made facilities are required production areas.
After technology transfer it is planned scaling production to 10,000 boats per year.
Republic of Iran.
Goal: acquisition of technology for the production of boats such as Dolphin 632 and components for its speedy localization in the Russian Federation in the amount of 6,000 pieces.
During the visit the following factories were visited:
1. avionics
2. engines
3. gliders
4. assembly production and quality control.
Due to the threat of airstrikes, all factories have two dispersed backups in Iran, the final assembly is located in a secret tunnel under a mountain near Tehran.
Due to the sanctions regime, 90% localization of all components. The imported components used apply only to public, not unique.
Avionics plant:
At the input there is a two-layer substrate, on which on an automated line components made in Korea and China are installed, then avionics elements are assembled from boards (flight control system, power distribution and others).
The board architecture and software were developed independently by the Iranian side.
The TMS 320F28335 processor is not unique and is freely available, for example, in quantity of 10,000 pcs in stock in the Russian Federation.
Capacity is approximately 10,000 boards per year.
Engine plant:
At the entrance are aluminum and steel ingots, then foundry equipment made in China. Further 24 machining machines (3 and 5 axis machines with CNC, turning, milling production of China, Iran, Germany, Taiwan).
Localization 90% with the exception of simple spark plugs of the People's Republic of China and bearings France (available in stores in the Russian Federation).
Detailed documentation of the MD-550 engine in the program was examined
SolidWorks and step-by-step assembly instructions. The plant also produces jet and other engines.
Capacity is approximately 5000 engines per year.
Glider Factory:
At the entrance there is carbon fiber and glass fiber fabric made in China (also produced in Alabuga) HoneyComb Nomex honeycombs, epoxy resin.
Equipment 24 matrices.
The technology is simple and not automated.
Capacity is approximately 500 gliders per year.
An agreement was concluded stipulating:
1. Transfer of technology, design documentation, source code Dolphin632 project.
Glider 632
Engine MD-550
Avionics system:
⁃ AirData navigation system
⁃ FCU flight control system
⁃ Sadro inertial navigation system
⁃ Nassir-2 anti-jamming system
Ground command center
JATO 632 rocket booster
Bumper M632.
Supply of all necessary equipment for 90% localization of production 2400 boats per year (only processors, spark plugs and bearings, all readily available in the Russian Federation in stock, taking into account availability in Alabuga fiberglass and carbon fiber).
6000 components to assemble over 2.5 years.
Full localization schedule:
Transfer of source documentation including source code - on the day of receipt advance
Glider from 4 months.
Avionics engine from 12 months.
Rocket launch system, bumper from 16 months.
Supply of components:
During the first 3 months, 100 sets per month.
4-30 months 211 sets per month.
Spare parts for 6,000 boats in full supply for 30 months.
The first 10 sets will be transferred on the day of the advance and can be assembled in Alabuga for 10 days.
The agreement provides for the training of 300,000 man-hours in Iran and 300,000 man-hours in Alabuga.
The Iranian side announced a starting price of 23 million rubles per piece (375 thousand dollars per piece).
During the negotiations, an agreement was reached at the level of 12 million rubles per 6000 pieces (193 thousand dollars per piece) (either 18 million rubles or 290 thousand dollars for 2000 PC).
Total contract price (technology, equipment, 6000 sets, initial code) is 108.5 billion rubles (1 billion 750 million dollars).
The cost of 6000 products is 72 billion rubles, 50% advance is 36 billion rubles.
Investments of JSC Alabuga amount to 48 billion rubles (36 billion rubles + 12 billion rubles complex of buildings and structures).
To accommodate production, 160,000 sq. m of ready-made facilities are required production areas.
After technology transfer it is planned scaling production to 10,000 boats per year.
Linkin lähde: https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/stalo-vidomo-skilky-koshtuye-shahed-136-dlya-rosiyi/
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MUOKKAUS 2: tällainen löytyi: https://irancybernews.org/irgc-front-company-sahara-thunder-hacked-by-prana-network/
IRGC Front Company Sahara Thunder Hacked by PRANA Network
1 day ago
On 4 February 2024, PRANA Network announced that they had successfully hacked the email servers of an IRGC front company called Sahara Thunder who are facilitating the illegal sale of weapons from Iran to Russia.
This data which is nearly 10Gb of files, includes contracts of multi million dollar deals, payments with gold bars, plans for UAVs (seen below), details of an agent in UAE called GENERATION TRADING FZE, a company called ALABUGA, bank account details, factory layouts etc.
We received this email yesterday showing the group had infiltrated Sahara Thunder’s emails.
PRANA Network later confirmed this was their work and that after stealing the data, they emailed Sahara Thunder’s customers, journalists and news agencies to inform them of the data leak and that the stolen data had been uploaded to simorgh.io for the whole world to see.
PRANA Network also confirmed that they deleted all emails from Sahara Thunder’s inbox as well as a list of contacts. They even went further and left a task to “Find your stolen data” and calendar appointments to “expect us”.
We are stilling going through all the data and will publish a more in depth report soon. If you can help let us know what you find by email [email protected]
Viimeksi muokattu:
Näissä tuotannon nostoissa on myös sekin puoli, että varastosta voidaan lohmaista vähän enempi, kun voidaan laskea riskiä, ettei niitä lyhyenä vajauksen aikana tarvita. Varsinkin Suomen osalta voitaisiin tuotannon kasvun myötä vajauttaa varastoja, kun niillä kuitenkin ammutaan samaa vihulaista...
Hanski
Respected Leader
Mekanisoidun pataljoonan taisteluosaston kalusto siirretty jälleen Stenalle, hyvä suoritus! Tällaiset panssarivaunujen päivätappiot olisivat loistavia, noin viisinkertaiset rysyjen kykyyn tuottaa rintamalle uusia vaunuja.Päivän luvut:
Antares
Respected Leader
Lisää tästä hakkeroidusta datasta (artikkeli julkaistu 6.2.2024):
The Prana Network hacker group breached the email servers of the Iranian company IRGC Sahara Thunder, that facilitates arms sales from Iran to Russia. The servers contained data on the production of Shahed-136 attack drones for Russia. The documents do not directly mention the type of product being manufactured. Instead, drones are listed in documents under a special code as "Dolphin 632 type motor boat."
The Iranian side announced a starting price of $375,000 per unit. However, during the negotiations, an agreement was reached for $193,000 per piece when ordering 6,000 units or $290,000 when ordering 2,000 units. The total price of the production contract, including the transfer of technologies, equipment, 6,000 pieces of UAVs and software, is roughly $1.75 billion. According to other published documents, at least partially, Russia conducts its financial transactions and payments with Iran in gold.
The Prana Network hacker group breached the email servers of the Iranian company IRGC Sahara Thunder, that facilitates arms sales from Iran to Russia. The servers contained data on the production of Shahed-136 attack drones for Russia. The documents do not directly mention the type of product being manufactured. Instead, drones are listed in documents under a special code as "Dolphin 632 type motor boat."
The Iranian side announced a starting price of $375,000 per unit. However, during the negotiations, an agreement was reached for $193,000 per piece when ordering 6,000 units or $290,000 when ordering 2,000 units. The total price of the production contract, including the transfer of technologies, equipment, 6,000 pieces of UAVs and software, is roughly $1.75 billion. According to other published documents, at least partially, Russia conducts its financial transactions and payments with Iran in gold.
February 6, 2024
Shahed-136 drone
A group of Prana Network hackers hacked the mail servers of the Iranian company IRGC Sahara Thunder, which contained a mass of data on the production of Shahed-136 attack drones for Russia.
The data were made public in the network.
On February 4, 2024, PRANA Network announced that they had successfully hacked the email servers of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps front company called Sahara Thunder, which facilitates the illegal arms sales from Iran to Russia.
Among the merged documentation on the localization of the production of Iranian attack drones in the special economic zone "Alabuga", Russia, information about the negotiation process was found, where the volumes of production and the cost of drones were noted.
According to the papers , by 2022, Russia intended to release 6,000 Iranian drones under license at its facilities for 2.5 years.
The Iranian side announced a starting price of 23 million rubles per unit ($375,000). However, during the negotiations, an agreement was reached at the level of 12 million rubles per board when ordering 6,000 units ($193,000) or 18 million rubles ($290,000) when ordering 2,000 units.
The total price of the production contract, including the transfer of technologies, equipment, 6,000 sets of UAVs, software, is 108.5 billion rubles ($1.75 billion).
However, this is only a forecast that may deviate in case of changes in planning and production.
At the same time, the cost of sale, that is, the price at which they will be transferred to the customer, will amount to 14.9 million rubles ($165.5 thousand). Probably, such a gap is explained by fixed payments for licensed production, additional costs and investments in the enterprise.
Thus, in February 2023, the "Alabuga Machines" organization transferred 2,067,795 grams of gold ingots to the Iranian front company Sahara Thunder, presumably as payment for services and goods.
"Military" is currently studying the documents and will provide a detailed report later.
Shahed-136 drone
It became known how much Shahed-136 costs for Russia
Shahed-136 BpA (Unmanned aerial vehicles) War with Russia Iran Russia WorldA group of Prana Network hackers hacked the mail servers of the Iranian company IRGC Sahara Thunder, which contained a mass of data on the production of Shahed-136 attack drones for Russia.
The data were made public in the network.
On February 4, 2024, PRANA Network announced that they had successfully hacked the email servers of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps front company called Sahara Thunder, which facilitates the illegal arms sales from Iran to Russia.
Among the merged documentation on the localization of the production of Iranian attack drones in the special economic zone "Alabuga", Russia, information about the negotiation process was found, where the volumes of production and the cost of drones were noted.
Production
The documents do not directly mention the type of product being manufactured. Instead, drones are listed in documents under a special code as "Dolphin 632 type motor boat."According to the papers , by 2022, Russia intended to release 6,000 Iranian drones under license at its facilities for 2.5 years.
The Iranian side announced a starting price of 23 million rubles per unit ($375,000). However, during the negotiations, an agreement was reached at the level of 12 million rubles per board when ordering 6,000 units ($193,000) or 18 million rubles ($290,000) when ordering 2,000 units.
The total price of the production contract, including the transfer of technologies, equipment, 6,000 sets of UAVs, software, is 108.5 billion rubles ($1.75 billion).
Planning
According to plans for 2023, with full localization of production with minimal supply of Iranian components, the estimated cost of the Shahed-136 should be 4.4 million rubles ($48.8 thousand) per plane.
However, this is only a forecast that may deviate in case of changes in planning and production.
At the same time, the cost of sale, that is, the price at which they will be transferred to the customer, will amount to 14.9 million rubles ($165.5 thousand). Probably, such a gap is explained by fixed payments for licensed production, additional costs and investments in the enterprise.
Payment
According to other published documents, at least partially, the Russian Federation conducts its financial transactions and payments with Iran in gold.Thus, in February 2023, the "Alabuga Machines" organization transferred 2,067,795 grams of gold ingots to the Iranian front company Sahara Thunder, presumably as payment for services and goods.
"Military" is currently studying the documents and will provide a detailed report later.
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Trump jyrähti lakiesityksestä, joka pitäisi sisällään apua Ukrainalle ja Israelille
Esitys kiristäisi samalla merkittävästi maahanmuuttolakeja Yhdysvalloissa. Kongressia hoputtanut presidentti Biden haluaa lakipaketin pöydälleen välittömästi.
YHDYSVALTAIN entisen presidentin Donald Trumpin mukaan republikaanien olisi hylättävä esitys, jolla olisi määrä muun muassa jatkaa maan tukea Ukrainalle ja Israelille.
Esityksestä on kiistelty kuukausikaupalla demokraattien ja republikaanien välillä. Republikaanit ovat kytkeneet Ukrainan ja Israelin tuen jatkamisen Yhdysvaltain rajavalvonnan huomattavaan kiristämiseen.
– Älkää olko typeriä! Tarvitsemme erillisen rajavalvontaa ja siirtolaisuutta koskevan lakiesityksen. Sen ei pitäisi olla millään muodolla tai tavalla kytköksissä ulkomaiseen apuun, sanoi republikaanien presidenttiehdokkuutta tavoitteleva Trump maanantaina Truth Social -viestipalvelussaan.
– Tämä lakiesitys on valtava lahja demokraateille ja kuolontoive republikaaneille. Se panee demokraattien siirtolaisuus- ja rahakysymyksissä tekemän hirveän työn myös republikaanien vastuuksi, Trump jatkoi.
YHDYSVALTAIN edustajainhuoneen puhemies Mike Johnson tyrmäsi täysin senaatin julkaiseman tekstiluonnoksen. Hänen mukaansa edustajainhuone ei päästäisi pakettia läpi, jos ehdotus edes selviäisi edustajainhuoneeseen saakka.
Ryssä vielä keksii että tuolla voi pudottaa örkkejä kyliin ja julistaa ne vallatuiksi.
Magneettitutkimuksissa muutaman kerran käyneenä voisin veikata, että tollasessa ahtaassa putkessa kuljetus vaatinee potilaalle vähintään rauhoittavan lääkityksen. Valoisassa MRI:n putkessa pärjää juuri ja juuri ilman että klaustrofobia iskee.
Kuvittelisin että pitää olla tiedottomassa tilassa. Ehkä myös niin heikossa hapessa että voidaan ottaa riski härpäkkeen putoamiseenkin. Toki tuolla lienee paljon dataa kuinka luotettavia dronet ovat, voihan olla että tuolla kuljetus turvallisempaa kuin maata pitkin, ja ennenkaikkea nopeampaa sekä lähempää rintamalinjoja.