Lainasin ketjun tekstin, viittaukset sekä valtaosan kuvista tähän spoilerin taakse mutta tämä on selkeämmin luettavissa täällä (mm. viitatut twitter-viestit näkyvät suoraan, eikä tarvitse klikata linkistä auki):
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1762117582935687218.html
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A few weeks ago @CovertCabal and @HighMarsed published the most detailed publicly available count of RU artillery units in storage. The count offers a very compelling low-end estimate of what's left in storage. Let's try and make some adjustments.
A long thread.
The problem with arty is it's further away from the frontline, offering lower visibility on average. It is relatively easier to recover once hit, so a damaged/destroyed unit will stay at a visible spot for a shorter time. This makes it harder for losses to be visually confirmed.
Additionally, as recce operations further behind the frontline require a higher level of sophistication, preparation, and technological involvement, it is more likely on average that material confirming longer range hits may not be made publicly available.
Overall, this means that arty is likely the piece of equipment suffering from the lowest % visual confirmations. GSUA reported numbers for MBTs and armoured vehicles have up to 3 times higher visual confirmation rates than arty.
pbs.twimg.com/media/GCfs9RKa…
Oryx feature 678 SP systems and 346 towed systems on their list. Even if we make adjustments for the higher rate of confirmations of @AndrewPerpetua (33% higher than Oryx), the numbers are still far below the ones reported by GSUA.
With MBTs, making the necessary adjustments, we got 5,537 units destroyed/damaged visually confirmable, as compared to 5,983 units reported by the GSUA for the same period. This is a 92.5% theoretical visual coverage.
pbs.twimg.com/media/GFppxpWb…
With arty, even a liberal adjustment would only take us to 5,519 units visually confirmable out of 9,425 reported by the GSUA for the same period. A 58.5% theoretical visual coverage with liberal assumptions.
Thus, visually confirmed losses cannot serve as a good enough estimation base for total arty losses. This is where visual confirmations of units of storage must aid our estimation process.
CovertCabal and HighMarsed (CCHM) have managed to find and count 19,081 arty systems in storage pre-war. The same estimate in Military Balance (MB) 2022 is 21,765. Where in doubt, we will rely on the CCHM estimate for now.
The MB estimates appear to include plenty of rounding up + the numbers haven't been changed in years. In some cases CCHM have managed to confirm more units of certain arty types in storage than the corresponding MB estimate.
Most of the difference comes from MT-12 (MB has 602 more), D-30 (MB +628), and M-30 (MB +402).
There are also some SPs invisible: 2S1 (MB +311), 2S3 (MB +153), 2S5 (MB +250), as well as a visual surplus of 60 2S9. It's possible that at least some are in covered storage.
The CCHM numbers have also evolved over time. Back in July 2023, CC managed to confirm 17,438 arty units in storage pre-war. Some of these have been miscounts of non-howitzer equipment. This has now been adjusted with the help of HM + new storage bases have been added.
We will keep these differences in numbers as "in reserve" estimates for later as they will need to be adjusted additionally.
CCHM have managed to confirm the disappearance of 1,489 SP and 7,845 towed howitzers from storage. A 33.5% drop and a 53.6% drop respectively. However, some of these counts are based on imagery dating back months.
While we cannot readily take the GSUA reported numbers at face value, one thing that has rarely been disputed is the consistency of the reports, which track visual confirmations in terms of relative amounts.
Thus, we could use GSUA's reports to determine the *relative* monthly RU arty losses. Due to the change in strategy, availability of superior counter-battery equipment and FPV drones, the reported losses increased dramatically after April 2023.
The 9 months between May 2023 and Jan 2024 account for 69% of all reported arty losses. In a number of visual counts based on older imagery, this makes for a substantial difference.
We assume a constant rate of distribution of storage draws.
After we account for this lack of recent visibility, we get an adjusted figure of 2,796 SP and 4,615 towed howitzers in storage.
However, of the towed units, 2,858 systems are a part of the D-20/D-1/M-30 set. More on why this matters:
Unroll available on Thread Reader
To my knowledge, not a single M-30 has been spotted near the frontline. Some D-1 have been reactivated, first mentioned in Sep 2022, but last seen in Oct 2023. No D-1's have been confirmed lost, and sightings have been rare, so few units have likely been reactivated.
One theory is that the stock of specific ammo used by D-1 has been depleted. Whatever the reason, we will have to discount any remaining D-1 units appropriately. The same, to an even greater extent, goes for any estimated remaining M-30 units.
It is plausible that most of the drawn systems from this set have, therefore, been D-20. Since a total of 2,075 units have been estimated drawn by the end of Jan 2024, it is possible that the entire visible stock of D-20 have been removed from storage.
If we assume 40% of removed units are D-20, then D-20 in storage = 130. A small amount of D-1 (say, 200) have been brought to the frontline. The rest of the removed D-1/M-30 (1,045 units) might be used as replacement for useful units removed from bases far from the frontline.
We will however assign some economic value (20%) to the remaining D-1 and M-30. For instance, in case some suitable ammo is found outside RU, or for further replacements in far away bases. That would be a total of 546 units.
LINKKI 1
LINKKI 2
After these adjustments, we are left with 2,432 economically viable towed howitzers in storage.
HM has previously suggested the 600 visually confirmed M-46 could be fully discounted. However, some have been reactivated, with ammo potentially coming from third-parties:
Thus, I won't be discounting these systems from the total count.
russians Deconserve Rare Stalin-era M-46 Guns to Use in War with Ukraine | Defense Express
The russian occupiers has began to use rare 130 mm M-46 towed field guns, which were manufactured back in the 1950s, in battles against the Defense Forces of Ukraine
https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/..._46_guns_to_use_in_war_with_ukraine-9333.html
Important note here that the sum of economically valuable D-1, M-30, and M-46 would at this point make up 44% of the remaining stock of towed artillery systems in storage.
In terms of SPs, 2S1 makes up 49% of the remaining stock. The removal rate for 2S1 has been substantially lower than that for other SPs. @Waffentrager has suggested it might've been due to shortage of 122mm ammo, or due to its lesser capabilities.
(hän lainaa viestissä high_marsed twitter-ketjun taulukot, joissa on laskettu pre-war ja current määrät eri varastotukikohtien osalta sekä tehty jako eri SPG ja vedettävien tykkien tyyppien osalta - jaoin ne toisessa ketjussa, linkki viestiin:
LINKKI)
It is possible that the labour required to reactivate any SP system is similar, so due to labour shortages, focus might have been placed on reactivating more capable systems first, leaving 2S1 systems as a "deep storage" alternative.
Further, cases of visible spare part cannibalization have been observed as early as May 2023. This appears to be especially prevalent with SPs. Since SPs are more sophisticated, it is plausible that a higher percentage require extensive repairs to reactivate.
Hence, instead of being reactivated, SPs in worst condition might be used as spare part donors only. Consider this area at 120th Arsenal with newly dragged in beaten-up 2S19's:
Unroll available on Thread Reader
At 80th Arsenal, multiple 2S19 units appear to have also been stripped of their barrels:
Unroll available on Thread Reader
At 94th Arsenal (the main hub for SPs), in some areas ~50% of remaining 2S5 and 2S7 units have had their barrels removed:
LINKKI 1
LINKKI 2
LINKKI 3
LINKKI 4
At 7020th Arsenal, out of 61 2S5 units, 36 remain. Of the 36 remaining, 18 (50%) have been cannibalized by May 2023:
Unroll available on Thread Reader
Important to note that when SPs are removed from storage, they are not always removed in order. This may signify serious problems with some of the remaining systems that are not immediately visible in satellite images:
LINKKI twitter-viestiin
While we don't yet have a full count of the good visible condition SPs in storage (and I know a few people are working on that), based on the above we could discount conservatively 30% as cannibalized for spare parts or damaged beyond economic repair.
After all of the aforementioned adjustments, there might be 1,957 viable self-propelled artillery systems in storage.
RUSI estimate RU have 4,780 barrel artillery pieces in theater, of which 20% self-propelled, so 956 SP, 3824 towed.
Russian Military Objectives and Capacity in Ukraine Through 2024
Russian forces are likely to peak in late 2024, with increasing material challenges over the course of 2025.
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-re...-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024
The MB estimated that pre-war, the RU army had 5,544 active artillery units. If the RUSI estimate and our assumptions are correct, this would mean that the RU army has been able to activate units alongside losses, at least numerically.
The ratio of SP to towed active howitzers has changed, from approximate 50:50 pre-war, to the RUSI estimated 20:80 at present. Thus, qualitatively the artillery composition appears to have been somewhat degraded.
We do not have a publicly available count of equipment stored in military bases further away from Ukraine, but based on visible emptying out of bases, we can assume 95% SP and 75% battle-ready towed units are in/near Ukraine.
This would make 1,006 SP and 5,098 towed active units total. Of the towed, as mentioned earlier 1,045 are D-1/M-30, so we will discount as not frontline-capable them to get 4,053 active towed howitzers.
Together with the estimated economically useful equipment in storage, we then get 2,963 SP and 6,485 towed units available to the RU army, or a total of 9,448 systems.
This is down from the pre-war estimate of 5,544 active duty systems, and (excluding the discounted D-1/M-30) 18,036 systems in storage, or a total of 23,580 systems.
Note that many of the lost units have not been lost due to battle-related damage, but likely due to the need for spare parts. This is particularly valid for towed artillery where the enormous amout of storage removals has not resulted in a corresponding jump in visibility.
For instance, since Aug 2023, Oryx have added 190 SP and 71 towed howitzers to their database. Perpetua has added 219 SP and 200 towed over the same period. At the same time the estimated SPs removed from storage are just 16% of the estimated towed removed from storage.
Expended ammo volume has decreased over time, lowering the level of wear on average. However, poor quality ammo (including from third-parties) has been used over time, correspondingly increasing the level of wear. We will thus assume the level of wear to have been constant.
As mentioned earlier, the level and speed of arty battle losses has increased substantially over time. We will assume that 50% of the lost 14,132 systems are due to battle and 50% due to wear/cannibalization, and we will calculate the projected rate of loss accordingly.
Lost per month to wear/cannibalization = 307 units.
Since May 2023, on average 7.5% of total monthly losses reported = 530 units.
A total of 837 lost per month. With 9,448 remaining units, that is a little over 11 months left, counting from end of Jan 2024.
Note that this is still substantially less than GSUA's actual monthly reports. Since May 2023, they have been reporting 700 hits on RU arty on average. This is 32% above our estimate.
If we assume even distribution throughout the period (not the case), and we assume the same rate of loss as the average for the war up to now (unlikely), the remaining stock will be sufficient for 15 months - until March 2024.
We then consider the 2,112 invisible viable stored units based on the difference between the MB estimate and the CCHM visual count. If these exist, they could add 2.5 months to the above estimate.
RU appear to produce very few brand-new units of artillery. Our estimate of new production is below 100 units/year. This would cover 3 days of losses. Read more here:
Unroll available on Thread Reader
All of the above estimates and assumptions can be altered with corresponding changes to the final outcome. Multiple adjustments and assumptions are made, so all results are low confidence. Additionally, some caveats need to be mentioned.
HM has confirmed he will be doing some recounts, which may change his previous estimates.
Visibility of cannibalized units is low. No full coherent counts exist at present, and existing partial counts are based on old imagery. The status quo may be worse than assumed here.
We assume a constant rate of loss equivalent to that post-April 2023. Ammo shortage for UA may result in a much slower pace of destruction. At a rate of loss similar to that pre-April, the existing RU arty stock can last 21-24 months.
Special thanks to @Waffentraeger for his very valuable input and to @HighMarsed and @CovertCabal for sharing with me not-yet-published data. These data will be shared by them in more detail at a later date.
As always full disclosure that I am not a specialist, and all of the above is meant for discussion purposes only. Any thoughts, comments, and suggestions would be greatly appreciated.
References:
pitkä lista lähdeviittauksia on helpointa katsoa twitter-ketjun lopusta:
LINKKI 1
LINKKI 2
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