ak.tied
Greatest Leader
Kansainvälinen yhteisö saattaa nähdä asian vähän eri tavalla. Sillä voi olla ratkaiseva merkitys siihen millaista tukea Ukraina jatkossa saa jos/kun venäjä tämän tulitauon porsii jotenkin.
Ukrainan konflikti/sota
Kansainvälinen yhteisö saattaa nähdä asian vähän eri tavalla. Sillä voi olla ratkaiseva merkitys siihen millaista tukea Ukraina jatkossa saa jos/kun venäjä tämän tulitauon porsii jotenkin.
Antares
Respected Leader
Tuoreita satelliittikuvia ryssän Olenya sotilaslentokentältä, kuvat otettu 11.3.2025 klo 8.15 UTC:
Satellite images of Russian Olenya airbase as of March 11 08:15 UTC
The airbase housed 10 Tu-95MS (Bear-H), 35 Tu-22M3 (Backfire-C), 5 An-12 (Cub), 3 Tu-134UBL (Crusty) for strategic aviation pilot training, and 4 Mi-8 (Hip).
-
MUOKKAUS: kommentoin vielä sen verran että 35 kpl Tu-22M3 pommikoneita eli Kh-22/32 ohjusten lavetteja kuulostaa hyvin suurelta määrältä (mitä se onkin) mutta näistä valtaosa taitaa olla lentokelvottomassa kunnossa. Muistelen jonkun satelliittikuvia tarkastelevan kommentoineen tällaista joskus tämän sodan aikana. Muistelen myös että ne kerrat kun ryssä on iskenyt Ukrainaan Kh-22/32 ohjuksilla, niin pommikoneiden olisi sanottu nousseen ilmaan Kaukasuksen alueella sijaitsevista lentotukikohdista (Mozdok on ainakin yksi näistä) - tosin meille kerrotaan harvoin näin tarkkoja tietoja kuten se, miltä kentältä pommikoneet nousivat ilmaan. Eli tässä voi olla myös vähäisestä datasta johtuvaa harhaa, koska mikään ei sinänsä estäisi lentämästä Tu-22M3 pommikoneilla Olenyasta.
Satellite images of Russian Olenya airbase as of March 11 08:15 UTC
The airbase housed 10 Tu-95MS (Bear-H), 35 Tu-22M3 (Backfire-C), 5 An-12 (Cub), 3 Tu-134UBL (Crusty) for strategic aviation pilot training, and 4 Mi-8 (Hip).
-
MUOKKAUS: kommentoin vielä sen verran että 35 kpl Tu-22M3 pommikoneita eli Kh-22/32 ohjusten lavetteja kuulostaa hyvin suurelta määrältä (mitä se onkin) mutta näistä valtaosa taitaa olla lentokelvottomassa kunnossa. Muistelen jonkun satelliittikuvia tarkastelevan kommentoineen tällaista joskus tämän sodan aikana. Muistelen myös että ne kerrat kun ryssä on iskenyt Ukrainaan Kh-22/32 ohjuksilla, niin pommikoneiden olisi sanottu nousseen ilmaan Kaukasuksen alueella sijaitsevista lentotukikohdista (Mozdok on ainakin yksi näistä) - tosin meille kerrotaan harvoin näin tarkkoja tietoja kuten se, miltä kentältä pommikoneet nousivat ilmaan. Eli tässä voi olla myös vähäisestä datasta johtuvaa harhaa, koska mikään ei sinänsä estäisi lentämästä Tu-22M3 pommikoneilla Olenyasta.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Sensei142
Majuri
Minkä verran näitä päristimiä tuolla normaalisti on? Tietäis vähän onko odotettavissa jotain vai onko ihan perus kattaus
pari-kolmekymmentä dronee tonne tekis aika höpsäkkää toim.huom.
Antares
Respected Leader
Peruskattaus kyseessä, koska Olenya on "kaukana ja siksi turvallinen". Sinne ei ole siis sijoitettu enää hetkeen uusia pommikoneita. Lähinnä nämä tuoreet kuvat kertovat siitä että "kentällä on edelleen sama määrä pommikoneita kuin aikaisemminkin".
Pari aikaisempaa datapistettä: LÄHDE
Satelliittikuvista laskettu ryssän koneet Engels-2 kentällä, kuvat otettu eilen eli 21.1.2025:
Engels-2 Air Base
50cm photos from 21 January 2025
Can't share the actual photos but have overlaid aircraft and locations on the stock Google Maps
First time I remember seeing Su-25 (5x) operating out of Engels
Also, 2x Tu-95 | 1x Tu-22 | 2x Tu-160 | 1x Tu-22 | 1x Mi-26 | 1x Il-76
-
Tasan kaksi viikkoa sitten eli 8.1.2025 Tu-95 pommikoneita oli sijoitettu näin (Ukrainaa uhkaavat lentokentät): LÄHDE
Tässä määrät per kenttä:
11 kpl Olenya
4 kpl Engels-2
3 kpl Diaghilev
Yhteensä 18 kpl
-
5.11.2024: LÄHDE
61st day without attacks on Ukraine from the decks of Russian strategic bombers.
- training flights are still ongoing ~15 Tu-95MS, ~6 Tu-22M3 and ~4 Tu-160
- "collecting" missiles is ongoing
- Olenia: 11 x Tu-95MS
- Engels: 4 x Tu-95MS
-
19.9.2024: LÄHDE
Tuore satelliittikuva Olenya sotilaslentokentältä eli Suomen naapurista Mursmarskin seudulta:
Source: @avivector (TG)
"Olenya" airbase
19 Sept 2024 satellite pictures.
- 9 x Tu-95MS
- 1 x Tu-160
-
Tu-95MS ja Tu-160 pommikoneet ovat niitä Kh-101 risteilyohjusten lavetteja, joten hyvä pitää niitä silmällä - näistä kahdesta tärkeämpi tekijä ovat Tu-95MS pommikoneet koska niitä on selvästi enemmän käytettävissä.
Sanoisin että Engels-2 sotilaslentokentän osalta numeroissa on hieman enemmän vaihtelevuutta, tosin tämä ei ole mikään tarkka seuranta vaan muutama datapiste vain.
Olenyan osalta 9-11 kpl Tu-95MS pommikoneita näyttäisi olevan aika vakio, tuoreimmissa kuvissa koneiden määräksi laskettiin 10 kpl (tosin näitä voi olla ilmassa esim. harjoittelemassa kuvien ottamisen aikaan).
Antares
Respected Leader
Näitä on varmasti ollut käytössä jo pidemmän aikaa, mutta nyt se on vahvistettu virallisesti:
Ukraine has created a drone carrier that carries FPV drones to hit targets behind enemy lines!
The drone carrier can carry up to six FPV drones and works as a repeater for communication between the operator and FPV, — Fedorov
Ukraine has created a drone carrier that carries FPV drones to hit targets behind enemy lines!
The drone carrier can carry up to six FPV drones and works as a repeater for communication between the operator and FPV, — Fedorov
Benelli
Respected Leader
Oli tuollaisesta aiemminkin ollut video kuvattuna kuningatar dronen näkökulmasta ja venäläiset ovat vahvistaneet noiden olemassaolon.
Antares
Respected Leader
Se mitä olen tänään lukenut twitterissä eri kirjoittajien näkemyksiä (sellaisten jotka ovat seuranneet sotaa tarkasti ja joiden näkemyksiin luotan), ovat kommentoineet että tässä on kyse pidemmän aikavälin tilannekehityksestä eli ei johtuisi suoraan näistä neuvotteluista.
Toki Ukraina pystyy halutessaan esittämään tämän "hyväntahdoneleenä", jolla se osoittaa "valmiutta ja halukkuutta neuvotella".
Ukraina tilanne Kurskin alueella on mennyt huonompaa suuntaan viime kuukausien aikana, sille on esitetty useita syitä:
1) ryssän määrällinen ja kalustollinen ylivoima
2) ryssä kykeni hyökkäämään useasta eri suunnasta
3) "Rubicon Center of Advanced Unmanned Systems" yksikön dronet ovat olleet hyvin EW-temppuja sietäviä ja tämä yksikkö on mainittu nimeltä yhtenä tekijänä. Näiden lisäksi alueella on käytetty paljon kuituohjattuja droneja
4) yksi ukrainalainen lähde sanoi myös että Pohjois-Korean joukoilla olisi ollut iso vaikutus mutta ei kertonut tarkempia yksityiskohtia
5) alueelle oli vain muutama tie huollon käytössä ja ne ovat olleet jo pidemmän aikaa tulenkäytön alla (tosin tätä on nähty ennenkin tämän sodan aikana eli ei johda automaattisesti ja nopeasti vetäytymiseen - välttämättä)
6) ryssä on käyttänyt hyvin suuren määrän ohjautuvia liitopommeja tällä alueella, mikä on heikentänyt puolustusasemia. Vaikka niiden ohjaukseen / satelliittilinkkiin on kyetty vaikuttamaan, tämä on kohtuu tuore kehitys ja kenties aikaisemmat kuukaudet tekivät tehtävänsä?
Ei sovi unohtaa että Ukrainan joukot taistelivat Kurskin alueella (kohtuu pieni alue) seitsemän kuukauden ajan eli huomattavan kauan (hyökkäys alkoi 6.8.2024). JOS halutaan esittää positiivisempi vaihtoehto niin kenties alueen miehityksen strateginen hyöty katsottiin päättyneeksi? Tämä sitoi ryssän joukkoja ja kalustoa seitsemän kuukauden ajaksi ja ryssä kärsi suuria tappioita alueen takaisinvaltaamiseksi (arvatenkin Putinin mahtikäskystä) - toki Ukraina on kärsinyt myös tappioita, tätä ei kiistä kukaan.
Kenties siis laskelmassa nähdään että hyöty tuli saavutettua eikä kannata jatkaa? Oma arvioni on että yllä lueteltujen syiden takia alueen hallussapito kävi kokoajan vaikeammaksi ja vaikeammaksi. Vetäytyminen oli edessä jossain vaiheessa ja nyt sen katsottiin olevan ajankohtaista.
En myöskään kiistä, etteikö tällä voisi olla jotain tekemistä "rauhanneuvottelujen" kanssa - tätä ei voida tietää varmaksi enkä ole nähnyt siitä virallisia väitteitä.
-
MUOKKAUS: Andrew Perpetua kommentoi muutama päivä sitten näin:
If you follow my map, the day you saw this shoulda been the day you started worrying about Kursk.
-
Michael Kofman kommentoi Kurskin tilannetta yleisesti näin: LÄHDE
Worth adding these issues have been discussed for quite some time. The main problem was RF interdiction of the few supply routes available, with one main road into Sudzha. As the Kursk pocket got squeezed it became increasingly unsustainable.
Although it may have temporarily exacerbated the situation, the most recent Russian advances in Kursk were taking place well before the suspension of US military assistance/intelligence. The problem was battlefield geometry, logistics, and constant assaults by DPRK.
-
Tästä tuli mieleen yksi asia: Pohjois-Korean joukot ovat taistelleet Kurskin alueella ja vaikka niistä on kuultu "huhuja" myös muilla suunnilla, en muista että oltaisiin saatu sille virallista vahvistusta. Toki erilaisia "neuvonantajia" sekä tykistön ja ballististen ohjusten käytön "opastajia" on nähty ja myös kuollut.
Mikä saa minut miettimään, liekö ryssän ja Pohjois-Korean kesken sovittu että heidän joukkojaan käytetään "varsinaisen Venäjän alueella" mutta Kim ei ole antanut lupaa käyttää niitä Ukrainan alueella?
Tälle saataneen vahvistus, mikä taistelut jatkuvat ja Ukraina vetäytyy kokonaan Kurskin alueelta (kuten näyttää tapahtuvan parhaillaan) ELI minne nämä Pohjois-Korean joukot siirtyvät sen jälkeen (ehkä ne jäävät vahtimaan rajaa tälle alueelle, vapauttaen ryssän joukkoja muualle?).
Tämä on vain minun omaa pohdintaani, ei voida tietää mitä diktaattorit ovat sopineet keskenään.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Igor Girkinin (Strelkov) tuore mutta lyhyt näkemys sodan nykytilanteesta (toki näistä kirjoituksista ei voi koskaan olla 100% varma että ne ovat hänen kirjoittamiaan):
Girkin-Strelkov on the front line situation—same old story.
Russia has achieved nothing beyond minor tactical gains.
The Ukrainian forces will withdraw from Sudzha without a fight, hardly a victory for Russia.
Once again, Russia is waging war half-heartedly.
Classic.
Girkin-Strelkov on the front line situation—same old story.
Russia has achieved nothing beyond minor tactical gains.
The Ukrainian forces will withdraw from Sudzha without a fight, hardly a victory for Russia.
Once again, Russia is waging war half-heartedly.
Classic.
teknohippi
Ylipäällikkö
Nyt kun täällä on puhuttu Ukrainan dronetuotantokyvystä ja niihin kohdistuvista vastatoimista niin asia on vähän monimutkaisempi kuin ymmärretään. Massatuotanto on hidasta koska tuotantoputkessa on paljon massaa jo osien tuotannosta lähtien. Lisäksi ryssä ei ole tyhmä, eli kyllä siellä seurataan mitä tulee niskaan. Jos tulee dronemalleja A, B ja C ja näistä malli B kattaa vaikka 70% ja loput vain 30% niin minkä dronen häirinnän kehitykseen keskityt. No tottakai siihen suurimpaan massaan, sillä saa parhaan tuloksen!
Tästä seuraa että massamaisesti käytettävään aseeseen kaivetaan aina vastatoimet. Ja tämä näkyy tottakai Ukrainassa. Shaded johti valtavaan määrään konekivääri ja konetykkipohjaisia it-teknikaaleja. Tiedusteludronet johti it-dronen kehitykseen. FPV dronet johti massamaisen häirinnän kehittämiseen. Ja niin edelleen.
Tästä seuraa että massamaisesti käytettävään aseeseen kaivetaan aina vastatoimet. Ja tämä näkyy tottakai Ukrainassa. Shaded johti valtavaan määrään konekivääri ja konetykkipohjaisia it-teknikaaleja. Tiedusteludronet johti it-dronen kehitykseen. FPV dronet johti massamaisen häirinnän kehittämiseen. Ja niin edelleen.
taantumu
Ylipäällikkö
Venäläiset kertovat testanneensa 5,45mm rynnäkkökivääreihin sopivia itsestään sirpaloituvia ammuksia droonintorjuntaan. 100 metrin etäisyydellä sirpaleparven hajonnan kerrotaan olevan 25cm.
https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/23377747
Antares
Respected Leader
Kurskin alueella taistelleen ukrainalaisen sotilaan kokemuksia viimeisen neljän kuukauden ajalta:
My personal thoughts as a soldier who took part in Kursk operation for four months.
Unusual thread for this page but with a purpose — to tell you more about Russian manoeuvres and assaults at the Western flank.
If U want to help us buy batteries
https://secure.wayforpay.com/donate/Kriegsforscher
My personal thoughts as a soldier who took part in Kursk operation for four months.
Unusual thread for this page but with a purpose — to tell you more about Russian manoeuvres and assaults at the Western flank.
If U want to help us buy batteries
https://secure.wayforpay.com/donate/Kriegsforscher
-
I need to say that those things that U gonna read are personal experience and represents Russian actions at the Western (the hardest since November till December) flank.
I hope it will help future historians to write a decent research.
-
And yes. This thread is not about the problems the AFU faced, Koreans or anything else.
This one is quite «technical», I would say. Because if I would like to write more and in complex — this thread would be close to a word «endless».
-
During those 4 months I have witnessed only a couple of times that Russians used tanks: 2-3 times in November and three times in a row in the end of January by 155 marine brigade.
In January for 3 days they used 13 BMP-3 and 3 T-80BVM. All of them got burned.
-
I don’t remember the last when I saw such a big concentration of Russian elite forces:
- 76 & 106 VDV divisions;
- 83, 11 & 56 VDV regiments and brigades;
- 810, 155 & 177 marine brigades;
- the best FPV operators.
It tells a lot how «non important» for them it was.
-
As a result, all of theirs AFV and tanks didn’t look like turtles. They’ve been firing during the assaults (at the wrong directions, but still).
I cannot recall at least 10 videos of theirs attack where AFV are firing during an assault for the last 6 months.
-
I think that October was the hottest and hardest month for us. We had a perfect weather and Russian aviation used a lot of bombs.
For 24 hours they beat their own record from Vovchansk: 84(!) guided bombs against one village and a couple of tree lines near it.
-
October was so hard that during one day in the morning, for example, Ukrainian AFV columns attacked Russians and than in a couple of hours Russians using the same road were attacking us.
A lot of armour, a lot of manoeuvres and huge amount of guided bombs.
-
As I mentioned a couple of times before, they used and lost at that flank more than 20 engineering machines at my flank for 4 months.
If we compare it with the battle for Avdiivka where RUAF lost 6-7 these kind of machines U May see a big difference.
-
In my opinion, since November Russians had a perfect weather for assaults — almost every day we had a fog because of a river Snagost near us.
It was perfect for rotation and assaults. But instead of that they attacked only when had a very shiny day.
-
Most of RUAF mechanised attacks consisted of 4-8 AFV.
From time to time they used a fog and even smoke to cover their manoeuvres while attacking. I need to say that because of smoke it was hard for us to find them. It’s effective.
-
This is the first time since Kyiv and Bilogorivka that I witnessed so much efforts to place a bridge through a river.
Every time. Every fucking time it was a disaster but they continued doing that.
-
As I mentioned, we fought against elite forces:
1) a lot of AFV (and the newest one);
2) well equipped (soldiers);
3) we saw a lot of technical stuff such as antennas, for example
Russian satellite antenna. We saw dozens of them.
-
Due to the bad weather both sides almost didn’t use long range UAVs. But when Russians did they were able to find their targets, unfortunately.
As a result — a lot of fibre drones against our armour.
UA tank being spotted by RU UAV.
-
Bad weather covered a lot of theirs actions. It was very hard to find and destroy their artillery.
That’s why we almost didn’t use HIMARS, for example. But sometimes we did.
-
Russian counteroffensive started 7.11.2024. They had not enough time to solve this problem with Kursk. But also they were very confident in themselves: they wanted to deal with it in 3 months.
U see the result. They are delayed a little bit.
-
And because that they did stupid things: they had only one road with dragon teeth’s near it, a river and a ditch. And they still decided to attack using the only one road having no place for manoeuvres and it would very hard to proceed a potential success if they breakthrough.
-
As a result of these actions ZERO Russian mechanised assaults reached any success. Every time they were losing from 90 to 100% of AFV that took part in charge.
Only when they started using infantry they started achieving something.
-
It was impossible to say whether Russian VDV are Rembo soldiers or not: because of those mech attacks they even didn’t reach our positions.
But here, in Kursk, for the first time since 2022 I saw 2 POWs with iron helmets and KIA near them being well equipped.
-
They had even more success using 5-9 ATVs rather than 8-9 BMD-2/4M.
That’s ridiculous.
And it was possible only because we don’t have enough infantry. And because of that Russian suicidal attacks may be successful.
-
That area was a top priority for Russians. And there a lot of evidence. Here for the first time I saw a new Russian EW that every (from UAZ to a tank) vehicle had. And there was only one type that firstly appeared here and only after I saw it near Pokrovsk.
-
Most of Russians attacks were during the day light. Only a couple of them during the early morning.
After a lot of theirs AFV found mines at the field they started using IMR with the help of…ATV. The guy on it was the first driving and looking for a mine.
-
Random facts:
- their drone pilots were closer to the frontline and more effective;
- we had 0 evidence that RUAF here were executing their own soldiers;
- they placed mortars closer than we did;
- we saw 0 TOS here;
- a minimum influence from their artillery
-
It was easy for them to find our drone operators. And they used against them a lot of FPV drones and maybe 9-12 artillery rounds (that’s not a lot. In 2022 they were firing at me for almost 5 hours because they THOUGHT I was at that position).
-
A very bad coordination from from. Artillery firing only after their AFV were destroyed, not firing at our positions before the advance. Their drivers didn’t orient and we’re missing locations. As a result — burning.
-
There was one remarkable event. 51 VDV attacked our positions with 2 BMD-2, dismounted infantry mb 150 m away from our positions. BMDs retreated and didn’t support their infantry before, during and after the attack.
As a result:
-
15 Russian VDV members were KIA. They didn’t manage to walk those 150 m. One guy decided to walk away. Not even run. Hi took off his helmet, armor, left his weapon and decided to walk away. Was KIA.
-
U know, in 2022 I asked myself (I am not a Nostradamus) whether I was willing to fight abroad. And I was against it.
In 2024 my folks and I were happy like kids when we found out that we are entering Russia.
-
And U know, Ukrainian army showed that they can fight bravely literally everywhere. And I am very surprised by that.
I have mixed emotions and thoughts about Kursk. But I have definitely learned a lot and it gave me a little bit more motivation. Cause I was killing 76 VDV.
I need to say that those things that U gonna read are personal experience and represents Russian actions at the Western (the hardest since November till December) flank.
I hope it will help future historians to write a decent research.
-
And yes. This thread is not about the problems the AFU faced, Koreans or anything else.
This one is quite «technical», I would say. Because if I would like to write more and in complex — this thread would be close to a word «endless».
-
During those 4 months I have witnessed only a couple of times that Russians used tanks: 2-3 times in November and three times in a row in the end of January by 155 marine brigade.
In January for 3 days they used 13 BMP-3 and 3 T-80BVM. All of them got burned.
-
I don’t remember the last when I saw such a big concentration of Russian elite forces:
- 76 & 106 VDV divisions;
- 83, 11 & 56 VDV regiments and brigades;
- 810, 155 & 177 marine brigades;
- the best FPV operators.
It tells a lot how «non important» for them it was.
-
As a result, all of theirs AFV and tanks didn’t look like turtles. They’ve been firing during the assaults (at the wrong directions, but still).
I cannot recall at least 10 videos of theirs attack where AFV are firing during an assault for the last 6 months.
-
I think that October was the hottest and hardest month for us. We had a perfect weather and Russian aviation used a lot of bombs.
For 24 hours they beat their own record from Vovchansk: 84(!) guided bombs against one village and a couple of tree lines near it.
-
October was so hard that during one day in the morning, for example, Ukrainian AFV columns attacked Russians and than in a couple of hours Russians using the same road were attacking us.
A lot of armour, a lot of manoeuvres and huge amount of guided bombs.
-
As I mentioned a couple of times before, they used and lost at that flank more than 20 engineering machines at my flank for 4 months.
If we compare it with the battle for Avdiivka where RUAF lost 6-7 these kind of machines U May see a big difference.
-
In my opinion, since November Russians had a perfect weather for assaults — almost every day we had a fog because of a river Snagost near us.
It was perfect for rotation and assaults. But instead of that they attacked only when had a very shiny day.
-
Most of RUAF mechanised attacks consisted of 4-8 AFV.
From time to time they used a fog and even smoke to cover their manoeuvres while attacking. I need to say that because of smoke it was hard for us to find them. It’s effective.
-
This is the first time since Kyiv and Bilogorivka that I witnessed so much efforts to place a bridge through a river.
Every time. Every fucking time it was a disaster but they continued doing that.
-
As I mentioned, we fought against elite forces:
1) a lot of AFV (and the newest one);
2) well equipped (soldiers);
3) we saw a lot of technical stuff such as antennas, for example
Russian satellite antenna. We saw dozens of them.
-
Due to the bad weather both sides almost didn’t use long range UAVs. But when Russians did they were able to find their targets, unfortunately.
As a result — a lot of fibre drones against our armour.
UA tank being spotted by RU UAV.
-
Bad weather covered a lot of theirs actions. It was very hard to find and destroy their artillery.
That’s why we almost didn’t use HIMARS, for example. But sometimes we did.
-
Russian counteroffensive started 7.11.2024. They had not enough time to solve this problem with Kursk. But also they were very confident in themselves: they wanted to deal with it in 3 months.
U see the result. They are delayed a little bit.
-
And because that they did stupid things: they had only one road with dragon teeth’s near it, a river and a ditch. And they still decided to attack using the only one road having no place for manoeuvres and it would very hard to proceed a potential success if they breakthrough.
-
As a result of these actions ZERO Russian mechanised assaults reached any success. Every time they were losing from 90 to 100% of AFV that took part in charge.
Only when they started using infantry they started achieving something.
-
It was impossible to say whether Russian VDV are Rembo soldiers or not: because of those mech attacks they even didn’t reach our positions.
But here, in Kursk, for the first time since 2022 I saw 2 POWs with iron helmets and KIA near them being well equipped.
-
They had even more success using 5-9 ATVs rather than 8-9 BMD-2/4M.
That’s ridiculous.
And it was possible only because we don’t have enough infantry. And because of that Russian suicidal attacks may be successful.
-
That area was a top priority for Russians. And there a lot of evidence. Here for the first time I saw a new Russian EW that every (from UAZ to a tank) vehicle had. And there was only one type that firstly appeared here and only after I saw it near Pokrovsk.
-
Most of Russians attacks were during the day light. Only a couple of them during the early morning.
After a lot of theirs AFV found mines at the field they started using IMR with the help of…ATV. The guy on it was the first driving and looking for a mine.
-
Random facts:
- their drone pilots were closer to the frontline and more effective;
- we had 0 evidence that RUAF here were executing their own soldiers;
- they placed mortars closer than we did;
- we saw 0 TOS here;
- a minimum influence from their artillery
-
It was easy for them to find our drone operators. And they used against them a lot of FPV drones and maybe 9-12 artillery rounds (that’s not a lot. In 2022 they were firing at me for almost 5 hours because they THOUGHT I was at that position).
-
A very bad coordination from from. Artillery firing only after their AFV were destroyed, not firing at our positions before the advance. Their drivers didn’t orient and we’re missing locations. As a result — burning.
-
There was one remarkable event. 51 VDV attacked our positions with 2 BMD-2, dismounted infantry mb 150 m away from our positions. BMDs retreated and didn’t support their infantry before, during and after the attack.
As a result:
-
15 Russian VDV members were KIA. They didn’t manage to walk those 150 m. One guy decided to walk away. Not even run. Hi took off his helmet, armor, left his weapon and decided to walk away. Was KIA.
-
U know, in 2022 I asked myself (I am not a Nostradamus) whether I was willing to fight abroad. And I was against it.
In 2024 my folks and I were happy like kids when we found out that we are entering Russia.
-
And U know, Ukrainian army showed that they can fight bravely literally everywhere. And I am very surprised by that.
I have mixed emotions and thoughts about Kursk. But I have definitely learned a lot and it gave me a little bit more motivation. Cause I was killing 76 VDV.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Mielenkiintoisia huhuja, jotka vahvistavat mielikuvaa että ryssä / Putin todellakin voisi valmistautua jonkinlaiseen "tulitaukoon".
Toki Peskov yms. höpöttävät että mihinkään ei valmistauduta, mitään ei ole sovittu, eikä tulla sopimaan "paitsi Venäjän ehdoilla" jne jne.
Silti, jos näitä uskotaan, tiettyjä merkkejä on nähtävissä (HUOM: toisen lähde on VChK-OGPU Telegram channel jolla on ollut hyvin vaihteleva maine tämän sodan aikana eli kaikki mitä hän kirjoittaa, ei ole osoittautunut todeksi - silti päätin että tämä on jakamisen arvoinen huhu / juoru):
In two possible indications that the Russians expect fighting in Ukraine to end soon, the Russian army has reportedly abruptly stopped recruiting convicts, and officers are said to be flocking to safe areas of Donetsk and Luhansk so that they can gain war veteran benefits.
According to the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, "sources report that in a number of penal colonies and pretrial detention centers the recruitment of prisoners for the war was suspended. It is possible that this was done everywhere."
"In some regions even those convicts who had been approved for sending to the so-called Special Military Operation zone by all authorities were "turned back".
"The administrations of the institutions where they are being held told them that the procedure was suspended for an indefinite period."
No reason is given, but the most likely explanation is that convict recruitment may have been stopped in anticipation of a ceasefire.
Meanwhile, the 'Battle_🅉 _Sailor' Telegram channel complains:
"The closer the deal on [Ukraine] is, the more different types of management and personnel officers go to safe [areas of] Donetsk and Luhansk for the status of veteran of the Special Military Operation."
"So that they can make it in time.
It's funny to watch how in '22 all these rats sat with their ears pressed back and licked the ass of their superiors.
"And some of them even managed to quit for health reasons, having learned that they had been fingered for [going to] the SMO."
The benefits available to war veterans are substantial, which is part of the reason why enlisting has been attractive to many Russians. They include:
50% compensation for their residential premises' rent and maintenance;
Exemption from property taxes for an apartment, house or garage, and from land tax for properties of under six acres;
Reductions in transport tax;
Free treatment in military clinics and hospitals, and free medicine;
Educational subsidies and extra vacation time;
Free use of public transport and sanatoriums;
Cash payments of 3,500 rubles ($40) a month.
Sources:
https://t.me/vchkogpu/55256
https://t.me/BattleSailor13/9426
-
Palautetaan myös mieleen viime vuonna liikkuneita huhuja:
1) Putin olisi suunnitellut sodan kulun sellaiseksi että "rauha tulee Trumpin presidentiksi valinnan jälkeen" - mitä tuolla sitten tarkoitetaankaan
2) Kurskin alue piti saada vapautettua vuoden 2024 / tammikuun 2025 / helmikuun 2025 loppuun mennessä (takaraja siirtyi sitä mukaa kun aikaisempi ohitettiin, mutta selvästi tälle oli kova paine koska ryssä käytti suuren määrän resursseja Kurskin takaisin valtaamiseen, mukaan lukien paljon erikoisjoukkoja / parhaita joukkojaan)
3) Putinin on väitetty haluavan "sodalle päätös" voitonpäivään mennessä eli 9.5.2025 (nyt eletään 12.3.2025 joten "voitonpäivään" on 58 päivää aikaa)
Näiden huhujen lisäksi ei sovi myöskään unohtaa muita tekijöitä:
1) varastotukikohtien tyhjeneminen tapahtunee valtaosaksi vuoden 2025 aikana (toki riippuen siitä, mitkä kaikki romut lasketaan "kelvollisiksi aihioiksi" ja eri kaluston osalta tämä takaraja tulee vastaan eri aikoina) jonka jälkeen kaluston tappioiden korvaaminen kävisi hyvin vaikeaksi,
2) kansallisen hyvinvointirahaston likvidien osuus on kulutettu loppuun vuoden 2025 aikana, minkä jälkeen ei ole "helppoa säästöpossua" mistä ottaa rahaa sodan jatkamiseen (toki taloudesta on otettavissa verojen, vientitulojen yms. muodossa mutta nämä ovat aina vaikeita ja mahdollisesti epäsuosittuja / porua aiheuttavia temppuja),
3) Venäjän talouden yleinen kuumeneminen: näyttää selvältä että menettivät kontrollin syksyllä 2024 ja vaikkei olekaan nähty "romahdusta" niin mitä pitempään sota jatkuu, sitä vaikeammaksi ja kalliimmaksi tilanne käy
4) ollaan vielä hyvin kaukana sodan "asetettujen tavoitteiden" saavuttamisessa: eivät ole kyenneet valtaamaan edes Donetskin ja Luhanskin alueita, puhumattakaan Zaporitzzjasta ja Khersonista. Ryssä on toki julistanut nämä "Venäjään kuuluviksi" mutta se on vain sanoja paperilla eli merkityksetöntä kuminaa. ELI ei ole näköpiirissä rintamalinjan romahtamista ja "tavoitteiden nopeaa saavuttamista"
En sano että sota päättyy huomenna tai edes ylihuomenna, mutta kieltämättä on olemassa ennusmerkkejä jotka vihjaavat että jonkinlainen tauko voisi olla näköpiirissä. Ryssä toki ryssämäiseen tyyliin kiistää kaiken, kunnes tulee se päivä että takki kääntyy 180 astetta.
Toki Peskov yms. höpöttävät että mihinkään ei valmistauduta, mitään ei ole sovittu, eikä tulla sopimaan "paitsi Venäjän ehdoilla" jne jne.
Silti, jos näitä uskotaan, tiettyjä merkkejä on nähtävissä (HUOM: toisen lähde on VChK-OGPU Telegram channel jolla on ollut hyvin vaihteleva maine tämän sodan aikana eli kaikki mitä hän kirjoittaa, ei ole osoittautunut todeksi - silti päätin että tämä on jakamisen arvoinen huhu / juoru):
In two possible indications that the Russians expect fighting in Ukraine to end soon, the Russian army has reportedly abruptly stopped recruiting convicts, and officers are said to be flocking to safe areas of Donetsk and Luhansk so that they can gain war veteran benefits.
According to the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, "sources report that in a number of penal colonies and pretrial detention centers the recruitment of prisoners for the war was suspended. It is possible that this was done everywhere."
"In some regions even those convicts who had been approved for sending to the so-called Special Military Operation zone by all authorities were "turned back".
"The administrations of the institutions where they are being held told them that the procedure was suspended for an indefinite period."
No reason is given, but the most likely explanation is that convict recruitment may have been stopped in anticipation of a ceasefire.
Meanwhile, the 'Battle_🅉 _Sailor' Telegram channel complains:
"The closer the deal on [Ukraine] is, the more different types of management and personnel officers go to safe [areas of] Donetsk and Luhansk for the status of veteran of the Special Military Operation."
"So that they can make it in time.
It's funny to watch how in '22 all these rats sat with their ears pressed back and licked the ass of their superiors.
"And some of them even managed to quit for health reasons, having learned that they had been fingered for [going to] the SMO."
The benefits available to war veterans are substantial, which is part of the reason why enlisting has been attractive to many Russians. They include:
50% compensation for their residential premises' rent and maintenance; Exemption from property taxes for an apartment, house or garage, and from land tax for properties of under six acres; Reductions in transport tax; Free treatment in military clinics and hospitals, and free medicine; Educational subsidies and extra vacation time; Free use of public transport and sanatoriums; Cash payments of 3,500 rubles ($40) a month.Sources:
https://t.me/vchkogpu/55256 https://t.me/BattleSailor13/9426-
Palautetaan myös mieleen viime vuonna liikkuneita huhuja:
1) Putin olisi suunnitellut sodan kulun sellaiseksi että "rauha tulee Trumpin presidentiksi valinnan jälkeen" - mitä tuolla sitten tarkoitetaankaan
2) Kurskin alue piti saada vapautettua vuoden 2024 / tammikuun 2025 / helmikuun 2025 loppuun mennessä (takaraja siirtyi sitä mukaa kun aikaisempi ohitettiin, mutta selvästi tälle oli kova paine koska ryssä käytti suuren määrän resursseja Kurskin takaisin valtaamiseen, mukaan lukien paljon erikoisjoukkoja / parhaita joukkojaan)
3) Putinin on väitetty haluavan "sodalle päätös" voitonpäivään mennessä eli 9.5.2025 (nyt eletään 12.3.2025 joten "voitonpäivään" on 58 päivää aikaa)
Näiden huhujen lisäksi ei sovi myöskään unohtaa muita tekijöitä:
1) varastotukikohtien tyhjeneminen tapahtunee valtaosaksi vuoden 2025 aikana (toki riippuen siitä, mitkä kaikki romut lasketaan "kelvollisiksi aihioiksi" ja eri kaluston osalta tämä takaraja tulee vastaan eri aikoina) jonka jälkeen kaluston tappioiden korvaaminen kävisi hyvin vaikeaksi,
2) kansallisen hyvinvointirahaston likvidien osuus on kulutettu loppuun vuoden 2025 aikana, minkä jälkeen ei ole "helppoa säästöpossua" mistä ottaa rahaa sodan jatkamiseen (toki taloudesta on otettavissa verojen, vientitulojen yms. muodossa mutta nämä ovat aina vaikeita ja mahdollisesti epäsuosittuja / porua aiheuttavia temppuja),
3) Venäjän talouden yleinen kuumeneminen: näyttää selvältä että menettivät kontrollin syksyllä 2024 ja vaikkei olekaan nähty "romahdusta" niin mitä pitempään sota jatkuu, sitä vaikeammaksi ja kalliimmaksi tilanne käy
4) ollaan vielä hyvin kaukana sodan "asetettujen tavoitteiden" saavuttamisessa: eivät ole kyenneet valtaamaan edes Donetskin ja Luhanskin alueita, puhumattakaan Zaporitzzjasta ja Khersonista. Ryssä on toki julistanut nämä "Venäjään kuuluviksi" mutta se on vain sanoja paperilla eli merkityksetöntä kuminaa. ELI ei ole näköpiirissä rintamalinjan romahtamista ja "tavoitteiden nopeaa saavuttamista"
En sano että sota päättyy huomenna tai edes ylihuomenna, mutta kieltämättä on olemassa ennusmerkkejä jotka vihjaavat että jonkinlainen tauko voisi olla näköpiirissä. Ryssä toki ryssämäiseen tyyliin kiistää kaiken, kunnes tulee se päivä että takki kääntyy 180 astetta.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Thorkill kirjoittanut ajatuksiaan "Kurskin operaatiosta":
Reckless Adventure. Kursk Expedition of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, August 2024-March 2025
- "Our progress in Kursk Oblast is going well today. We are achieving our strategic goal" - on August 14, 2024, President Zelensky informed Ukrainians in a video posted on his Twitter profile. In fact, at the moment he said these words, he already knew that the Kursk operation had failed, and the intended strategic goals had not been achieved and would almost certainly not be achieved in the future.
Plan.
The idea for the Kursk operation came from Bankova Street and presidential circles, revealed by the Politico portal in September 2024. According to its information, President Zelensky was supposed to have persuaded General Zaluzhny - the then Commander-in-Chief of the ZSU - to carry it out as early as January 2024. According to the portal's report, Zaluzhny was supposed to have refused. "He asked what would happen next if the border of the Russian Federation was crossed," says one of the sources quoted by Politico. "He never got a clear answer from Zelensky. He considered it a gamble."
Less than a month later in February 2024, Zaluzhny was replaced by General Syrsky. He no longer has any objections. Work on the Kursk operation plan is starting in the Ukrainian General Staff. This document will probably never be declassified and made public, but its outlines and general assumptions can be determined based on retrospective analysis. The main goal of the operation was to occupy a fragment of the Kursk Oblast in the Sudza-Rylsk region. This was to cause a military and image crisis among the civilian and military authorities of the Russian Federation, which would force them to transfer some forces from Donbas in order to stop the offensive operations of the Ukrainians. This was to reduce the pressure of Russian troops on the directions of their main attacks in the Pokrovsk, Toretsk and Kurahove regions and, as a result, stabilize the front line in Donbas.
The plan emphasized the element of surprise and speed of action. Three main goals of the first stage of the operation: Sudza was to be taken on the 2nd day, Malaya Loknya on the 3rd day, and Korenievo no later than the 4th-5th day of the operation. In the second phase of the operation, after taking the aforementioned locations, it was intended to carry out a series of auxiliary, diversionary and raid strikes in the area of Lgov and Bolshoye Soldatskoye, which were to conceal the actual intentions of the Ukrainians, cause confusion in the Russian command and intensify the crisis. At the same time, it was planned to carry out two more main strikes by means of new incursions into the Kursk region in the following places: in the Belitsa region and in the Rylsk region. Thanks to this, on approximately the 8th day of the operation, Ukrainian troops were to capture the entire area of the Kursk region along the line Kozino - Rylsk - Korenievo - Malaya Loknya - Sudza Belitsa - Giri - Ozerki.
Available information indicates that after the plan of the operation was passed on to the commanders of the brigades that were to take part in it, it was considered unrealistic by most of them. In one of the interviews Syrski admitted "that he had to convince the brigade commanders for a long time to accept it". It did not work with all of them. The strongest critic of his assumptions, Colonel Emil Ishkulov - then commander of the 80th Airborne Brigade - had to be dismissed. This broke the resistance of the rest of the Ukrainian commanders.
Execution.
In early July 2024, the Ukrainians began the gradual concentration of the leading assault group, which was to enter the Kursk region in the Sudzha area. It consisted of the 80th and 82nd VDV Brigades, the 61st Airborne Brigade, and the Khorne Task Force (elements of the 22nd Airborne Brigade and 116th Airborne Brigade, the 225th and 33rd Assault Battalions, the 8th Special Purpose Regiment). The second wave initially included elements of the 17th Airborne Brigade (Heavy), 21st Airborne Brigade, 22nd Airborne Brigade, 53rd Airborne Brigade, 92nd Assault Brigade, 95th VDV, and the 117th OT Brigade. However, the crisis in the Toretsk region forced General Syrsky to withdraw the 53rd Airborne Brigade from the border zone of the Sumy region in mid-July 2024 and redirect it to New York.
The Kursk operation began on the morning of August 6, 2024, and initially achieved complete success because it managed to achieve the effect of surprise. At the end of the second day of the operation (07.08), the 61st Brigade captured Sudza, and on the third day the 80th VDV Brigade captured Malaya Lokna (with the exception of the buildings of the local penal colony). This allowed the Ukrainians to move on to the second phase in these areas. Raids began towards Lgov. At the same time, on August 10, the 92nd BS entered the Kursk region in the Plekhov area and began an attack towards Bielitsa. Unfortunately for the Ukrainians, they failed to capture it.
At the same time, the battle for Korieniewo was still ongoing. The vanguard of the "Khorne" Task Force reached the eastern edge of the village of Korieniewo on the evening of August 7. However, the assault carried out the following day ended in failure. In the meantime, the Russian command had transferred there from Zaporozhye, partly by air, a 200-300-person combat group from the 51st VDV Regiment. It strengthened the defense of the Space Forces Rifle Regiment Zmot. As a result, subsequent Ukrainian attacks on August 10 and the strongest one on August 11 - combined with an attempt to bypass the village from the north by elements of the 82nd VDV Brigade - also did not bring any major successes.
In the following days (August 12-15), the main forces of the Russian 51st and 56th VDV Regiments with heavy equipment reached Korieniewo. Gen. Syrski considered that further attacks on the town were doomed to failure and ordered them to cease. The Ukrainian side was left with nothing but creating psy-ops about the capture of Korieniewo using fake news and photos of the mailbox. Around August 20, the Ukrainians stopped all major offensive operations in the Kursk region and the active phase of their operations temporarily ended. Then, in mid-September 2024, the Ukrainians will try another entry into the border zone of the Kursk region in the Veseloe area in order to occupy the Glushkovo-Tetkino region. However, these offensive operations will end in complete failure after a few weeks.
Since October 2024, Ukrainian troops in the Sudzha region have been conducting almost exclusively defensive operations, gradually losing ground. In mid-February 2025, the Russians capture Sverdlikovo, narrowing the base of the Kursk bridgehead to about 12-13 km. At the same time, thanks to fiber-optic FPV drones, the Russians have been paralyzing the logistics of the Ukrainian military group defending itself in the Sudzha region since January 2025. As a result, the Ukrainian command decides to withdraw Ukrainian troops from the Sudzha region. This has been taking place gradually since about February 20.
Consequences.
The Kursk operation did not achieve its intended main goal. It failed to create a crisis large enough to force the Russians to transfer more units from Donbas there. The Russian SG weakened the front in the Zaporozhye, Yar and Volcha Chayvodsk sectors. On the other hand, the Supreme Command did not send any major units to Kursk from the Pokrovsk and Toretsk areas, and only the 155th Marine Brigade was transferred there from the Kurakhov direction. Its absence did not affect the pace of the Russian operations in the Kurakhov and Vuhledar areas, and both of these locations were captured by the Russians.
Since Gen. Syrsky took almost the entire strategic reserve of the ZSU for the needs of the so-called Kursk expedition, when the Ukrainian front was broken through in the Mykolaivka - Ptyche area in the Pokrov direction at the end of August 2024, he had to plug it with freshly formed brigades: 151st Brigade, 152nd Yeger Brigade, 154th Brigade and 157th Brigade. In October 2024, due to the lack of rotation and the resulting total exhaustion, the 72nd Brigade had to leave the Wuhledar area.
In total, the Ukrainians lost 363 square kilometers in Donbas in August 2024 (an increase of 100 percent compared to July), 397 square kilometers in September, 503 square kilometers in October and as much as 730 square kilometers in November. The Ukrainians managed to partially stabilize the front lines in Donbas only in January 2025.
August 2024 Gen. Syrski reports to President Zelensky via videoconference on the course of the so-called Kursk expedition.
- "Our progress in Kursk Oblast is going well today. We are achieving our strategic goal" - on August 14, 2024, President Zelensky informed Ukrainians in a video posted on his Twitter profile. In fact, at the moment he said these words, he already knew that the Kursk operation had failed, and the intended strategic goals had not been achieved and would almost certainly not be achieved in the future.
Plan.
The idea for the Kursk operation came from Bankova Street and presidential circles, revealed by the Politico portal in September 2024. According to its information, President Zelensky was supposed to have persuaded General Zaluzhny - the then Commander-in-Chief of the ZSU - to carry it out as early as January 2024. According to the portal's report, Zaluzhny was supposed to have refused. "He asked what would happen next if the border of the Russian Federation was crossed," says one of the sources quoted by Politico. "He never got a clear answer from Zelensky. He considered it a gamble."
Less than a month later in February 2024, Zaluzhny was replaced by General Syrsky. He no longer has any objections. Work on the Kursk operation plan is starting in the Ukrainian General Staff. This document will probably never be declassified and made public, but its outlines and general assumptions can be determined based on retrospective analysis. The main goal of the operation was to occupy a fragment of the Kursk Oblast in the Sudza-Rylsk region. This was to cause a military and image crisis among the civilian and military authorities of the Russian Federation, which would force them to transfer some forces from Donbas in order to stop the offensive operations of the Ukrainians. This was to reduce the pressure of Russian troops on the directions of their main attacks in the Pokrovsk, Toretsk and Kurahove regions and, as a result, stabilize the front line in Donbas.
The plan emphasized the element of surprise and speed of action. Three main goals of the first stage of the operation: Sudza was to be taken on the 2nd day, Malaya Loknya on the 3rd day, and Korenievo no later than the 4th-5th day of the operation. In the second phase of the operation, after taking the aforementioned locations, it was intended to carry out a series of auxiliary, diversionary and raid strikes in the area of Lgov and Bolshoye Soldatskoye, which were to conceal the actual intentions of the Ukrainians, cause confusion in the Russian command and intensify the crisis. At the same time, it was planned to carry out two more main strikes by means of new incursions into the Kursk region in the following places: in the Belitsa region and in the Rylsk region. Thanks to this, on approximately the 8th day of the operation, Ukrainian troops were to capture the entire area of the Kursk region along the line Kozino - Rylsk - Korenievo - Malaya Loknya - Sudza Belitsa - Giri - Ozerki.
Available information indicates that after the plan of the operation was passed on to the commanders of the brigades that were to take part in it, it was considered unrealistic by most of them. In one of the interviews Syrski admitted "that he had to convince the brigade commanders for a long time to accept it". It did not work with all of them. The strongest critic of his assumptions, Colonel Emil Ishkulov - then commander of the 80th Airborne Brigade - had to be dismissed. This broke the resistance of the rest of the Ukrainian commanders.
Execution.
In early July 2024, the Ukrainians began the gradual concentration of the leading assault group, which was to enter the Kursk region in the Sudzha area. It consisted of the 80th and 82nd VDV Brigades, the 61st Airborne Brigade, and the Khorne Task Force (elements of the 22nd Airborne Brigade and 116th Airborne Brigade, the 225th and 33rd Assault Battalions, the 8th Special Purpose Regiment). The second wave initially included elements of the 17th Airborne Brigade (Heavy), 21st Airborne Brigade, 22nd Airborne Brigade, 53rd Airborne Brigade, 92nd Assault Brigade, 95th VDV, and the 117th OT Brigade. However, the crisis in the Toretsk region forced General Syrsky to withdraw the 53rd Airborne Brigade from the border zone of the Sumy region in mid-July 2024 and redirect it to New York.
The Kursk operation began on the morning of August 6, 2024, and initially achieved complete success because it managed to achieve the effect of surprise. At the end of the second day of the operation (07.08), the 61st Brigade captured Sudza, and on the third day the 80th VDV Brigade captured Malaya Lokna (with the exception of the buildings of the local penal colony). This allowed the Ukrainians to move on to the second phase in these areas. Raids began towards Lgov. At the same time, on August 10, the 92nd BS entered the Kursk region in the Plekhov area and began an attack towards Bielitsa. Unfortunately for the Ukrainians, they failed to capture it.
At the same time, the battle for Korieniewo was still ongoing. The vanguard of the "Khorne" Task Force reached the eastern edge of the village of Korieniewo on the evening of August 7. However, the assault carried out the following day ended in failure. In the meantime, the Russian command had transferred there from Zaporozhye, partly by air, a 200-300-person combat group from the 51st VDV Regiment. It strengthened the defense of the Space Forces Rifle Regiment Zmot. As a result, subsequent Ukrainian attacks on August 10 and the strongest one on August 11 - combined with an attempt to bypass the village from the north by elements of the 82nd VDV Brigade - also did not bring any major successes.
In the following days (August 12-15), the main forces of the Russian 51st and 56th VDV Regiments with heavy equipment reached Korieniewo. Gen. Syrski considered that further attacks on the town were doomed to failure and ordered them to cease. The Ukrainian side was left with nothing but creating psy-ops about the capture of Korieniewo using fake news and photos of the mailbox. Around August 20, the Ukrainians stopped all major offensive operations in the Kursk region and the active phase of their operations temporarily ended. Then, in mid-September 2024, the Ukrainians will try another entry into the border zone of the Kursk region in the Veseloe area in order to occupy the Glushkovo-Tetkino region. However, these offensive operations will end in complete failure after a few weeks.
Since October 2024, Ukrainian troops in the Sudzha region have been conducting almost exclusively defensive operations, gradually losing ground. In mid-February 2025, the Russians capture Sverdlikovo, narrowing the base of the Kursk bridgehead to about 12-13 km. At the same time, thanks to fiber-optic FPV drones, the Russians have been paralyzing the logistics of the Ukrainian military group defending itself in the Sudzha region since January 2025. As a result, the Ukrainian command decides to withdraw Ukrainian troops from the Sudzha region. This has been taking place gradually since about February 20.
Consequences.
The Kursk operation did not achieve its intended main goal. It failed to create a crisis large enough to force the Russians to transfer more units from Donbas there. The Russian SG weakened the front in the Zaporozhye, Yar and Volcha Chayvodsk sectors. On the other hand, the Supreme Command did not send any major units to Kursk from the Pokrovsk and Toretsk areas, and only the 155th Marine Brigade was transferred there from the Kurakhov direction. Its absence did not affect the pace of the Russian operations in the Kurakhov and Vuhledar areas, and both of these locations were captured by the Russians.
Since Gen. Syrsky took almost the entire strategic reserve of the ZSU for the needs of the so-called Kursk expedition, when the Ukrainian front was broken through in the Mykolaivka - Ptyche area in the Pokrov direction at the end of August 2024, he had to plug it with freshly formed brigades: 151st Brigade, 152nd Yeger Brigade, 154th Brigade and 157th Brigade. In October 2024, due to the lack of rotation and the resulting total exhaustion, the 72nd Brigade had to leave the Wuhledar area.
In total, the Ukrainians lost 363 square kilometers in Donbas in August 2024 (an increase of 100 percent compared to July), 397 square kilometers in September, 503 square kilometers in October and as much as 730 square kilometers in November. The Ukrainians managed to partially stabilize the front lines in Donbas only in January 2025.
August 2024 Gen. Syrski reports to President Zelensky via videoconference on the course of the so-called Kursk expedition.
Kyllä Kurskista lähtö on sovittu jenkkien kanssa. Ja oli varmasti ehto myös ryssien puolelta. Parin päivän sisällä tullaan kuulemaan ryssien suostumisesta tulitaukoon.
Nähtäväksi jää miten tuota valvotaan (kenen toimesta) ja miten tulitauko pitää. Perinteisesti repeillään suntaan ja toiseen ainakin aluksi, jos ei sitten trumppi laita riittävän jyrkkiä ehtoja pitävyydelle.
Nähtäväksi jää miten tuota valvotaan (kenen toimesta) ja miten tulitauko pitää. Perinteisesti repeillään suntaan ja toiseen ainakin aluksi, jos ei sitten trumppi laita riittävän jyrkkiä ehtoja pitävyydelle.
Se tuntuu monelta päättäjältä unohtuvat, että ryssä on aina ryssä vaikka voissa paistaisi. Se on juurikin näin, että ryssä ymmärtää vain aseiden ja voiman päälle.
