teknohippi
Ylipäällikkö
Rajoituksia suurempi ongelma on että niitä pitkänkantaman puikkoja ei ole tai on todella vähän.
Ukrainan konflikti/sota
Antares
Respected Leader
Itäisen Ukrainan alueella on melko uhkaavan näköinen tilanne Kupianskin seudulla, katso ylin kuva:
Updated map from @Deepstate_UA showing Russian advances NW of Kupyansk and in Udachne, and Ukrainian advances in Novomykhailivka and Zelenyi Hai.
https://deepstatemap.live/en#12/48.2420528/37.0067596
-
Tämä on tietysti pitkään kehittynyt tilanne, kuten Pokrovskin seudun "pullistumatkin" eli ei mikään uusi ja yllättävä "läpimurto". Jos selaa DeepstateMAP karttaa ajassa taaksepäin, näkee että uhkaavin Myrnen vallannut kärki on lisätty viimeisen viikon aikana, mutta sitä aikaisemmin tilanne on ollut melko vakaa.
Otin DeepstateMAP kartasta yhden kuvan lisää, tämä on hieman korkeammalta:
Tässä sama kartta mutta ajanhetki on 25.5.2025:
Kupiansk on suuri kaupunki tällä suunnalla ja tärkeä Oskil-joen ylityspaikka. Mielenkiintoista nähdä että ryssä ei ole kyennyt valtaamaan Oskil-joen itäpuolisia alueita, vaikka ovat yrittäneet sitä syksystä 2022 lähtien (Ukraina vapautti nämä alueet tuolloin vahvalla vastahyökkäyksellään ja uhkasi jopa Svatovea.
Muistan että tällä suunnalla maantieverkko on paljon harvempi, sama juttu Luhanskin alueen pohjoisosissa. Eteneminen on siis hidasta ja huollon järjestäminen vaikeaa.
Mietinkin, pystyisikö Ukraina vapauttamaan jonkin määrän joukkoja Sumyn suunnalta ja siirtämään ne tänne Kupianskin seudulle. Sumyn suunta vaikuttaa siltä että se on saatu hallintaan ja väitetysti ryssä olisi siirtänyt / siirtämässä joukkoja pois sieltä, tukemaan muiden suuntien hyökkäyksiä (veikkaan että Pokrovskin seutu on erityisen tärkeä).
Updated map from @Deepstate_UA showing Russian advances NW of Kupyansk and in Udachne, and Ukrainian advances in Novomykhailivka and Zelenyi Hai.
https://deepstatemap.live/en#12/48.2420528/37.0067596
-
Tämä on tietysti pitkään kehittynyt tilanne, kuten Pokrovskin seudun "pullistumatkin" eli ei mikään uusi ja yllättävä "läpimurto". Jos selaa DeepstateMAP karttaa ajassa taaksepäin, näkee että uhkaavin Myrnen vallannut kärki on lisätty viimeisen viikon aikana, mutta sitä aikaisemmin tilanne on ollut melko vakaa.
Otin DeepstateMAP kartasta yhden kuvan lisää, tämä on hieman korkeammalta:
Tässä sama kartta mutta ajanhetki on 25.5.2025:
Kupiansk on suuri kaupunki tällä suunnalla ja tärkeä Oskil-joen ylityspaikka. Mielenkiintoista nähdä että ryssä ei ole kyennyt valtaamaan Oskil-joen itäpuolisia alueita, vaikka ovat yrittäneet sitä syksystä 2022 lähtien (Ukraina vapautti nämä alueet tuolloin vahvalla vastahyökkäyksellään ja uhkasi jopa Svatovea.
Muistan että tällä suunnalla maantieverkko on paljon harvempi, sama juttu Luhanskin alueen pohjoisosissa. Eteneminen on siis hidasta ja huollon järjestäminen vaikeaa.
Mietinkin, pystyisikö Ukraina vapauttamaan jonkin määrän joukkoja Sumyn suunnalta ja siirtämään ne tänne Kupianskin seudulle. Sumyn suunta vaikuttaa siltä että se on saatu hallintaan ja väitetysti ryssä olisi siirtänyt / siirtämässä joukkoja pois sieltä, tukemaan muiden suuntien hyökkäyksiä (veikkaan että Pokrovskin seutu on erityisen tärkeä).
Viimeksi muokattu:
Oli niitä paljon tai vähän, niin pointti on se, että niitä saa käyttää aivan niin kun parhaimmaksi näkee... Oli mersun G6 malliakin vähän jaettavissa muille, mutta ei niihin mitään käyttörajoitteita liitetty, enemminkin liitettiin täydennystakuu jokaiseen pudonneeseen
Käyttörajoitteet ja tavaran riittävyys on ihan eri asioita.... Jos nyt on annettu vaikka " yksi kpl. ohjus. USA." niin käyttäjä saa ite valita mihin se laitetaan
Viimeksi muokattu:
Vähän niin kuin turkkilaisessa parturissa, käräytetään korvakarvat nopeasti. Jevgeni laittoi vaan vodkapäissään tehot täysille. Olis ollut hauska nähdä hieman pitempi versio tuosta.
Antares
Respected Leader
Satelliittikuvien perusteella näyttää siltä että Novoshakhtinsk öljynjalostamolla olisi vaurioitunut ja/tai tuhoutunut jopa 16 kpl suuria polttoainesäiliöitä:
New satellite images from Dnipro Osint show the western section of the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery in ruins, with up to 16 storage tanks either heavily damaged or completely destroyed by fire.
FIRMS data shows no active fires now, suggesting the blaze has either been extinguished or burned itself out.
New satellite images from Dnipro Osint show the western section of the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery in ruins, with up to 16 storage tanks either heavily damaged or completely destroyed by fire.
FIRMS data shows no active fires now, suggesting the blaze has either been extinguished or burned itself out.
anTero81
Kersantti
Onkohan Neptunen testiryhmä hakkeroinut tuon web-kameran "testimaalin" lähettyvillä jotta on saatu live-kuvaa osumahetkestä.
Hyvin saman näköinen ja kokoinen pullistuma kuin etelämmässä aikaisemmin. Se mikä tästä uudesta hyökkäyskärjestä tekee vaarallisemman, on se, että kärki on varsin lähellä Kupianskia ja oikeastaan kartan mukaan jo kiertänyt sen taakse. Joukko pystyy vaikuttamaan Kupianskiin heittimillä ja droneilla, mutta ennen kaikkea molemmat Oskil-joen länsipuoliset Kupianskin huolto- ja vetäytymisteistä länteen sekä etelään, ovat nyt muodostuneen kärjen päästä noin 2-3 km etäisyydellä. Tämä tekee Kupianskin huollosta ja mahdollisesta vetäytymisestä vaikeampaa.
Mapsin perusteella Ukrainalaisilla on (tai ainkain on ollut) tilapäissilta Kupiansikin eteläpuolella, joka toiminee alueen henkireikänä ainakin toistaiseksi.
49°38'33.3"N 37°38'06.9"E
Resepti tämä kuplan puhkaisemiseen lienee samat kuin aiemminkin etelässä. Pehmitys ilmasta epäsuoralla, dronein ja tarvittaessa ilmaiskuin ja sitten kevyen joukon loppusiivous. Kovin ohkaiselta Ukrainan linja kyllä vaikuttaa kun näitä nyt pääsee tapahtumaan "liukuhihnalta".
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
BBC.ru ja Mediazona ovat julkaisseet tuoreimmat numerot ryssän todennettujen kuolleiden määrästä (artikkeli julkaistu 22.8.2025). Lisäsin kuviin tekstien Google Lens -käännökset.
Tämä on siis ehdoton, todennettu minimi: 124 832 kuollutta.
https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c15ldx4v0g8o
About the article
We included all Russian soldiers killed in the period from February 11, 2025 to the present in this number. In cases where the exact date of death was unknown, we took into account the date of death confirmation in open sources. The real number of deaths during this period will, of course, be higher.
Since February 2025, official representatives of Russia and the United States have begun regular contacts, including on the settlement of the conflict in Ukraine. On February 11, US Presidential Special Envoy Steve Witkoff flew to Moscow for the first time.
On the same day, 56-year-old native of the Bashkir village of Staroyantuzovo Ranif Fazylov signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense. The next day, for the first time since Donald Trump returned to the White House, the Russian and American presidents spoke on the phone.
Apart from his military service in Orenburg in 1989-1991, Ranif Fazylov had no connection with the army - he studied at school for eight years, graduated from college, returned to his native village, worked on the Pobeda collective farm, and later " worked in various organizations " in the Sverdlovsk region and Bashkortostan.
In the last years before going to the front, Fazylov worked as a driver. However, he never had a driver's license - at least that's what he will tell the court.
In 2019, Fazylov got into an accident while driving a ZIL - he did not notice a Seat overtaking him and began to change lanes without using the turn signal. Dodging a collision with a truck, the car flew into a ditch and overturned, the passengers - two adults and a child - were injured. In the lawsuit against Fazylov, the Seat driver claimed that due to the injuries sustained in the accident, his daughter was unable to enroll in university.
In 2020, the Birsk Interdistrict Court of Bashkortostan found Fazylov guilty in a case of violating traffic rules, which resulted in the infliction of serious bodily harm to a person through negligence. Fazylov avoided a prison colony; the court only sentenced him to one and a half years of restricted freedom and banned him from driving for three years.
By the time the man decided to go to war, those restrictions had already expired. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine had been going on for almost three years.
Fazylov went to fight as part of the 80th Guards Tank Regiment. He was given the call sign Gamsa. At least, that is what is in the messages from Fazylov's wife and sisters - since the end of April, they have been trying to find out at least something about the man's fate by sending his photos to Telegram chats for missing persons.
Fazylov last contacted his family on March 30. An obituary published on the village library website said that Fazylov died on April 1 near the village of Novoandreyevka in Donetsk Oblast. The Russian army has not yet managed to capture the frontline village of Novoandreyevka, but last week the Ukrainian authorities announced the mandatory evacuation of its residents. The BBC, using open data, was able to find 173 more soldiers of the 80th Guards Tank Regiment who died in addition to Fazylov.
The man's obituary on the website of the Bashkir Malonakaryakovskaya rural library says that he had no children. In the section "Heroes of the SVO of the Mishkinsky District" on the library's website there are already 123 obituaries. Bashkortostan continues to hold first place among Russian regions in the number of people killed in the war with Ukraine - 6,117 people as of August 22.
(HUOM: tämä on interaktiivinen kartta eli siitä näkee tietyn Venäjän oblastin todennetut tappiot kun vie hiiren kursorin ko. alueen päälle. En ala kopioimaan numeroita jokaisen alueen osalta, mutta kuvasta näkee karkeasti sen miltä alueelta tappiot ovat eli tummempi väri on suurempi numero ja vaalea väri pienempi numero)
Fazilov went to war from the village of Chebykovo in the Mishkinsky District of Bashkortostan. The population of Chebykovo is 385 people, of which 100 are men aged 18 to 60. The BBC knows of at least two more natives of the same village who died in the war. Nothing was written about them in the Chebykovo House of Culture public page on VKontakte. But they publish poems in support of the war in Ukraine and constantly report on how local residents weave camouflage nets for the military.
27% of the fatalities we identified were volunteers. By comparison, in 2023, their share was only 14% of the total number of casualties.
Former prisoners account for 14.5% of those killed in the war. The share of this category is gradually decreasing in the overall report - this is due to the fact that now investigators and lawyers are obliged to notify the accused and suspects about the possibility of avoiding criminal punishment if they sign a contract with the Russian army. Since in such cases people are not formally found guilty by the court, we classify them as volunteers, not convicts.
About 11% of the dead were mobilized. However, the actual losses among them may be significantly higher, since obituaries do not always indicate the exact status of the deceased. Because of this, it is often impossible to determine whether a person went to the front voluntarily or was mobilized.
Russia also continues to suffer losses among officers - a total of 5,621 since the beginning of the invasion until August 22. Among them are 12 generals (including Interior Ministry Major General Andrei Golovatsky, who was sentenced to 8.5 years in prison).
On August 17, another general, deputy commander of the Sever group, Esedulla Abachev, was wounded in the war. According to the head of Dagestan, Sergei Melikov, Abachev was "in one of the border regions." The general was hospitalized, doctors assessed his condition as serious. The Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine reported that Abachev was wounded on Sunday, August 17. The GUR claimed that Ukrainian troops hit a Russian convoy on the Rylsk-Khomutovka highway in the Kursk region, and the general's arm and legs were amputated as a result of the wound. Abachev fought in Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, and in April 2022, President Vladimir Putin awarded him the title of "Hero of Russia."
Four generals were killed in the first four months of the war. During that period, many commanders were close to the front lines, trying to speed up decision-making by their presence, compensating for logistical problems, operational planning shortcomings, and the lack of reliable secure communications.
By the summer of 2022, the Russian military had managed to partially establish a supply and communications system - generals and other high-ranking officers were transferred to rear areas, and over the next year we did not record any confirmed cases of deaths of senior officers.
In the summer of 2023, when the Ukrainians received long-range artillery systems from their Western allies, Russian generals began to die in pinpoint strikes. By the end of 2024, a new trend emerged — generals were killed as a result of assassination attempts — for example, Igor Kirillov, the head of the radiation, chemical and biological defense troops , was killed in Moscow . A scooter packed with explosives was remotely detonated at the entrance to the general’s house as he was walking out to his waiting car.
The real scale of losses is obviously much higher than those recorded in open sources. According to estimates of military experts we interviewed, an analysis of Russian cemeteries, memorials and obituaries reflects only 45% to 65% of the total number of victims.
One reason is that the bodies of many of the soldiers killed in recent months may still be on the battlefield. Removing them would risk further casualties, leaving them vulnerable to drone attacks.
Taking into account the above estimates, the death toll on the Russian side could range from 192,049 to 277,404.
The total number of losses increases significantly if we include in the calculation the military personnel who participated in the battles against Ukraine as part of the formations of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People's "Republics".
Since December 2022, the DPR authorities have stopped publishing information about losses, and the LPR has never disclosed them at all. Having studied the available obituaries and reports of LPR/DPR fighters who have not been in touch for a long time, we came to the conclusion that by the end of September 2024, the number of people killed in these formations could have been between 21,000 and 23,500 people. Later, we began to count killed LPR/DPR fighters as foreigners in the Russian army.
Thus, based on the collected data, it can be assumed that the total number of deaths among pro-Russian forces is in the range of 213,049 to 300,904 military personnel.
We are continuing to collect information about service personnel who have died. If you would like to share information on this topic, please email [email protected].
How we count
In Russia, new names of the dead and photographs of funerals are published every day. Most often, the names are given by the heads of Russian regions or representatives of district administrations, local media and educational institutions where the dead previously studied, as well as relatives.
The BBC, Mediazona and a team of volunteers are studying this data and adding it to the list we have been keeping since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
We consider a publication in a Russian official source or media outlet, publications by relatives or posts in other sources, if they are accompanied by photographs of the burial, as confirmation of death.
We determined the branches of the armed forces based on reports of where the deceased served or on the insignia on the uniform. Mobilized personnel, volunteers, and prisoners are not separate branches of the armed forces, but we separate these losses into a separate category to compare them with the losses of professional (contract) units of the regular army.
* The publication "Mediazona" has been recognized as a "foreign agent" by the Russian authorities.
Tämä on siis ehdoton, todennettu minimi: 124 832 kuollutta.
https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c15ldx4v0g8o
11,000 dead during peace talks: what we know about Russia's losses in Ukraine by the end of August
About the article
- Author, Sergey Goryashko and the correspondents' department
- Place of work,BBC
- August 22, 2025
We included all Russian soldiers killed in the period from February 11, 2025 to the present in this number. In cases where the exact date of death was unknown, we took into account the date of death confirmation in open sources. The real number of deaths during this period will, of course, be higher.
Contract on the day negotiations begin
Since February 2025, official representatives of Russia and the United States have begun regular contacts, including on the settlement of the conflict in Ukraine. On February 11, US Presidential Special Envoy Steve Witkoff flew to Moscow for the first time.
On the same day, 56-year-old native of the Bashkir village of Staroyantuzovo Ranif Fazylov signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense. The next day, for the first time since Donald Trump returned to the White House, the Russian and American presidents spoke on the phone.
Apart from his military service in Orenburg in 1989-1991, Ranif Fazylov had no connection with the army - he studied at school for eight years, graduated from college, returned to his native village, worked on the Pobeda collective farm, and later " worked in various organizations " in the Sverdlovsk region and Bashkortostan.
In the last years before going to the front, Fazylov worked as a driver. However, he never had a driver's license - at least that's what he will tell the court.
In 2019, Fazylov got into an accident while driving a ZIL - he did not notice a Seat overtaking him and began to change lanes without using the turn signal. Dodging a collision with a truck, the car flew into a ditch and overturned, the passengers - two adults and a child - were injured. In the lawsuit against Fazylov, the Seat driver claimed that due to the injuries sustained in the accident, his daughter was unable to enroll in university.
In 2020, the Birsk Interdistrict Court of Bashkortostan found Fazylov guilty in a case of violating traffic rules, which resulted in the infliction of serious bodily harm to a person through negligence. Fazylov avoided a prison colony; the court only sentenced him to one and a half years of restricted freedom and banned him from driving for three years.
By the time the man decided to go to war, those restrictions had already expired. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine had been going on for almost three years.
Fazylov went to fight as part of the 80th Guards Tank Regiment. He was given the call sign Gamsa. At least, that is what is in the messages from Fazylov's wife and sisters - since the end of April, they have been trying to find out at least something about the man's fate by sending his photos to Telegram chats for missing persons.
Fazylov last contacted his family on March 30. An obituary published on the village library website said that Fazylov died on April 1 near the village of Novoandreyevka in Donetsk Oblast. The Russian army has not yet managed to capture the frontline village of Novoandreyevka, but last week the Ukrainian authorities announced the mandatory evacuation of its residents. The BBC, using open data, was able to find 173 more soldiers of the 80th Guards Tank Regiment who died in addition to Fazylov.
The man's obituary on the website of the Bashkir Malonakaryakovskaya rural library says that he had no children. In the section "Heroes of the SVO of the Mishkinsky District" on the library's website there are already 123 obituaries. Bashkortostan continues to hold first place among Russian regions in the number of people killed in the war with Ukraine - 6,117 people as of August 22.
(HUOM: tämä on interaktiivinen kartta eli siitä näkee tietyn Venäjän oblastin todennetut tappiot kun vie hiiren kursorin ko. alueen päälle. En ala kopioimaan numeroita jokaisen alueen osalta, mutta kuvasta näkee karkeasti sen miltä alueelta tappiot ovat eli tummempi väri on suurempi numero ja vaalea väri pienempi numero)
Fazilov went to war from the village of Chebykovo in the Mishkinsky District of Bashkortostan. The population of Chebykovo is 385 people, of which 100 are men aged 18 to 60. The BBC knows of at least two more natives of the same village who died in the war. Nothing was written about them in the Chebykovo House of Culture public page on VKontakte. But they publish poems in support of the war in Ukraine and constantly report on how local residents weave camouflage nets for the military.
Main trends
27% of the fatalities we identified were volunteers. By comparison, in 2023, their share was only 14% of the total number of casualties.
Former prisoners account for 14.5% of those killed in the war. The share of this category is gradually decreasing in the overall report - this is due to the fact that now investigators and lawyers are obliged to notify the accused and suspects about the possibility of avoiding criminal punishment if they sign a contract with the Russian army. Since in such cases people are not formally found guilty by the court, we classify them as volunteers, not convicts.
About 11% of the dead were mobilized. However, the actual losses among them may be significantly higher, since obituaries do not always indicate the exact status of the deceased. Because of this, it is often impossible to determine whether a person went to the front voluntarily or was mobilized.
Russia also continues to suffer losses among officers - a total of 5,621 since the beginning of the invasion until August 22. Among them are 12 generals (including Interior Ministry Major General Andrei Golovatsky, who was sentenced to 8.5 years in prison).
On August 17, another general, deputy commander of the Sever group, Esedulla Abachev, was wounded in the war. According to the head of Dagestan, Sergei Melikov, Abachev was "in one of the border regions." The general was hospitalized, doctors assessed his condition as serious. The Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine reported that Abachev was wounded on Sunday, August 17. The GUR claimed that Ukrainian troops hit a Russian convoy on the Rylsk-Khomutovka highway in the Kursk region, and the general's arm and legs were amputated as a result of the wound. Abachev fought in Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, and in April 2022, President Vladimir Putin awarded him the title of "Hero of Russia."
Four generals were killed in the first four months of the war. During that period, many commanders were close to the front lines, trying to speed up decision-making by their presence, compensating for logistical problems, operational planning shortcomings, and the lack of reliable secure communications.
By the summer of 2022, the Russian military had managed to partially establish a supply and communications system - generals and other high-ranking officers were transferred to rear areas, and over the next year we did not record any confirmed cases of deaths of senior officers.
In the summer of 2023, when the Ukrainians received long-range artillery systems from their Western allies, Russian generals began to die in pinpoint strikes. By the end of 2024, a new trend emerged — generals were killed as a result of assassination attempts — for example, Igor Kirillov, the head of the radiation, chemical and biological defense troops , was killed in Moscow . A scooter packed with explosives was remotely detonated at the entrance to the general’s house as he was walking out to his waiting car.
Overall assessment of Russian losses
The real scale of losses is obviously much higher than those recorded in open sources. According to estimates of military experts we interviewed, an analysis of Russian cemeteries, memorials and obituaries reflects only 45% to 65% of the total number of victims.
One reason is that the bodies of many of the soldiers killed in recent months may still be on the battlefield. Removing them would risk further casualties, leaving them vulnerable to drone attacks.
Taking into account the above estimates, the death toll on the Russian side could range from 192,049 to 277,404.
The total number of losses increases significantly if we include in the calculation the military personnel who participated in the battles against Ukraine as part of the formations of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People's "Republics".
Since December 2022, the DPR authorities have stopped publishing information about losses, and the LPR has never disclosed them at all. Having studied the available obituaries and reports of LPR/DPR fighters who have not been in touch for a long time, we came to the conclusion that by the end of September 2024, the number of people killed in these formations could have been between 21,000 and 23,500 people. Later, we began to count killed LPR/DPR fighters as foreigners in the Russian army.
Thus, based on the collected data, it can be assumed that the total number of deaths among pro-Russian forces is in the range of 213,049 to 300,904 military personnel.
We are continuing to collect information about service personnel who have died. If you would like to share information on this topic, please email [email protected].
How we count
In Russia, new names of the dead and photographs of funerals are published every day. Most often, the names are given by the heads of Russian regions or representatives of district administrations, local media and educational institutions where the dead previously studied, as well as relatives.
The BBC, Mediazona and a team of volunteers are studying this data and adding it to the list we have been keeping since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
We consider a publication in a Russian official source or media outlet, publications by relatives or posts in other sources, if they are accompanied by photographs of the burial, as confirmation of death.
We determined the branches of the armed forces based on reports of where the deceased served or on the insignia on the uniform. Mobilized personnel, volunteers, and prisoners are not separate branches of the armed forces, but we separate these losses into a separate category to compare them with the losses of professional (contract) units of the regular army.
* The publication "Mediazona" has been recognized as a "foreign agent" by the Russian authorities.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Maidan
Respected Leader
Venäjä iskee Ukrainan energiainfrastruktuuriin estääkseen valmistautumisen talveen", toteaa Ukrainan presidentti Volodymyr Zelenskyi. Hän puhui asiasta yhteisessä tiedotustilaisuudessa Kanadan pääministerin Mark Carney kanssa. Ukraina tarvitsee tukea kaasun hankintaan Venäjän iskujen vuoksi, jotka ovat kohdistuneet energiantuotantoon ja kaivostoimintaan.
Censor.NET-sivuston mukaan, viitaten Ukrinformiin, Zelenskyi kommentoi asiaa myös Norjan pääministerin Jonas Gahr Støren kanssa järjestetyssä yhteisessä lehdistötilaisuudessa. "Venäjä yrittää estää meidän valmistautumisemme talveen, iskemällä energiainfrastruktuuriimme. Tämä koskee paitsi sähkön- ja lämmöntuotantoa myös oman maakaasumme tuotantoa. Siksi me arvostamme suuresti apua, jonka Norja tarjoaa Ukrainalle kaasun hankintaan", Zelenskyi sanoi.
Muistutuksena, Norja aikoo vuoteen 2026 mennessä myöntää Ukrainalle 8,5 miljardia dollaria osana Nansenin tukiohjelmaa.
Lähde: https://censor.net/ru/n3570399
Censor.NET-sivuston mukaan, viitaten Ukrinformiin, Zelenskyi kommentoi asiaa myös Norjan pääministerin Jonas Gahr Støren kanssa järjestetyssä yhteisessä lehdistötilaisuudessa. "Venäjä yrittää estää meidän valmistautumisemme talveen, iskemällä energiainfrastruktuuriimme. Tämä koskee paitsi sähkön- ja lämmöntuotantoa myös oman maakaasumme tuotantoa. Siksi me arvostamme suuresti apua, jonka Norja tarjoaa Ukrainalle kaasun hankintaan", Zelenskyi sanoi.
Muistutuksena, Norja aikoo vuoteen 2026 mennessä myöntää Ukrainalle 8,5 miljardia dollaria osana Nansenin tukiohjelmaa.
Lähde: https://censor.net/ru/n3570399
Maidan
Respected Leader
Yhdysvallat on hyväksynyt 3350 ERAM-ohjuksen myynnin Ukrainalle, joiden kantama on 241–450 km, kertoo WSJ. Ohjukset toimitetaan Ukrainan asevoimille kuuden viikon sisällä Pentagonin hyväksynnästä. Paketin arvo on 850 miljoonaa dollaria, ja suurin osa kustannuksista katetaan Euroopan liittolaisten toimesta."Mahdollisesti kyseessä on uusi ammus, joka on suunniteltu erityisesti Ukrainan tarpeisiin taistelukentällä. Sen kehittäminen alkoi jo heinäkuussa 2024, kuten 'Militarist' tuolloin kirjoitti."
Tämän ammuksen teknisissä vaatimuksissa mainittiin kantama yli 400 km, taistelukärjen paino 250 kg, nopeus 200 m/s (720 km/h), ja CEP-arvo (tarkkuus) 10 metriä. Keskeiset vaatimukset olivat kuitenkin edullisuus ja mahdollisuus laajamittaiseen tuotantoon.
WSJ:n mukaan näiden ohjusten toimitus voi johtaa ATACMS- ja Storm Shadow -ohjusten käytön kiellon poistamiseen Venäjän territorioon kohdistuvissa iskuissa. Tämä kielto on ollut voimassa kevään lopusta lähtien.
"Kuvassa on Boeingin kehittämä PJDAM-prototyyppi, jolla on samankaltaisia ominaisuuksia, mutta miltä ukrainalainen ERAM näyttää, sitä emme vielä tiedä."
**INSIDER UA @ToBeOr_Official**
Antares
Respected Leader
Kolme minuuttia pitkä Wall Street Journal video jossa esitellään Yak-52 potkurikoneilla lentävää ja ryssän tiedusteludroneja pudottavaa yksikköä:
The Wall Street Journal story about the work of a Ukrainian unit that uses Soviet Yak-52 training aircraft to combat Russian drones.
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Minun käsitys on että näitä koneita on muutama ja ne lentävät Odessan seudulla. Ei siis mitenkään yleinen taktiikka mutta todistetusti toimiva eikä ryssä ole kyennyt pudottamaan näitä, eli saavat jatkaa toimintaansa. Aikaisemmin tänä vuonna muistan nähneeni uutisen että yksi Yak-52 lentäjä olisi kuollut, en muista oliko taistelulennon aikana vai sen ulkopuolella. Hän taisi olla "Odessan ilmailuseuran" johtaja, jos muistini ei petä.
The Wall Street Journal story about the work of a Ukrainian unit that uses Soviet Yak-52 training aircraft to combat Russian drones.
-
Minun käsitys on että näitä koneita on muutama ja ne lentävät Odessan seudulla. Ei siis mitenkään yleinen taktiikka mutta todistetusti toimiva eikä ryssä ole kyennyt pudottamaan näitä, eli saavat jatkaa toimintaansa. Aikaisemmin tänä vuonna muistan nähneeni uutisen että yksi Yak-52 lentäjä olisi kuollut, en muista oliko taistelulennon aikana vai sen ulkopuolella. Hän taisi olla "Odessan ilmailuseuran" johtaja, jos muistini ei petä.
J0h1F
Respected Leader
Kovasti flamingojen visiittiä kaipaisivat siis noihin lentotukikohtiin.JR2 lainaa erästä OSINT-tiliä joka varoittaa ryssän valmistelevan "merkittävää ohjusiskua" sekä merkittävän suurta dronejen käyttöä (valmistelu ei tarkoita että isku tapahtuisi tulevana yönä - tosin viitattu lähde arvioi "tänään tai huomenna"):
preparations for a massive missile-drone strike on Ukraine:
- up to 9 Tu-95MS
- up to 2 Tu-160
(up to 60 Kh-101 missiles in total)
- Kinzhal/Caliber/Iskander-K missiles: 7/24/12
- approx. 500-800 Shaheds
Source: https://t.me/marmuletik_news/41171
Intelligence information, so be on guard today and in the coming days
Kuvien tekstin käännös:
Ohjuksilla
Olenja 3 Tu95
Engels 4 Ty95
Engels 2 Tu160
Djagilev 2 Ty95
Mahdollinen kokonaislaukaus X101 jopa 60 ohjusta (todellisuudessa jopa 40)
Kaliiperit jopa 24 ohjusta
Daggers jopa 7 ohjusta
Ballistinen uhka pohjoiselle ja keskiosille jopa 22 ohjusta
Iskander K jopa 12 ohjusta
Viimeisten neljän päivän droonitiedustelutoiminnan perusteella Kiova ja muut pohjoiset ja keskiosat saattavat olla pääkohteita. Kokemuksen perusteella valmistautuvat toimet voivat viitata tulitukseen seuraavana päivänä. Eli odotamme tulitusta tänään tai huomenna.
Yksiköiden huomio!
Tällä hetkellä kaikki vihollisen laukaisulinjat valmistautuvat laukaisua varten.
Tällä hetkellä:
Shatalovo - valmistelut
Orel - valmistelut
Halino - 50 kappaletta
Nyavlya - 25 kappaletta
Millerovo - valmistelut
Primorsko Akhtarsk - 30-50 kappaletta
Chauda - valmistelut
Gvardijske - valmistelut
Donetsk - valmistelut
Berdyansk - valmistelut
Vastaavasti - tänään tai huomenna odotamme yhdistettyä raketti- ja tulitusiskua. Tulitikkujen odotettu kokonaismäärä 500-800.
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HUOM:Kim Hovik varoitti ohjusiskun valmistelusta eilen, mutta ei ole kommentoinut asiaa tänään (hän on yleensä ajantasalla näistä iskuista ja varoittaa kun havaitsee uhkaavaa aktiviteettia):
Russia has begun preparing for a new missile strike on Ukraine.
2x TU-95MS from Ukrainka air base moved to Engels-2
1x TU-160 from Ukrainka air base moved 2 Engels-2.
2x TU-95MS that were used for a combat sortie on Ukraine on 21. Aug are still at Olenya air base.
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Total of 4x TU-95MS now at Olenya.
2x TU-95MS flew from Engels-2 to Olenya.
Antares
Respected Leader
CNN on julkaissut artikkelin jossa käsitellään dronesotaa, lainasin sen tekstin spoilerin taakse. Artikkelissa oli useita havainnollistavia kuvia, lainasin niistä osan mutten kaikkia:
"In 2022, Russia paid an average of $200,000 for one such drone, a Ukrainian Defense Intelligence source said. In 2025, that number came down to approximately $70,000."
https://edition.cnn.com/world/russia-drone-attacks-ukraine-war-intl-vis
Rachel Wilson
,
Lauren Kent
,
Yukari Schrickel
Updated 2 hr ago
As Russia’s war machine grinds forward in eastern Ukraine, there is another offensive being waged far beyond the front line. Russia is ramping up nightly drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure, and as it rapidly increases its production of those weapons its strikes are intensifying.
Many of the drones aren’t particularly fast or high-tech, but they are cheap enough for the Kremlin to launch more than 700 in one night, in an effort to overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses and decimate civilian morale, experts say.
After obtaining Iranian designs for Shahed attack drones, Russia built its own massive factory to churn out thousands of these weapons each month. Its evolving tactics are forcing Ukraine to fight back with more expensive ammunition and innovations, as less costly methods of defense become less effective.
-
Last updated on August 24, 2025. Data updated weekly.
Note: Data includes Shahed-136/131, Lancet and Kub kamikaze drones. Many drone attacks are carried out overnight for hours-long periods – these have been attributed to the day after.
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Graphic: Soph Warnes and Rachel Wilson, CNN
-
The rapid increase in drone strikes shows how warfare has evolved to rely on these unmanned autonomous vehicles.
Ukraine and Russia have been driven to improve drone capabilities to compensate for deficiencies in air force capabilities, a dynamic that isn’t applicable to all Western powers. But experts say that the United States and its European NATO allies are actively working to improve drones and counter-drone operations to retain an advantage in any future conflicts.
“NATO will probably end up using drones on a large scale. Not at the same scale as Russia and Ukraine, because we’ve got these massive air forces that we’ve invested in and that can strike with a lot of power very quickly – but as a complement to that,” Robert Tollast, a research fellow focused on land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), told CNN.
Taiwan is already looking into developing large numbers of cheap attack drones, Tollast said. Non-state actors across the globe and drug cartels are also increasingly relying on drones. “These are going to pose a huge challenge to unprepared armies around the world,” he added.
This is how Russia’s drone campaign operates – and how Ukraine is working to fight back.
Russia is moving toward producing more than 6,000 Shahed-type drones each month, Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence told CNN. And it’s much cheaper to produce the attack drones inside Russia compared to earlier in the war, when Moscow was purchasing them from Tehran.
“In 2022, Russia paid an average of $200,000 for one such drone,” a Ukrainian Defense Intelligence source said. “In 2025, that number came down to approximately $70,000,” due to the large-scale production at the Alabuga drone factory in Russia’s Tatarstan region.
But cost estimates vary greatly – the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a DC-based think tank, found that estimates for Shahed-136s ranged from $20,000 to $50,000 per drone. By comparison, a single surface-to-air missile interceptor can cost more than $3 million.
That relatively low cost makes it possible for the Kremlin to ramp up its nightly drone attacks, as well as conduct more frequent large-scale attacks. Earlier in the war, major missile-and-drone salvos happened roughly once a month. By mid-2025, they occured every eight days on average, according to an analysis by CSIS.
To many civilians, the constant threat of drone attacks is terrifying.
An apartment building is heavily damaged following a Russian drone strike in Odesa, Ukraine, on July 24, 2025.
Nina Liashonok/Reuters
Kyiv resident Bohdana Zhupanyna was heavily pregnant when her family’s apartment was obliterated by a Russian drone strike in July.
“I’m trying to calm down, because such stress at nine months of pregnancy is very dangerous,” Zhupanyna, who has since delivered her baby safely, told CNN in the immediate aftermath of the strike. “I lost a lot in this damn war. My father was killed by the hands of Russians, my apartment was destroyed by the hands of Russians, and my mother was almost killed by the hands of Russians.”
And while Russia uses long-range drones to attack Ukrainian cities hundreds of miles from the front lines, civilians living in cities close to Russian-controlled areas describe being haunted by daily FPV drone attacks. Residents of the Kherson region previously told CNN that no target seems to be off limits, with reported FPV drone attacks on pedestrians, cars, buses and even ambulances.
Russia has repeatedly denied targeting civilians, despite substantial evidence to the contrary.
-
-
The percentage of drones that hit their targets has roughly doubled, with a hit rate of close to 20% since April, compared with 2024, when less than 10% hit targets on average, said Yasir Atalan, a data fellow at CSIS. And, the CSIS analysts wrote in their analysis, “it doesn’t matter if an individual Shahed hits its target. What matters is the compound effect the terror weapon has on civilians and the stress it places on air defenses.”
Russia’s tactics are about “keeping the constant pressure,” Atalan told CNN. “Their strategy is now focusing more and more on this sort of attrition.”
Ukraine also counterattacks with FPV drones on the front lines and has attacked infrastructure and weapons facilities inside Russia using long-range drones.
“For every technological development, both sides are already looking for a counter-measure. And the innovation cycle is so fast that within (a) matter of two to three weeks, we already see a counter-adaptation to (a) technological breakthrough,” said Kateryna Stepanenko, a Russia analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think-tank.
“So, some of the approaches that might be effective currently might not be as effective in the coming months,” Stepanenko said.
Now, both Ukraine and Russia are working to develop AI-powered drones that can make their own decisions on the battlefield, as well as creating interceptor drones that could be deployed as a cheaper method of countering aerial assaults than firing missiles, according to ISW.
“There are numerous reports about Ukrainians testing some of these drones, but we haven’t seen them deployed at scale,” Stepanenko said. “The development of interceptor drones would free up Ukrainian capabilities and also help Ukrainian forces preserve some of (their) air defense missiles for missile strikes.”
CNN’s Toby Hancock, Henrik Pettersson and Daria Tarasova-Markina contributed to this report.
Your occasional reminder that the widely cited $20.000 price tag for a Shahed is completely made-up.
"In 2022, Russia paid an average of $200,000 for one such drone, a Ukrainian Defense Intelligence source said. In 2025, that number came down to approximately $70,000."
https://edition.cnn.com/world/russia-drone-attacks-ukraine-war-intl-vis
How Russia’s drone attacks have reshaped the war in Ukraine: An illustrated guide
How Russia’s drone attacks have reshaped the war in Ukraine: An illustrated guide
ByRachel Wilson
,
Lauren Kent
,
Yukari Schrickel
Updated 2 hr ago
As Russia’s war machine grinds forward in eastern Ukraine, there is another offensive being waged far beyond the front line. Russia is ramping up nightly drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure, and as it rapidly increases its production of those weapons its strikes are intensifying.
Many of the drones aren’t particularly fast or high-tech, but they are cheap enough for the Kremlin to launch more than 700 in one night, in an effort to overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses and decimate civilian morale, experts say.
After obtaining Iranian designs for Shahed attack drones, Russia built its own massive factory to churn out thousands of these weapons each month. Its evolving tactics are forcing Ukraine to fight back with more expensive ammunition and innovations, as less costly methods of defense become less effective.
-
Russia has expanded its capacity for launching drone assaults on Ukraine
The largest attack recorded in a single night this year was 728 launches on July 9, which surpassed last year's single-night record of 193 launches.Last updated on August 24, 2025. Data updated weekly.
Note: Data includes Shahed-136/131, Lancet and Kub kamikaze drones. Many drone attacks are carried out overnight for hours-long periods – these have been attributed to the day after.
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Graphic: Soph Warnes and Rachel Wilson, CNN
-
The rapid increase in drone strikes shows how warfare has evolved to rely on these unmanned autonomous vehicles.
Ukraine and Russia have been driven to improve drone capabilities to compensate for deficiencies in air force capabilities, a dynamic that isn’t applicable to all Western powers. But experts say that the United States and its European NATO allies are actively working to improve drones and counter-drone operations to retain an advantage in any future conflicts.
“NATO will probably end up using drones on a large scale. Not at the same scale as Russia and Ukraine, because we’ve got these massive air forces that we’ve invested in and that can strike with a lot of power very quickly – but as a complement to that,” Robert Tollast, a research fellow focused on land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), told CNN.
Taiwan is already looking into developing large numbers of cheap attack drones, Tollast said. Non-state actors across the globe and drug cartels are also increasingly relying on drones. “These are going to pose a huge challenge to unprepared armies around the world,” he added.
This is how Russia’s drone campaign operates – and how Ukraine is working to fight back.
Russia is moving toward producing more than 6,000 Shahed-type drones each month, Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence told CNN. And it’s much cheaper to produce the attack drones inside Russia compared to earlier in the war, when Moscow was purchasing them from Tehran.
“In 2022, Russia paid an average of $200,000 for one such drone,” a Ukrainian Defense Intelligence source said. “In 2025, that number came down to approximately $70,000,” due to the large-scale production at the Alabuga drone factory in Russia’s Tatarstan region.
But cost estimates vary greatly – the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a DC-based think tank, found that estimates for Shahed-136s ranged from $20,000 to $50,000 per drone. By comparison, a single surface-to-air missile interceptor can cost more than $3 million.
That relatively low cost makes it possible for the Kremlin to ramp up its nightly drone attacks, as well as conduct more frequent large-scale attacks. Earlier in the war, major missile-and-drone salvos happened roughly once a month. By mid-2025, they occured every eight days on average, according to an analysis by CSIS.
To many civilians, the constant threat of drone attacks is terrifying.
An apartment building is heavily damaged following a Russian drone strike in Odesa, Ukraine, on July 24, 2025.
Nina Liashonok/Reuters
Kyiv resident Bohdana Zhupanyna was heavily pregnant when her family’s apartment was obliterated by a Russian drone strike in July.
“I’m trying to calm down, because such stress at nine months of pregnancy is very dangerous,” Zhupanyna, who has since delivered her baby safely, told CNN in the immediate aftermath of the strike. “I lost a lot in this damn war. My father was killed by the hands of Russians, my apartment was destroyed by the hands of Russians, and my mother was almost killed by the hands of Russians.”
And while Russia uses long-range drones to attack Ukrainian cities hundreds of miles from the front lines, civilians living in cities close to Russian-controlled areas describe being haunted by daily FPV drone attacks. Residents of the Kherson region previously told CNN that no target seems to be off limits, with reported FPV drone attacks on pedestrians, cars, buses and even ambulances.
Russia has repeatedly denied targeting civilians, despite substantial evidence to the contrary.
-
-
The percentage of drones that hit their targets has roughly doubled, with a hit rate of close to 20% since April, compared with 2024, when less than 10% hit targets on average, said Yasir Atalan, a data fellow at CSIS. And, the CSIS analysts wrote in their analysis, “it doesn’t matter if an individual Shahed hits its target. What matters is the compound effect the terror weapon has on civilians and the stress it places on air defenses.”
Russia’s tactics are about “keeping the constant pressure,” Atalan told CNN. “Their strategy is now focusing more and more on this sort of attrition.”
Ukraine also counterattacks with FPV drones on the front lines and has attacked infrastructure and weapons facilities inside Russia using long-range drones.
“For every technological development, both sides are already looking for a counter-measure. And the innovation cycle is so fast that within (a) matter of two to three weeks, we already see a counter-adaptation to (a) technological breakthrough,” said Kateryna Stepanenko, a Russia analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think-tank.
“So, some of the approaches that might be effective currently might not be as effective in the coming months,” Stepanenko said.
Now, both Ukraine and Russia are working to develop AI-powered drones that can make their own decisions on the battlefield, as well as creating interceptor drones that could be deployed as a cheaper method of countering aerial assaults than firing missiles, according to ISW.
“There are numerous reports about Ukrainians testing some of these drones, but we haven’t seen them deployed at scale,” Stepanenko said. “The development of interceptor drones would free up Ukrainian capabilities and also help Ukrainian forces preserve some of (their) air defense missiles for missile strikes.”
CNN’s Toby Hancock, Henrik Pettersson and Daria Tarasova-Markina contributed to this report.
Your occasional reminder that the widely cited $20.000 price tag for a Shahed is completely made-up.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Lainasin edellisessä viestissäni CNN:n tuoretta drone-artikkelia ja siinä viitattiin aikaisempaan, Yelabugan dronetehdasta käsittelevään artikkeliin.
En muista nähneeni sitä täällä joten lainaan sen tekstin ja kuvat spoilerin taakse jos jotakuta kiinnostaa lukea (artikkeli on julkaistu 8.8.2025 eli noin kaksi viikkoa sitten):
https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/08/europe/russia-drone-factory-iran-intl
En muista nähneeni sitä täällä joten lainaan sen tekstin ja kuvat spoilerin taakse jos jotakuta kiinnostaa lukea (artikkeli on julkaistu 8.8.2025 eli noin kaksi viikkoa sitten):
https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/08/europe/russia-drone-factory-iran-intl
Russia built a massive drone factory to pump out Iranian-designed drones. Now it’s leaving Tehran out in the cold
https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/08/europe/russia-drone-factory-iran-intl
Vasco Cotovio, Saskya Vandoorne, Victoria Butenko, Clare Sebastian and Allegra Goodwin, CNN
Aug 8, 2025
CNN counted more than 170 drones as a Russian Ministry of Defense documentary showcased production inside the Alabuga drone factory.
TV Zvezda
“Finally, something no one else has,” a Russian journalist says during a TV documentary on the country’s largest drone factory. “Such mass production of two-stroke engines doesn’t exist anywhere else in Russia.”
The factory in question, Alabuga, 600 miles east of Moscow in Russia’s Tatarstan region, has been pumping out increasing numbers of the Iranian-designed Shahed-136 attack drone (known in Russia as Geran), but the man behind the site believes this may be one of its greatest achievements.
“This is a complete facility,” CEO Timur Shagivaleev adds in the documentary, explaining most of the components for the drone are now produced locally. “Aluminium bars come in, engines are made from them; microelectronics are made from electric chips; fuselages are made from carbon fiber and fiberglass – this is a complete location.”
The claim signals that production of the Iranian-designed Shahed, which has been the backbone of Moscow’s drone war on Ukraine, has now been mostly absorbed into Russia’s military industrial machine. Analysts and intelligence officials believe 90% of production stages now happen at Alabuga or other Russian facilities.
To that end, recent satellite imagery shows the site is continuing to expand, with new production facilities and dorms that would allow it to scale up production exponentially. Analysts CNN spoke with believe this growth would allow Russia to potentially export an updated and battle-tested version of the drone it originally imported from Iran – maybe even to Tehran itself.
But a Western intelligence source says the expansion and the complete Russian integration of the Shahed-136, have effectively marginalized Iran, revealing a rift between Moscow and Tehran. They say Tehran has been growing increasingly impatient with the little return it’s received from Russia, despite having supported Moscow’s war effort with not just drones, but missiles and other assets.
That discontent effectively boiled over throughout Israel’s 12-day bombing campaign of targeting Iran’s nuclear weapons program in June, during which Russia’s statements of condemnation were seen as paltry support for a country that has been helping Moscow since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
“Iran may have expected Russia to do more or take more steps without being required to do so,” Ali Akbar Dareini, an analyst for the Tehran-based Center for Strategic Studies, the research arm of the Iranian President’s office, told CNN. They may not intervene militarily, but they may beef operative support, in terms of weapons shipments, technological support, intelligence sharing, or things like that.”
But Russia’s distant approach was not surprising for the Western intelligence official CNN spoke with, who argued it showed the “purely transactional and utilitarian nature” of Russian cooperation with Iran.
“This explicit disengagement demonstrates that Russia never intervenes beyond its immediate interests, even when a partner – here an essential supplier of drones – is attacked,” they said.
The 6,000 drones by September 2025 stipulated in the initial contract were manufactured about a year ahead of schedule and, according to Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, Alabuga is now pumping out more than 5,500 units per month. It’s also doing so in a more efficient and cost-effective way.
“In 2022, Russia paid an average of 200,000 US dollars for one such drone,” a Ukrainian Defense Intelligence source said. “In 2025, that number came down to approximately 70,000 US dollars.”
Ukraine also said Russia has also modernized the drone, with improved communications, longer-lasting batteries and much larger warheads, making them deadlier and harder to bring down.
The Western intelligence official said Iran initially seemed to embrace Russia’s efforts to localize roughly 90% of production of the Shahed 136 at Alabuga but Moscow’s upgrades seem to have caught it off guard.
“This evolution marks a gradual loss of control for Iran over the final product, which is now largely manufactured locally and independently,” the source explained. They added Moscow’s end goal is “to fully master the production cycle and free itself from future negotiations with Tehran.”
Dareini says Russia’s predatory behavior is not surprising and describes the relationship between the two countries as “both cooperation and competition.”
“It’s obvious that Russians want more, to get more and give less, and this is this applies to Iran as well,” he explained. “Iran has provided Russia with drones and technology and the factory, and it has not been for free.”
But in the process of expanding, the official says, Alabuga has been unable to meet obligations to its Iranian partners. According to them, in addition to the loss of control over the final product, Iranian authorities and companies, namely Sahara Thunder, have complained that some payments have not been made, in part because of the suffocating international sanctions the Russian economy has been under for more than three years.
CNN has been unable to independently verify this. CNN has reached out to the Alabuga administration for comment but has yet to hear back.
“These obstacles add to Tehran’s frustration with the blockages hindering the transfer of Russian aeronautical technologies to Iran, which were promised by Moscow in exchange for its support,” the official added.
David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector and head of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) think tank, believes Alabuga’s expansion may allow Moscow to provide some meaningful support and send some of the updated versions of the Shahed back to Iran.
“Some of [Iran’s] drone production facilities were bombed and they fired a lot of [drones], so as a way to build back stock, they may do that,” Albright said. “And then then Iran could reverse engineer or receive the technology to make the better quality Shahed.”
“I think it’s very dangerous,” he added.
Other military equipment may be making its way to Tehran as well. Open-source flight tracking data shows a Gelix Airlines Ilyushin–76 military cargo plane flew from Moscow to Tehran on July 11.
The IL-76 is a heavy transport plane frequently used by the Russian military to ferry troops and military equipment, and Gelix Airlines has been associated with the transport of military equipment in the past.
The aircraft spent around three hours on the ground and then flew back to Moscow.
CNN was unable to confirm what was on board but Iranian media reported it was the final components of a Russian S-400 air defense system.
CNN asked the Russia Ministry of Defense for comment on the tension between the two countries but has not received a response. Similarly, CNN also reached out to the Iranian government, both in Tehran and via its embassy in the UK, but has yet to hear back.
These latest developments highlight Dareini’s core belief about relations between the two countries: while there may be tension, ultimately Iran will also reap the benefits of the partnership.
“Iran has got, and very likely will get the things it needs for its own security,” he explained. “Whether it’s military hardware, whether it’s in terms of economic cooperation, technology and whatever it needs.”
Russia built a massive drone factory to pump out Iranian-designed drones. Now it’s leaving Tehran out in the cold
ByVasco Cotovio, Saskya Vandoorne, Victoria Butenko, Clare Sebastian and Allegra Goodwin, CNN
Aug 8, 2025
CNN counted more than 170 drones as a Russian Ministry of Defense documentary showcased production inside the Alabuga drone factory.
TV Zvezda
“Finally, something no one else has,” a Russian journalist says during a TV documentary on the country’s largest drone factory. “Such mass production of two-stroke engines doesn’t exist anywhere else in Russia.”
The factory in question, Alabuga, 600 miles east of Moscow in Russia’s Tatarstan region, has been pumping out increasing numbers of the Iranian-designed Shahed-136 attack drone (known in Russia as Geran), but the man behind the site believes this may be one of its greatest achievements.
“This is a complete facility,” CEO Timur Shagivaleev adds in the documentary, explaining most of the components for the drone are now produced locally. “Aluminium bars come in, engines are made from them; microelectronics are made from electric chips; fuselages are made from carbon fiber and fiberglass – this is a complete location.”
The claim signals that production of the Iranian-designed Shahed, which has been the backbone of Moscow’s drone war on Ukraine, has now been mostly absorbed into Russia’s military industrial machine. Analysts and intelligence officials believe 90% of production stages now happen at Alabuga or other Russian facilities.
To that end, recent satellite imagery shows the site is continuing to expand, with new production facilities and dorms that would allow it to scale up production exponentially. Analysts CNN spoke with believe this growth would allow Russia to potentially export an updated and battle-tested version of the drone it originally imported from Iran – maybe even to Tehran itself.
But a Western intelligence source says the expansion and the complete Russian integration of the Shahed-136, have effectively marginalized Iran, revealing a rift between Moscow and Tehran. They say Tehran has been growing increasingly impatient with the little return it’s received from Russia, despite having supported Moscow’s war effort with not just drones, but missiles and other assets.
That discontent effectively boiled over throughout Israel’s 12-day bombing campaign of targeting Iran’s nuclear weapons program in June, during which Russia’s statements of condemnation were seen as paltry support for a country that has been helping Moscow since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
“Iran may have expected Russia to do more or take more steps without being required to do so,” Ali Akbar Dareini, an analyst for the Tehran-based Center for Strategic Studies, the research arm of the Iranian President’s office, told CNN. They may not intervene militarily, but they may beef operative support, in terms of weapons shipments, technological support, intelligence sharing, or things like that.”
But Russia’s distant approach was not surprising for the Western intelligence official CNN spoke with, who argued it showed the “purely transactional and utilitarian nature” of Russian cooperation with Iran.
“This explicit disengagement demonstrates that Russia never intervenes beyond its immediate interests, even when a partner – here an essential supplier of drones – is attacked,” they said.
Strategic partnership
After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it began importing Iranian Shahed drones. By early 2023, Moscow and Tehran had inked a $1.75 billion deal for Russia to make the drones domestically.The 6,000 drones by September 2025 stipulated in the initial contract were manufactured about a year ahead of schedule and, according to Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, Alabuga is now pumping out more than 5,500 units per month. It’s also doing so in a more efficient and cost-effective way.
“In 2022, Russia paid an average of 200,000 US dollars for one such drone,” a Ukrainian Defense Intelligence source said. “In 2025, that number came down to approximately 70,000 US dollars.”
Ukraine also said Russia has also modernized the drone, with improved communications, longer-lasting batteries and much larger warheads, making them deadlier and harder to bring down.
The Western intelligence official said Iran initially seemed to embrace Russia’s efforts to localize roughly 90% of production of the Shahed 136 at Alabuga but Moscow’s upgrades seem to have caught it off guard.
“This evolution marks a gradual loss of control for Iran over the final product, which is now largely manufactured locally and independently,” the source explained. They added Moscow’s end goal is “to fully master the production cycle and free itself from future negotiations with Tehran.”
Dareini says Russia’s predatory behavior is not surprising and describes the relationship between the two countries as “both cooperation and competition.”
“It’s obvious that Russians want more, to get more and give less, and this is this applies to Iran as well,” he explained. “Iran has provided Russia with drones and technology and the factory, and it has not been for free.”
But in the process of expanding, the official says, Alabuga has been unable to meet obligations to its Iranian partners. According to them, in addition to the loss of control over the final product, Iranian authorities and companies, namely Sahara Thunder, have complained that some payments have not been made, in part because of the suffocating international sanctions the Russian economy has been under for more than three years.
CNN has been unable to independently verify this. CNN has reached out to the Alabuga administration for comment but has yet to hear back.
“These obstacles add to Tehran’s frustration with the blockages hindering the transfer of Russian aeronautical technologies to Iran, which were promised by Moscow in exchange for its support,” the official added.
Salvaging the relationship?
The ceasefire between Israel and Iran has seen Tehran mostly withdraw from the international sphere to regroup, reorganize and rebuild what was destroyed during the conflict. And in addition to the well-publicized damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities, Israel targeted several other Iranian facilities.David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector and head of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) think tank, believes Alabuga’s expansion may allow Moscow to provide some meaningful support and send some of the updated versions of the Shahed back to Iran.
“Some of [Iran’s] drone production facilities were bombed and they fired a lot of [drones], so as a way to build back stock, they may do that,” Albright said. “And then then Iran could reverse engineer or receive the technology to make the better quality Shahed.”
“I think it’s very dangerous,” he added.
Other military equipment may be making its way to Tehran as well. Open-source flight tracking data shows a Gelix Airlines Ilyushin–76 military cargo plane flew from Moscow to Tehran on July 11.
The IL-76 is a heavy transport plane frequently used by the Russian military to ferry troops and military equipment, and Gelix Airlines has been associated with the transport of military equipment in the past.
The aircraft spent around three hours on the ground and then flew back to Moscow.
CNN was unable to confirm what was on board but Iranian media reported it was the final components of a Russian S-400 air defense system.
CNN asked the Russia Ministry of Defense for comment on the tension between the two countries but has not received a response. Similarly, CNN also reached out to the Iranian government, both in Tehran and via its embassy in the UK, but has yet to hear back.
These latest developments highlight Dareini’s core belief about relations between the two countries: while there may be tension, ultimately Iran will also reap the benefits of the partnership.
“Iran has got, and very likely will get the things it needs for its own security,” he explained. “Whether it’s military hardware, whether it’s in terms of economic cooperation, technology and whatever it needs.”
Antares
Respected Leader
Käännös twitter-tili Thorkill jakamasta Pokrovskin alueen tilannetta käsittelevästä viestistä, lähteenä ryssäläinen Filatov:
Situation in the Nowoekonomiczne (Pokrowsk) area, part IV.
Available scraps of info indicate that the crisis in the Nowoekonomiczne area, related to the Ukrainian counterattack, is still ongoing and has not yet been resolved by the Russians. Let's recall that on 22.08, elements of the 425th Assault Regiment "Skala" and the 79th Air Assault Brigade penetrated to a depth of about 5 km into the sector of responsibility of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade, occupying the area of the village of Myrne.
Yesterday, Filatov - the Russian war correspondent from the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade mentioned just earlier - wrote three posts related to the situation in the Myrne area. In the first one, he once again referred to the lies in the reports passed up by the command of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade
"Leveling the front line is necessary. And if there's no sense, you can just draw your movement on par with the allies and hope that the enemy will crumble under someone else's pressure. At the same time, beating your chest that you're where you drew it.
Only the opponent doesn't know about it…
Is there any military genius of the Ukrainians in that their assault troops penetrated Myrne? No. It's our eternal self-deception and cover-up."
In the subsequent posts, Filatov referred to the video published yesterday by the Ukrainian 79th Air Assault Brigade featuring soldiers of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade taken prisoner in Malyniwka.
"With all due respect to the guys who were taken prisoner. And they were taken because their commanders are degenerates.
If we're talking about Malyniwka, I'm not there, because I'm dealing with electronic warfare methods today, and just yesterday evening I planned to be in that locality. The Five is there 'in transit,' they don't have their positions there."
In the next post, he added:
"Malyniwka is not under enemy control. They reached Myrne through empty terrain, got beaten, suffered losses in personnel, and withdrew to forested areas.
Analysis of available Sentinel images indicates that Ukrainian assault groups, advancing from the Mychajliwka - Myrolubiwka area along the strip of foresting south of Myrne (48.324808,37.37210), first penetrated the village of Myrne and then the western part of the village of Malyniwka, occupying positions there in old Ukrainian fortifications along the strip of foresting north of Malyniwka (48.34079,37.415641). Under Ukrainian control are most likely also other old fortifications in the strip of foresting north of Myrne (48.348434,37.3892273).
The objective of the Ukrainian attack seems to be the Shevchenko Pershe - Koptieve area. In the event of its capture, the logistical situation of some brigades (110,114,132) of the 51st Army fighting in the Rodynskie - Biłytsia - Nowe Szachowe area will be very difficult. However, it appears that after the initial surprise, the command of the 51st Army has already sent reserve units there, and further territorial advances by the Ukrainians will be very difficult to achieve.
-
Tuon perusteella Myrne olisi ukrainalaisten hallinnassa mutta Malynivka (Myrnen itäpuolella) ei olisi.
Väitetään myös että ryssä olisi tuonut alueelle vahvistuksia, tosin ainakin toistaiseksi nämä eivät ole kyenneet valtaamaan alueita takaisin. Ukrainan yllätyshyökkäys tapahtui 22.8.2025 eli viime viikon perjantaina.
Situation in the Nowoekonomiczne (Pokrowsk) area, part IV.
Available scraps of info indicate that the crisis in the Nowoekonomiczne area, related to the Ukrainian counterattack, is still ongoing and has not yet been resolved by the Russians. Let's recall that on 22.08, elements of the 425th Assault Regiment "Skala" and the 79th Air Assault Brigade penetrated to a depth of about 5 km into the sector of responsibility of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade, occupying the area of the village of Myrne.
Yesterday, Filatov - the Russian war correspondent from the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade mentioned just earlier - wrote three posts related to the situation in the Myrne area. In the first one, he once again referred to the lies in the reports passed up by the command of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade
"Leveling the front line is necessary. And if there's no sense, you can just draw your movement on par with the allies and hope that the enemy will crumble under someone else's pressure. At the same time, beating your chest that you're where you drew it.
Only the opponent doesn't know about it…
Is there any military genius of the Ukrainians in that their assault troops penetrated Myrne? No. It's our eternal self-deception and cover-up."
In the subsequent posts, Filatov referred to the video published yesterday by the Ukrainian 79th Air Assault Brigade featuring soldiers of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade taken prisoner in Malyniwka.
"With all due respect to the guys who were taken prisoner. And they were taken because their commanders are degenerates.
If we're talking about Malyniwka, I'm not there, because I'm dealing with electronic warfare methods today, and just yesterday evening I planned to be in that locality. The Five is there 'in transit,' they don't have their positions there."
In the next post, he added:
"Malyniwka is not under enemy control. They reached Myrne through empty terrain, got beaten, suffered losses in personnel, and withdrew to forested areas.
Analysis of available Sentinel images indicates that Ukrainian assault groups, advancing from the Mychajliwka - Myrolubiwka area along the strip of foresting south of Myrne (48.324808,37.37210), first penetrated the village of Myrne and then the western part of the village of Malyniwka, occupying positions there in old Ukrainian fortifications along the strip of foresting north of Malyniwka (48.34079,37.415641). Under Ukrainian control are most likely also other old fortifications in the strip of foresting north of Myrne (48.348434,37.3892273).
The objective of the Ukrainian attack seems to be the Shevchenko Pershe - Koptieve area. In the event of its capture, the logistical situation of some brigades (110,114,132) of the 51st Army fighting in the Rodynskie - Biłytsia - Nowe Szachowe area will be very difficult. However, it appears that after the initial surprise, the command of the 51st Army has already sent reserve units there, and further territorial advances by the Ukrainians will be very difficult to achieve.
-
Tuon perusteella Myrne olisi ukrainalaisten hallinnassa mutta Malynivka (Myrnen itäpuolella) ei olisi.
Väitetään myös että ryssä olisi tuonut alueelle vahvistuksia, tosin ainakin toistaiseksi nämä eivät ole kyenneet valtaamaan alueita takaisin. Ukrainan yllätyshyökkäys tapahtui 22.8.2025 eli viime viikon perjantaina.
Jokaista usan presidenttiä on tällä saitilla haukuttu estoitta. Jokaista. Joskus ihan kuvittelee, että tämä saitti tihkuu pyhää vasemmistolaista vihaa usan presidenttiä kohtaan, tulee väkisin mieleen kasarin rauhanpuolllustajat ym.
Jokaista vuorollaan haukutaan. Kannattaa muistaa, että usa toimii etujensa perusteella. Ei usa ole pyyteetön ratsuväki, joka karauttaa automaattisesti joka asiaa selvittämään ja levittämään rauhoittavaa balsamia jokaiseen itkunivuseen.
Kannattaa oikeasti miettiä, että usan etu ei välttis ole sama kuin euroopan etu, vaikka niin me eurooppalaiset kovasti haluamme.
Milloin ryssä olisi puhunut jotain "tosissaan". Ryssä huijaa, kusettaa ja johtaa harhaan kaikkia, jotka erehtyvät uskomaan, että ryssillä olisi hyvät tarkoitukset.ha, haha, haa... Näin se Sergei Hevosen naama hirnuu tällä kertaa, ettei Zele kelpaa allekirjoittamaan rauhansopimusta. Kysyn vaan mitä rauhansopimusta
Maidan
Respected Leader
Yhdysvaltoja on historiansa aikana usein pidetty merkittävänä demokratian ja länsimaisten arvojen symbolina sekä globaalina toimijana, joka on monella tapaa vaikuttanut kansainväliseen politiikkaan, talouteen ja turvallisuuteen. Jopa termia "maailman poliisi" on käytetty kuvaamaan USA:n aktiivista roolia kansainvälisissä konflikteissa ja sen pyrkimystä vaikuttaa maailmanjärjestykseen.
USA on myös demokratian perikuva, perustuslakineen ja vallanjakojärjestelmineen maata on pitkään nähty demokratian malliesimerkkinä. Sen perustamisajatukset vapaudesta, tasa-arvosta ja yksilön oikeuksista ovat toimineet innoituksena monissa muissa maissa.
Toisen maailmansodan jälkeen Yhdysvallat pyrki aktiivisesti levittämään demokratiaa ja torjumaan kommunististen ideologioiden leviämistä. Tästä sitä ihailtu. Kylmä sota NL vastaan oli tässä keskeinen asia.
Yhdysvallat korostaa teemoja, kuten yksilönvapautta, ilmaisunvapautta, markkinataloutta ja ihmisoikeuksien kunnioittamista, ja se on pyrkinyt edistämään näitä arvoja kansainvälisillä foorumeilla ja eri maiden politiikoissa.
Siksi sitä ihailtu. Mutta sitten kansa valitsi Trumpin..
Kun Trump yhtäkkiä rupesi "kaveraa" ja suorastaan liian ihailevan sävyn puhua sotarikollisesta putinista, se on järkyttänyt monia. Diplomatia on yhtä, mutta tässä oli jotain muuta, ehkä se selviä joskus, mutta minusta tällä ei ole mitään tekemistä vasemmiston kanssa.
Trampin populismi liian silmän pistävä, ja muutkin asiat, konkurssit, lahjointa jne. Sekaantuminen Epsteiniin, joka on kuuluisa parituksesta korkeissa piireissa, hänelle mm tuottuu jopa alaikäisiä, jopa 12 v tyttöjä nimenomaan Venäjältä. Se on hyvin hämärä juttu, todistajat vaimennettu, itse Epsteinia hyvinkin mahdollista - tapettu vankilassa.
Saahan nähdä asiat myös tältä puolelta, itse pitänyt Ronald Reiganista ja Tatcherista, ja kyllä aikamoiset vihan niskoille sain tästä, kun kerroin.