Jopuni
Kenraali
Eikä noille joukoille tarvii kovin kummoista henkilökohtaista varustusta. Eiköhän puolustusvoimissa nyt kovasti pohdita vastakeinoja noihin drone laitteiden torjuntaan.
Ukrainan sodan havainnot ja opetukset
- Viestiketjun aloittaja Mustaruuti
- Aloitus PVM
Sako
Eversti
Hyvään valemaaliin ei riitä pelkkä ulkonäkö. Pitäisi huomioida ainakin lämpöjälki ja myös rauta aiheuttaa erilaista vipinää sensoreissa kuin puu. Väärävärikuvasta pystyy tunnistamaan, että millaisella maalilla kohde värjätty. Vaatimukset tietysti pitää arvioida sen mukaan mitkä on vihollisen kyvykkyydet. Ryssien tekniikka lahaa jäljessä vähintään vuosikymmenen länteen verrattuna, joten sieltä saa tuntumaa.
Pointti on, että pelkkä valevanerimaali ei ole tulevaisuudessa riittävä. Ei pitäisi olla riittävä edes tänään... Jep, ongelma on monitahoiden. Pelkkä näkyvän valon alueen huijaaminen ei riitä. Toisaalta valemaalin pitää olla halpa ja havainnosta tulenavaukseen ei saa kulua liikkuvien laitteiden osalta pitkään, jolloin harkinta-aika on rajallinen. Valemaalin ei tarvitse olla täydellinen, riittävä väärään päätökseen on tavoite. Serbit taisi saada aikaan onnistumisia autonromulla, putkella ja kynttilällä -> lännen tilastoissa tuhottu panssari.
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Hyvä pointti. Aisti-iv:n kouluttaminen tosiaan taisi jo vuosia sitten jäädä tarpeettomana pois ilmavoimien varusmieskoulutuksesta. Droneja ei vissiin oikein osattu ennakoida ?
Sanavalmis Muurinen
Kenraali
Tässähän olisi meille vähän vanhemmillekin ressuille sopivaa mielekästä ja tarpeellista tehtävää. Aikoinaan tosiaan oli oma varusmieskoulutuksen sektorinsa, mutta luulisi, että jollain auttavalla tasolla näihin voisi kouluttaa reserviläisiä kertausharjoituksissakin. Sotien aikana oli suurelta osalta siviilitaustaisten lottien hommaa, ja vaikka ajat ovat muuttuneet, eivät kai perusteet pohjimmiltaan niin monimutkaisia nytkään ole, etteikö reserviläisiäkin pystyttäisi kouluttamaan jollekin tasolle reservissä ilman, että siihen tarvittaisiin erikoistunutta varusmieskoulutusta.
Antares
Respected Leader
Ainakin ne valemaalit, mitä olen Ukrainassa nähneet ovat olleet vanerista tehtyjä. Kauemmas näyttävät kuitenkin hyvin aidoilta. Venäjällä on väitetysti ilmatäytteisiä ja näistä on kuvia netissä, mutta en ole nähnyt niiden käytöstä mitään todisteita. Niitä voi olla käytetty, tai sitten tässäkin on kyse pääasiassa propagandan käyttöön tuotetuista muutamasta kappaleesta.
Serbit tosiaan käyttivät monenlaisia temppuja, yksi oli teräsputki maahan ja pieni kytevä tuli sen sisälle. Sopivasti kallistettuna näytti korkealla lentävän FLIR-kameran silmään lämpimälle tykin putkelle. Muistaakseni tekivät tätäkin: kun lentokenttää pommitettiin, maalasivat kiitoradalle "läiskiä" jotka esittivät kraattereita. Korkealla taivaalla lentävä optinen satelliitti näkee että kiitoradalle osuttu --> ei tarvitse iskeä heti uudestaan.
Toki SAR-satelliitti näkee pinnan muodot, joten tietynlaiset maalit eivät toimi. Samoin tuo kuvailemasi maalipinnan analysointi erilaisia tempuin - mutta en ehkä lähtisi tekemään tästä liian monimutkaista. Jokaiselle valemaalille on tunnistuskeinonsa, joten siitä syystä ei voida rakentaa minkäänlaisia valemaaleja, koska aina on teoriassa keinot tunnistaa se?
Kieltämättä tuo olisi hyvin suomalaiseen luonteeseen sopiva eli yli-itsekriittinen ja yli-analyyttinen tapa ampua itseään jalkaan.
En antaisi vanjalle näin paljon pisteitä taidokkuudesta, toistaiseksi Ukrainasta on nähty videoita hyvin yksinkertaisten valemaalien käytöstä ja siitä että ryssä on iskenyt näitä vastaan.
Riittävän hyvä on täydellisen verivihollinen.
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Tässä on pitkä ketju valokuvien kera Venäjän tiettyjen UAV-lennokkien sisuskaluista:
Viimeksi muokattu:
Fisu
Kenraali
Jokin tovi sitten oli pätkä haastattelua muistaakseni Krimin suunnalta ja taustalla heilu ilmava S300.
Ainakin tuollaiseten Iranilaisten Shaded itsemurhadronien tunnistamiseen aisti-ilmavalvonta toimisi hyvin. Pitävät kovaa meteliä, mutta näkyvät huonosti tutkassa.
Antares
Respected Leader
Onko tälle "huonosti tutkassa näkymiselle" jotain vahvistusta? Pienehköjä maaleja ovat, mutta kuvien perusteella näillä ei ole mitenkään erikoista stealth-muotoilua enkä muista lukeneeni tutkasäteilyä huonosti takaisin heijastavasta maalipinnasta / pinnoituksesta.
Matalalla lentäminen ja maastonmuotojen käyttö suojana ovat perinteisiä keinoja vältellä tutkaa ja ehkä nämä tekevät sitä, mutta selvästi näitä on ammuttu alas suuret määrät. Ukrainan väitösten mukaan ehkä jopa puolet, joten vaikea uskoa että näkyisivät huonosti tutkassa. Silloin näiden torjunta olisi huomattavasti vaikeampaa.
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Tämä on voinut olla täällä aikaisemmin, koska artikkeli on julkaistu 30.8.2022 mutta laitan siltä varalta jos ei ole ollut tässä ketjussa: LÄHDE
A Frontline Shadow Economy: Ukrainian Units Swap Tanks and Artillery
A Frontline Shadow Economy: Ukrainian Units Swap Tanks and Artillery
Most of the bartering involves items captured from Russian troops, which are exchanged for urgently needed supplies. “Let’s just call it a simplification of bureaucracy,” one soldier said.
By Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak
Photographs by Tyler Hicks
Aug. 30, 2022
DONETSK REGION, Ukraine — The Ukrainian sergeant slid the captured Russian rocket launcher into the center of a small room. He was pleased. The weapon was practically brand-new. It had been built in 2020, and its thermobaric warhead was deadly against troops and armored vehicles.
But the sergeant, nicknamed Zmei, had no plans to fire it at advancing Russian soldiers or at a tank trying to burst through his unit’s front line in eastern Ukraine.
Instead, he was going to use it as a bargaining chip.
Within the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, Zmei was not just a lowly sergeant. He was the brigade’s point man for a wartime bartering system among Ukrainian forces. Prevalent along the front line, the exchange operates like a kind of shadow economy, soldiers say, in which units acquire weapons or equipment and trade them for supplies they need urgently.
Most of the bartering involves items captured from Russian troops. Ukrainian soldiers refer to them as “trophies.”
“Usually, the trades are done really fast,” Zmei said last week during an interview in Ukraine’s mineral-rich Donbas region, where the 93rd is now stationed. “Let’s just call it a simplification of bureaucracy.”
Despite the influx of Western weapons and equipment in recent months, the Ukrainian military still relies heavily on arms and vehicles captured from their better-equipped Russian foe for the matériel needed to wage war; much of Ukraine’s aging Soviet-era arsenal is either destroyed, worn down or lacks ammunition.
That has left Ukrainian soldiers scrounging the battlefield for essentials as their own supply lines are strained. And the relatively small numbers of big-ticket foreign weapons, such as the American-made M777 howitzer, are thinly spread on the sprawling 1,500-mile front.
“We have hopes for Kyiv,” said Fedir, one of the brigade’s supply sergeants and an understudy of Zmei, referring to military commanders in the capital. “But we rely on ourselves. We aren’t trying to just sit and wait like idiots until Kyiv sends us something.”
To protect against reprisals, Zmei, Fedir and others interviewed for this article requested that only their given names or nicknames be used.
The Ukrainian military did not immediately respond to a request for comment about the equipment exchanges.
Capturing Russian items has become increasingly difficult as the war moves into a more static phase, with Russia’s grinding artillery war forcing Ukrainians to slowly retreat in the east, while trying to regain territory in the south. That has created even higher demand for items traded in the soldiers’ underground exchange.
Such was the case in early May, when the 93rd — a renowned unit that had fought in almost every major battle of the war — was operating around the Russian-occupied city of Izium. Zmei, who before the war owned a small publishing house that specialized in dark fantasy novels, received an innocuous text message from a nearby Ukrainian commander.
“Hi,” the message read. “Listen, here’s the thing, we have a needless tank, a T-72 a bit damaged.”
“And we’d exchange it for something nice,” the commander added.
The series of text messages, sent over the messaging application Telegram and reviewed by The New York Times, is just one example of the type of equipment that is unofficially swapping hands.
The commander’s requests were modest: a transport truck and a couple of sniper rifles in return for the Russian trophy tank. But Zmei told his customer, “This is too few things for a tank, write down what else you need.” The commander responded that he had plenty of tanks and wanted only the items requested.
When the commander mentioned all the tanks in his unit’s possession, Zmei sensed an opportunity to expand the trade. He wanted more tanks, and noted that the 93rd had foreign-supplied anti-tank missiles and U.S. portable surface-to-air missile systems available for a swap.
“Can get the launchers for a Stinger, NLAWs, various large stuff for a trade — and a lot of that,” Zmei said, referring to some of the Western weapons, which cost tens of thousands of dollars apiece.
Of the more than half-dozen soldiers interviewed for this article, most said that this underground economy was driven by the need to survive. Sometimes, they said, that meant circumventing a clumsy bureaucracy.
Although soldiers said that they were supposed to send captured equipment up the supply chain back to Kyiv, they noted that there was little effort to investigate the underground exchanges, let alone punish anyone for doing it.
Western governments, having provided billions of dollars of military equipment, have pressed Ukraine to safeguard against possible corruption in the distribution process, but so far there have been no documented cases of weapons ending up in the hands of anyone apart from other Ukrainian units.
But even keeping the transfer of weapons unofficial can cause problems.
Matt Schroeder, an analyst at the Small Arms Survey, a research organization, said that informal transfers of matériel between units “could undermine stockpile management procedures,” but that “such transfers are not, in themselves, indicative of trafficking or leakage.”
Sitting near the turret of a captured Russian T-80 tank, a Ukrainian soldier named Alex explained that sending captured equipment back to Kyiv for official accounting was problematic.
“There is no guarantee that we’re going to get it back anytime soon,” he said. “We try to do it mostly ourselves.”
A former software engineer from Ukraine’s second-largest city, Kharkiv, Alex is a celebrity in the 93rd. His captured tank, nicknamed Bunny, with him in command, destroyed several Russian armored vehicles around Izium and the northeastern city of Sumy earlier in the war, Ukrainian commanders said.
But now the tank is far from the front and awaiting a turret repair. An important part for that work was recently acquired by trading a 120-millimeter mortar and a heavy machine gun with another unit, Alex said.
Just as he was speaking, a captured Russian armored personnel carrier rolled into the repair bay. It parked behind a barely running Ukrainian armored vehicle that one soldier joked had probably participated in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s.
Alex is waiting for his own kind of repairs. He was shot in the right leg during a patrol in May. The bullet shattered his femur.
He and several other Ukrainian soldiers had been on a reconnaissance patrol in the gray zone — the area between Russian and Ukrainian front lines — when he was hit. The mission had carried two objectives, he said: to find Russian positions and to find abandoned equipment.
“We are losing tanks,” Alex said. “If this war goes the distance, sooner or later we’ll be out of Soviet equipment and other Soviet tanks, so we will have to switch to something else.”
Near his subterranean headquarters not far from the front line, Alex’s battalion commander, Bogdan, described the severity of his unit’s situation. The sound of incoming and outgoing artillery echoed in the fields beyond.
“We’re fighting with whatever we captured from the enemy,” Bogdan said, noting that 80 percent of his current supplies was captured Russian equipment.
“It’s no better in other battalions,” he added.
Bogdan’s unit of around 700 troops had arrived to replace Ukrainian forces worn down by casualties and equipment loss. Now, after six months of acting like a “firefighter” by rushing from one frontline hot spot to the next, his troops were facing a similar fate.
“We are losing a lot of men,” Bogdan said. “We can’t cope with their artillery. This, and airstrikes, are big problems.”
Asked about sophisticated, Western-supplied weapons that government officials say will be the big difference-maker, he said that in his brigade, “nobody has foreign equipment,” adding, “We have a great many questions as to where it goes.”
Those questions have fallen on a 28-year-old Ukrainian soldier who goes by the name of Michael. He lives in a small rundown single-story house several miles from the front line. An infantry soldier by trade, he is currently Bogdan’s supply officer.
In Michael’s squalid kitchen are printouts tacked to the wall listing the Western equipment his battalion desperately needs: encrypted radios, semiautomatic grenade launchers and Polish 155-millimeter howitzers, known as Krabs.
A Krab unit commander named Andriy said that his howitzers were not available for trade, though he might consider a swap if offered a French self-propelled artillery piece in exchange.
The 93rd currently only possesses old Soviet-era artillery pieces that have worn out barrels and are low on ammunition.
“I have to go and buy everything and trade things, and bring it all here,” Michael said.
“So what’s going on is a personal initiative,” he said. “You’re taking the risk, it’s criminal. Nobody will thank you. It’s a thankless job.”
Otsikossa sanotaan varjotaloudeksi mutta toinen kuvaava nimi olisi vaihdantatalous: taistelevat yksiköt juttelevat keskenään sotasaaliistaan ja vaihtavat tavaraa keskenään tarpeen mukaan. Vaihdetaan siis tyyliin "meillä on T-72B panssarivaunu eikä sille käyttöä, mitä annette siitä vaihdossa?" mihin joku toinen yksikkö voi vastata tyyliin "kolme kiikarikivääriä, drone ja pimeänäkölaitteet"
Tämä vaikuttaisi toimivan ainakin osaksi komentajilta piilossa, tosin arvaisin että suuremmat ja tärkeämmät saaliit välitetään taaksepäin. Samoin suuremman korjauksen tarpeessa olevat.
Ukrainan kaltaisessa pitkien etäisyyksien maassa, jossa taistellaan monella eri suunnalla tämä voi olla luonnollinen kehityssuunta. Toki voi miettiä, että tuo on hyvin tehokas tapa toimia pienessä mittakaavassa: yksiköt juttelevat toisilleen ja kommunikoivat tarpeensa. Kauppaa käydään samaan tapaan kuin internetissä yksityiset myyvät eri tavaroita. Miksi vaivata tällä ylempiä tai kuormittaa logistiikkaa tavaran siirtelyyn, jos se voidaan hoitaa "sivupolkuja".
Toki tuossa haiskahtaa vahvasti itä-eurooppalainen ja varsinkin venäläinen tyyli: "mikään ei toimi mutta kaikki on järjestettävissä (jos on tarpeeksi rahaa ja / tai vaikutusvaltaa)".
Sinänsä voi miettiä, mitä on tehokkuus ja miltä se näyttää eri mittakaavoissa.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Norppa
Eversti
Ei mitään takeita tuosta ähly-lennokista, mutta kuvien perusteella ollut päällisin puolin kuiturakenteinen.
Kokemuksesta tiedän, että esim 7-9m purjevene voi sopivassa aallokossa ja sateessa olla lähes näkymätön tutkalle, johtuen lasikuiturungosta jota tutka-aallot läpäisee sujuvasti. Vaikka masto on 10-15m korkea ja 25cm halkaisijaltaan, sekin häviää välkkeeseen. Ratkaisu on tutkaheijastin.
Tältä pohjalta sanoisin, että Shahed voi olla hankala maali jopa sotilastason tutkalle - etenkin kun pelissä on vielä yksi ulottuvuus lisää ja tutkat suunniteltu isoille ja nopeille metallilinnuille.
Antares
Respected Leader
Entäs ne lasikuitukotelon sisällä olevat rakenteet? Moottori, taistelukärki, elektroniikka, polttonestesäiliö yms. Vaikka tutka-aallot läpäisivät pintamateriaalin, oletan että ne heijastuvat takaisin jos kohtaavat jotain muuta materiaalia sen alla.
Purjeveneen masto lienee ontto, joten siellä ei ole mitään mikä heijastaisi säteilyn takaisin.
Tämä tulee ulkomuistista mutta Ben Rich joka johti Lockheed Martinin Skunkworks-osastoa F-117A koneen kehityksen aikaan kirjoitti kirjassa "Skunkworks" että karkeasti ottaen 66% koneen häiveestä tulee sen muotoilusta (tutka-aallot heijastetaan kaikkiin muihin suuntiin paitsi siihen lähettäjään, ainakin teoriassa) ja loput 33% tulee pinnoitteesta, joka ottaa säteilyn vastaan ja "sitoo sen itseensä" eli yleensä muuttaa sen lämmöksi.
Tuosta on tietysti aikaa, koneet tehtiin 80-luvulla mutta fysiikan lait eivät ole siitä muuttuneet. Ehkä nykyään paremmilla tietokoneilla muotoilun osuus on suurempi mutta toisaalta pinnoitteet myös parempia, minkä takia kokonaisuudessa koneet näkyvät entistäkin vaikeammin tutkassa, ollen silti parempia lentää kuin F-117A.
En ole tutkamies ja sähkömagneettinen säteily ei ole ylintä osaamista, joten jos joku tietävämpi korjaa, en ota nokkiin.
Norppa
Eversti
On siellä veneen sisälläkin tavaraa aina uunia ja paskahuussia myöten. Toki lähellä vesirajaa, mutta tavaraa on. Nykyaikainen masto (l. ei puumasto) on ontto mutta sielläkin on kaapelia, vaijeria, köyttä - eli vähänkuin lentokoneetkin ja nekin on alumiinia. Ohjusveneissäkin ylärakenteet on komposiittia pienemmän tutkaheijasteen vuoksi.
Shahed-136 on 3,5 metriä pitkä, kärkiväli 2,5m. Varsin yleinen laulujoutsen on 1,5 metrinen ja kärkiväli 2,2m. Onko siellä sumuisella taivaalla joutsenparvi vai kamikaze-drone? Päätä ei taputella jos jätät dronen ampumatta, mutta joutsenpaisti puikolla tai edes Gepardilla aiheuttaa myös pahaa silmää.
Kuten sanoin, ei purjevene tietenkään näkymätön ole mutta olosuhteiden ollessa sopivat tulee aika orpo olo kun tietää että alkaa häviämään tutkan näytöltä - Estoniakaan ei ollut ihan helppo tutkamaali mayday-kutsunsa aikaan. Merenkulkututka näyttää sopivalla kelillä lähellä lentävät lokit ja parhaimmillaan olen saanut lukittua kohteeksi vektorilaskentaa varten
. Vaahtopäänä räyhäävä selkä tai reilumpi sade pakottaa ruuvaamaan filtteriä niin ettei esim normikelissä helpot tutkaheijastimettomat viitat enää näy tutkalla, linnuista puhumattakaan.Suurin ongelma tuossa on koko. Pieni maali, parin yleisen linnun kokoinen, liikkuu nopeasti. Lasikuitu päästää tutkasignaalin läpi vaimennettuna, sisällä olevat komponentit toki heijastaa, mutta heijastuma vaimenee taas kuoren läpi kulkiessaan. Löydätkö taskulampulla pimeältä pellolta ensin mattaharmaan post-it-noten vai huomioliivin? Samaa kamaa, aaltoliikettä ja sen heijastumista.
JR49
Respected Leader
Aivan, samaa mieltä. Tällä hetkellä on todisteita siitä, että yksinkertaiset valemaalit hämäävät drone-operaattoria, ja siksi niitä kannattaa käyttää massamaisesti.
Mitään SAR-kyvyn vast. hyödyntämistä tässä mielessä ryssällä sen sijaan ei ole näkynyt.
Nämä luulotellut ryssän kyvyt versus todellisuus hyppäävät kyllä joka paikassa esiin. Yllättävän harvalla on kyky analysoida käytettävissä olevia tietoja Ukrainan taistelukentältä ja tajuta, miten niiden pitäisi muuttaa käsityksiä.
Viittaan nyt lukemattomiin kuulemiini kommentteihin tämän sodan ajalta:
"Minä olen niitä pst-miehiä. Sodan ajan elinikä 10 sekuntia. Kun vaunua ammut, se kääntää putken päin ja ampuu automaattisesti tuliasemaan, vaikka miehistö olisi kuollut"
"Minä olen soppatykillä. Me kuoltaisiin ensimmäisenä sodan aikana. Lämpöhakuinen ohjus, tiijätsä"
"Minä olen it-ohjusmies. Elinikä x sekuntia. Koska kun ammut helikopteria, niin se ampuu heti takaisin"
"Tulenjohtaja, samat tarinat"
Sitten kun kärsivällisesti selittää miten nuo luulot ovat realisoituneet Ukrainassa, niin ollaan vähän aikaa hölmistyneitä, kunnes lamppu syttyy: "Niin joo, niinhän se kyllä on"
Joku voi olla aktiivisestikin seurannut tapahtumia ja videoita, mutta ei ole silti osannut tehdä niistä johtopäätöksiä, ja toistaa automaattisesti varusmiesaikaista tornihuhua.
Ehkä yksi suurimpia tämän sodan oppeja on, että nämä venäläisen kaluston ja niiden käyttäjien yli-inhimilliset kyvyt asettuvat realismin viitekehykseen taistelussa nähtyjen suoritusten ansiosta.
Mutta kyllä siinä työsarkaa on yhä.
Antares
Respected Leader
Tämä on voinut olla aikaisemmin, koska melkein viikon vanha video mutta otetaan silti talteen:
Video of a Ukrainian air defense crew using a modern tablet/computer to augment its Osa-AKM air defense system.
https://t.co/DUKWUodje3
Ukrainan sodan seuranta -ketjussa oli tänään jutustelua iranilaisista droneista ja niiden torjunnasta, mikä pisti miettimään ainakin tämän sodan kohdalla Ukraina on joutunut usein keksimään nopeasti uusia ratkaisuja, innovoimaan. Tekemään parhaansa niillä välineillä mitkä on käytettävissä.
Heille toki virtaa kokoajan apua eri muodoissa mutta sitä ei riitä joka paikkaan. Eikä tasajako ole taktiikkaa, kuten tiedetään: oikea tavara oikeaan paikkaan ja muut joutuvat pärjäämään sillä mitä jää / mitä kykenevät parsimaan kasaan.
Video of a Ukrainian air defense crew using a modern tablet/computer to augment its Osa-AKM air defense system.
https://t.co/DUKWUodje3
Ukrainan sodan seuranta -ketjussa oli tänään jutustelua iranilaisista droneista ja niiden torjunnasta, mikä pisti miettimään ainakin tämän sodan kohdalla Ukraina on joutunut usein keksimään nopeasti uusia ratkaisuja, innovoimaan. Tekemään parhaansa niillä välineillä mitkä on käytettävissä.
Heille toki virtaa kokoajan apua eri muodoissa mutta sitä ei riitä joka paikkaan. Eikä tasajako ole taktiikkaa, kuten tiedetään: oikea tavara oikeaan paikkaan ja muut joutuvat pärjäämään sillä mitä jää / mitä kykenevät parsimaan kasaan.
Ei suoraan tämänhetken konfliktiin (paitsi ehkä seuraavassa videossa) Mutta historiankatsaus Donbassin teollisuusalueen taisteluihin.
Lisätään kanavan edeltävä videokin, How Ukraine was able to survive, kartalla käydään sodan vaiheita sen alusta, heinäkuun loppuun.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Ohimennen sanottava: minä en saa millään päähäni ajatusta, että Suomi voisi olla pian NATO:n jäsen. Tuo vaikuttaa tietysti oleellisesti siihen, mihin suuntaan omaa puolustusta tullaan kehittämään sekä miten uhkia, mukaanlukien Venäjä tulisi jatkossa ajatella. Koko minun elämän ajan olen tehnyt kaikki arviot sillä ajatuksella että jossain vaiheessa Venäjä tulee hyökkäämään tänne ja silloin apua saataneen (samaan tyyliin kuin Ukraina nyt) MUTTA varsinainen taistelu tehtäisiin itse (poislukien jokin määrä ulkomailta tulleita vapaaehtoisia).
Hyvin vaikea päästä irti tuosta, nytkin mietin että Ukrainan sodasta nähdään että panssarivaunuja pitäisi olla lisää JA tykistön kranaatteja useampi miljoona varastoissa JA olkapäältä laukaistavia it- ja pst-ohjuksia useita tuhansia kumpaakin jne jne.
NATO-jäsenyys tulee muuttamaan tuon perusteellisesti eikä minun pää millään taivu näkemään, mitä se tulee tarkoittamaan. Arvatenkin omaa toimivaa systeemiä ei tulla romuttamaan jäsenyydestä huolimatta MUTTA pohjoisen Euroopan ja Balttian + Puolan kanssa tultaneen laatimaan yhteiset puolustussuunnitelmat, jotka sitten ohjaavat tulevia hankintoja jotta soudetaan samaan suuntaan. Jokainen maa päättää toki itse mitä hankkii mutta synergiaedut tulevat mukaan ihan eri tavalla kuin ennen jäsenyyttä.
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Puolalainen Defence24.pl sivusto on haastatellut puolalaista vapaaehtoista tykkimiestä hänen kokemuksistaan Ukrainassa. Haastattelu on kysymys-vastaus -muodossa, ei mitään ylimääräisiä värityksiä, Google Translate -käännös (huom: joskus puola-englanti -käännös ei mene sanasta sanaan oikein, joten tässäkin voi olla "outouksia"):
10/18/2022 06:43
Defence24 talks with a veteran of the fighting in Donbas, Ukraine, who fought in artillery during the Russian attack on Severodonetsk and Lisichansk. What was the everyday work of an artilleryman characterized by? What was the atmosphere at the time when the Ukrainian positions in Donbas resembled a sack surrounded on three sides by the Russians, and what posed the greatest threat?
Maciej Szopa: What prompted you to participate in the fighting in Ukraine?
I came to Ukraine as a volunteer paramedic as part of a grassroots project aimed at medical evacuation of the wounded to the west. Initially, we transported them to hospitals in Poland, and then these actions turned into evacuations to foreign hospitals and we transported the wounded to medical planes landing in Rzeszów-Jasionka. At the turn of March and April, I started to help the Ukrainians I met on the spot, train volunteers and the army in the field of tactical rescue. What encouraged me to go there? Willingness to verify existing skills, gain additional practice and, above all, put some effort into the fight against the common enemy.Unfortunately, it is the war that is the best place to gain new experiences: both medical and tactical.
But in the end, fate threw you into artillery. How did this happen?
It was a bit of a coincidence. My assumption, going to Ukraine for the second time, was to get involved in the evacuation of the wounded in the east. But then, in the places where I had contacts, there were a lot of volunteers, and at the same time I had an active proposal to act as a medic in securing the artillery service. I agreed to it, although in practice it turned out that I was acting as a regular artilleryman.
I was employed in several positions, guys were throwing me into various functions. At first, I just went to work with them. I was securing them as a medic while watching what they were doing. Then they started to involve me in individual positions, maybe not all of them, because not everyone, for example, introduced settings.
What was your frontline everyday life like?
We had our base a bit further from the front line, near the larger cities of the region. We preferred to spend more time traveling at the cost of reducing the risk of detection and shock to the storage area for equipment and ammunition. It was a big plus, after leaving the robot we had a chance to restore the combat ability and rest. Still, that did not rule out the threat. The city was under regular fire, be it by air force or long-range artillery. Military targets had been struck earlier, so the Russians fired on civilian settlements in general.
The intensity of the activities depended mainly on the weather. If it was non-volatile and the drones could not fly by wind and rain, there was automatically less work. But it also happened that there were two departures a day. We then started early in the morning, segregating the ammunition in denominations, loading it on the truck, preparing the truck, and driving on to the waiting area. There we waited for the drones to provide us with the coordinates.
From the things that I remember, these are definitely the starting Toczki. First you could see them on the horizon, they were taking off some five kilometers from us. Then they passed over our heads and sped up towards Russia. We saw them in the clouds, then came a sound.These were two pieces, they went somewhere north of Severodonetsk. Right after that, aviation struck nearby. And riding Crabs - there was a tear in the eye. We also saw Polish helmets, Polish equipment at checkpoints and Polish equipment that came from Poland to the east.
Who did you work with, who were these people?
I was the only Pole in the Ukrainian sub-unit, so not in a strictly international unit. Ukrainians from the east, south and west of Ukraine were with me. They were different in age, from people in their twenties to people in their early 60's. So nice cross section. The atmosphere was definitely a plus. It was a volunteer unit, made up almost entirely of volunteers except for the 1-2 contract soldiers I knew. These people were very motivated and worked in artillery from the beginning of the war. As far as I know, this was their third direction on which this sub-unit fought. You could see their great motivation and will to fight.
And when it comes to work culture. Did you have the feeling that you were working with people from the West, were there any post-Soviet climates after all?
There was an element of eastern "uhlan fantasy", but when it comes to sticking to procedures and mentality as a whole, it was more west.
It was an old 152mm D-20 towed howitzer. I do not know if it was obtained from the Russians or from the warehouses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In turn, the truck, as far as I know, was purchased from a public fundraiser. The operation of the towed howitzer itself is not very difficult. There are several knobs, several fuses for folding and unfolding the supports. It was more important to react to emergencies and jamming. It was important to clean, maintain, disassemble the slide and all elements of the firing pin. The latter requires some knowledge and practice. The most complicated step was to calculate the settings in the absence of ballistic computers. It is easy to set up as well, having preset settings.
Working in such a department is hard physical work?
The missile for the D-20 weighs over 40 kilograms. Complete with shell / throwing charge and box it is over 60 kg. It was really exhausting. The gym is useful in this specialization and you can feel it in your back. The mere administration of 20 152 mm shells from the truck, especially if it is only the first job on a given day, is a difficult topic. The man is after loading the entire boxes on the truck. Then he arrives in the area and the starter kit has to be brought to the area of the howitzer and possibly then additional missiles should be added if there is a need to continue firing.
Did you leave the scales or take them back?
If time allowed, we took them back, because there was a chance that they would be elaborated again. If there was no time, we left it on the spot. We were left with ammunition boxes rather than shells.
You mentioned droniarzach, i.e. drone operators. They rode with you?
Drones were an integral part of the squad. Thanks to them, we had our own diagnosis and this data did not come from the outside. So we were independent. However, they themselves worked somewhere closer to the front, a few kilometers from the enemy's position. We were approaching close enough to shoot the target, which was more or less deep in the enemy's position.
About 17 km depending on the ammunition used. Sometimes we drove a few kilometers from the front line, sometimes a dozen or so. It depends on how deep the goal was and what was the concept of the task.
Did you know what you are shooting at, or are the drones just telling you where to shoot?
Thanks to communication via Starlink terminals, which were the main source of connectivity and live communication, we could have known if we wanted to obtain this data. At the beginning of the task, we received ready-made initial settings. It was enough just to shoot and make adjustments to fire on a regular basis. Voice communication was non-stop, so we had corrections on a regular basis or, for example, information that the ammunition did not explode and other detonators had to be screwed in.
Could you have been in position for a long time after the first shot? Have you been counting down the time?
There was no countdown with a stopwatch in hand, but we tried to shoot as few bullets as possible. A few shots and a change of fire position.
Did you decide to change yourself?
The decision was made on the basis of information from the reconnaissance from drones. It happened that they wanted a target and we fired almost the entire truck, more than 20 rounds from one position. Back then, unfortunately, we were in the post longer. The increased risk in this situation was balanced by the fact that we were working as a single howitzer rather than a complete battery, so we had a lower priority when it comes to counter-battery fire.
Yes, unless we set Starlink's antenna too close to the gun and it destabilized when firing and lost its range. Then you had to wait for it to reconnect. Anyway, you need to be aware that when shooting in the vicinity of buildings, several meters behind the howitzer, windows can fall out of the pickup truck.
It was the hearing protectors that were rather compulsory.
Most people used active hearing protectors. Others simply blocked her ears on command and continued to work without hearing protectors. Added to this is dirt and dust when firing.From our stands, we came back dirty and drained of energy. Especially if it was a dry and hot day.
And finally rest ...
At night, still cleaning the howitzer, often "on flashlights". Despite the tiredness, it was necessary to prepare the howitzer for work. Only barrel cleaning and ongoing maintenance, so there was no big philosophy here.
How people reacted to you, ie when you set up near their homes. They were not afraid of counter-batter fire, Russian revenge?
This had to be considered in the planning, and it was important. There were situations when locals from quite close buildings, seeing that we were parting, came and asked us, even on their knees, to go somewhere else. Sometimes they even lay down on the roads. And we left because we did not want to and could not expose them. Often, after driving to the frontier villages and a short stop between the buildings, a few soldiers jumped out and said: "Hello guys, you're revealing our position, you're going somewhere further."
Civilians in larger cities, in turn, were used to the army. Life went on as normal there. And the closer to the front, the more often only older people stayed at home. Due to their age and attachment to the house, they did not want to leave it. The young, more agile ones went west, and the older ones stayed. And many troops could be found buried all over the neighborhood.
Was it a surprise for the Russians that you drive single howitzers and were, as they say, a "low-value target"?
We used the classic force spread, and that made sense. We often passed many such "low-value" targets - single guns and a rocket launcher with an accompanying vehicle. Once, a Grad launcher came next to us. She set up - we did not even see when - fired a short volley and left the station. There were several times Grady fell close to us and once the air force attacked something in the area.
Those Grady fell at a great distance?
Two or three hundred meters, but the terrain and our concealment prevented the debris from offending us. Here you can praise the commanders of my division. They planned and selected the firing positions well. They used the area to the maximum. This was taken into account both when it comes to hiding the cannon and planning departure routes in case of an enemy attack. It was all thought out, there were no instances of random firing positions that did not provide us with at least camouflage.
Cloaking played a big role?
We did not use typical masking nets. Why? I do not know. Perhaps laziness, or rather the desire to shorten the time of staying in the position. Unwinding the nets takes a few minutes.Roll-up - at least a minute, and you need to get down quickly. Something for something. It was an internal decision of our sub-unit. But with us it was more about leaving the firing position quickly.
Did enemy drones hover over you?
We have never seen them, at the stage of setting up the gun, the driver was in the first place responsible for holding the "sky" sector. However, when we were deployed and waited for information from the drones, the sky was watched by more pairs of eyes.
Was there a great sense of danger during such a trip? Stress?
Generally speaking, working with towed cannons requires quite a lot of physical effort, both in terms of handling and logistics. Working on a fire position and moving without armor means that any fire exposure of the enemy in the area is associated with great danger. There was an awareness of this risk. However, it was more important to accept it at an early stage, which allowed us to work with a clean head, focusing only on the work. All the time we could hear artillery shells flying overhead, including ours. A soldier can quickly develop the ability to judge whether a bullet is near, far away, coming in or out. And he knows if you need to react and hide.
During the fighting for Lisiczańsk it was said that the Russians fired 10 times as many missiles as the Ukrainians. Did you have a shortage of ammunition?
I can speak from the point of view of the division I was in. There has never been something that ran out of ammunition. There was always enough of it for at least one or two trips or a few smaller jobs. The ammunition came to us on a regular basis, including captured Russian ammunition. At one point, there was a lot of equipment - there were more than people.Technical problems, especially with detonators, were a more significant problem than the lack of ammunition. Sometimes they didn't fire. But we had information from the drones on a regular basis and reacted by exchanging for a different series.
What was the quality of this captured Russian ammunition compared to the Ukrainian and Central and Eastern European ammunition?
I was there too shortly for me to be able to reliably judge it. I saw with my own eyes the problems with 152 mm "western" ammunition. This ammunition was old. Only at the end of my presence a Russian appeared. The problem was with some production series of Polish fuses. If necessary, we turned them to another version. The guys said. that they previously had similar problems with Czech ammunition.
Did you have the feeling that the Russians are dominating, that you are almost in a lap?Donbass was then practically a sack surrounded by Russian forces ...
No, it was not felt. There were a lot of Ukrainian units around, and they were driving in the back, just like us. In the vicinity of Bachmut, Siewiersk ... We had no impression that the enemy was surrounding us.
There were no groups crossing the front? Did you not protect yourself against such a threat?
Generally, we tried to issue insurances as far as the number of service personnel allowed for it. For this, select positions so as to limit the approach paths. We have never recorded such a case ourselves. Civilians who could pass information to the opponent were a bigger problem. The saturation with the military in the back room was such that it would be difficult for them to carry out any activities.
What conclusions for Poland can we draw from what you experienced in Ukraine?
I have seen or heard of various volunteer units in many places. From volunteers in the back who deal with completing first aid kits, distributing humanitarian aid, through trainers - civilians training volunteers whose groups resemble our pro-defense organizations. There were also volunteer units typically operating at the front. And it is not only about the international legion, but also about those Ukrainian units that were formed from below. You can see there at every step that the entire state defends itself against aggression, not just the army as an institution. I think you have to accept the fact that in the event of war, similar units will also be created in Poland. There will be volunteers who will want to fight and those who will want to help from the rear. I believe that the military should develop certain procedures and frameworks for such potential cooperation, for example with voluntary medical personnel, so as to maximize their potential for the benefit of the state.
Thank you for the conversation.
-
Der Gepardkommandant -niminen tili kirjoittanut Twitterissä ajatuksiaan iranilaisten dronejen torjunnasta Gepardilla. Oletan että samaa voisi sanoa muistakin tutkaohjatuista ammus-it-vaunuista kuten meidän Marksmanit ja vanhat Shilkat (toki on jonkin verran eroja vaunujen iän, tekniikan yms. takia):
Hyvin vaikea päästä irti tuosta, nytkin mietin että Ukrainan sodasta nähdään että panssarivaunuja pitäisi olla lisää JA tykistön kranaatteja useampi miljoona varastoissa JA olkapäältä laukaistavia it- ja pst-ohjuksia useita tuhansia kumpaakin jne jne.
NATO-jäsenyys tulee muuttamaan tuon perusteellisesti eikä minun pää millään taivu näkemään, mitä se tulee tarkoittamaan. Arvatenkin omaa toimivaa systeemiä ei tulla romuttamaan jäsenyydestä huolimatta MUTTA pohjoisen Euroopan ja Balttian + Puolan kanssa tultaneen laatimaan yhteiset puolustussuunnitelmat, jotka sitten ohjaavat tulevia hankintoja jotta soudetaan samaan suuntaan. Jokainen maa päättää toki itse mitä hankkii mutta synergiaedut tulevat mukaan ihan eri tavalla kuin ennen jäsenyyttä.
-
Puolalainen Defence24.pl sivusto on haastatellut puolalaista vapaaehtoista tykkimiestä hänen kokemuksistaan Ukrainassa. Haastattelu on kysymys-vastaus -muodossa, ei mitään ylimääräisiä värityksiä, Google Translate -käännös (huom: joskus puola-englanti -käännös ei mene sanasta sanaan oikein, joten tässäkin voi olla "outouksia"):
"We accepted the risk and focused on the job." Pole in artillery operations in Donbas [INTERVIEW]
Defence24 talks with a veteran of the fighting in Donbas, Ukraine, who fought in artillery during the Russian attack on Severodonetsk and Lisichansk. What was the everyday work of an artilleryman characterized by? What was the atmosphere at the time when the Ukrainian positions in Donbas resembled a sack surrounded on three sides by the Russians, and what posed the greatest threat?"We accepted the risk and focused on the job." Pole in artillery operations in Donbas [INTERVIEW]
MACIEJ SZOPA10/18/2022 06:43
Defence24 talks with a veteran of the fighting in Donbas, Ukraine, who fought in artillery during the Russian attack on Severodonetsk and Lisichansk. What was the everyday work of an artilleryman characterized by? What was the atmosphere at the time when the Ukrainian positions in Donbas resembled a sack surrounded on three sides by the Russians, and what posed the greatest threat?
Maciej Szopa: What prompted you to participate in the fighting in Ukraine?
I came to Ukraine as a volunteer paramedic as part of a grassroots project aimed at medical evacuation of the wounded to the west. Initially, we transported them to hospitals in Poland, and then these actions turned into evacuations to foreign hospitals and we transported the wounded to medical planes landing in Rzeszów-Jasionka. At the turn of March and April, I started to help the Ukrainians I met on the spot, train volunteers and the army in the field of tactical rescue. What encouraged me to go there? Willingness to verify existing skills, gain additional practice and, above all, put some effort into the fight against the common enemy.Unfortunately, it is the war that is the best place to gain new experiences: both medical and tactical.
But in the end, fate threw you into artillery. How did this happen?
It was a bit of a coincidence. My assumption, going to Ukraine for the second time, was to get involved in the evacuation of the wounded in the east. But then, in the places where I had contacts, there were a lot of volunteers, and at the same time I had an active proposal to act as a medic in securing the artillery service. I agreed to it, although in practice it turned out that I was acting as a regular artilleryman.
ALSO READ
So you were the loader?
I was employed in several positions, guys were throwing me into various functions. At first, I just went to work with them. I was securing them as a medic while watching what they were doing. Then they started to involve me in individual positions, maybe not all of them, because not everyone, for example, introduced settings.
What was your frontline everyday life like?
We had our base a bit further from the front line, near the larger cities of the region. We preferred to spend more time traveling at the cost of reducing the risk of detection and shock to the storage area for equipment and ammunition. It was a big plus, after leaving the robot we had a chance to restore the combat ability and rest. Still, that did not rule out the threat. The city was under regular fire, be it by air force or long-range artillery. Military targets had been struck earlier, so the Russians fired on civilian settlements in general.
The intensity of the activities depended mainly on the weather. If it was non-volatile and the drones could not fly by wind and rain, there was automatically less work. But it also happened that there were two departures a day. We then started early in the morning, segregating the ammunition in denominations, loading it on the truck, preparing the truck, and driving on to the waiting area. There we waited for the drones to provide us with the coordinates.
From the things that I remember, these are definitely the starting Toczki. First you could see them on the horizon, they were taking off some five kilometers from us. Then they passed over our heads and sped up towards Russia. We saw them in the clouds, then came a sound.These were two pieces, they went somewhere north of Severodonetsk. Right after that, aviation struck nearby. And riding Crabs - there was a tear in the eye. We also saw Polish helmets, Polish equipment at checkpoints and Polish equipment that came from Poland to the east.
Who did you work with, who were these people?
I was the only Pole in the Ukrainian sub-unit, so not in a strictly international unit. Ukrainians from the east, south and west of Ukraine were with me. They were different in age, from people in their twenties to people in their early 60's. So nice cross section. The atmosphere was definitely a plus. It was a volunteer unit, made up almost entirely of volunteers except for the 1-2 contract soldiers I knew. These people were very motivated and worked in artillery from the beginning of the war. As far as I know, this was their third direction on which this sub-unit fought. You could see their great motivation and will to fight.
And when it comes to work culture. Did you have the feeling that you were working with people from the West, were there any post-Soviet climates after all?
There was an element of eastern "uhlan fantasy", but when it comes to sticking to procedures and mentality as a whole, it was more west.
ALSO READ
What kind of gun did you handle?
It was an old 152mm D-20 towed howitzer. I do not know if it was obtained from the Russians or from the warehouses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In turn, the truck, as far as I know, was purchased from a public fundraiser. The operation of the towed howitzer itself is not very difficult. There are several knobs, several fuses for folding and unfolding the supports. It was more important to react to emergencies and jamming. It was important to clean, maintain, disassemble the slide and all elements of the firing pin. The latter requires some knowledge and practice. The most complicated step was to calculate the settings in the absence of ballistic computers. It is easy to set up as well, having preset settings.
Working in such a department is hard physical work?
The missile for the D-20 weighs over 40 kilograms. Complete with shell / throwing charge and box it is over 60 kg. It was really exhausting. The gym is useful in this specialization and you can feel it in your back. The mere administration of 20 152 mm shells from the truck, especially if it is only the first job on a given day, is a difficult topic. The man is after loading the entire boxes on the truck. Then he arrives in the area and the starter kit has to be brought to the area of the howitzer and possibly then additional missiles should be added if there is a need to continue firing.
Did you leave the scales or take them back?
If time allowed, we took them back, because there was a chance that they would be elaborated again. If there was no time, we left it on the spot. We were left with ammunition boxes rather than shells.
You mentioned droniarzach, i.e. drone operators. They rode with you?
Drones were an integral part of the squad. Thanks to them, we had our own diagnosis and this data did not come from the outside. So we were independent. However, they themselves worked somewhere closer to the front, a few kilometers from the enemy's position. We were approaching close enough to shoot the target, which was more or less deep in the enemy's position.
ALSO READ
What is the range of the D-20 howitzer? About 20 km?
About 17 km depending on the ammunition used. Sometimes we drove a few kilometers from the front line, sometimes a dozen or so. It depends on how deep the goal was and what was the concept of the task.
Did you know what you are shooting at, or are the drones just telling you where to shoot?
Thanks to communication via Starlink terminals, which were the main source of connectivity and live communication, we could have known if we wanted to obtain this data. At the beginning of the task, we received ready-made initial settings. It was enough just to shoot and make adjustments to fire on a regular basis. Voice communication was non-stop, so we had corrections on a regular basis or, for example, information that the ammunition did not explode and other detonators had to be screwed in.
Could you have been in position for a long time after the first shot? Have you been counting down the time?
There was no countdown with a stopwatch in hand, but we tried to shoot as few bullets as possible. A few shots and a change of fire position.
Did you decide to change yourself?
The decision was made on the basis of information from the reconnaissance from drones. It happened that they wanted a target and we fired almost the entire truck, more than 20 rounds from one position. Back then, unfortunately, we were in the post longer. The increased risk in this situation was balanced by the fact that we were working as a single howitzer rather than a complete battery, so we had a lower priority when it comes to counter-battery fire.
ALSO READ
So connectivity was crucial, you didn't have to worry about a lot of things ...
Yes, unless we set Starlink's antenna too close to the gun and it destabilized when firing and lost its range. Then you had to wait for it to reconnect. Anyway, you need to be aware that when shooting in the vicinity of buildings, several meters behind the howitzer, windows can fall out of the pickup truck.
It was the hearing protectors that were rather compulsory.
Most people used active hearing protectors. Others simply blocked her ears on command and continued to work without hearing protectors. Added to this is dirt and dust when firing.From our stands, we came back dirty and drained of energy. Especially if it was a dry and hot day.
And finally rest ...
At night, still cleaning the howitzer, often "on flashlights". Despite the tiredness, it was necessary to prepare the howitzer for work. Only barrel cleaning and ongoing maintenance, so there was no big philosophy here.
How people reacted to you, ie when you set up near their homes. They were not afraid of counter-batter fire, Russian revenge?
This had to be considered in the planning, and it was important. There were situations when locals from quite close buildings, seeing that we were parting, came and asked us, even on their knees, to go somewhere else. Sometimes they even lay down on the roads. And we left because we did not want to and could not expose them. Often, after driving to the frontier villages and a short stop between the buildings, a few soldiers jumped out and said: "Hello guys, you're revealing our position, you're going somewhere further."
Civilians in larger cities, in turn, were used to the army. Life went on as normal there. And the closer to the front, the more often only older people stayed at home. Due to their age and attachment to the house, they did not want to leave it. The young, more agile ones went west, and the older ones stayed. And many troops could be found buried all over the neighborhood.
ALSO READ
Was it a surprise for the Russians that you drive single howitzers and were, as they say, a "low-value target"?
We used the classic force spread, and that made sense. We often passed many such "low-value" targets - single guns and a rocket launcher with an accompanying vehicle. Once, a Grad launcher came next to us. She set up - we did not even see when - fired a short volley and left the station. There were several times Grady fell close to us and once the air force attacked something in the area.
Those Grady fell at a great distance?
Two or three hundred meters, but the terrain and our concealment prevented the debris from offending us. Here you can praise the commanders of my division. They planned and selected the firing positions well. They used the area to the maximum. This was taken into account both when it comes to hiding the cannon and planning departure routes in case of an enemy attack. It was all thought out, there were no instances of random firing positions that did not provide us with at least camouflage.
Cloaking played a big role?
We did not use typical masking nets. Why? I do not know. Perhaps laziness, or rather the desire to shorten the time of staying in the position. Unwinding the nets takes a few minutes.Roll-up - at least a minute, and you need to get down quickly. Something for something. It was an internal decision of our sub-unit. But with us it was more about leaving the firing position quickly.
Did enemy drones hover over you?
We have never seen them, at the stage of setting up the gun, the driver was in the first place responsible for holding the "sky" sector. However, when we were deployed and waited for information from the drones, the sky was watched by more pairs of eyes.
ALSO READ
Was there a great sense of danger during such a trip? Stress?
Generally speaking, working with towed cannons requires quite a lot of physical effort, both in terms of handling and logistics. Working on a fire position and moving without armor means that any fire exposure of the enemy in the area is associated with great danger. There was an awareness of this risk. However, it was more important to accept it at an early stage, which allowed us to work with a clean head, focusing only on the work. All the time we could hear artillery shells flying overhead, including ours. A soldier can quickly develop the ability to judge whether a bullet is near, far away, coming in or out. And he knows if you need to react and hide.
During the fighting for Lisiczańsk it was said that the Russians fired 10 times as many missiles as the Ukrainians. Did you have a shortage of ammunition?
I can speak from the point of view of the division I was in. There has never been something that ran out of ammunition. There was always enough of it for at least one or two trips or a few smaller jobs. The ammunition came to us on a regular basis, including captured Russian ammunition. At one point, there was a lot of equipment - there were more than people.Technical problems, especially with detonators, were a more significant problem than the lack of ammunition. Sometimes they didn't fire. But we had information from the drones on a regular basis and reacted by exchanging for a different series.
What was the quality of this captured Russian ammunition compared to the Ukrainian and Central and Eastern European ammunition?
I was there too shortly for me to be able to reliably judge it. I saw with my own eyes the problems with 152 mm "western" ammunition. This ammunition was old. Only at the end of my presence a Russian appeared. The problem was with some production series of Polish fuses. If necessary, we turned them to another version. The guys said. that they previously had similar problems with Czech ammunition.
ALSO READ
Did you have the feeling that the Russians are dominating, that you are almost in a lap?Donbass was then practically a sack surrounded by Russian forces ...
No, it was not felt. There were a lot of Ukrainian units around, and they were driving in the back, just like us. In the vicinity of Bachmut, Siewiersk ... We had no impression that the enemy was surrounding us.
There were no groups crossing the front? Did you not protect yourself against such a threat?
Generally, we tried to issue insurances as far as the number of service personnel allowed for it. For this, select positions so as to limit the approach paths. We have never recorded such a case ourselves. Civilians who could pass information to the opponent were a bigger problem. The saturation with the military in the back room was such that it would be difficult for them to carry out any activities.
What conclusions for Poland can we draw from what you experienced in Ukraine?
I have seen or heard of various volunteer units in many places. From volunteers in the back who deal with completing first aid kits, distributing humanitarian aid, through trainers - civilians training volunteers whose groups resemble our pro-defense organizations. There were also volunteer units typically operating at the front. And it is not only about the international legion, but also about those Ukrainian units that were formed from below. You can see there at every step that the entire state defends itself against aggression, not just the army as an institution. I think you have to accept the fact that in the event of war, similar units will also be created in Poland. There will be volunteers who will want to fight and those who will want to help from the rear. I believe that the military should develop certain procedures and frameworks for such potential cooperation, for example with voluntary medical personnel, so as to maximize their potential for the benefit of the state.
Thank you for the conversation.
-
Der Gepardkommandant -niminen tili kirjoittanut Twitterissä ajatuksiaan iranilaisten dronejen torjunnasta Gepardilla. Oletan että samaa voisi sanoa muistakin tutkaohjatuista ammus-it-vaunuista kuten meidän Marksmanit ja vanhat Shilkat (toki on jonkin verran eroja vaunujen iän, tekniikan yms. takia):
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Tässä yhden taistelijan kokemuksia, kertoo kokemuksistaan Kharkovan rintamalla (tämä on siellä tapahtuneen läpimurron jälkeistä aikaa). Hän siirtyi alueella Donbassin suunnalta, joten sanoo pari sanaa näiden kahden taistelualueen eroista:
Tuossa on paljon yksityiskohtia kokemuksista, mutta minulle tuli mieleen se miten vielä alkukesästä vanjalla oli hurja ylivoima tykistössä ja käyttivät sitä merkittävässä määrin hyökkäystensä perustana. Hänen mukaansa Kharkovan suunnalla Ukrainan tykistö teki työtä "koko ajan". Muistan jonkun toisen taistelijan kommentoineen että heidän pääasiallinen tehtävä oli etsiä ja osoittaa maaleja tykistölle, siitä on merkkejä tässäkin tekstissä.
Tuosta on nähtävissä rivien välistä samaa sodan kuvaa mitä usein kuulee aikaisemmista sodista: paljon ns. tylsää eli siirtymistä, odottamista jne. ja sitten kun jotain tapahtuu, se on nopeaa ja väkivaltaista. Sen jälkeen kun taistelu on ohi, on taas tätä ns. tylsyyttä. Hänen kirjoituksen mukaan tähän tottuu: vihollisen panssarivaunut ampuivat heidän asemiin, joten odottivat rauhassa kunnes se oli ohi, sitten taas jatketaan. Kun sotaa on jatkunut näin pitkään, siitä tulee varmasti ns. rutiinia ja päivätyötä.
A small thread about our «vacation» to Kharkiv oblast.
Just listen to it? What do you hear? Exactly, silence!
It’s even impossible to compare Donetsk oblast with Kharkiv.
Why? Let’s read a little bit more about my expressions
Let’s start from the beginning. We arrived to Kharkiv oblast after Russian retreat, sorry, regrouping from Izium. They were still in Купянськ-Вузловий.
From time to time we heard how Russian artillery working. But it was almost impossible to compare with previous place - Donetsk oblast.
We witnessed a failure counter-attack from their side.
They lost:
- 3 T-90A
- 2 T-80BV
- 2 BMP-3
- 2 BTR-82A
Everything is recorded by @oryxspioenkop I really didn’t get the point. And it was only in one village.
Then they retreated and in another village I saw destroyed Russian BTR-82A and 10 their soldiers who were KIA.
In 500 m I witnessed the most horrific thing in my life: 23 KIA Ukrainian citizens who tried to escape. Their column was destroyed. 10 kids, one pregnant women and adult men. Just corpses of burned kids. It was horrible.
In that day for less then 5 hours I saw 38 dead people. Half of them were Russian soldiers. Another half - civilians.
When we arrived to one more village I saw 2 destroyed Russian Kamaz, 4 damaged and abounded armed vehicles and BTR-80. They were from Russian NG special forces.
We had a task to find out positions of Russian army. And we did it. Then Russians started firing with a tank a little bit. So just sitting and waiting them to stop.
But honestly, I got used to it. It wasn’t scary at all.
Well, we found some positions: 4 tanks and 1 BMP-3. And we corrected the artillery (M109 SPG). Unfortunately, we don’t have enough ammunition that’s why arty stopped firing.
But! We damaged one T-72. And it wasn’t able to move. And! Russians had 16 WIA and 2 KIA. Including the fact, that the arty fired less then 10 times - it’s awesome!
What I really liked about Kharkiv oblast? I liked how our artillery constantly was working. All the time.
Folks, it’s hard to explain the feeling when Russian artillery firing at U for 4 hours! And U have nothing. But in that day we had!
During our tasks of course we had time for lunch. I tried for the first time German and American MRE. And I didn’t like it
U know, in Ukraine we prefer more homemade food. Like rise/potato etc. American was like a totally chemical
Just listen to it? What do you hear? Exactly, silence!
It’s even impossible to compare Donetsk oblast with Kharkiv.
Why? Let’s read a little bit more about my expressions
Let’s start from the beginning. We arrived to Kharkiv oblast after Russian retreat, sorry, regrouping from Izium. They were still in Купянськ-Вузловий.
From time to time we heard how Russian artillery working. But it was almost impossible to compare with previous place - Donetsk oblast.
We witnessed a failure counter-attack from their side.
They lost:
- 3 T-90A
- 2 T-80BV
- 2 BMP-3
- 2 BTR-82A
Everything is recorded by @oryxspioenkop I really didn’t get the point. And it was only in one village.
Then they retreated and in another village I saw destroyed Russian BTR-82A and 10 their soldiers who were KIA.
In 500 m I witnessed the most horrific thing in my life: 23 KIA Ukrainian citizens who tried to escape. Their column was destroyed. 10 kids, one pregnant women and adult men. Just corpses of burned kids. It was horrible.
In that day for less then 5 hours I saw 38 dead people. Half of them were Russian soldiers. Another half - civilians.
When we arrived to one more village I saw 2 destroyed Russian Kamaz, 4 damaged and abounded armed vehicles and BTR-80. They were from Russian NG special forces.
We had a task to find out positions of Russian army. And we did it. Then Russians started firing with a tank a little bit. So just sitting and waiting them to stop.
But honestly, I got used to it. It wasn’t scary at all.
Well, we found some positions: 4 tanks and 1 BMP-3. And we corrected the artillery (M109 SPG). Unfortunately, we don’t have enough ammunition that’s why arty stopped firing.
But! We damaged one T-72. And it wasn’t able to move. And! Russians had 16 WIA and 2 KIA. Including the fact, that the arty fired less then 10 times - it’s awesome!
What I really liked about Kharkiv oblast? I liked how our artillery constantly was working. All the time.
Folks, it’s hard to explain the feeling when Russian artillery firing at U for 4 hours! And U have nothing. But in that day we had!
During our tasks of course we had time for lunch. I tried for the first time German and American MRE. And I didn’t like it
U know, in Ukraine we prefer more homemade food. Like rise/potato etc. American was like a totally chemical
Tuossa on paljon yksityiskohtia kokemuksista, mutta minulle tuli mieleen se miten vielä alkukesästä vanjalla oli hurja ylivoima tykistössä ja käyttivät sitä merkittävässä määrin hyökkäystensä perustana. Hänen mukaansa Kharkovan suunnalla Ukrainan tykistö teki työtä "koko ajan". Muistan jonkun toisen taistelijan kommentoineen että heidän pääasiallinen tehtävä oli etsiä ja osoittaa maaleja tykistölle, siitä on merkkejä tässäkin tekstissä.
Tuosta on nähtävissä rivien välistä samaa sodan kuvaa mitä usein kuulee aikaisemmista sodista: paljon ns. tylsää eli siirtymistä, odottamista jne. ja sitten kun jotain tapahtuu, se on nopeaa ja väkivaltaista. Sen jälkeen kun taistelu on ohi, on taas tätä ns. tylsyyttä. Hänen kirjoituksen mukaan tähän tottuu: vihollisen panssarivaunut ampuivat heidän asemiin, joten odottivat rauhassa kunnes se oli ohi, sitten taas jatketaan. Kun sotaa on jatkunut näin pitkään, siitä tulee varmasti ns. rutiinia ja päivätyötä.
Raveni
Greatest Leader
Dronet tuntuvat olevan taistelukentällä aikamoinen game changer jos näin voi sanoa. Liike paljastaa joukon nopeasti ja aikaisemmin juuri liike on ollut se suojaava tekijä. Paikallaan olevat joukot saattavat myös olla suojattomia halpojen dronejen edessä. Aseistetut dronet voivat vaikuttaa nopeasti havaittuun kohteeseen ja toisaalta vaanivat ammukset ovat oma uhkansa.
Jos sallitaan tällainen sivujuonne tuonne Armenia ja Azereiden väliseen sotaan niin siellä droneja käytettiin paljon ja huolella menestys oli aikamoista. Tarkka-ampujan aiheuttama uhka on vaihtunut jatkuvaan uhkaan ilmasta. Nyt Ukrainassa molemmat osapuolet käyttävät asevaikutteisia droneja merkittäviä määriä niin taistelukentällä kuin siviili infraa vastaan.
Kyllä tuo drone puoli on sellainen joka myös Suomen tulee tulevissa taktiikoissa huolehtia ja myös itse hankkia näitä asevaikutteisia droneja kuten myös suurempia tiedusteluun ja tulenjohtoon tarkoitettuja.
Meillä on hävyttömän huono valmius tuohon drone puoleen tällä hetkellä.