vlad
Respected Leader
En ole havainnut tätä Diplomaatian haastattelua linkitetyn palstalle: Former Kremlin Official: Putin’s Russia Moving Towards Salazar’s Portugal.
Artikkalissa Jaanus Piirsalu haastattelee Aleksandr Morozovia (politiikantutkija).
"The West is not ready for Russia’s nuclear blackmail.
The West will be extremely surprised in five years’ time when they see what Russia’s “new society” looks like, claims Alexandr Morozov, a Moscow political scientist and editor-in-chief of noted online journal Russkiy Zhurnal who worked in the Kremlin and handled planning domestic policy in the early 2000s, in this interview with Diplomaatia".
Haastattelussa käydään varsin seikkaperäisesti läpi tätä "uutta yhteisöä" kuin myös laajemmin Venäjän tulevaisuutta ja sitä mihin suuntaan se mahdollisesti menee.
"If we were to try and find a parallel from history, then which society will this “new Russia” resemble?
It would resemble Salazar’s [António de Oliveira Salazar, Portugal’s dictator from 1932 to 1968] regime in Portugal rather than Mussolini’s—a corporate society where loyalty is highly regarded. It might also be seen as a sort of Russian version of Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s Belarus, only a much more aggressive and energetic society than today’s Belarus or the Portugal of the past. The difference from pre-war Italy is that Putin is not forming a party or creating a national ideology in the classical sense. Of course there is United Russia, but it doesn’t mobilise anyone, they are not like the Nazi party in Germany or the Fascist Party in Italy. Obviously, it cannot be ruled out that these new “Komsomols” want such a strong party or a movement that would be guided by patriotism and would implement the idea of Russia’s special direction."
Tulevaisuuden kuva ei siis avaudu kovinkaan positiivisena jos se tulee jatkossakin olemaan Morozovin ennusteen mukaan "aggressiivinen" ja nähtäväksi jää kuinka pitkälle Putinin Venäjä on tässä aggressiossaan ja aggressiivisuudessaan valmis menemään. Merkille pantavaa on se, että Putinilla ei olisi selkeää ideologiaa, jollei anti-amerikkalaisuutta oteta huomioon ja tämän Morozov ei usko saavan todella merkittävää globaalia liikettä aikaan - vaikka anti-amerikkalaisuus ei välttämättä aivan merkityksettömäksi ilmiöksi ja ideologiaksi jää. Lännessäkin he ovat hitaasti kasvava joukko mutta loppujen lopuksi liike taitaa todelliselta voimaltaan jäädä marginaaliin - tai toivottavasti näin käy.
Seuraava vastaus on tietyllä tapaa pelottava, se on tavallaan hyvin arvaamaton ja arvelluttava - entä jos:
"Putin has another very powerful way to influence Europe apart from Russia Today—nuclear weapons—and this possibility is discussed in Russia more often and more publicly. Do you believe that Putin might take things that far?
(Kremlin propagandists Dmitry Kiselyov and Mikhail Leontyev, as well as Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky, have talked about using nuclear weapons.—JP)
[Morozov thinks about this for a long time.] I believe so. Why? Because we can expect anything from Russia at this point. Until the Crimean incident, nobody would have said that nuclear blackmail by the Kremlin would be possible. This [the annexation of Crimea] was such a radical step."
Onko siis aiheellista kysyä, että olemmeko ymmärtäneetkään sitä kuinka radikaali askel Krimin anneksaatio lopulta on? Mihin kaikkeen tämä voi johtaa?
"Do you believe that the Kremlin and Putin were planning revanchist plans such as we saw last year since the early 2000s?
...
There must be some events that did not seem important at the time but have a completely different meaning today. Can you give an example?
For one, it is difficult to hush up the fact that, in 2008, the Kremlin’s political managers went to Luhansk Oblast in Ukraine and eight other regions that would form the envisaged Novorossiya [New Russia] in order to talk to the locals about political perspectives. Or, to be more accurate, in order to find out what would happen to people’s frame of mind if those regions were to get out from under Kiev’s control. The people of Luhansk, Donetsk and Nikolajevski remember this now and draw the conclusion, “I see, the Kremlin was planning something even back then”. However, people thought differently then: “So some experts came, asked about people’s opinions, so what?” I know, of course, that the Kremlin was not planning anything then.
But what were they planning then? Why were they asking about people’s opinions in East Ukraine?
Simply because different organisations in Russia were always compiling reports or analyses for different scenarios. Some wrote that we have to behave in a certain manner and others that we should behave in another. The military has scenarios for every possible version. So they went there, talked to people and wrote analyses, but this did not mean that the proposed suggestions had to be carried out. We cannot conclude from this that Putin decided to join Crimea with Russia at that stage."
Venäjällä on jo pidempi historia erilaisen kartoittamisen ja kyselemisen sekä siihen liittyvän tiedustelun saralla - historia yltää Neuvostoaikoihin ja sitä ennen tsaarinvallan aikakaudelle. Ei siis mitään uutta auringon alla. Kartoitustyöstä ei tietenkään voi vetää suoraa johtopäätöstä anneksaatioon tai separatismiin Itä-Ukrainassa mutta missään nimessä ei voi unohtaa tällaisen kartoitustyön merkitystä ja sitä tietoa mikä sellaisen myötä on saatavilla, mutta osin näyttää käyneen siten, että Donbassin alueella on tehty vääriä tulkintoja - kenties Krimin menestyksen sokaisemana.
Mutta nämä kartoitukset, kyselyt ja tiedustelut sovitettuna vuosien ajan harjoitettuihin "sotapeleihin" joissa otetaan haltuun tuntematon strategisesti tärkeä kohde on sovitettavissa yhteen ja voidaan ainakin arvella, että Krimin miehittämisen oheen sotapelejä Donbassin alueella on harjoitettu jo ennen kevättä 2014.
Morozov näkee tulevaisuuden synkkänä talouden kriisistä huolimatta - vai onko näkymä lopulta synkkä, jospa se on karun realistinen?
"The Russian economy is already in deep crisis, which could even get worse. If this crisis turns out to be long and deep, how would this affect Putin’s power?
The drums of patriotism will be beaten ever harder, there is no doubt about that. The “new Komsomols” will fight for that. The official propaganda will constantly insist that the West is destroying the Russian economy deliberately and that the whole society must face this together and be ready for sacrifice, because the West wants to take away our oil, our gas, our natural resources. Actually, this is already being said, but not yet very widely and publicly."
vlad.
Artikkalissa Jaanus Piirsalu haastattelee Aleksandr Morozovia (politiikantutkija).
"The West is not ready for Russia’s nuclear blackmail.
The West will be extremely surprised in five years’ time when they see what Russia’s “new society” looks like, claims Alexandr Morozov, a Moscow political scientist and editor-in-chief of noted online journal Russkiy Zhurnal who worked in the Kremlin and handled planning domestic policy in the early 2000s, in this interview with Diplomaatia".
Haastattelussa käydään varsin seikkaperäisesti läpi tätä "uutta yhteisöä" kuin myös laajemmin Venäjän tulevaisuutta ja sitä mihin suuntaan se mahdollisesti menee.
"If we were to try and find a parallel from history, then which society will this “new Russia” resemble?
It would resemble Salazar’s [António de Oliveira Salazar, Portugal’s dictator from 1932 to 1968] regime in Portugal rather than Mussolini’s—a corporate society where loyalty is highly regarded. It might also be seen as a sort of Russian version of Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s Belarus, only a much more aggressive and energetic society than today’s Belarus or the Portugal of the past. The difference from pre-war Italy is that Putin is not forming a party or creating a national ideology in the classical sense. Of course there is United Russia, but it doesn’t mobilise anyone, they are not like the Nazi party in Germany or the Fascist Party in Italy. Obviously, it cannot be ruled out that these new “Komsomols” want such a strong party or a movement that would be guided by patriotism and would implement the idea of Russia’s special direction."
Tulevaisuuden kuva ei siis avaudu kovinkaan positiivisena jos se tulee jatkossakin olemaan Morozovin ennusteen mukaan "aggressiivinen" ja nähtäväksi jää kuinka pitkälle Putinin Venäjä on tässä aggressiossaan ja aggressiivisuudessaan valmis menemään. Merkille pantavaa on se, että Putinilla ei olisi selkeää ideologiaa, jollei anti-amerikkalaisuutta oteta huomioon ja tämän Morozov ei usko saavan todella merkittävää globaalia liikettä aikaan - vaikka anti-amerikkalaisuus ei välttämättä aivan merkityksettömäksi ilmiöksi ja ideologiaksi jää. Lännessäkin he ovat hitaasti kasvava joukko mutta loppujen lopuksi liike taitaa todelliselta voimaltaan jäädä marginaaliin - tai toivottavasti näin käy.
Seuraava vastaus on tietyllä tapaa pelottava, se on tavallaan hyvin arvaamaton ja arvelluttava - entä jos:
"Putin has another very powerful way to influence Europe apart from Russia Today—nuclear weapons—and this possibility is discussed in Russia more often and more publicly. Do you believe that Putin might take things that far?
(Kremlin propagandists Dmitry Kiselyov and Mikhail Leontyev, as well as Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky, have talked about using nuclear weapons.—JP)
[Morozov thinks about this for a long time.] I believe so. Why? Because we can expect anything from Russia at this point. Until the Crimean incident, nobody would have said that nuclear blackmail by the Kremlin would be possible. This [the annexation of Crimea] was such a radical step."
Onko siis aiheellista kysyä, että olemmeko ymmärtäneetkään sitä kuinka radikaali askel Krimin anneksaatio lopulta on? Mihin kaikkeen tämä voi johtaa?
"Do you believe that the Kremlin and Putin were planning revanchist plans such as we saw last year since the early 2000s?
...
There must be some events that did not seem important at the time but have a completely different meaning today. Can you give an example?
For one, it is difficult to hush up the fact that, in 2008, the Kremlin’s political managers went to Luhansk Oblast in Ukraine and eight other regions that would form the envisaged Novorossiya [New Russia] in order to talk to the locals about political perspectives. Or, to be more accurate, in order to find out what would happen to people’s frame of mind if those regions were to get out from under Kiev’s control. The people of Luhansk, Donetsk and Nikolajevski remember this now and draw the conclusion, “I see, the Kremlin was planning something even back then”. However, people thought differently then: “So some experts came, asked about people’s opinions, so what?” I know, of course, that the Kremlin was not planning anything then.
But what were they planning then? Why were they asking about people’s opinions in East Ukraine?
Simply because different organisations in Russia were always compiling reports or analyses for different scenarios. Some wrote that we have to behave in a certain manner and others that we should behave in another. The military has scenarios for every possible version. So they went there, talked to people and wrote analyses, but this did not mean that the proposed suggestions had to be carried out. We cannot conclude from this that Putin decided to join Crimea with Russia at that stage."
Venäjällä on jo pidempi historia erilaisen kartoittamisen ja kyselemisen sekä siihen liittyvän tiedustelun saralla - historia yltää Neuvostoaikoihin ja sitä ennen tsaarinvallan aikakaudelle. Ei siis mitään uutta auringon alla. Kartoitustyöstä ei tietenkään voi vetää suoraa johtopäätöstä anneksaatioon tai separatismiin Itä-Ukrainassa mutta missään nimessä ei voi unohtaa tällaisen kartoitustyön merkitystä ja sitä tietoa mikä sellaisen myötä on saatavilla, mutta osin näyttää käyneen siten, että Donbassin alueella on tehty vääriä tulkintoja - kenties Krimin menestyksen sokaisemana.
Mutta nämä kartoitukset, kyselyt ja tiedustelut sovitettuna vuosien ajan harjoitettuihin "sotapeleihin" joissa otetaan haltuun tuntematon strategisesti tärkeä kohde on sovitettavissa yhteen ja voidaan ainakin arvella, että Krimin miehittämisen oheen sotapelejä Donbassin alueella on harjoitettu jo ennen kevättä 2014.
Morozov näkee tulevaisuuden synkkänä talouden kriisistä huolimatta - vai onko näkymä lopulta synkkä, jospa se on karun realistinen?
"The Russian economy is already in deep crisis, which could even get worse. If this crisis turns out to be long and deep, how would this affect Putin’s power?
The drums of patriotism will be beaten ever harder, there is no doubt about that. The “new Komsomols” will fight for that. The official propaganda will constantly insist that the West is destroying the Russian economy deliberately and that the whole society must face this together and be ready for sacrifice, because the West wants to take away our oil, our gas, our natural resources. Actually, this is already being said, but not yet very widely and publicly."
vlad.
