Ydinaseet

North Korea on Saturday showed off what it said were long-range ballistic missiles carrying miniaturised nuclear warheads, its latest claim to the sophisticated technology which state television said could destroy enemies in a "sea of fire".

Rows of the intercontinental ballistic missiles known as KN-08, which some think could fly far enough to reach the continental US, were paraded through the capital as part of a massive military parade marking the 70th anniversary of the ruling Workers Party.

A defence analyst in Seoul said the new missile appeared to have been modified to allow it to be fitted with a miniature nuclear warhead -- a claim echoed by North Korea's state TV -- but others experts said it was impossible to tell.

North Korea has long claimed it has technology capable of launching nuclear bombs at its distant enemies, but experts are sceptical whether the impoverished country has acquired the sophisticated technology needed to produce such weapons.

"With the vengeful desire to turn the citadel of our enemies into a sea of fire, our powerful tactical rockets loaded with diversified and miniaturised nuclear warheads are on the move," the commentator said, as rows of missiles were shown on screen.

Leader Kim Jong-Un on Saturday told crowds assembled for the parade that the country's armed forces "are capable of fighting any kind of war provoked by the US and we are ready to protect our people and the blue sky of our motherland".

Lee Il-Woo, a defence analyst at Korea Defence Network, said the new version of the KN-08 -- which has an estimated range of up to 12,000 kilometres (7,500 miles) -- had a more rounded end than the version unveiled in 2012.

"This means North Korea might have successfully developed technology to minimise nuclear warheads and fit them on top of missiles," he told AFP.

But another analyst, Chae Yeon-Seok at the Korea Aerospace Research Institute, cautioned that the missiles might be mock-ups.

"You never know what is inside by just looking at them. It has never been verified that North Korea has developed any nuclear-tipped ICBMs," he said, using a short-hand for intercontinental ballistic missile.

Seoul's Yonhap news agency, quoting military sources, also said it remains unclear whether the warheads on display might be ordinary explosives or nuclear devices.

"Its cone has a different shape now. We need further analysis to determine whether it is filled with ordinary high explosives or a nuclear warhead," the military official said.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/N_Korea_showcases_new_nuclear_long-range_missile_state_TV_999.html
 
Historian sivuilta tämäkin

By Bordne’s account, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Air Force crews on Okinawa were ordered to launch 32 missiles, each carrying a large nuclear warhead. Only caution and the common sense and decisive action of the line personnel receiving those orders prevented the launches—and averted the nuclear war that most likely would have ensued.


Kyodo News has reported on this event, but only in regard to Bordne’s crew. In my opinion, Bordne’s full recollections—as they relate to the other seven crews—need to be made public at this time as well, because they provide more than enough reason for the US government to search for and release in timely fashion all documents relating to events in Okinawa during the Cuban Missile Crisis. If true, Bordne’s account would add appreciably to historical understanding, not just of the Cuban crisis, but of the role accident or miscalculation have played and continue to play in the Nuclear Age.

What Bordne contends. Bordne was interviewed extensively last year by Masakatsu Ota, a senior writer with Kyodo News, which describes itself as the leading news agency in Japan and has a worldwide presence, with more than 40 news bureaus outside that country. In a March 2015 article, Ota laid out much of Bordne’s account and wrote that “[a]nother former US veteran who served in Okinawa also recently confirmed [Bordne’s account] on condition of anonymity.” Ota has subsequently declined to identify the unnamed veteran, because of the anonymity he’d been promised.

Ota did not report portions of Bordne’s story that are based on telephone exchanges that Bordne says he overheard between his launch officer, Capt. Basset, and the other seven launch officers. Bordne, who was in the Launch Control Center with the captain, was directly privy only to what was said at one end of the line during those conversations—unless the captain directly relayed to Bordne and the other two crew members in the Launch Control Center what another launch officers just said.

With that limitation acknowledged, here is Bordne’s account of the ensuing events of that night:

Immediately after opening his pouch and confirming that he had received orders to launch all four nuclear missiles under his command, Capt. Bassett expressed the thought that something was amiss, Bordne told me. Instructions to launch nuclear weapons were supposed to be issued only at the highest state of alert; indeed this was the main difference between DEFCON 2 and DEFCON1. Bordne recalls the captain saying, “We have not received the upgrade to DEFCON1, which is highly irregular, and we need to proceed with caution. This may be the real thing, or it is the biggest screw up we will ever experience in our lifetime.”

While the captain consulted by phone with some of the other launch officers, the crew wondered whether the DEFCON1 order had been jammed by the enemy, while the weather report and coded launch order had somehow managed to get through. And, Bordne recalls, the captain conveyed another concern coming from one of the other launch officers: A pre-emptive attack was already under way, and in the rush to respond, commanders had dispensed with the step to DEFCON1. After some hasty calculations, crew members realized that if Okinawa were the target of a preemptive strike, they ought to have felt the impact already. Every moment that went by without the sounds or tremors of an explosion made this possible explanation seem less likely.

Still, to hedge against this possibility, Capt. Bassett ordered his crew to run a final check on each of the missiles’ launch readiness. When the captain read out the target list, to the crew’s surprise, three of the four targets were not in Russia. At this point, Bordne recalls, the inter-site phone rang. It was another launch officer, reporting that his list had two non-Russian targets.Why target non-belligerent countries? It didn’t seem right.

The captain ordered that the bay doors for the non-Russian-targeted missiles remain shut. He then cracked open the door for the Russia-designated missile. In that position, it could readily be tipped open the rest of the way (even manually), or, if there were an explosion outside, the door would be slammed shut by its blast, thereby increasing the chances that the missile could ride out the attack. He got on the radio and advised all other crews to take the same measures, pending “clarification” of the mid-shift broadcast.

Bassett then called the Missile Operations Center and requested, on the pretense that the original transmission had not come through clearly, that the mid-shift report be retransmitted. The hope was that this would help those at the center to notice that the original transmission’s coded instruction had been issued in error and would use the retransmission to rectify matters. To the whole crew’s consternation, after the time-check and weather update, the coded launch instruction was repeated, unaltered. The other seven crews, of course, heard the repetition of the instruction as well.

According to Bordne’s account—which, recall, is based on hearing just one side of a phone call—the situation of one launch crew was particularly stark: All its targets were in Russia. Its launch officer, a lieutenant, did not acknowledge the authority of the senior field officer—i.e. Capt. Bassett—to override the now-repeated order of the major. The second launch officer at that site reported to Bassett that the lieutenant had ordered his crew to proceed with the launch of its missiles! Bassett immediately ordered the other launch officer, as Bordne remembers it, “to send two airmen over with weapons and shoot the [lieutenant] if he tries to launch without [either] verbal authorization from the ‘senior officer in the field’ or the upgrade to DEFCON 1 by Missile Operations Center.” About 30 yards of underground tunnel separated the two Launch Control Centers.

At this most stressful moment, Bordne says, it suddenly occurred to him that it was very peculiar such an important instruction would be tacked to the end of a weather report. It also struck him as strange that the major had methodically repeated the coded instruction without the slightest hint of stress in his voice, as if it were little more than a boring nuisance. Other crew members agreed; Bassett immediately resolved to telephone the major and say that he needed one of two things:

Raise the DEFCON level to 1, or
Issue a launch stand-down order.

Judging from what Bordne says he heard of the phone conversation, this request got a more stress-filled reaction from the major, who immediately took to the radio and read out a new coded instruction. It was an order to stand down the missiles … and, just like that, the incident was over.

To double-check that disaster had really been averted, Capt. Bassett asked for and received confirmation from the other launch officers that no missiles had been fired.

At the beginning of the crisis, Bordne says, Capt. Bassett had warned his men, “If this is a screw up and we do not launch, we get no recognition, and this never happened.” Now, at the end of it all, he said, “None of us will discuss anything that happened here tonight, and I mean anything. No discussions at the barracks, in a bar, or even here at the launch site. You do not even write home about this. Am I making myself perfectly clear on this subject?”

For more than 50 years, silence was observed.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
http://thebulletin.org/okinawa-missiles-october8826
 
Over the past century, Australia has been America’s most dependable military ally. In every major U.S. conflict, including World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam and Iraq, Australians have fought alongside.

Yet as competition between China and the United States heats up in the Western Pacific, Australia is cautious not to provoke its greatest trading partner. When it comes to a potential U.S.-China conflict, Australia is doing all it can to keep its options open – and with good reason.

Australia is highly vulnerable to long-range missile attack, including those carrying nuclear payloads. Despite Australia being a continental power, almost all its population is concentrated in a half-dozen major cities — easy targets for small numbers of warheads.

In a high-intensity conflict between the United States and China, it is conceivable that China may target Australia with long-range nuclear missiles as a step up the escalation ladder, demonstrating to the United States its capacity, and willingness, to conduct nuclear strikes over intercontinental ranges.

In this eventuality, extended nuclear deterrence would hardly be credible. Retaliating on Australia’s behalf would demonstrably mean accepting large-scale nuclear attack by China on the continental United States.

For this reason, many Australians believe entering into conflict with the world’s most populous nuclear power, for any reason and under any circumstance, is unthinkable – despite very strong support for the Australia-U.S. alliance overall. The most effective means for Australia to insulate itself from long-range nuclear attack is to develop or acquire its own reliable long-range nuclear deterrent.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
http://warisboring.com/articles/australia-needs-nukes/
 
The Russian state space corporation Roscosmos is planning to dismantle a total of 17 outdated Topol mobile missile launchers by the end of 2016.

The Topol entered service with the Russian Strategic Missile Forces in 1988 and is being gradually replaced with more advanced Topol-M and Yars mobile missile systems.

According to a post on the website of state purchase orders, the company is looking for a contractor to dismantle 17 Topol launches from a missile unit based in the Udmurt Republic in Russia's Volga Region "in line with a federal program on the dismantling of weaponry and other military equipment until 2020."

During the process, the launchers will be placed and scrapped at the facilities coordinated with the United States, in line with the Russian-US New START Treaty of 2010, Roscosmos said.

The launchers have been designed to fire RS-12M Topol (NATO reporting name SS-25 Sickle) single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles that have a maximum range of 10,000 kilometers (6,125 miles) and can carry a nuclear warhead with a yield of up to 550 kilotons.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Rus...ated_Topol_Missile_Launchers_by_2017_999.html
 
The Kremlin has admitted that Russian television accidentally showed secret plans for a nuclear torpedo system on air.

Two Kremlin-controlled channels, NTV and Channel One, showed a military official looking at a confidential document containing drawings and details of a weapons system called Status-6, designed by Rubin, a nuclear submarine construction company based in St Petersburg.

The nuclear torpedoes, to be fired by submarines, would create “zones of extensive radioactive contamination making them unsuitable for military or economic activity for a long period”, says the document, which is clearly visible in the footage for several seconds.

The images were filmed during a meeting of President Vladimir Putin with military officials in the Black Sea city of Sochi on Monday.

The footage was aired on Tuesday and later deleted by the channels, but several websites still published screenshots from it.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
http://www.theguardian.com/world/20...ations-broadcast-secret-nuclear-torpedo-plans
 
ctg kirjoitti:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/20...ations-broadcast-secret-nuclear-torpedo-plans
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...

Pieni huomio: Tuollainen moka on mahdollista vain silloin, kun valtion propagandaelin saa ylettömän määrän tietoa yleensäkin kaikesta mikä liittyy maan väkivaltakoneistoon, mukaan lukien salaista materiaalia. JA että tämä valtion propagandaelin on käytännössä sama asia kuin paikallinen media!

Samalla pitää kysyä, että kuinka nuija pitää olla, että antaa medialle salaista tietoa ja olettaa sen pysyvän salassa? Olisiko tuossa kyseessä jokin kulttuurillinen seikka, että alaisia pitää voidella sillä, että annetaan nähdä kaikenlaista "salaista" ja jännää materiaalia, että nämä pysyy motivoituneina? Ja muutenkin tuosta kuvastaa sellainen tietynlainen kuppikuntamaisuus, että saman pomon pitää saada salaista tietoa ja samalla tämä huolehtii tarkkaan siitä, mistä tehdään juttuja. Ei ketään välissä toimimaan suodattimena ja sanomassa, että "onko tämä julkaistavaa materiaalia?"
 
"Vahingossa" vuodettu tieto uudesta ydinpelote-aseesta. Jep jep.
Neuvostoliitolla kyllä oli pitkän matkan ydintorpedoja jotka oli tarkoitettu juurikin satamia vastaan joten ajatus ei ole uusi. Tietenkin kyseessä voi olla myös ihan puhdas maskirovka.
 
Teräsmies kirjoitti:
Israelilaiset tiedemiehet olivat läsnä aina kun ranskalaiset testasivat ydinseita (1970 luvun lopulla tapahtui välirikko) ja sitä on sanottu että kun fransmannit räjäyttivät ensimmäisen vetypomminsa niin maailmassa oli kaksi uutta valtaiota joilla on kyky valmistaa kyseisiä aseita. Toisaalta ei tiedetä että kykenevätkö Israelilaiset valmistamaan kovin pieniä vetypommeja joten heidän rakettinsa varmaankin kantavat ainostaan yhden vetypommin.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...

Ranskalaisilla meni tosi kauan saada vetypommi aikaiseksi. Se saatiin 1968, kun briteillä se valmistui 1957(?), neukuilla 1955 ja jenkeillä ensimmäisenä 1952. Fyysikko Hans Bethellä: https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Bethe
on selvä näkemys, että toisten tekemien testien laskeuman analysoinnilla oli ratkaiseva vaikutus vetypommin salaisuuden selvittämiseen. Bethe vastasi Neuvosliiton testien laskeuman analysoinnista Los Alamosissa ja kertoo niistä saadun tietoon yhtä ja toista pommien rakenteesta. Atomivakooja Klaus Fuchs: https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Klaus_Fuchs
tietysti toimitti joitain tietoja neukuille. Nämä tiedot kumminkin pystyivät koskemaan vain Tellerin "super pommia", joka ei ollut toimiva ratkaisu. Teller-Ulam konstruktio suunniteltiin, vasta kun Fuchs oli jo jäänyt kiinni. Truman hyväksyi koko ohjelman osin juuri vakoojan paljastumisen vuoksi. USA toimitti neukkujen vetypommin laskeumanäytteitä briteille, koska halusi heidän mielipiteensä. Britit ovat näiden näytteiden analyysillä kertoneet selvittäneensä vetypommin rakentamisen idean. Bethe epäili, että samoin toimivat neukut Ivy Mike laskeuman suhteen. Oppenheimer vastusti koko testin tekemistä ja sitä käytettiin todisteena häntä vastaan "epäamerikkalaisuus" syytöksissä. Hän kumminkin kertoi syyksi juuri sen, että Neuvostoliitolle välittyy testin kautta tietoa pommista.
 
Edelleenkin osaan keskittyä vain venäläisten hyökkäykseen Suomen ilmavoimia vastaan. Tässä tukikohtaa, eli Rissalaa, ammutaan vaikkapa Iskanderilla ja räjäytys on pinnassa: 0-30m. Iskanderin suhteen on vaikea löytää netistä tietoja ydinkärjestä, kun virallisesti sellaista kai ei ole. Oletetaan siis, että käytetään samaa taistelukärkeä kuin OTR-21 Tochka ohjuksessa, jolloin se olisi 10-50 kT. Tehoon nyt ei varmaan muutenkaan kannata liikaa takertua. Venäjän arsenaalista löytyy tietysti tarvittaessa suurempiakin, jollei jostain syystä 50 kT katsottaisi riittäväksi.

NUKEMAP karttasovellus on aika hieno, kun Google Mapsin avulla voidaan erikokoisten pommien tehosta saada karkeita arvioita. Voit siis pommittaa haluamaasi kohdetta kartalla. Uhriluvun laskemiseksi sovellus yhdistää väestödataa (LandScan Global Population 2011). Suomesta tiedän, että data on saatavilla 1km x 1km ruudukolle (kerran sellaisen datan kanssa nikkaroin), mutta en osaa sanoa tuon tarkkuutta. Ilmeisesti sovelluksessa vain kerrotaan väestön määrä tietyllä todennäköisyydellä, joka riippuu ylipaineen määrästä alueella. Säteilyvaikutukset jätetään huomiotta.

Joka tapauksessa NUKEMAP:in ennustama uhriluku jäisi hyvin alhaiseksi vielä suuremmallakin 150 kT räjähteellä. Tämä toki olisi aliarvio. Lentokentällä ei juuri asu ihmisiä, mutta siellä on varsinkin päivisin paljonkin porukkaa. Jos tuuli sattuisi olemaan Kuopioon 15 mph, niin pahin laskeuma menisi tavallaan yli kaupungin keskustan (rasti radiactive fallout ja sitten detonate uudestaan ja tuulen suunnan voit määrittää lipun avulla). Linkin takaa valmis NUKEMAP simulaatio (tässä 150 kT):

http://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?...&airburst=0&hob_ft=0&casualties=1&ff=50&zm=12
 
Is the U.S. military's plan to modernize its nuclear bombs skirting President Obama's pledge to not develop new nuclear capabilities? PBS NewsHour spoke with Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists on the government's $8 billion upgrade of the B61 nuclear bomb.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...
 
Teräsmies kirjoitti:
REVISITING SOUTH AFRICA’S BOMB
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1200544/revisiting-south-africas-bomb/
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...

Tuo Etelä-Afrikan edesmennyt ydinpommiohjelma on kaikin puolin kiinnostava. Ydinpelotteella, mikäli sellainen olisi saatu aikaan, piti mitä ilmeisimmin hillitä Kuuban ym. kommunistivoimien ryntäilyä eteläisessä Afrikassa. Angolan sota ja Namibian kärhämät sitten vielä päälle.

Jotain aiempaa juttua on liikkunut, että kansainvälisen hylkiön maineessa ollut maa olisi saanut jonkin verran apuja Israelista.
 
tulikomento kirjoitti:
Tuo Etelä-Afrikan edesmennyt ydinpommiohjelma on kaikin puolin kiinnostava. Ydinpelotteella, mikäli sellainen olisi saatu aikaan, piti mitä ilmeisimmin hillitä Kuuban ym. kommunistivoimien ryntäilyä eteläisessä Afrikassa. Angolan sota ja Namibian kärhämät sitten vielä päälle.

Jotain aiempaa juttua on liikkunut, että kansainvälisen hylkiön maineessa ollut maa olisi saanut jonkin verran apuja Israelista.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...

Käsittääkseni esim. Israelin omaa ydinasetta testattiin yhteistyössä E-Afrikan kanssa. Koe taidettiin tehdä lähellä Antarktista.
 
tulikomento kirjoitti:
Tarkoittanet tätä ?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vela_Incident

Satelliittihavainto jäi epävarmaksi. Ja jos kyseessä tosiaan oli ydinkoe, niin on epäselvää oliko se E-Afrikan oma, Israelin koe, vaiko molempien yhteinen.
Klikkaa laajentaaksesi...

Juurikin tuota. Huhut jopa Israelissa pitävät asiaa aika "julkisena salaisuutena". Ilmeisesti kyse oli yhteisestä kokeesta. Ydinaseita kun vielä tuohon aikaan oli vaikea simuloisa tietokoneella, niitä piti kokeilla. Etenkin jos alasta ei ollut suurempaa vuosikymmenten kokemusta.
 
Sinun täytyy kirjautua vastataksesi.
Back
Top