Sea power is difficult, though not impossible, to bring to bear in an unconventional Baltic contingency. When considering the use of naval assets in an irregular scenario, it is helpful in closing to summarize their potential role in terms of the three characteristics of irregular conflict in the Baltic region.
Speed and distance act as immediate obstacles to leveraging U.S. sea power in the immediate vicinity of a Baltic scenario. The Navy will, in all likelihood, have to leverage whatever options are present at the time, not all of which will be optimal force projectors. Special Operations Forces and tripwire deployments present some options for short-circuiting this advantage in an irregular standoff, though at risk to deployed, non-clandestine forces.
Limited Russian aims further dictate and confine U.S. naval options. Special Forces present the Navy with the capacity to slow or repel irregular Russian-backed troops. Since they can be rapidly deployed, Special Forces reduce the likelihood of a fait accompli—the type of quick success that makes irregular campaigns attractive—while limiting (but not eliminating) the likelihood of conventional escalation. While naval tripwire forces may weigh on Russia’s strategic calculus, they rely on a successful rebuff by Baltic states since they would not blunt the initial success of an unconventional contingency.
Finally, ambiguity in the early stages of a campaign (in which the true costs of engaging are unclear) places perhaps the greatest constraints on sea power. The options discussed above assume that critical decisions are made in a timely manner. Independently, naval assets cannot influence such decisions at the political level, though naval intelligence assets could potentially help.
Of course, in any Baltic scenario, no matter how a response was calibrated, a crisis could escalate; what if Estonia invoked Article V? In these instances, the conflict could theoretically escalate to deescalate, with Russia realizing that it had miscalculated and unwilling to risk a war with NATO. The opposite seems just as plausible. And should war occur, options for leveraging United States sea power change dramatically.
