This “too big to fail” attitude is coupled with a recurring failure to anticipate the technical complexity involved in projects. This is somewhat understandable, given that NASA projects are often trying to accomplish unprecedented feats, but the complexity involved in integration and testing seem to be systematically underestimated by project managers and their technical teams. This behavior worries the GAO, especially since many of NASA’s current major projects that are already driving cost overruns and schedule delays have not yet entered integration, which is where most projects experience trouble.
Another reason NASA management plays down a project’s technical complexity and risk is to get the project sold, Martin noted. Once sold, a project almost immediately becomes too big to fail. So, as former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin (and now
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) once confessed, the goal of a NASA project manager “
becomes that of getting [a project] started, no matter what has to be said or done to accomplish it.” The
same approach is true at the U.S. Department of Defense, so Griffin is probably feeling right at home.
A third issue raised by the NASA Inspector General is funding instability, which is caused by decisions made by both Congress and NASA. NASA appropriations have been a political football since 1959; only seven times has the agency ever received its annual appropriation at the start of a fiscal year. However, the IG also noted that NASA hasn’t helped itself by its over-optimistic planning and decision making, either.
The last issue the report raised was a problem with developing and retaining experienced project managers. Engineers complained that they had few “hands-on” opportunities to learn engineering management skills as they spent too much time performing contractor oversight. Going into private industry looks more attractive than working for NASA and being contract monitors for many young engineers, the Inspector General observed.
Both the GAO and the Inspector General Martin, however, recounted that NASA has taken numerous steps to improve how it manages its projects, and that
cost overruns are not nearly as bad as in the past. For instance, Martin stated that NASA began instituting a
Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level in 2006 that provides “a percentage likelihood the project will be developed at a particular cost and on a particular schedule, but also identifies associated cost and schedule reserves needed to back-up the plan.”
The availability of reserves has helped NASA to address risks early, rather than letting them turn into costly problems. The Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level, which was fully implemented in 2009, has helped rein in some of the drivers of project cost and schedule.
That said, both the GAO and IG reports make it very clear that if project costs continue to climb, NASA should not be surprised to see
Congress pass legislation capping its funding.
