That is why the announcement made at the Franco-German Defense and Security Council (established by the Additional Protocol of 22 January 1988 to the Treaty of Elysée of 22 January 1963) of 13 July, taking place at the Élysée under the direction of Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron, was surprising in more ways than one. "France and Germany agree to develop a European air combat system, under the leadership of both countries, to replace their current fleets of long-range combat aircraft. Both partners wish to develop a roadmap by mid-2018. " Berlin would make its decision in 2018 to determine whether the post-Eurofighter and Tornado will go through a buy-off - and Germany's interest in the F-35 has made a lot of noise - or development of a new combat aircraft.
The European options for replacing the existing fighter-bombers are enriched by two cooperation operations. The door is not closed to an entry of Germany into the SCAF / FCAS, without this being a sufficiently obvious option since Berlin and Paris announced on July 13, 2017 a separate program only in the existence of the announcement . Pending a clarification of the German position, the hypotheses are legion to imagine the range of possibilities.
Beyond its involvement with the United Kingdom on the one hand, and Germany on the other, Paris created a surprise at the beginning of September, not deciding not to withdraw from the offers to replace the F-16 of the Belgian Air Component, as had been envisaged, but to propose a political partnership around the Rafale program. The French offer would be based on a mysterious "Rafale +" evoked by the Minister of Armies. These could be two distinct assumptions:
The first is a version of the Rafale F4 that incorporates the needs, but also the financial means of Belgium, if that's what it is about. For the French industry and Bercy, such a partnership around a "belgized" F4 standard would be a boon at a time when the French deliveries, which are also very debatable, are being reduced, enabling them to continue supplying assembly lines. Dassault while sharing the financing (and returns on investment) of the technological evolution of the Rafale. In any case, it is for France to propose a Rafale to a standard higher than the currently marketed F3R, in order to rapidly develop a standard adapted to the problems of hyper-connectivity of the next generation aircraft, which would then cut the grass under foot to much of the commercial arguments of Lockheed-Martin.
The second hypothesis could correspond to a new-generation Rafale, materially different from the F3R and F4, which would mean integrating Belgium into the development of the future Rafale standard, with enormous spin-offs for the local industry, but also a good means for Dassault and France to perpetuate the Rafale at a time when the future European air combat systems, piloted or not. If this hypothesis, which is relatively unlikely, would appear to be part of the options proposed in Brussels by Paris, this would be a much deeper work than a simple new standard of the Rafale, which could go as far as an architectural evolution of the Rafale and his cell.
In the end, it would not be unlikely that the agreement proposed to Belgium would offer an intermediate solution between these two hypotheses, namely the purchase by Brussels of a boosted F4 standard, the "Rafale +", based on the architecture current equipment but with latest generation equipment capable of competing with the F-35 and meeting the needs of the Air Component, while Belgian industry would be fully integrated into the design and industrialization of future Rafale, even if they were intended only for France and / or the export market.
All the options are posed, from a French-French point of view, the waltz is reduced to three times, since it is not possible, given the strategic imperatives defined regularly by the policy, to content itself with acquiring F-35. The SCAF, the Franco-German program that could be described as the "SCAE" (European Air Combat System) and the highly speculative "Rafale +". Does France have the means to disperse its efforts, in programs sometimes contradictory to each other?
From an economic point of view, it is obvious that this is a luxury that our armies and our industry can not afford. And this is not to say that the political viability of the first two partnerships is doubtful:
On the British side, SCAF can be a tremendous opportunity to develop procedures and communication.