Jatkoa
RAFALE XL?
The partnership with Germany leads to much less comment since the surprise of its creation is proportional to the weakness of its content. Litigation is very likely to be industrial insofar as industrial co-operation with Berlin is highly complicated, as the German industrial share and the apprenticeship of these industries in co-operation may be Berlin's main strategic objective. all cases higher than the question of sovereignty. What about the difficulties encountered on the Eurofighter and A400M programs (willingness to develop MTU's aero capabilities)? Disputes of the German company OHB-System for the constellation of navigation satellites Galileo? And even more, let us not have the short memory, what about the German-French 80% German-speaking tank in the distribution of the industrial load? Of the Tiger without fenestron because otherwise the helicopter would have looked too French? TKMS of which Berlin preferred to see the UAE become a shareholder rather than DCNS goes up to the capital in order to launch a "Naval Airbus" as claimed by Paris? The successive reorganizations of EADS 'defense activities, which became Airbus, to Germany? What does Paris have to gain from a partnership with Berlin that plays its interest in the F-35 against the imperatives of political sovereignty of France, if not to get the maximum of Paris when it there is nothing to gain from Washington?
And yet, surprisingly, it would be the Franco-French internal political context that would invite very serious future political decisions on this option. The President of the Republic - Mr Macron - does not carry the industrial group Dassault in high esteem and even split to imply publicly but by a virtually ad nominem exit towards the owner of the Figaro, Serge Dassault. It is possible that, in addition to Alexis Kholer, the Elysee counts in its most august representative another person very unhappy with the financial victories of the Hotel de Brienne sur Bercy under the previous legislature. Then, Minister Macron was able to observe that the sacralization of orders of 11 Rafale per year for the French armies (before they found buyers abroad) linked the entire military budget to the Dassault Aviation group , forcing the Hotel de Brienne to enter into several branches of iron with Bercy, and to carry out elsewhere the budget cuts imposed, even if this is done to the detriment of the MCO of other materials or the preparation of forces. In fact, rather than Minister Le Drian, it was a victory of the DGA Jean-Yves Helmer (1996-2001) that had managed to impose on Bercy the contractualization of the multi-year command of Rafale combat aircraft. Hence the shackles of 14 and 11 Rafale to be ordered every year in order to make the production line viable. Just like the command of FTI frigates, chosen by Minister Le Drian to the detriment of a lengthening of the FREMM series in order to satisfy the national defense industrialists rather than the equipment of the forces, the constant fidelity brought to Dassault Aviation was significant priority given to national industrial issues rather than to the operational effectiveness of French and European forces.
This is why the Franco-German project could benefit from all presidential favors since it involves Airbus as a central pivot, not Dassault Aviation, all in a dynamic grouping of European industrial powers that is not without echoes of the recent rapprochement between the French and Italian naval industries, or between Siemens and Alstom in the rail sector. Such a redistribution of maps in the field of combat aircraft would de facto defeat the organization of principle enacted by Germany and France: to Dassault Aviation the UCAV, and to EADS then Airbus the MALE UAV. This could of course be seen as a way of bypassing, even twisting, the sole designer and builder of Franco-French combat aircraft, according to presidential desires. Another approach, more pragmatic, would be to see it as a way of turning the traditional dynamic between Dassault Aviation and the Air Force, which seems to show some limitations lately. Indeed, while Dassault Aviation is used to approaching the direct needs of pilots and airmen in the broad sense before obtaining the funds necessary to develop the object of the desire of the military, sometimes to the detriment of the political or economic ambitions of the " There could be some doubt about the strategic direction of the company in such a context. Thus, the way in which Dassault Aviation systematically rests on the Quai d'Orsay for the conduct of exports of military equipment seems to be of a different age, and the commercial failures of the Rafale seem hardly to have called into question the highly politicized decision-making structures of the company. Similarly, while the nEURO program has been beneficial both for European design offices and for demonstrating the manufacturer's excellent industrial organization, it must be noted that UCAVs of the "flying wing" type, do not represent a large market, as we highlighted above in relation to SCAF / FCAS, particularly in Europe, where the replacement of combat aircraft and the development of MALE drones seem to be a high priority.
If there is no reason to condemn Dassault, these are all elements that make it possible to put into perspective the idea that the French aircraft manufacturer represents the only possible way for the development and industrialization of the and that it would be free from defects, unlike Airbus' multi-national companies such as the A400M (whose delays and additional costs are just as much, if not more, of industrialists, let us recall). What would open doors to Airbus and, therefore, to a Franco-German plane, which Dassault Aviation would not necessarily be totally ousted.
Contrary to what was originally planned with the SCAF program, the vector would undoubtedly be piloted, or at least optionally piloted, and the target of the program more comfortable with a potential of 170 to 200 machines at 120-150 to replace Tornado and about fifty for the replacement of the Mirage 2000D at first, perhaps more if it is also a question of replacing the first Rafales delivered in the early 2000s. In terms of industrial organization, imagine that the project management would go to Germany, the main customer, while the prime contractor could return to the French, more experienced in the field of combat aircraft. Obviously, this would include strong subcontracting in Germany, as our neighbors in the Outre-Rhine region are not used to accepting a work share that is less than their share of investment, to say the least. An industrial assembly which would then be accompanied by all the risks involved in this kind of industrial adventure with regard to the geopolitical situation of France in Europe and its comparative advantage in the field of combat aircraft.
In addition, Germany, through a department of its Ministry of Defense, sent a letter requesting information from Boeing, concerning the F-15, in an unspecified version, and F / A-18E / F Super Hornet. A request that follows a similar letter already sent to Lockheed-Martin requesting a precise briefing on the F-35, which had already made a lot of ink on both sides of the Rhine. On the other hand, while it is surprising that there is no demand for the F-16, whose latest development - the Viper - is more than credible, it is clear that Berlin is definitely not committed to reviving the development of the Eurofighter to integrate all the air-to-ground capabilities (thus demonstrating the correctness of French choices in the 1980s by assuming the solitary adventure of the Rafale?), the letters requesting German information have still not arrived to the offices of the DGA and Dassault aviation for the Rafale.
Nevertheless, the demands made by American aircraft manufacturers seem to direct the choice of Berlin towards a multi-purpose heavy fighter.
RAFALE XL?
A Rafale XL for the European air superiority of the future?
Moreover, and this shows that the context is not conducive to the stimulation of strategic thinking, the timetable described above invites us to point out that there is no political definition of the aircraft sought. The Eurofighter and Rafale are, first of all, aircraft superiority aircraft before being attacking aircraft, although the French plane is more balanced than its European counterpart on this issue. What will be the qualities of the future apparatus: increased discretion or search for an integral stealth? Supersonic speed, hypersonic? Interception or penetration at high or low altitude? Piloted, optionally piloted or unmanned aircraft? Would the mission of air superiority fall to him, at least as part of a chain of vectors of detection / decision / intervention? The questions are very numerous and the debate so little cleared up.
One of them may appear as a technique, but it remains essential for France as it was when the future EAP (Experimental Aircraft Program) was defined: the navalization of the future aircraft, either SCAF or SCAE.
The Air Force does not seem to significantly change its choices regarding air superiority, preferring to devote itself to the continuous and incremental modernization of the well-born Rafale. The study, which has been evoked between the walls for a few years, but more openly displayed in recent months, could be launched in order to satisfy the Air Force's strategic penetration needs, even if such a device could provide an excellent basis for a European competitor of the F-35.
The angle of attack retained by the Air Force in order to bring the idea of a more radical development of the Rafale by a rather important modification of its cell is the maintenance of the credibility of the FAS (Strategic Air Forces ). In order to sustain its ability to penetrate less and less permissive enemy airspaces, combining the ever-more sophisticated interceptors and air defense systems - the S-400 regularly increases its customer list - significantly increased discretion of the cell is sought. In addition, in order to bring the successor to ASMP-A, which is a much longer hypersonic and / or stealth device, which could be much longer than the current ASMP-A and SCALP-EGs, an enlargement of the Rafale cell is evoked in the corridors.
A solution that would obviously have the support of Dassault, who would see a continuity between the Rafale and probably a means of developing certain subsystems that could be integrated in retrofit to the current fleet of Rafale, but also that of a part of the Air Force cadres, who are particularly pleased with their privileged relationship with the national aircraft manufacturer for half a century. Despite the delays caused by the end of the Cold War, the National Rafalepurement program has always been able to meet its deadlines and to show full satisfaction to the Air Force, which has a short and reactive line of communication with the aircraft manufacturer. This is far from the case with regard to European aeronautical programs, notably the A400M, which has accumulated delays, technical limitations and additional costs, as well as the ALAT and the Navy's NH-90 Cayman helicopter , whose industrial disappointments are well known to aviators.
Almost no information is circulating on this possible proposal of Rafale XL, which would be driven by the need to strengthen the FAS, but that the aircraft manufacturer would probably see as a replacement base for the oldest Air Force Rafale , or even the Navy. We nevertheless lent ourselves to the play of conjunctures, taking into account the previous communications that had been made concerning possible developments for the Rafale, but also with regard to the technical possibilities and the operational constraints.
In order to reduce development costs, the Rafale XL could probably be equipped, at least initially, with an enlarged and more powerful version of the M88 reactor capable of pushing 9t or 10t with post-combustion. An engine whose development is already partly advanced, studies have been carried out in this direction by Safran for a possible contract Rafale in the United Arab Emirates. The aircraft's cell would then increase, probably between 0.8 and 1.2 meters longer and at least 40 to 60 cm wider, which would add two heavy the sail, like the Japanese F-2, enlarged version of the F-16. Increased discretion would be achieved by conforming tanks and antennas, all or part of the armament contained in releasable cocoons and probably one or two internal bunkers of modest dimensions but capable of carrying a minimum air-to-ground charge and a pair of missiles air-air for example. It is not impossible that the bunker is removable and semi-compliant, such as the ventral reservoir that was envisaged for the Mirage 4000 for example. The refueling boom would be retractable, and the aircraft would have a new fuselage-air inlet junction, and therefore new air intakes, perhaps a DSI model comparable to what one finds on the F-35, the Chinese J-10 or the Pakistani JF-17. The apparatus would doubtless be equipped with a double slope. In this case, we would head towards a Mach 2 class hunter, probably a little less. The ability to quickly reach a speed between Mach 1.5 and Mach 1.8 at high altitude (speed and acceleration), and to maintain this speed without post-computation (super cruising) obtaining a high peak speed. The maximum mass of the aircraft would probably be on the order of 30-32 tons - 25% more mass than the Rafale under full load. This means that the Mirage IV and Mirage 4000 take off in a much more compact plane.
While some prophesied through the Rafale the "last fighter designed in France", it would be very difficult to reduce the horizon of this "Rafale XL" to the only France Archipelago. And even so, it will be a question of granting the violins between the Air Force and the French Navy, which is asking for the size of the future combat aircraft in order to be able to dimension the New Aircraft Carrier (NPA). The European horizon for this successive Rafale - much like the Super Hornet succeeded to the Hornet - seems to be unsurpassed in the French political class. And this, despite all the pangs of multinational cooperation and its long list of well-identified extra costs. We have suggested (see above) a "wise prudence" to be observed with regard to the British and German partners, who do not forget as much as we do their national interests, especially industrial interests.
That is why it remains the lessons of the nEUROn program. The return to a sound method - advocated by Dassault aviation for nearly 35 years - consisting of unique owners and works and the removal of geographical return on investment replaced by the contribution of each partner based on its technological capabilities and industrial sectors. France, strong with the demonstrators nEUROn and SCAF, would propose to all its European partners to join it in the development of a demonstrator of a future piloted combat aircraft. This would, of course, be the "Rafale XL", although there is no point in bringing this fact forward. It would be more judicious to find a consensual name for the European sounds in the demonstrator. In this vein, Celtic, Gaulish, etc. mythologies provide a more than consistent pantheon. In the same way as nEUROn, European partners, excluded from major aeronautical maneuvers, would be very likely to be embarked on the adventure in order to preserve their achievements. The Swedes (what is the succession for the Gripen E / T), the Swiss (now a military industrial ambition), the Swedes (the succession for the Gripen E / F?), The Belgians (what benefits for the industrialists with the F-35?) Or the Portuguese? The integration of these small aeronautical nations would be all the easier in a model based on that of the nEUROn, since it would not require the political and financial involvement of the governments concerned and would allow these national industries to constitute a genuine European network of defense aeronautics independently of state controls.
Were we to forget that when the Rafale and Eurofighter programs split up on irreconcilable demands (unladen mass and thus motorisation, navalization, versatility, etc.), Spain had seriously interested in joining France on the Rafale program? A Spain that could easily be integrated with Airbus' German industrial ambitions, and thus with the Franco-German project.
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