ELSO (elektroninen sodankäynti) radiotaajuuksilla: radiotiedustelu, taajuushäirintä, EMP etc

NovAtel, the provider of world leading OEM high precision positioning technology, is pleased to announce that the Canadian Army has successfully tested NovAtel's GPS Anti-Jam Technology (GAJT®) in live-firing conditions on the M777C1 Howitzer.

The trial was conducted at Canadian Forces Base Shilo in Manitoba under the auspices of the Build in Canada Innovation Program (BCIP) of Public Services and Procurement Canada (formerly referred to as Public Works and Government Services Canada). The BCIP helps companies to bridge the pre-commercialization gap by procuring and testing late stage innovative goods and services within the federal government before taking them to market.

GAJT was trialed on the M777C1 Howitzer to demonstrate its robustness under the most demanding conditions. GAJT protects GPS-based navigation and precise timing receivers from intentional jamming and accidental interference. It is a null-forming antenna system which ensures satellite signals necessary to compute position and time are always available. It is a Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) product, and comes in versions suitable for land, sea, fixed installations and smaller platforms such as UAVs. Military vehicles and platforms, networks and timing infrastructure also benefit from the protection that GAJT provides.

There is no need to replace GPS receivers already installed, as GAJT works with civil and military receivers, and is ready for M-Code. NovAtel's lean manufacturing techniques and quality processes mean that that the company can ramp up quickly to meet volume requirements. Reliability is assured by NovAtel's industry-best low return rate.

The M777C1 lightweight 155-mm towed Howitzer provides close fire support without sacrificing range, stability, accuracy or durability. It is equipped with a highly advanced Digital Gun Management System which enables the crew to engage targets in a very precise manner, particularly when employing precision-guided munitions that use location data from GPS satellites.

Captain Thomas Booth, CD RCCS, the GAJT Trial Director said "I am proud to support Canadian companies via the Build in Canada Innovation Program, as administered by Public Services and Procurement Canada. Through our independent testing, we saw that NovAtel's GAJT-AE-N continued to work under the most demanding circumstances, indicating it could potentially be employed to preserve a combat force's freedom of action in a hostile and unforgiving environment."

"NovAtel is most grateful to Public Services and Procurement Canada and the Canadian Army for making this trial happen and for their wholehearted and efficient support," Peter Soar, Business Development Manager, Military and Defence of NovAtel said, adding, "This work shows that GAJT is ready to protect military platforms in harsh operating circumstances and to provide assurance that GPS signals will be available."

Positioning Intelligence is part of Hexagon, a leading global provider of information technologies that drive quality and productivity across geospatial and industrial enterprise applications.
http://www.armyrecognition.com/nove...anadian_army_on_m777c1_howitzer_51811161.html
 
Intel is taking a new direction in chip development as it looks to the future of artificial intelligence, with the company betting the technology will pervade applications and web services.

The company on Thursday said it is developing new chips that will handle AI workloads, which will increasingly be a part of its chip future. For now, the AI chips will be released as specialized primary chips or co-processors in computers and separate from the major product lines.

But over time, Intel could adapt and integrate the AI features into its mainstream server, IoT, and perhaps even PC chips. The AI features could be useful in servers, drones, robots, and autonomous cars. Intel is aggressively chasing these sectors as it tries to diversify outside the weakening PC market.
http://www.pcworld.com/article/3142...h-new-chips-but-still-lacks-a-potent-gpu.html
 
Laitan tänne koska kyseessä on proof-of-concept.

663-580x358.png


IF YOU have read Philip K Dick's novel A Scanner Darkly, or seen the rotoscope film version (below), you'll remember that in order to protect their identity, detectives wear a "scramble suit" that gives them a mish-mash of faces to protect their anonymity.

Given the age we live in where Amazon has just revealed facial scanning at its planned physical stores, and even home equipment like the Netatmo Welcome able to identify you from your facial features, it was only a matter of time before the "scramble suit" became a thing.

Berlin-based technology artist Adam Harvey has used the ‘hall of mirrors' approach by creating a fabric designed to mimic how computers pick out faces and throw them off with thousands of false positives.
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer...tempts-to-confuse-facial-recognition-software

Hyperface' is part of an ongoing project to overwhelm facial recognition following ‘CV Dazzle' a technique of makeup and hairstyling specifically designed to shake off the trackers. The only problem is that unless you're on a catwalk, the result sticks out like a sore thumb, making you instantly look like someone is trying to hide.

Harvey told The Guardian that ‘Hyperface' is about "overloading an algorithm with what it wants, oversaturating an area with faces to divert the gaze of the computer vision algorithm."

It is, in effect, a DDoS of facial data.

Harvey collated 47 different data points that researchers claim to be able to discover simply from analysis of a 100x100 photo. Which to give you some idea is basically a thumbnail.

It can be either used to cover you, or the area around you, with the same effect of letting you disappear into the computer landscape.

Harvey and his partners at Hypen-Labs will give more details of how ‘Hyperface' will graduate from art to reality as part of Hyphen-Labs' new work NeuroSpeculative AfroFeminism later this month. µ
 
ELECTRONIC WARFARE · RUSSIA
The tactics of Russian EW formations in the battle of Debaltsevo. “IP” Analytics
January 22, 2017Joel Harding


Anonymous expert analysis and reporting on Russian EW

The principal message is that the US late Cold War era policy of using any and every radio-frequency emission an enemy makes to geolocate and ident assets have been absorbed and implemented by the Russians, with a particular focus on exploitation of an opponent’s civil assets like cellphones, WiFi etc. for psywar/IW, EW and simple targeting and kill assessment. All spelled out below.

If it works for the Russians, the Chinese will emulate it exactly.

Punchline is simple, practice EMCON/LPI/LPD or travel home in a bodybag.

http://sprotyv.info/ru/news/kiev/taktika-rossiyskih-grupp-reb-v-boyah-za-debalcevo-analitika

The tactics of Russian EW formations in the battle of Debaltsevo. “IP” Analytics
05/01/2017 – 11:00
Debaltsevo in Donbas – a traffic node of the Donetsk coal region. The city is located on the outskirts of Luhansk region has an excellent transport infrastructure, through it passes the majority of goods from this territory.

First, in 2015 the Kremlin was important to take control of the center. Direct evidence that were open declarations of President Vladimir Putin’s Russia (02.17.2015), where he openly expressed his confidence in mastering the “militia” of the area. In addition, the Russian leader called on Ukrainian military leadership to dispose lay down their arms and to save people from death.



The tactical situation around Debaltsevo created a deep ledge on one side of which are divisions of Donetsk terrorists reinforcement of regular troops of Russia, and on the other – ATO forces. By the middle of February 2015 the situation on the line of contact escalated, the Russian regular troops came close to the front line and began to impose fighting, trying to take in the Ukrainian units into envelopment and destroy them.

In this situation, the role of electronic warfare has been leading among other types of combat support. As in previous cases, the basis of electronic warfare systems were enhanced maneuverability and Group CPC EW troops of the Russian army.

A comprehensive technical monitoring group provides EW planning data center on electronic environment in the region. In addition to assessing EWw defences their funds in their range of tasks included the collection of data and the initial assessment of electronic environment. It should be noted that the CTC experts groups who have worked in the occupied regions of Ukraine have already acquired some experience and have studied the tactics of application of radio Ukrainian forces ATO.

Manoeuvring EW group in this period significantly expanded its capabilities.

Conducting military operations in the tactical area of approximately 50 × 30 km has created ideal conditions for the organization of bases for DF [Direction Finding / Geolocation] VHF and HF bands. For the technical implementation of this plan DF device used automated jamming stations. Typically, DF Base organized 2-3 jammers on armoured vehicles (R-378BMV, 330BMV P, P-934BMV , R-330ZH). The presence of the enemy DF platforms allowed him to constantly monitor the electronic environment, and create interference on detection if necessary. That is to say, in this case, electronic warfare was organized by the classical scheme of constructing order of battle group maneuver with the implementation of the algorithm of the automated cycle “radio-survey – jamming – intelligence analyis”.

Among other things, with the help of special software systems that have been used by Russian groups EW carried out a mass mailing of SMS-messages on personal mobile phones servicemen and their families. As we previously reported , similar methods of electronic warfare have been designed to create psychological pressure on the morale of the personnel of the forces ATO.

In addition, the bending positions of Ukrainian troops in Debaltsevo allowed the Russian military component EW effectively apply a set of portable radio RP-377UVM2 “Lesochek”, which could generate a barrage of interference in a small area.

It should be noted that, as in previous clashes in the Donbas, Russian military experts used the suppression of mobile GSM-communication signal delivered by the transmitter operators aerodynamically “Leer-3” interference on unmanned aerial vehicles such as “Orlan”.



However, radiation from mobile phones were widely used to cue enemy artillery to them. With the help of special software systems EW RF numbers of mobile phones Ukrainian servicemen have been identified with their owners. Being in the defense area of military units and equipment easily identified and in accordance with the determined further battle tactics. Apparently, for this reason, the enemy artillery accuracy was high – more than 50% of the Ukrainian armored vehicles at the final stage of the battle were either destroyed or put out of action. Unfortunately, the ATO forces did not use the experience from previous errors in Ilovaysk during the summer campaign, which gave advantages to the enemy in the conduct of electronic warfare.

With renewed vigor turned bck to radio-disinformtion using individual mobile phone via SMS-service. According to eyewitnesses , “the SMS could be sent by a ” faked “base station, which was located approximately within a radius of 1 km from the subscriber. This station takes bearings included all GSM transceivers (mobiles) in this area creates a mass mailing messages prepared in advance.

***

Thus, participating in the battles on the side of the “L-DNR” Russian troops are widely used power tools and electronic warfare as an element of combat support. According to the testimony of many witnesses, radio in the area of conducting battles in np Debaltsevo often violated. On many memories from open sources, commanders of their units in the manual often take into account the lack of / unreliable radio communications. Often, parts management and departments was carried out by using other forms of communication.


En lukennut ihan koko juttua kiireestä johtuen mutta laitoin sen tänne koska tuskin muuten muistan ja voi jotain kiinnostaa.
Arvioikaa itse onko sivu luotettava:
https://toinformistoinfluence.com/2...ons-in-the-battle-of-debaltsevo-ip-analytics/
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Phones cut in eastern Ukraine as rebels seize firms

r


An armed man stands guard during the visit of head of the separatist self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic Alexander Zakharchenko (not pictured) to the Yuzovsky metallurgical plant in Donetsk, Ukraine, March 1, 2017. REUTERS/Alexander Ermochenko


A fifth of a million phone users in Ukraine's rebel-controlled eastern city of Donetsk were cut off from the rest of the country on Wednesday after armed men took over the offices and equipment of the main fixed-line telecoms company, its director said.

Pro-Russian separatists had warned they would seize businesses in areas they control unless the Ukrainian government ends a rail blockade that has halted coal shipments from rebel territory.

The blockade and the rebel retaliation have highlighted the mutual economic dependence between the two sides, despite three years of simmering military conflict in which more than 10,000 people have been killed.

As a result of the takeover of its premises, Ukrtelecom director Mikhail Shuranov said "the company has cut off the Donetsk sector from the national network".

He said on Facebook: "Around 200,000 of our citizens have lost a means of communication."

Separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko said rebels were following through on their ultimatum because Ukraine had not lifted the blockade.

"Today since midnight companies have been being taken under external control," separatist website DAN quoted him as saying.

Ukrtelecom is part of a financial and industrial group owned by Ukraine's richest businessman Rinat Akhmetov, whose power-generating and steelmaking businesses on both sides of the eastern front line have already been hit by the blockade's squeeze on coal supplies.

On an official visit to Kiev, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson joined his Ukrainian counterpart in condemning the separatists' latest acts.

"This expropriation, like the annexation of Crimea, like other aspects of the behavior that has been encouraged by the Russians, is unacceptable, it must stop," Johnson said.

RELATED COVERAGE
Both the Ukrainian authorities and separatist officials have warned of economic fallout from the blockade. Separatists say local industrial firms are suffering, while Ukraine says the country could be hit by rolling blackouts and lost foreign export income of up to $2 billion.

Russia said the rebels' move to take control of the companies on its territory was partly understandable because the blockade had put the separatists in "an even more difficult situation".

"The steps made by the administrations of these regions, ... can be understood to a degree," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists.

A humanitarian group funded by Akhmetov that has been a major supplier of aid to conflict-hit areas also said on Wednesday it had been forced to halt operations in rebel-held areas after distribution points were blocked by armed men.

In rebel-held Donetsk, a Reuters witness saw one police car parked near the fund's distribution center at a football arena. Signs on the building's doors said the center was not operating and the entrances had been sealed with papers carrying official-looking stamps, but there was no armed presence.

Ukraine's largest private power and coal producer, DTEK, which is also part of Akhmetov's business empire, said the management of its operations in separatist-held territory had not been taken over.

It was not immediately clear if or how other Ukraine-registered businesses operating in separatist territory had been affected.



(Reporting by Pavel Polityuk and Alessandra Prentice in Kiev, Reuters reporter in Donetsk,; Additional reporting by Aleksandar Vasovic in Moscow; Writing by Alessandra Prentice; Editing by Mark Trevelyan)
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-donetsk-idUSKBN1684QX
 
Among other things, with the help of special software systems that have been used by Russian groups EW carried out a mass mailing of SMS-messages on personal mobile phones servicemen and their families. As we previously reported , similar methods of electronic warfare have been designed to create psychological pressure on the morale of the personnel of the forces ATO.
Tähän ei voi kyllin varautua henkisesti, vaikka pitäisi jo olla kaikilla tiedossa.
Jos pilliin vihellettäisiin, jokaisen reserviläisen pitää ohjeistaa perheensä ja sukulaisensa tämän varalta.
 
ELECTRONIC WARFARE · RUSSIA
The tactics of Russian EW formations in the battle of Debaltsevo. “IP” Analytics
January 22, 2017Joel Harding


Anonymous expert analysis and reporting on Russian EW

The principal message is that the US late Cold War era policy of using any and every radio-frequency emission an enemy makes to geolocate and ident assets have been absorbed and implemented by the Russians, with a particular focus on exploitation of an opponent’s civil assets like cellphones, WiFi etc. for psywar/IW, EW and simple targeting and kill assessment. All spelled out below.

If it works for the Russians, the Chinese will emulate it exactly.

Punchline is simple, practice EMCON/LPI/LPD or travel home in a bodybag.

http://sprotyv.info/ru/news/kiev/taktika-rossiyskih-grupp-reb-v-boyah-za-debalcevo-analitika

The tactics of Russian EW formations in the battle of Debaltsevo. “IP” Analytics
05/01/2017 – 11:00
Debaltsevo in Donbas – a traffic node of the Donetsk coal region. The city is located on the outskirts of Luhansk region has an excellent transport infrastructure, through it passes the majority of goods from this territory.

First, in 2015 the Kremlin was important to take control of the center. Direct evidence that were open declarations of President Vladimir Putin’s Russia (02.17.2015), where he openly expressed his confidence in mastering the “militia” of the area. In addition, the Russian leader called on Ukrainian military leadership to dispose lay down their arms and to save people from death.



The tactical situation around Debaltsevo created a deep ledge on one side of which are divisions of Donetsk terrorists reinforcement of regular troops of Russia, and on the other – ATO forces. By the middle of February 2015 the situation on the line of contact escalated, the Russian regular troops came close to the front line and began to impose fighting, trying to take in the Ukrainian units into envelopment and destroy them.

In this situation, the role of electronic warfare has been leading among other types of combat support. As in previous cases, the basis of electronic warfare systems were enhanced maneuverability and Group CPC EW troops of the Russian army.

A comprehensive technical monitoring group provides EW planning data center on electronic environment in the region. In addition to assessing EWw defences their funds in their range of tasks included the collection of data and the initial assessment of electronic environment. It should be noted that the CTC experts groups who have worked in the occupied regions of Ukraine have already acquired some experience and have studied the tactics of application of radio Ukrainian forces ATO.

Manoeuvring EW group in this period significantly expanded its capabilities.

Conducting military operations in the tactical area of approximately 50 × 30 km has created ideal conditions for the organization of bases for DF [Direction Finding / Geolocation] VHF and HF bands. For the technical implementation of this plan DF device used automated jamming stations. Typically, DF Base organized 2-3 jammers on armoured vehicles (R-378BMV, 330BMV P, P-934BMV , R-330ZH). The presence of the enemy DF platforms allowed him to constantly monitor the electronic environment, and create interference on detection if necessary. That is to say, in this case, electronic warfare was organized by the classical scheme of constructing order of battle group maneuver with the implementation of the algorithm of the automated cycle “radio-survey – jamming – intelligence analyis”.

Among other things, with the help of special software systems that have been used by Russian groups EW carried out a mass mailing of SMS-messages on personal mobile phones servicemen and their families. As we previously reported , similar methods of electronic warfare have been designed to create psychological pressure on the morale of the personnel of the forces ATO.

In addition, the bending positions of Ukrainian troops in Debaltsevo allowed the Russian military component EW effectively apply a set of portable radio RP-377UVM2 “Lesochek”, which could generate a barrage of interference in a small area.

It should be noted that, as in previous clashes in the Donbas, Russian military experts used the suppression of mobile GSM-communication signal delivered by the transmitter operators aerodynamically “Leer-3” interference on unmanned aerial vehicles such as “Orlan”.



However, radiation from mobile phones were widely used to cue enemy artillery to them. With the help of special software systems EW RF numbers of mobile phones Ukrainian servicemen have been identified with their owners. Being in the defense area of military units and equipment easily identified and in accordance with the determined further battle tactics. Apparently, for this reason, the enemy artillery accuracy was high – more than 50% of the Ukrainian armored vehicles at the final stage of the battle were either destroyed or put out of action. Unfortunately, the ATO forces did not use the experience from previous errors in Ilovaysk during the summer campaign, which gave advantages to the enemy in the conduct of electronic warfare.

With renewed vigor turned bck to radio-disinformtion using individual mobile phone via SMS-service. According to eyewitnesses , “the SMS could be sent by a ” faked “base station, which was located approximately within a radius of 1 km from the subscriber. This station takes bearings included all GSM transceivers (mobiles) in this area creates a mass mailing messages prepared in advance.

***

Thus, participating in the battles on the side of the “L-DNR” Russian troops are widely used power tools and electronic warfare as an element of combat support. According to the testimony of many witnesses, radio in the area of conducting battles in np Debaltsevo often violated. On many memories from open sources, commanders of their units in the manual often take into account the lack of / unreliable radio communications. Often, parts management and departments was carried out by using other forms of communication.


En lukennut ihan koko juttua kiireestä johtuen mutta laitoin sen tänne koska tuskin muuten muistan ja voi jotain kiinnostaa.
Arvioikaa itse onko sivu luotettava:
https://toinformistoinfluence.com/2...ons-in-the-battle-of-debaltsevo-ip-analytics/


Tuohon artikkeliin liittyen tuli mieleen jotakin: Olisiko mahdollista kehittää jonkinlainen aplikaatio noille älykännyköille, joka osaisi tunnistaa tuollaisen valetukiaseman ja varoittaisi sellaisen läsnäolosta? Siis oletan, että tuollaisella tukiasemalla olisi suhteellisen lyhyt kantama, koska suuret lähetystehot havaittaisiin kaukaa ja vastatoimet olisivat nopeat. Ja lennokissa oleva tukiasema on muutenkin rajallinen kantamaltaan, toisaalta tarvitseeko sen sitten kantaakaan, kun se on lennokin kyydissä. Ja tämä aplikaatio toimisi puhelimen ollessa offline -tilassa, joskin tietenkin puhelin kuulostelisi tukiasemia koko ajan. Mahdollinen tälläinen puhelin voisi olla myös aktiivisena, jos sitä olisi tarkoitus käyttää jonkinlaisena syöttinä viholliselle, mutta silloin se ei voisi oikein varoittaa ketään mistään, kun kukaan ei oikein voi olla tuollaisen puhelimen lähettyvillä.
 
Tuossa kantamassa on muitakin rajoituksia kuin lähetysteho. Esim. GSM-puhelin ei toimi lainkaan, jos se on yli 30 km tukiasemasta oli kenttä sitten kuinka voimakas tahansa. Syynä on kommunikaatiorytmitykselle varattu aikaikkuna. Tuon 30 km jälkeen vastaamisen aikaviive on liian suuri, eikä puhelin enää kytkeydy verkkoon.
 
Kyllä sotatilassa ne puhelimet kannattaa jättää ihan vain kotiin, ei sen tarvi olla edes valetukiasema että tietoihin päästään kiinne.
Norjassakin kielettiin matkapuhelimet ja sosiaalinen media seuraavassa isossa sotaharjoituksessa.

Puhelimet on helvetillinen riski ottaa sotaan mukaan.
Ainoastaan sellaiset hätävara puhelimet mukaan mitkä joukkueen johtaja antaa, ne on tarkistettu ja niihen on ladattu omat spessu softat jos tälläisiä käytetään.
Puhelimet luonnollisesti ovat joukkueenjohtajan hallussa.
 
Kyllä sotatilassa ne puhelimet kannattaa jättää ihan vain kotiin, ei sen tarvi olla edes valetukiasema että tietoihin päästään kiinne.
Norjassakin kielettiin matkapuhelimet ja sosiaalinen media seuraavassa isossa sotaharjoituksessa.

Puhelimet on helvetillinen riski ottaa sotaan mukaan.
Ainoastaan sellaiset hätävara puhelimet mukaan mitkä joukkueen johtaja antaa, ne on tarkistettu ja niihen on ladattu omat spessu softat jos tälläisiä käytetään.
Puhelimet luonnollisesti ovat joukkueenjohtajan hallussa.
Itse olen aina ajatellut kommunikoivani ihan perinteisen kenttäpostin välityksellä. Puhelin on riski.
Mutta läheisten puhelimiin voi tulla viholliselta kaikenlaista kamaa, sitä asiaa ei ole turhan paljon pidetty esillä.
 
Kyllä sotatilassa ne puhelimet kannattaa jättää ihan vain kotiin, ei sen tarvi olla edes valetukiasema että tietoihin päästään kiinne.

Puhelimet on helvetillinen riski ottaa sotaan mukaan.
Asioissa on puolensa.
Päällä olevan kännykän voi helposti paikantaa ja niin ollen myös paljastaa ryhmitysalueet missä on paljon aktiivisuutta. Toisaaltaan Ukrainan kaltaisissa sodissa hommien mennessä vituiksi se kännykkä voi olla ainoa viestiyhteys. Ukrainassa kännykät toimii (löytää kentät) yleensä läpi rintamalinjan, mutta se ei lienee ole yhteensattuma tai vihollisen kyvyttömyyttä häiritä GSM liikennettä, vaan johtuu ennemminkin siitä että molemmat osapuolet (Venäjä ja Ukraina) seuraa toistensa viestiliikennettä.
Kännykkä on ihan ok. olla mukana taistelutoimissa akku irroitettuna (akun ollessa kiinni puhelimen voi paikantaa vaikka se ei olisikaan päällä), mutta sen aikansakuluksi pläräämistä tulee välttää ja ainakin pidättäytyä viestimästä sillä mitään turvallisuutta vaarantavaa tietoa jos ei ole aivan pakko sen kakan osuttua oikein kunnolla tuullettimeen.
Sotaharjoituksissa kännykkä kiellolla nähtävästi haetaan autenttisuutta ja halutaan näyttää Jade Muumille se miltä tuntuu kun on tunninkin pois sosiaalisen median ääreltä.
 
Asioissa on puolensa.
Päällä olevan kännykän voi helposti paikantaa ja niin ollen myös paljastaa ryhmitysalueet missä on paljon aktiivisuutta. Toisaaltaan Ukrainan kaltaisissa sodissa hommien mennessä vituiksi se kännykkä voi olla ainoa viestiyhteys. Ukrainassa kännykät toimii (löytää kentät) yleensä läpi rintamalinjan, mutta se ei lienee ole yhteensattuma tai vihollisen kyvyttömyyttä häiritä GSM liikennettä, vaan johtuu ennemminkin siitä että molemmat osapuolet (Venäjä ja Ukraina) seuraa toistensa viestiliikennettä.
Kännykkä on ihan ok. olla mukana taistelutoimissa akku irroitettuna (akun ollessa kiinni puhelimen voi paikantaa vaikka se ei olisikaan päällä), mutta sen aikansakuluksi pläräämistä tulee välttää ja ainakin pidättäytyä viestimästä sillä mitään turvallisuutta vaarantavaa tietoa jos ei ole aivan pakko sen kakan osuttua oikein kunnolla tuullettimeen.
Sotaharjoituksissa kännykkä kiellolla nähtävästi haetaan autenttisuutta ja halutaan näyttää Jade Muumille se miltä tuntuu kun on tunninkin pois sosiaalisen median ääreltä.
Se vain tuppaa menemään niin että kun on 300 miestä ja ne ovat eristyksissä vaikkapa 40 päivää perheistään niin porukka alkaa kummasti laittaa viestiä vaikka ei olisi lupaa ja asettavat koko joukon vaaraan. Kännykän tietoihin päästään kiinne, mikrofoniin, kameraan, sijaintiin jne Ei kaikkia puhelimia tietystikkään seurata mutta minun joukossa ei laskettaisi ainakaan tuurin varaan, ne puhelimet mitä käytettäisiin olisi ne nollattu, johtajan vastuulla, salauksella esim tekstiviestille, kamera irrottettuna, speciaali softa sisällä ja mikrofoni irrotettuna.

Jenkkien tutkimuksissa suurin "radiosingaali" ei tullutkaan johtamisjärjestelmien lähettyviltä tai viestilaitteiden ympäriltä vaan joukkojen maijoitusalueilta vaikka sotilaita oli kieletty puhelimen käyttäminen.
 
Asioissa on puolensa.
Päällä olevan kännykän voi helposti paikantaa ja niin ollen myös paljastaa ryhmitysalueet missä on paljon aktiivisuutta. Toisaaltaan Ukrainan kaltaisissa sodissa hommien mennessä vituiksi se kännykkä voi olla ainoa viestiyhteys. Ukrainassa kännykät toimii (löytää kentät) yleensä läpi rintamalinjan, mutta se ei lienee ole yhteensattuma tai vihollisen kyvyttömyyttä häiritä GSM liikennettä, vaan johtuu ennemminkin siitä että molemmat osapuolet (Venäjä ja Ukraina) seuraa toistensa viestiliikennettä.
Kännykkä on ihan ok. olla mukana taistelutoimissa akku irroitettuna (akun ollessa kiinni puhelimen voi paikantaa vaikka se ei olisikaan päällä), mutta sen aikansakuluksi pläräämistä tulee välttää ja ainakin pidättäytyä viestimästä sillä mitään turvallisuutta vaarantavaa tietoa jos ei ole aivan pakko sen kakan osuttua oikein kunnolla tuullettimeen.
Sotaharjoituksissa kännykkä kiellolla nähtävästi haetaan autenttisuutta ja halutaan näyttää Jade Muumille se miltä tuntuu kun on tunninkin pois sosiaalisen median ääreltä.
Pois päältä ja lentokonetilassa olevia puhelimia ei voi paikantaa ellei näitä olla jo hakkeroitu jolloin ne vain näyttävät olevan pois päältä/lentokonetilassa.
Ilman yhteyksiäkin näistä voi olla huomattavaa hyötyä kuten raivaajien toimintaa helpottaa jos kohteesta on valokuvia.
 
Itse olen aina ajatellut kommunikoivani ihan perinteisen kenttäpostin välityksellä. Puhelin on riski.
Mutta läheisten puhelimiin voi tulla viholliselta kaikenlaista kamaa, sitä asiaa ei ole turhan paljon pidetty esillä.

Ukrainassa on venäläisten toimesta lähetetty rintamalla olevien ukrainalaissotilaiden kännyköihin propagandaviestejä, mietinpä vaan, että millainen vaikutus sellaisilla olisi lähetettynä kotirintamalle joko kohdennetusti (sotilaiden omaisille) tai massana suurelle joukolle vastaanottajia. Millainen vaikutus sillä on omaisiin, jos saa "viranomaistaholta" (eli venäläisiltä) huolestuttavia tietoja rintamalta? Etenkin jos se koskee läheistä rintamalla, epävarmuus voi kaltava mieltä jollei päivään pariin saa varmistusta asialle - siitä huolimatta, että kyse on propagandasta.

Millainen vaikutus kotirintamaan olisi päivittäisillä ja jatkuvilla propagandaviesteillä, jotka lähetään "viranomaisten" nimissä? Tai saadaanko sellaisilla riittävä hyöty (niin paljon "altistuneita", että he ryhtyvät resonoimaan tarinaa eteenpäin)?

vlad
 
Se vain tuppaa menemään niin että kun on 300 miestä ja ne ovat eristyksissä vaikkapa 40 päivää perheistään niin porukka alkaa kummasti laittaa viestiä vaikka ei olisi lupaa ja asettavat koko joukon vaaraan.
Selusta-alueilla on joka tapauksessa sellainen määrä GSM liikennettä (jos mastot on toiminnassa), että ei riko palleja ja tst-tehtävien GSM käytännön kuvasin jo edellä.

Lisäksi "sota opettaa", eli viimeistään ryhmäkuri kyllä pitää huolen kännyköiden käytön operaatioturvallisuudesta kun huomataan että niiden räpläämisellä ja vastoinkäymisillä on syy-yhteys. Sotatoimialueella toiminen ei perustu demokratiaan, tai siihen että tehdään kivasti ettei tule tyhmimmällekään pahamieli.

Jos haluaa olla täysin varma GSM viestinnän turvallisuudesta, niin silloin täytyy kerätä puhelimet pois, mutta silloin voi myös tulla sekin hetki eteen että toivoo olleensa tekemättä sitä. Isoin ongelma GSM kurin pettäessä on se, että sitä joutuu käymään sotaansa apinalauman keskellä jossa selvästikään kaikki ei pidä hengissä kotiin selviämistä yhtä tärkeänä kuin some-päivittelyään.
 
Norjalaiset ovat kieltäneet kännykän mukaanottamisen harjoitukseen.

https://forsvaretsforum.no/mobilforbud-jointviking

Soldater og befal må legge mobilen igjen hjemme når de reiser til Finnmark.


Torbjørn Løvland

Det er brigadesjef Eldar Berli som har besluttet at ingen av hans mannskaper skal ha med seg mobiltelefon ut på Joint Viking. Aldri før har noe mobilforbud vært i nærheten av det som nå skal praktiseres for flere tusen mannskaper. Og aldri før har folk flest vært så avhengig av mobil som i dag.

– Vi gjør det fordi vi øver oss på krig. Og da er helt klart mobiltelefonen en risikofaktor. Det være seg ved avlytting eller ved spredning av informasjon på sosiale medier. En opphopning av telefoner vil også avsløre hvor avdelingen befinner seg, sier Hærens talsmann Ole Johan Skogmo.

– Vi gjør det fordi vi øver oss på krig. Og da er helt klart mobiltelefonen en risikofaktor.
Noen få. Om den sosiale kontakten blir borte, skal likevel sikkerheta være minst like godt ivaretatt uten mobil. Hver enkelt soldat får gi sine pårørende et telefonnummer som vedkommende kan nås på dersom det gjelder liv og helse. Et begrenset antall nøkkelpersonell vil også få muligheter til å bære med seg mobiler med enkelte restriksjoner. Forsvaret har dessuten sine egne radioer og telefonnett som sikrer forbindelse ned til den minste patrulje.

– Det å ivareta sikkerheta er ikke det samme som å være avhengig av mobil, sier oberstløytnant Skogmo, som er en av dem som vil kunne bruke mobiltelefon fra det etablerte pressesenteret de ti dagene øvelsen varer.

Tusenvis mobilløse. Det å kontrollere at ingen bryter mobilforbudet regnes som en enkel oppgave. Drøyt 8000 menn og kvinner vil delta på vinterøvelsen i området mellom Lakselv og Alta fra 6 til 15. mars.
 
Usko pois, kyllä voi ja paikannetaan.
Puhelin on yhteydessä mastoon, oli siinä virrat päällä tai ei. Ainoa tapa estää tuo on ottaa puhelin virrattomaksi irroittamalla akku.
Ei ole fyysisesti mahdollista jos virta ei kulje. Osaa puhelimista ei vain saa sammutettua ilman akun irrottamista.
 
Usko pois, kyllä voi ja paikannetaan.
Puhelin on yhteydessä mastoon, oli siinä virrat päällä tai ei. Ainoa tapa estää tuo on ottaa puhelin virrattomaksi irroittamalla akku.
Jos tunnet tätä teknistä puolta enemmän niin voisitko vähän avata tätä väitettä eli selittää tarkemmin miten tämä yhteydenpito käytännössä tapahtuu. Nykyäänhän näissä on kuitenkin kohtuullisen monimutkaiset käyttöjärjestelmät ja toimivuus vaatii yleensä, että ne on bootattu "työpöydälle". Tai näin minä ainakin olen ymmärtänyt. Eri asia olisi tietysti asentaa puhelimeen haittaohjelma joka antaa käyttäjän ymmärtää, että puhelin on sammutettu, vaikka komponentit pysyisivätkin päällä näyttöä lukuun ottamatta.
 
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