F-22 Raptor
- Viestiketjun aloittaja John Hilly
- Aloitus PVM
Hyvin kyllä nokkasuuntaamisautoriteettia piisaa!
Tuota kutsutaan termillä "power agility".
Vähän aina jäänyt auki tiedot, että miksi F22 ei tehty enempää, miksi ei syntynyt päivitysmallia (puheita oli) tai miksi ei näy koneen ominaisuuksia hyödyntäviä jatkokehitelmiä. Kallista oli joo mutta silti.
Maailma muuttui. Eikös tuo alunperin suunniteltu idän uhkaa vastaan?
Obama myös näki rahareikiä ihan kotimaassa joten kalliit projektit laitettiin jäihin.
Gyllis1
Respected Leader
Maailman luultiin muuttuneen. Silloinen puolustusministeri katsoi että Venäjä ja Kiina eivät ole enää sellainen sotilaallinen uhka, että Raptoreita tarvittaisiin. Ei montaa vuotta mennyt kun voitiin todeta että metsään meni ne ennusteet.
Oma veikkaukseni on, että F-35 terminoi F-22:n.
Ensinnäkin F-22 oli ja on itsessään todella kallis ylläpidettävä. Ja 2010-luvun alussa oli käynyt selväksi, että F-35 ei ole eikä tule olemaan niin edullinen kuin sen alkuperäisessä ajattelussa kuviteltiin olevan. Molempiin ei ollut missään tapauksessa varaa.
F-35 on Jenkeille huomattavasti tärkeämpi kuin tehtäväkentältään rajallisempi F-22. Joten jos jostain piti luopua, valinta oli helppo. "Maailman muuttuminen" oli sitten Amerikkalainen versio "erityisolosuhteista".
Tosiasia on, että kuulaa ei ollut molempiin.
Gyllis1
Respected Leader
Kuten tavallista, puhut taas paskaa.
Minuutin jos jaksaisi googlettaa, niin ei tarvisi arvailla:
Retired General Says F-22 Production Was Killed So That A New Bomber Could Live
Other revelations include the Next Generation Bomber was to be armed with air-to-air missiles and the B-21 is indeed one part of a family of systems.
www.thedrive.com
Viimeksi muokattu:
Kuten tavallista, puhut taas paskaa.
Minuutin jos jaksaisi googlettaa, niin ei tarvisi arvailla:
Retired General Says F-22 Production Was Killed So That A New Bomber Could Live
Other revelations include the Next Generation Bomber was to be armed with air-to-air missiles and the B-21 is indeed one part of a family of systems.
Sinulla tuo keskustelutyyli ei koskaan petä
.Eli tuo yhden eläkkeelle jääneen kenraalin muistelmat ovat totuus? Häpeäisit nyt edes vähän kun tuollaista yrität myydä
. Jo kaikkitietävästä Wikistäkin löytyy toisenlaista näkemystä kuten hyvin tiedät.In 2009, the program was cut to 187 operational production aircraft due to high costs, a lack of clear air-to-air missions due to delays in Russian and Chinese fighter programs, a ban on exports, and development of the more versatile F-35. The last F-22 was delivered in 2012. (Wiki)
Googlesta löytää kaikenlaista. Sitten voi myös itse katsoa mitä maailmassa on tapahtunut ja verrata sitä siihen mitä kaikenlaista asioista sanotaan ja itsekin miettiä hieman miten asiat ovat.
Gyllis1
Respected Leader
On tuo yksi asiasta päättämässä ollut kenraali aika paljon vakuuttavampi lähde kuin sinä, "kuten hyvin tiedät".Sinulla tuo keskustelutyyli ei koskaan petä
Eli tuo yhden eläkkeelle jääneen kenraalin muistelmat ovat totuus? Häpeäisit nyt edes vähän kun tuollaista yrität myydä
In 2009, the program was cut to 187 operational production aircraft due to high costs, a lack of clear air-to-air missions due to delays in Russian and Chinese fighter programs, a ban on exports, and development of the more versatile F-35. The last F-22 was delivered in 2012. (Wiki)
Googlesta löytää kaikenlaista. Sitten voi myös itse katsoa mitä maailmassa on tapahtunut ja verrata sitä siihen mitä kaikenlaista asioista sanotaan ja itsekin miettiä hieman miten asiat ovat.
Olemme luonnollisesti molemmat oikeutettuja olemaan autuaita uskossamme
. Eipä taida tuo kenraali olla esittänyt ideoita mistä rahat kaikkeen tuohon haluttuun saadaan. Kannattaa muistaa, että 2007-2008 Jenkeissä ja maailmalla oli hieman muitakin rahareikiä kuin uudet koneet. Armeija ei ole ainoa asia maailmassa edes jenkeissä.Sinänsä tuo artikkeli on mielenkiintoinen. Näkee hyvin, miksi uusien asejärjestelmien hinnat räjähtävät nykyään säännönmukaisesti läpi katon.
Gyllis1
Respected Leader
Niin, sinä ja iltavoimien entinen esikuntapäällikkö tosiaan olette asiasta eri mieltä. Hän uskoakseen suostui F-22 tuotannon alasajoon varmistaakseen B-21 projektille rahoituksen. Sinä uskot tietäväsi asian häntä paremmin.Olemme luonnollisesti molemmat oikeutettuja olemaan autuaita uskossamme
Sinänsä tuo artikkeli on mielenkiintoinen. Näkee hyvin, miksi uusien asejärjestelmien hinnat räjähtävät nykyään säännönmukaisesti läpi katon.
Minä tiedän kumpaa teistä pidän uskottavampana.
Gyllis1
Respected Leader
Tässä vielä toinen ko kirjan pohjalta kirjoitettu artikkeli sikäli mikäli muita foorumilaisia sattuu aihe kiinnostamaan:
The top Air Force leadership went along with former Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ termination of the F-22 fighter—after producing less than half the required number—because they believed they couldn’t win the argument and that getting approval to build a new bomber was more important.
In “Journey: Memoirs of an Air Force Chief of Staff,” now in bookstores, retired Gen. Norton Schwartz said his predecessor, retired Gen. Mike Moseley, “never gave up in his principled attempts to get those 381 F-22s,” for which Gates fired Moseley and the then-Secretary of the Air Force, Mike Wynne. Schwartz was named to replace Moseley, and Mike Donley was brought in as Wynne’s replacement.
Although there were at least a dozen internal and external studies confirming 381 as the right number of F-22s, “I wanted an independent assessment to determine the minimum number,” Schwartz wrote, “and what we came up with” was 243 aircraft. Gates rejected that number too, “even though we had shaved over 35 percent off the Moseley/Wynne demand for 381,” Schwartz said. That difference of 60 airplanes would have cost “$13 billion at a time that defense budgets were being tightened,” and Gates wanted that money for “things like remotely piloted aircraft and MRAPs.”
Schwartz and Donley concluded “the F-22 debate had consumed enough oxygen and it was time to move on,” Schwartz said, and the two were “certainly not going to go to the Hill behind Secretary Gates’s back and lobby for more … That was never going to happen on our watch.” Schwartz acknowledged that some thought this “too pristine a judgement,” and that “anything in Washington is fair, but I say no. I had never been disloyal to a boss and I wasn’t about to start then.” Schwartz wrote extensively in the book about how Gates fought for Schwartz’ nomination to be Chief against congressional resistance.
Gates, in his own memoir, “Duty,” argued that the F-22 was useless in the Afghanistan and Iraq counterinsurgencies, was a Cold War relic, and that a Chinese stealth fighter wouldn’t be along until the 2020s, so nothing would be lost by killing it. In actual fact, the F-22 has been essential in the Syria campaign and China fielded its first operational stealth squadron in 2017. Every Air Combat Command chief since Gates tenure has warned that the F-22 force is far too small for the demands placed on it.
There was “a method to our madness,” Schwartz continued. “We felt that the real coin of the realm was the replacement bomber” and “we had our work cut out for us” convincing a “very skeptical civilian leadership” that the B-1 and B-52 would not last forever, that the B-2 fleet was too small, and that a replacement aircraft, in numbers, was urgentlyneeded.Gates terminated the Next-Generation Bomber—the project preceding what’s now known as the B-21—for what Schwartz agreed were “rational reasons.” The NGB “had grown too big” and was carrying too many missions and requirements. It was to have an air-to-air missile capability for self defense, Schwartz revealed, describing that requirement as “not completely nonsensical” but unaffordable. The attitude was that “cost was no object” on the NGB, Schwartz claimed, and that didn’t meet with Gates’ worldview, “So he cancelled it.”
In explaining the termination of the NGB to Congress and the press, Gates claimed that the B-2’s unit cost had swelled unreasonably and this is why it had been cancelled in its day, but that was exactly backwards. It was cutting the planned 132 B-2s to 20 that caused its unit cost to swell, because all of the research and development costs associated with it had to be amortized across a force less than a sixth as large as had been planned.
Nevertheless, Schwartz and Donley believed there was a “valid need” for a new bomber; an “unquestioned requirement” to provide such an option for a future president, “both for warfighting and deterrence purposes.” Schwartz and Donley had to convince Gates the Air Force “would not repeat the experience of the B-2.” They argued that USAF had to have 80-100 new bombers, and the service would swear to keep the cost as the prime consideration and not break a ceiling of $550 million in 2010 dollars. Moreover, they promised the aircraft would rely heavily on offboard sensors, jammers, and other capabilities to keep the cost down, as part of a system of systems.
“We had to convince him of all of this, or like the [NGB], the long-range strike bomber would be dead in the water,” Schwartz asserted. Ultimately, Gates relented, apparently persuaded that “we as an Air Force could field such a system with discipline.” Schwartz said he and Donley are proud of having “succeeded in persuading Gates” the B-21 would be pursued with “discipline like he had not seen, and so it’s up to our successors to deliver on that promise. The Air Force has to, if it is going to bring this one home.”
www.airforcemag.com
The top Air Force leadership went along with former Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ termination of the F-22 fighter—after producing less than half the required number—because they believed they couldn’t win the argument and that getting approval to build a new bomber was more important.
In “Journey: Memoirs of an Air Force Chief of Staff,” now in bookstores, retired Gen. Norton Schwartz said his predecessor, retired Gen. Mike Moseley, “never gave up in his principled attempts to get those 381 F-22s,” for which Gates fired Moseley and the then-Secretary of the Air Force, Mike Wynne. Schwartz was named to replace Moseley, and Mike Donley was brought in as Wynne’s replacement.
Although there were at least a dozen internal and external studies confirming 381 as the right number of F-22s, “I wanted an independent assessment to determine the minimum number,” Schwartz wrote, “and what we came up with” was 243 aircraft. Gates rejected that number too, “even though we had shaved over 35 percent off the Moseley/Wynne demand for 381,” Schwartz said. That difference of 60 airplanes would have cost “$13 billion at a time that defense budgets were being tightened,” and Gates wanted that money for “things like remotely piloted aircraft and MRAPs.”
Schwartz and Donley concluded “the F-22 debate had consumed enough oxygen and it was time to move on,” Schwartz said, and the two were “certainly not going to go to the Hill behind Secretary Gates’s back and lobby for more … That was never going to happen on our watch.” Schwartz acknowledged that some thought this “too pristine a judgement,” and that “anything in Washington is fair, but I say no. I had never been disloyal to a boss and I wasn’t about to start then.” Schwartz wrote extensively in the book about how Gates fought for Schwartz’ nomination to be Chief against congressional resistance.
Gates, in his own memoir, “Duty,” argued that the F-22 was useless in the Afghanistan and Iraq counterinsurgencies, was a Cold War relic, and that a Chinese stealth fighter wouldn’t be along until the 2020s, so nothing would be lost by killing it. In actual fact, the F-22 has been essential in the Syria campaign and China fielded its first operational stealth squadron in 2017. Every Air Combat Command chief since Gates tenure has warned that the F-22 force is far too small for the demands placed on it.
There was “a method to our madness,” Schwartz continued. “We felt that the real coin of the realm was the replacement bomber” and “we had our work cut out for us” convincing a “very skeptical civilian leadership” that the B-1 and B-52 would not last forever, that the B-2 fleet was too small, and that a replacement aircraft, in numbers, was urgentlyneeded.Gates terminated the Next-Generation Bomber—the project preceding what’s now known as the B-21—for what Schwartz agreed were “rational reasons.” The NGB “had grown too big” and was carrying too many missions and requirements. It was to have an air-to-air missile capability for self defense, Schwartz revealed, describing that requirement as “not completely nonsensical” but unaffordable. The attitude was that “cost was no object” on the NGB, Schwartz claimed, and that didn’t meet with Gates’ worldview, “So he cancelled it.”
In explaining the termination of the NGB to Congress and the press, Gates claimed that the B-2’s unit cost had swelled unreasonably and this is why it had been cancelled in its day, but that was exactly backwards. It was cutting the planned 132 B-2s to 20 that caused its unit cost to swell, because all of the research and development costs associated with it had to be amortized across a force less than a sixth as large as had been planned.
Nevertheless, Schwartz and Donley believed there was a “valid need” for a new bomber; an “unquestioned requirement” to provide such an option for a future president, “both for warfighting and deterrence purposes.” Schwartz and Donley had to convince Gates the Air Force “would not repeat the experience of the B-2.” They argued that USAF had to have 80-100 new bombers, and the service would swear to keep the cost as the prime consideration and not break a ceiling of $550 million in 2010 dollars. Moreover, they promised the aircraft would rely heavily on offboard sensors, jammers, and other capabilities to keep the cost down, as part of a system of systems.
“We had to convince him of all of this, or like the [NGB], the long-range strike bomber would be dead in the water,” Schwartz asserted. Ultimately, Gates relented, apparently persuaded that “we as an Air Force could field such a system with discipline.” Schwartz said he and Donley are proud of having “succeeded in persuading Gates” the B-21 would be pursued with “discipline like he had not seen, and so it’s up to our successors to deliver on that promise. The Air Force has to, if it is going to bring this one home.”
Schwartz, in Memoir, Says F-22 was Traded for B-21 Bomber | Air & Space Forces Magazine
Retired Gen. Norton Schwartz's “Journey: Memoirs of an Air Force Chief of Staff” is now in bookstores.
www.airforcemag.com
Oli syyt mitkä tahansa ja jumiutumatta kappalemääriin niin Raptor olisi ollut hyvä pohja päivittää konetta kuten F35 osoittaa ja Raptor 2.0:lle olisi varmasti käyttöä. Tai ehkä tämä vielä seuraavan sukupolven koneessa nähdäänkin.
Einomies1
Respected Leader
Tietääkseni Raptorin päivitettävyys ei ole helppoa. Paljon helpompaa on päivittää moderninpaa F-35:ä. Raptorin keskustietokone ja järjestelmät ovat 1980-1990-luvun vaihteen suunnittelua ja eivät kovinkaan avointa arkkitehtuuria. Esimerkiksi JHMCS ja AIM-9x lisääminen kesti todella kauan, vaikka blokkipäivityksiä on tehty jatkuvasti. Koneen ylläpito lienee turkasen kallista ja sen häivepinnan kunnostaminen on hidasta ja kallista.
Kone oli kylmän sodan suunnittelua ja sen piti hoitaa vain ilmaherruustehtäviä aluksi. Sitten huomattiin että monitoimisuutta tarvitaan enemmän ja kone sai JDAM-päivityksen. Nykyaika on enemmän F-35 tyyppisten monitoimikoneiden pelikenttää, eikä yhden tehtävän koneille ole oikein käyttöä.
Kyllä Raptor silti on omassa roolissaan(BWR) se paras toistaiseksi, ainakin paperilla. Sen käytettävyys sodassa on vain todella kapeata sorttia.
Eli F-22 lopetettiin koska paalu oli loppu. Se, onko paalu loppu yllättävästi kasvaneiden kustannusten, vai epärealististen hankintatoiveiden vai molempien johdosta ei käy ilmi näistä teksteistä. Tosiasia on, että rahan tuhlaamiselle alettiin pistämään stoppia.
Tuo kenraali on täysin sokea omille jutuilleen. Kaikki pitäisi saada ja kun ilmavoiminen projektit olivat osoittautuneet järjestään kalliimmiksi kuin oli suunniteltu, niin herra itkee kun kukkaronvartijat alkavat pistää hanttiin. Tuo kaverihan halusi siis B-2:ia lisää, F-22:sia lisää ja olisi ottanut sen NGB:nkin josta oli tulossa ilmeisesti aivan yhtä kauhea rahasyöppö kuin B-2:sta. Ja kaikki projektit ties kuinka paljon yli budjettien. Onko ihme, että tuolla saavutuslistalla aletaan hieman olemaan hallinnossa allergisia jatkuvalle rahan ruinaamiselle?
Tulee olemaan kovasti jännää nähdä pitääkö herran lupaus siitä, että B-21 tulee olemaan tiukasti hoidettu ja budjetissa pysyvä projekti paikkansa. Ainakaan itse hän ei sellaiseen saavutukseen organisaatiotaan saanut yltämään.