F-35 Lightning II

http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/~/media...ments/useful resources/the naval engineer.pdf
pdf-sivu 42.

"Squadron technicians experience new technical faults for the first time weekly. Most are as predicted by the designers; however technical faults still occur during flight where components did not perform as expected. This will continue to occur as the airframes and systems are exposed to growing number of flying hours and the flight envelope is expanded. New procedures are required to repair this type of damage"

Näillä koneilla ollaan komponentti ja materiaalirasituksen suhteen vasta hyvin alkuvaiheessa.
 
Niskanen Center kyseenalaistaa sopiiko F-35 Yhdysvaltojen asevoimien strategiaan.

https://niskanencenter.org/blog/the-f-35-and-the-disconnect-between-technology-and-strategy/

Lockheed_F-35_Joint_Strike_Fighter-1131x320.jpg

LOCKHEED MARTIN X-35, Joint Strike Fighter. Nears completion of flight testing at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif. The JSF is being built in three variants: a conventional take-off and landing aircraft (CTOL) for the US Air Force; a carrier based variant (CV) for the US Navy; and a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft for the US Marine Corps and the Royal Navy. (U.S. Air Force photo)

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015
THE F-35 AND THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY
BY JOSHUA HAMPSON

According to Lockheed’s dedicated F-35 website, the fighter plane was designed to “defeat today’s most advanced threat systems both in the air and on the ground,” and would provide “unprecedented capability.” Does it? The F-35 has faced intense scrutiny during its development and testing. The plane’s detractors say it is a massively expensive failure. Even the Pentagon has admitted to encountering major flaws with the F-35 in development and planning. However, many technical or tactical critiques fail to address the more important underlying issue: how does the F-35 tie into broader U.S. military strategy?

Technological improvements are useful only if they’re properly integrated into American strategy. The F-35 is supposed to increase the Pentagon’s capabilities. However, it appears that while the Air Force has been developing the F-35, its pilots have been losing some of the skills directly tied to its strategic mission.

During a panel at the Intelligence & National Security Summit, Major-General Linda Urrutia-Varhall admitted that the Air Force has become “rusty” in contested airspace. Pilots “know counterterrorism like the back of their hand. They do that well,” she said. “A2/AD? Not so much. We found that out when we went up against the competition in Syria.”

A2/AD, or anti-access/anti-denial capabilities, are designed to prevent planes from entering an airspace or, if entry occurs, to limit their freedom of movement and action. Urrutia-Varhall went on to say that 80 percent of Air Force personnel signed on after September 11, 2001 and have not needed to use counter-anti-access/area denial skills. The Major-General said that the Air Force was going to have to “re-teach some of this stuff on target … it’s not as easy.”

The F-35 was designed to be useful against advanced air defenses, but its radar-evading and -jamming technology may already have been compromised. Concerns over the F-35’s technical ability to penetrate contested air space are made more worrying given the revelation that Air Force pilots lack experience with counter-AS/AD maneuvering. What’s the advantage of a manned stealthy strike fighter if pilots are not ready to make the most of it? If the Air Force has had trouble operating in Syria, as Urrutia-Varhall admits, what problems might it encounter in contested Chinese air space?

Urrutia-Varhall’s confession highlights the disconnect between defense acquisitions and strategic planning. The Pentagon’s ability, or inability, to make accurate strategic predictions has been pointed out before. Richard Danzig, a directer for the Center for a New American Security, has explained how the accelerating pace of technological change have increased the DOD’s chances of making bad predictions. He argues that defense acquisitions must factor in the likelihood that strategies will need to shift during the lifetime of a program. In light of the Air Force’s new revelation, that need to plan for the unexpected is more pressing than ever.
 
Tetra kirjoitti:
Niskanen Center kyseenalaistaa sopiiko F-35 Yhdysvaltojen asevoimien strategiaan.

https://niskanencenter.org/blog/the-f-35-and-the-disconnect-between-technology-and-strategy/
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F-35 (ja tulevat häivekoneet) ovat olennainen osa sitä palettia jolla kehittynyt A2AD systeemi pyritään avaamaan. Ja vaikka tällä hetkellä USAF:n tehtävät ovatkin varmaan terroristiterojen pommittamista, niin kyllä myös kehittyneiden ilmapuolustusverkkojen uhka otetaan tosissaan. Ja uusia koneita ja aseita kehitetään tätä silmällä pitäen. USAF ei osta vanhoja legacy platformeja, vaikka se halvemmaksi tulisikin ja savimajojen pommittaminen onnistuu niilläkin, vaan siellä kehitetään uusia kyvykkäämpiä koneita ja aseita.

QOuY5Fd.jpg
 
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Kysehän ei varsinaisesti tainnut olla doktriinin puuttumisesta, vaan siitä, että pilottien aika taitaa mennä muihin tehtäviin kuin A2AD-vastaisiin harjoituksiin.
 
Bill Sweetmanin juttu Aviation Weekin maksumuurin takaa:

Norway has been considered one of the most reliable and consistent international partners in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, but substantial cuts to its planned 56-aircraft buy are among options in the nation’s current defense planning cycle.
The cuts may be included in the planning guidance that Norway’s chief of defense, Adm. Haakon Bruun-Hanssen, is expected to submit to the defense ministry on Oct. 1. These recommendations will form part of a White Paper to be delivered to Norway’s parliament next spring.

The principal concern is that Norway’s operating budget may not support such a large F-35 fleet. Norwegian national armaments director Morten Tiller confirmed to Aviation Week at the ComDef conference in Washington this week that the F-35 is expected to cost more to operate than the country’s F-16s, although program office director Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan said on the same occasion that the team is working hard to reduce costs and create an efficient worldwide support system.

Norway’s parliament has approved the purchase of 24 F-35s so far. Four aircraft are under contract and two are complete; the first one is to be formally unveiled in Fort Worth later this month before being delivered to the customer and joining a multinational training squadron at Luke AFB in Arizona.

In May, former Norwegian defense chief Sverre Diesen warned in the Aftenposten newspaper that, at current budget levels, the nation could maintain no more than 10-15 operational F-35s, resulting in “Norway’s largest investment scandal.” Other pressures on the defense budget include the renewed focus on operations in the Arctic “high North” region, which is causing priorities to shift toward replacing the air force’s P-3 Orion patrol airplanes and the navy’s six submarines. Norway has pledged to increase its defense spending to 2% of GDP, in common with other nations, but observers see little likelihood of an increase beyond the current 1.5% level.

Norway is also facing the possibility of paying the entire cost of integrating Kongsberg’s Joint Strike Missile on the F-35, Tiller said. Kongsberg teamed with Raytheon on JSM last year and had hoped for U.S. Navy interest in the weapon, which can be carried internally by the F-35A and F-35C. But the Navy’s near-term anti-ship weapon is the Lockheed Martin AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, carried by the Super Hornet. Norway expects the JSM to be part of the Block 4.2 upgrade package, which is close to its final definition stage. U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work visited Norway this week and met with Norway’s Secretary of State Oystein Bo.

The Saab Gripen NG was evaluated against the F-35 in Norway in 2008, but the U.S. made strong public and “even more forceful” private statements (according to WikiLeaks documents) in favor of the F-35 and Norway eventually declared that the F-35 was more capable and less costly than the Gripen. However, more recent Swedish and Norwegian budget estimates have shown that the 30-year life-cycle cost of Norway’s 56 F-35s is expected to be three times greater than that of Sweden’s 60 JAS 39Es.

Lockheed Martin and the JSF project office expect more than 250 international sales in the next five years, but only 30 are under contract.
 
Tetra kirjoitti:
Niskanen Center kyseenalaistaa sopiiko F-35 Yhdysvaltojen asevoimien strategiaan.
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Tuo on mielestäni "onko varaa" -kysymyksen jälkeen meilläkin tärkein arvioitava kysymys.
Julkisen tiedon pohjalta ei ainakaan vielä voida moista hyvin edes spekuloida (myös sen osalta mikä on kotimainen strategia ja järjestelmä 2025->).

Kuitenkin jotain voidaan arvioida. Esim. jos F-35:n operoinnissa taaempana tuleva 4(.5)G-koneet kuten Growler muodostuvat olennaiseksi osaksi doktriinia, niin miten käy kun meillä ei moista tilannetta voi toteuttaa ilman Natoa/Ruotsiliittoa?
 
Kyllähän omasta mielestä F-35 on/tulee olemaan parempi kone kuin Gripen NG. Mutta kuten yllä on mainittu, tuhannen taalan kysymys onkin se onko meillä siihen varaa.
 
Here’s what’s happening with Norway’s F-35s

http://blogg.regjeringen.no/kampfly/2015/09/11/norway-f35-whats-happening/

Long-term observer of the F-35, Bill Sweetman today published an article in Aviation Week stating that «Norway considers F-35 Order Cuts» and we wanted to provide a little more context to his article.

Last year our Minister of Defence, Ms. Ine Eriksen Søreide, initiated a new defence review process here in Norway, and as a result, on 1. October 2014, the Minister tasked the Chief of Defence, Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hanssen with providing what can best be translated as a «Formal Military Advice» to the Ministry that would inform a subsequent Long-Term Plan/White Paper, expected in 2016. The advice commissioned by the Minister is to be delivered on 1. October 2015, one year after it started, and will include a broad and detailed review of the entirety of the Armed Forces – including our future Combat Aircraft arm. Any review which did not include this capability, which will be central to our future Armed Forces, would of course be incomplete. Until the formal military advice becomes public, we will not be able to comment on its contents, but it goes without saying that the Armed Forces, as part of their work, have looked at any number of scenarios and options, and we would be very surprised if they had not also considered the F-35 among them. This is a completely normal process, carried out at regular intervals, and one that is mirrored in most other countries.

In terms of the additional cost for operating the future F-35-fleet compared to today’s F-16-fleet it is important to know that this is something we have been aware of for quite some time, and which has already been taken into account in our planning processes. It was also part of the information presented to Parliament when they approved the procurement phase of the F-35 as part of the current Long Term Plan in 2012.

Finally, regarding the JSM, we have already allowed for the cost of Norway having to pay for the full development and integration of the missile on the F-35 (as described in this article from last year). The Norwegian Parliament passed a bill to that effect in June 2014. The reason why we are willing to do so is quite simple – the missile is essential to our ability to deter any adversary from the use of force against Norway. In combination with the F-35, the missile offers even a smaller nation like Norway the ability to strike even well defended targets at range, a capability that we have never had before. And while it is true that no other parther has joined us yet in the development and integration of the JSM on the F-35, it is clear that this kind of capability is of interest to several nations, including Australia, which has already agreed to look for ways to support its development.

(PS: just to clarify, we are planning to buy 52 aircraft, and we have received authority to begin procurement of 22 of them.)
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Viimeksi muokattu:
Tossa on vaan se, Suomi tarvii parhaan mitä on saatavilla. Ei toiseksi tai kolmanneksi parasta vaan parhaan. Koska vastustaja on ylivoimainen.
 
http://warisboring.com/articles/we-...watered-down-the-f-35-to-avoid-embarrassment/ blogi on Freedom of Information Act lain avulla hankkinut tietoonsa miten F-35A:n IOC-kriteerejä on muutettu vuosien saatossa.

"On May 18, 2012, the U.S. House of Representatives dropped a figurative bomb on the U.S. Air Force. Fed up with delays and cost overruns on the U.S.-led international F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program — an ambitious effort to replace nearly all the thousands of jet fighters in the U.S. military and allied air arms with a single basic model — the House wrote language into the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act requiring the Pentagon to set deadlines for bringing the F-35 into service.
This was a problem for the Air Force’s Air Combat Command, which oversees most of the flying branch’s fighters and which had hoped to take a wait-and-see approach..."

2015-08-27_171547.jpg


Kun IOC:lle piti saada päivämäärä, kriteerejä piti höllentää reippaasti.
 
yrjö kirjoitti:
Tossa on vaan se, Suomi tarvii parhaan mitä on saatavilla. Ei toiseksi tai kolmanneksi parasta vaan parhaan. Koska vastustaja on ylivoimainen.
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Mäkin haluan Suomelle satelliitti tiedustelu järjestelmän ja Global Hawkit mutta ei ole rahaa... meille ei ole minkään näköistä iloa jos ostetaan lähes kymmenellä miljardilla koneita joita saadaan kourallinen ja joilla lentäminen on 2/3 kalliimpaa kuin grippenillä... Jos grippen NG pullahtaa linjalta ulos 2020 ja omaa sen ajan tekniikan pois lukien etusektorin stealthin ja sisäiset asekuilut mutta sillä lentäminen maksaa 1/3 siitä mitä F-35 ja flyway hinnan ollessa sama tai pienempi niin... Loppujen lopuksi ratkaisevaa on taktiikka jota käytetään... Ei meillä tule koskaan olemaan sellaisia resursseja että voisimme kuvitella tekevämme lentoja vihollisen syvyyteen...
 
magitsu kirjoitti:
Tuosta kannattaa ehkä unohtaa toi F-35 linkki ja nähdä asia yleisenä johtamis/ilmapiiriongelmana. Tästä on huikeasti esimerkkejä nähtävissä esim. vain vilkaisemalla läpi mitä John Q. Public -blogissa on kirjoitettu viime aikoina.
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Joo, tuo on kuplinut esiin viime aikoina. Kai sitä ongelmaa on kaikissa asevoimissa ylipäänsä. Mutta ilmeisesti F-35 on yksi hankala paikka jenkkilän asevoimien sisällä.

Nämä pari otetta ovat erittäin arvokkaita muistaa myös Suomessa.

Maj. Gen. James Post and the colonel who bullied me – were both fostering an environment that is hostile to divergent views. One incident might be dismissed as a fluke, but two might indicate a larger pattern of Air Force leaders taking steps to stop airmen from participating in public discourse. The problem is that such an environment quickly devolves into one that is hostile to thought entirely … and that has serious national security implications.

Insisting on intellectual conformity, discouraging divergent views or introducing barriers that over-filter unpopular ideas is the surest way for the military to lose credibility with the country we are supposed to serve.
 
yrjö kirjoitti:
Tossa on vaan se, Suomi tarvii parhaan mitä on saatavilla. Ei toiseksi tai kolmanneksi parasta vaan parhaan. Koska vastustaja on ylivoimainen.
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Suomi ei tarvitse tiettyä konetta, Suomi tarvitsee ns. "most bang for the buck". Tämä on todettu puolustusvoimain komentajan suulla, ja luotan enemmän hänen arvostelukykyynsä kuin foorumilla käytävään riitelyyn Gripenin tai F-35:n parhaudesta:

Mikä uuden hävittäjätyypin valinnassa painaa?

– Suorituskyky suhteessa hintaan eli kuinka paljon suorituskykyä sillä rahalla saa. Sotilaana minä tietysti vastaan, että sen pitäisi olla se määräävä tekijä, ja näinhän oli taannoisessa Hornet-kaupassakin. Ilmavoimat oli tehnyt tähän liittyvän pisteytyksen, ja paras suhdeluku oli Hornetilla.
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http://www.verkkouutiset.fi/kotimaa/1puolustusvoimain komentaja-37632
 
yrjö kirjoitti:
Tossa on vaan se, Suomi tarvii parhaan mitä on saatavilla. Ei toiseksi tai kolmanneksi parasta vaan parhaan. Koska vastustaja on ylivoimainen.
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Miten, jos otetaan ajatusleikki, että USA ottaisi F-22:den uudistuotantoon ja se tulisi Suomelle saataville (strateginen yhteistyö Venäjän naapurina tmv.), tulisiko Suomen valita sitten se?
 
Mustaruuti kirjoitti:
Miten, jos otetaan ajatusleikki, että USA ottaisi F-22:den uudistuotantoon ja se tulisi Suomelle saataville (strateginen yhteistyö Venäjän naapurina tmv.), tulisiko Suomen valita sitten se?
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Jos F-22 otettaisiin uudelleen tuotantoon, siihen luultavasti tehtäisiin parannuksia suhteessa vanhoihin versioihin. On myös luultavaa, ettei tuotantoa käynnistettäisi vain muutaman kymmenen tai sadan koneen tilausta varten. Iso tuotantomäärä taas laskee hintaa, joten aiempaa korkeampi teho ja aiempaa alhaisempi hinta voisivat tehdä hankinnasta järkevän.

Jos kuvaamasi kaltainen tilaisuus aukeaisi Suomelle, niin Suomelle aukeaisi varmaankin samalla FMF-rahahanat. Joten, miksipä ei? Toki, jos F-35 tarjoaa enemmän "bang for the buck", niin sitten ostetaan FMF-rahoilla ennemmin se.

Lopullinen vastaus: Most bang for the buck.
 
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