F-35 Lightning II

Vuonna 98 ero Drakenilla ja Hornetilla oli kuin yöllä ja päivällä. Sen näki ilman lentonäytöstäkin. En ole havainnut merkittävää eroa Hornetin liikehtimiskyvyn kehityksessä.

Se on silti totta, että ei tuo varmastikaan lopullista kuvaa antanut.

Mutta taas F-22 oli vaikuttava alusta lähtien. Esim. Tämä 2007.

Mutta, ei hutkita. Odotellaan lisää.

Ja kuten todettua F-35 on sitten muita avuja.



Tuo video laittaa perspektiiviin muun maailman vs. usa. Mitä tulee tekniikkaan. Tuotantolinjat on jauhanut ja jo suljettu aikaa sitten. Kiina esittelee omaansa puolen vuoden välein ja aina uudella Raptorin kaltaisella muutoksella, kun ovat saaneet taas uutta vakoiltua. Venäjästä ei kannata edes puhua. Täysin toisen keskustelun aihe on sitten se että oliko F-22 Usan suurin saavutus verrattuna muuhun maailmaan ja onko ne ajat jo takanapäin. Obaman aiheuttaman tuhon määrää on vaikea täältä arvata.
 
The F-35's flight plan appears to have delays written all over it. A previously unreleased memo from Michael Gilmore, the Department of Defense's director for Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), details a list of problems that will likely hold up the testing of the final configuration of the aircraft—and will mean the "Block 2B" aircraft now being delivered to the Marine Corps soon will continue to be full of software bugs for years to come. But officials with the F-35's Joint Program Office (JPO) have downplayed the seriousness of Gilmore's concerns, with one military member of the office taking to the Facebook page of a defense publication to call the memo "whining."

The concerns center largely on testing of software components—many of which the JPO has deferred to keep the program close to its schedule, and which JPO leadership has suggested would be a waste of time and money to fix now—since they are in interim releases of the F-35's systems and an entirely new set of software will be completed for the final version of the F-35. But with the Marine Corps and Air Force scheduled to fly as many as five F-35A and F-35B aircraft at the Farnborough International Air Show this summer, and production of the aircraft ramping up, so much uncertainty about the software could lead to even more complications down the road—particularly as weapons systems are added to the aircraft.

"The current 'official schedule' to complete full development and testing of all Block 3F capabilities by 31 July 31, 2017 is not realistic," Gilmore wrote in the memo dated from December, which was first obtained by Aviation Week. Making that schedule would require dropping "a significant number of currently planned test points, tripling the rate at which weapons delivery events have historically been conducted, and deferring resolution of significant operational deficiencies to Block 4"—a software upgrade the aircraft won't see until at least 2021.

Of particular concern to Gilmore was the F-35's "Autonomic Logistics Information System" (ALIS), which he said "continues to struggle in development with deferred requirements, late and incomplete deliveries, high manpower requirements, multiple deficiencies requiring work-arounds, and a complex architecture with likely (but largely untested) cyber deficiencies." ALIS is a system that spans from the aircraft itself to the entire supply chain for its maintenance and repair parts, and it includes portable computing gear required to check if the right parts are installed properly before flight. The software is still a work in progress, and testing of potential security vulnerabilities—which could potentially keep aircraft from being able to take off—has largely been deferred for now while Lockheed Martin and the JPO focus on getting the software to actually work as intended.

The Marine Corps' F-35B aircraft are being delivered with Block 2B software, which Gilmore said has "hundreds of unresolved deficiencies." And those problems have compounded in Block 3F software. That's because the first round of Block 3 was created by "re-hosting the immature Block 2B software…into new processors to create Block 3i," the initial release for the code, Gilmore noted. This led to "avionics instabilities and other new problems, resulting in poor performance during developmental testing."

And rather than fix Block 3i, the JPO made a "schedule driven decision," Gilmore said, to throw the final features for Block 3 on top of the buggy code to create Block 3F—the software that will be installed in full-rate production F-35s. The final release of Block 3F is scheduled for the middle of this year.
http://arstechnica.com/information-...re-overrun-with-bugs-dod-testing-chief-warns/

Mitä tapahtuu kun F35sen koneet kaatuu kesken lennon mahdolliseen bugiin?
 
Mitä tapahtuu kun F35sen koneet kaatuu kesken lennon mahdolliseen bugiin?
Sama kuin Gripenille? :)

Sama käynee kaikille uusille ja nykyisille taistelukoneille koska niissä on kaikissa paljon tietotekniikkaa. Gripenillä lienee paras score pudotetuista uusista koneista ja siltikin se rulettaa kovalla maineellaan!

F-35B lentonäytöksestä senverran että ihan samanlaista kaartoa se oli kuin JAS Gripen C:llä viime kesänä Turussa: mitään ihmeellistä ei siinä tehty kuin pelkkää jatkuvaa kaartoa eestaas.
Ohjelmaa ei voi verrata näyttävyydessä Suomi-Hornetin näytökseen edes samana päivänä koska se olisi sama kuin vertaisi 70-vuotiaitten ja 30-vuotiaiden seksisuoritusta.

Mutta, mutta, kyseessä onkin lentonäytös jossa esitellään temppuja eikä sotatanner. Gripenin kyvyt ovat varmasti ihan jossain muualla kuten F-35:n. Jos nyt jotain hyvää pitää välttämättä löytää taitolennosta niin ehkä F-35 ja Gripen kykenevät pidempään kaartoon kuin HN...?
 
Lockheed’s F-117 stealth fighter was developed in a breakneck 30 months by a close-knit team of 50 engineers led by an experienced fighter designer named Alan Brown and overseen by seven government employees. Brown said he exercised strict control over the design effort, nixing any proposed feature of the plane that might add cost or delay or detract from its main mission.

The F-35, by contrast, is being designed by some 6,000 engineers led by a rotating contingent of short-tenure managers, with no fewer than 2,000 government workers providing oversight. The sprawling JSF staff, partially a product of the design’s complexity, has also added to that complexity like a bureaucratic feedback loop, as every engineer or manager scrambles to add his or her specialty widget, subsystem or specification to the plane’s already complicated blueprints … and inexperienced leaders allow it.

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/fd...ds-worst-new-warplane-5c95d45f86a5#.xy3hiner3

Lainaus on vanhasta kirjoituksesta, jossa ei kirjoittajan omaa mielipidettä peitellä, mutta jotenkin tuo koko projekti on kauhistuttava esimerkki siitä kuinka valtion projekti on mahdollista kusta mahdollisimman pahasti pystyyn.

Mitä useampi kokki, sitä huonompi soppa
 
Sama kuin Gripenille? :)

Sama käynee kaikille uusille ja nykyisille taistelukoneille koska niissä on kaikissa paljon tietotekniikkaa. Gripenillä lienee paras score pudotetuista uusista koneista ja siltikin se rulettaa kovalla maineellaan!

F-35B lentonäytöksestä senverran että ihan samanlaista kaartoa se oli kuin JAS Gripen C:llä viime kesänä Turussa: mitään ihmeellistä ei siinä tehty kuin pelkkää jatkuvaa kaartoa eestaas.
Ohjelmaa ei voi verrata näyttävyydessä Suomi-Hornetin näytökseen edes samana päivänä koska se olisi sama kuin vertaisi 70-vuotiaitten ja 30-vuotiaiden seksisuoritusta.

Mutta, mutta, kyseessä onkin lentonäytös jossa esitellään temppuja eikä sotatanner. Gripenin kyvyt ovat varmasti ihan jossain muualla kuten F-35:n. Jos nyt jotain hyvää pitää välttämättä löytää taitolennosta niin ehkä F-35 ja Gripen kykenevät pidempään kaartoon kuin HN...?
Ei ole F 35:n kaartokyky samanlaista kuin Gripenillä. Sustained turn rate oli tuossa videossa 11,3 deg/s. Gripenillä se on 20 deg/s. Hornet jää näiden väliin. 2 deg/s pidetään merkittävänä erona.
 
Ei sillä ole hirveästi merkitystä minkälaista kaartoa tuossa esityksessä tehtiin. Merkittävää on millaiseen kaartoon kone pystyy.

F-35B ei pysty samaan kuin A/C mallit. Tämä varmaankin on tosi, muu on spekulaatiota. Kun tyypin eri mallit saadaan täyteen operatiiviseen valmiuteen voidaan varmaan sanoa paremmin (näin maallikkoina).
 
L
Ei sillä ole hirveästi merkitystä minkälaista kaartoa tuossa esityksessä tehtiin. Merkittävää on millaiseen kaartoon kone pystyy.

F-35B ei pysty samaan kuin A/C mallit. Tämä varmaankin on tosi, muu on spekulaatiota. Kun tyypin eri mallit saadaan täyteen operatiiviseen valmiuteen voidaan varmaan sanoa paremmin (näin maallikkoina).
Useissa artikkeleissa F35:n jatkuva kaartokyky ilmoitetaan juuri tälle alueelle (10-12) joka nähtiin tässä. Voi olla että se saadaan paremmaksi kun kaikki siihen vaikuttavat tekijät (control laws) saadaan optimoitua. Merkittävämpiä parannuksia saadaan kun moottoripäivitys (third channel) toteutuu. Tässä videossa nähdyt kaarrot ovat parasta mihin kone tällä hetkellä pystyy.
 
L

Useissa artikkeleissa F35:n jatkuva kaartokyky ilmoitetaan juuri tälle alueelle (10-12) joka nähtiin tässä. Voi olla että se saadaan paremmaksi kun kaikki siihen vaikuttavat tekijät (control laws) saadaan optimoitua. Merkittävämpiä parannuksia saadaan kun moottoripäivitys (third channel) toteutuu. Tässä videossa nähdyt kaarrot ovat parasta mihin kone tällä hetkellä pystyy.
Nuo koneet ovat siis ne ainoat 10 kpl F-35B koneita jotka luovutettiin viime heinäkuussa VMFA-121 "Green Knights" (Marine Fighter Attack Squadron) laivueelle. Koneissa oli luovutuksessa käytössä Block2B ohjelmisto joka ei ole lopullinen versio vaikka kone kykenee tiettyihin taistelutehtäviin.

En usko siis että kone näytti tai kykeni edes näyttämään lentonäytöksessä lopullisen suorituskykynsä.
 
Ehkä se on valmis vuoteen 2025 mennessä?

http://aviationweek.com/defense/test-report-points-f-35-s-combat-limits-0

Test Report Points to F-35’s Combat Limits
Jan 31, 2016 Bill Sweetman | Aviation Week & Space Technology

The Block 2B version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which the Marine Corps declared operational in July last year, is not capable of unsupported combat against any serious threat, according to Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation (DOT&E). In a 48-page annual project report to be published shortly, a copy of which was obtained by Aviation Week, the DOT&E states that “the F-35B Block 2B aircraft would need to avoid threat engagement… in an opposed combat scenario, and would require augmentation by other friendly forces.”

Most of the same limitations will apply to the U.S. Air Force’s initial operational capability (IOC) version, the F-35A Block 3i. “Since no capabilities were added to Block 3i, only limited corrections to deficiencies, the combat capability of the initial operational Block 3i units will not be noticeably different.”

The report is “factually accurate,” the F-35 Joint Program Office concedes in an official response, but “does not fully address program efforts to resolve known technical challenges and schedule risks.” Lockheed Martin said it endorsed the program office's views.

Giving more details on the software deficiencies mentioned in a December memo, Gilmore says 11 out of 12 weapon delivery accuracy (WDA) tests carried out during Block 2B developmental testing “required intervention by the test and control team to overcome system deficiencies and ensure a successful event,” Gilmore says that the F-35’s performance in combat “will depend in part on the operational utility of the workarounds” that were used in testing.

At the root of the difficulties in the WDA tests, Gilmore said, was that component tests in the run-up to the WDA events were focused “on contract specification compliance, instead of readiness for combat.” Those tests required only that the subcomponent should work. The actual WDA tests involved the entire kill chain and “highlighted the impact of deficiencies.” The F-35 program leadership altered some of them to achieve a “kill” – for example, by restricting target maneuvers and countermeasures.

Also, the Marines accepted several substantial flaws in their IOC standard, causing problems with the way that the “performance and accuracy of mission systems functions,” including the aircraft’s data fusion system and radar performance, were displayed to the pilot.

Specific technical problems continue to impose speed and maneuver limitations on the F-35, the report says. The weapon bay temperatures exceed limits during ground operations at on days warmer than 90-deg. F, and at high speeds below 25,000 feet, if the weapon bays are closed for more than 10 min. (The F-35 is not stealthy with the doors open.) On the F-35A, the time limit is applied at speeds from 500 to 600 kts, depending on altitude.

Heating issues were identified several years ago, but were said to have been addressed with a more efficient fuel pump and other changes: the F-35 uses the fuel as a heat sink to cool the airframe interior and systems, but runs short of cooling capacity under some circumstances. When Air Force operators at Luke AFB, Arizona, announced in December 2014 that they had painted fuel trucks white to reduce the heating problem, the program office stated: “This is not an F-35 issue. There are no special restrictions on the F-35 related to fuel temperature.”

All F-35s are currently subject to g restrictions with full internal fuel. This is due to a problem where air enters a siphon fuel line and causes pressure in an associated tank to exceed limits. A repair scheme is in the works.

Overall, the report says, “the rate of deficiency correction has not kept pace with the discovery rate” – that is, problems are being found in tests faster than they can be solved. “Well-known, significant problems” include the defective Autonomic Logistics Information System, unstable avionics and persistent aircraft and engine reliability and maintainability issues.

Combined with poor aircraft availability, this record leads DOT&E to conclude that the program cannot speed up flight testing enough to deliver Block 3F – the IOC standard for the Navy and export customers and the exit criterion for the systems development and demonstration (SDD) phase – on schedule. Block 3F developmental flight testing started 11 months late, in March 2015. The planned 48 WDAs in Block 3F – most of them more complex and challenging than the Block 2B weapons tests – cannot be accomplished by the May 2017 schedule date “unless the program is able to significantly increase their historic completion rate.”

Moreover, DOT&E predicts, the fleet of production-representative, instrumented aircraft required for initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) – the service-led testing that follows SDD and precedes the declaration of operational capability – will not be ready before August 2017. The IOT&E force will then use these for “spin-up” and training before IOT&E starts, which Gilmore does not now expect to happen before August 2018.

An essential element of IOT&E is a high-fidelity simulation of threats and scenarios too complex to be addressed in live testing. Gilmore has been warning for several years that the program’s own Verification Simulation (VSim) subsystem was flawed and behind schedule. In August 2015, in an unannounced move, VSim was cancelled outright (after $250 million in added investment from 2010 onwards) and will be replaced by a government-led Joint Simulation Environment. But this will not be ready in time for IOT&E, so testers will either have to skip those scenarios or add costly and time-consuming live tests to the program.
 
Vähän off-topic, mutta laitetaan tänne.

Sonic booms and condensation clouds (explained)

B-1_pensacola_show.jpg


http://theaviationist.com/2008/10/13/sonic-booms-and-condensation-clouds-explained/
 
Eli muuten täysin toimiva kone, mutta moottorin jäähdytys on vajaavainen jos on kuuma/lämmin ja aseet osuu maaliin, jos maali ei tee minkäänlaisia väistöliikkeitä?

Giving more details on the software deficiencies mentioned in a December memo, Gilmore says 11 out of 12 weapon delivery accuracy (WDA) tests carried out during Block 2B developmental testing “required intervention by the test and control team to overcome system deficiencies and ensure a successful event,” Gilmore says that the F-35’s performance in combat “will depend in part on the operational utility of the workarounds” that were used in testing.

At the root of the difficulties in the WDA tests, Gilmore said, was that component tests in the run-up to the WDA events were focused “on contract specification compliance, instead of readiness for combat.” Those tests required only that the subcomponent should work. The actual WDA tests involved the entire kill chain and “highlighted the impact of deficiencies.” The F-35 program leadership altered some of them to achieve a “kill” – for example, by restricting target maneuvers and countermeasures.
Specific technical problems continue to impose speed and maneuver limitations on the F-35, the report says. The weapon bay temperatures exceed limits during ground operations at on days warmer than 90-deg (32 C). F, and at high speeds below 25,000 feet, if the weapon bays are closed for more than 10 min. (The F-35 is not stealthy with the doors open.) On the F-35A, the time limit is applied at speeds from 500 to 600 kts, depending on altitude.

Heating issues were identified several years ago, but were said to have been addressed with a more efficient fuel pump and other changes: the F-35 uses the fuel as a heat sink to cool the airframe interior and systems, but runs short of cooling capacity under some circumstances. When Air Force operators at Luke AFB, Arizona, announced in December 2014 that they had painted fuel trucks white to reduce the heating problem, the program office stated: “This is not an F-35 issue. There are no special restrictions on the F-35 related to fuel temperature.”
 
http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2015/pdf/dod/2015f35jsf.pdf

Täysi raportti on julkistettu, tuttuun tapaan kovin hyytävää luettavaa

"Due to inadequate leadership and management on the part of both the Program Office and the contractor, the program has failed to develop and deliver a Verification Simulation"

Voisiko kyseessä olla laskelmoitu viivytys, jotta koneen vajavainen suorituskyky pysyy piilossa mahdollisimman pitkään?

Vastavetona:
"Therefore, to partially compensate for the lack of a simulator test venue, the JOTT will nowplan to conduct a significant number of additional open-air flights"

Heittoistuimesta:
"Services have decided to accept this level of risk to pilots in this weight range, although the basis for the decision to accept these risks is unknown."

Koneen pitäisi olla lentokiellossa tai ainakin alle 75kg lentäjät?

Pieni huumori keventää ilmapiiriä:
"The program lifted the restriction preventing the F-35B from flying within 25 nautical miles of known lightning prior to the declaration of IOC; however, the program has added a restriction from taxiing or taking off within 25 nautical miles of known lightning..."
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Nyt jo Australian Ilmavoimatkin hermostuu:

Australian Wing Commander: Sell Us New F-22s
Chris Mills wants America to export Raptors

Retired Royal Australian Air Force wing commander Chris Mills doesn’t like the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter that Canberra is buying from the United States. Noting the new plane’s sluggishness and poor results in simulated air combat against the latest Russian fighters, Mills has called for Australia to lobby the United States for F-22 Raptors.

It’s a problematic suggestion. The U.S. Congress banned export of the Raptor and would have to reverse its legislation in order to sell the plane abroad. Lockheed Martin shuttered the F-22 assembly line in Georgia in 2012, although the company did preserve the tooling. As recently as mid-January, U.S. Air Force secretary Deborah Lee James called another round of Raptor production “pretty much a non-starter” owing to the high cost — as much as $17 billion for 75 fresh aircraft.


Mills is undeterred. “Air combat is the most important single capability for the defense of Australia, because control of the air over our territory and maritime approaches is critical to all other types of operation in the defense of Australia,” Mills wrote in testimony he recently submitted to the Australian parliament.

The 100 F-35s Australia plans on buying will be “irrelevant” in air combat, Mills claimed.

Australia has lost regional air superiority in the past, Mills explained — and it can lose it again as China and other Southeast Asia countries acquire new jets. Mills wrote that his own experiences as a fighter pilot in the 1975 underscore his concern.

“I was flying an air combat mission in a Mirage near Butterworth, Malaya at the moment this happened,” Mills recalled. “The RMAF had re-equipped 12 Squadron with the F-5E Tiger, and invited RAAF’s 3 Squadron to a four versus four (mock) air combat engagement. Our lead was the squadron’s operations officer and I was his wingman. As we merged, it quickly became apparent that we were inferior: the F-5E [pilots] could out-turn and the Mirage [and] they had much more modern air-to-air missiles and a better gunsight. We could out-climb and out-run them, advantages useful for escaping, but not for killing the enemy. The F-5E had a very small cross-section, and was difficult to spot on radar or visually.”

Likewise, the Su-30s, Su-35s and other fighters that China, Malaysia, Indonesia and other regional countries are buying can fly farther and faster and haul more weapons than can Australia’s current F/A-18s and its future F-35s. A new “F-22C” — in essence a refreshed version of the current F-22 — is the only feasible counter, Mills asserted. Mills advised the United States, Australia and their allies together to acquire 420 F-22Cs then quickly develop a two-seat F-22E.

2016-01-31_174123-1024x383.png

“At a production rate of 100 per year, building this world-dominance fleet would require 4.2 years for the F-22[C] and a further six years for the F-22E.”

http://warisboring.com/articles/chris-mills-wants-america-to-export-raptors/
 
Mielenkiintoinen avaus, toivottavasti johtaa johonkin päätöksiin jenkkilässä.
 
Israelin f35 hankinnoista juttua:


ANALYSIS: F-35 revolutionises multi-role operations for IAF [MUCH MORE at the SOURCE]
01 Feb 2016 Arie Egozi

"The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has accelerated its preparations for the delivery of the first Lockheed Martin F-35I Adir at the end of the year.

The "Golden Eagle" squadron at the Nevatim airbase is working to be ready for the stealth fighter that in Israel is considered one of the main elements of the edge the IAF wants to have in any future war.

Major Ehud is the F-35 squadron project manager in charge of the preparations. He said the deployment of the F-35 in the IAF is no less than a revolution. "With its capabilities, it redefines the term multi-role aircraft,” Ehud says.

"We know even before the first aircraft lands in this base that it's a force multiplier. Two F-35s will do the work of larger formations, sometimes of different types. Its capabilities to locate targets and perform the best attack under different conditions are no less than an operational revolution.”...

...IAF fighter pilots have begun training on the F-35 at bases in the USA. These pilots will be the first to fly the aircraft in Israel and will instruct the others as more aircraft are delivered.

When the IAF decided to purchase the F-35, it made clear the preferred configuration will include an Israel-developed electronic warfare system, replacing the BAE Systems ASQ-239 Barracuda. This request was not accepted by Washington, but there are indications that after the stealth fighter arrives in Israel, “add-on" subsystems will be installed to give it the needed "special edge" based on the vast operational experience of the IAF in the Middle East.

The Israeli F-35s will also carry a unique communication system in the cockpit. The additional box will allow the F-35s to integrate with Israel’s recently deployed airborne network, which Rafael calls Ravnet-300 on the export market. Though in some ways comparable to the NATO-standard Link 16 system, Ravnet-300 operates significantly faster and allows more applications.

In December a contract for the purchase of another 14 Lockheed Martin F-35 (Adir) fighters for the IAF was signed in Washington.

The IAF and the ministry of defence wanted to purchase 31 F-35s but strong opposition in the Israeli cabinet limited the number in the new $2.82 billion deal. Instead, the new contract includes options for an additional 17 examples.

In 2010, Israel had already signed a deal to purchase 19 of the fighters.

Defence ministry sources say efforts will continue to purchase the additional number of the stealth aircraft that match the operational needs of the IAF.

The original plan was to deploy 75 F-35Is, replacing an ageing fleet of F-16A/Bs. Recent political dynamics could bolster the air force’s plans to buy more of the fighters. Last year, the Obama administration accepted terms on a nuclear deal with Iran over the objections of the Israeli government. In return, Tel Aviv expects to receive a “compensation package” from the US government. Indications suggest such a package will increase the number of F-35Is sold to Israel, perhaps nearing the air force’s original procurement plan...."

Source:https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... ns-421158/
 
Liitetäänpäs tämä huumoriteksti tähän:

Opinion
American Gripen: The Solution To The F-35 Nightmare
darchibald-43455411.png

David Archibald
Author, Twilight of Abundance

5:36 PM 01/22/2016
One thing that has helped keep the F-35 program going is a perception that there is no ‘Plane B.’ As Margaret Thatcher famously said,“There is no alternative.” No matter how bad the F-35 is, it is going to be built because the U.S. Air Force needs something to replace its worn-out fighters. That appears to be the fallback position in Lockheed Martin’s marketing plan for the F-35. The Department of Defence though is fully aware of the extraordinary cost of the F-35 relative to its performance and is looking to scale back its procurement. That could result in a death spiral as falling numbers send unit costs through the roof.

This figure shows U.S. Air Force fighter and light bomber procurement from 1975 with a projection to 2030:

Screen-Shot-2016-01-22-at-5.08.21-PM-620x402.png

Most of the fighter fleet was built in the fifteen years from 1977 to 1992. Then the F-22 came along a decade ago. While it is a fabulous fighter when it is flying, it is too costly to fly. The F-22 takes 42 man-hours of maintenance for each hour in the air. About half of those maintenance hours are taken with repairing its radar-absorbent-material (RAM) coating. Availability has risen to 63 percent. F-22 pilots are restricted to 10 to 12 hours in the air per month due to an operating cost of $58,000 per hour, the Air Force simply can’t afford more than that. Ideally pilots would get at least twice that amount of flying time in order to be fully proficient in their weapon system.

So restarting the F-22 production line to make good the fighter aircraft shortfall is not the ideal solution. Arguably the cost of the F-22 has wiped out half of the U.S. fighter fleet even before the Russians or Chinese have had a chance to attack it. Simply due to its cost, what was to be a 750-strong fleet stalled at 187 aircraft; of that number, only 123 are ‘combat-coded.’ After the 63 percent availability figure, that means that there is one modern fighter per every 4.1 million Americans. Of course that is not enough. The U.S. Air Force is considering buying more F-16 and F-15 fighters. That is not a solution either. As General Mike Hostage, former commander of Air Combat Command said,“If you gave me all the money I needed to refurbish the F-15 and the F-16 fleets, they would still become tactically obsolete by the middle of the next decade. Our adversaries are building fleets that will overmatch our legacy fleet, no matter what I do, by the middle of the next decade.”


Should We Restart The F-22 Production Line?
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The U.S. Air Force has been worshipping at the altar of stealth for over three decades, since the F-117 became operational in 1983. It was considered such a wonderful thing that it was deployed to South Korea in secret, only flew at night and so on. The F-117’s promise was borne out by its performance in Desert Storm in 1991. But things had changed by the end of that same decade. In Operation Allied Force against Serbia in 1999, one F-117 was shot down by a SAM battery and another was mission-killed by the same battery. The stealthy F-117 had a higher loss rate in that conflict than the F-16. It could only operate when it was protected by a pack of other aircraft.
Shaping provides 90 percent of the stealth of the invisibility cloak of a stealth aircraft with the remaining 10 percent coming from the RAM coating. The operational doctrine of the F-22 is based on the F-22 flying around without its radar on and not making any other electronic emissions either. At the same time it is vacuuming up the electronic emissions of enemy aircraft, triangulating their position and then pouncing at a time of its choosing. The world has moved on from that. Stealth, as practiced by the F-22 and F-35, is optimized on radar in the X band from 7.0 to 11.2 gigahertz. Detection in other parts of the electromagnetic spectrum has improved a lot over the last twenty years. Chief of these is infrared search and track (IRST) which enables an F-35 to be detected from its engine exhaust from over 60 miles away. The latest iteration of the Su-27 Flanker family, the Su-35, has IRST and L band radar on its wings. L band and lower frequency radars can see stealthy aircraft over 100 miles away. So an Su-35 can see a F-35 well before the F-35 can detect it. Stealth, as an end in itself, has outlived its usefulness, and maintaining that RAM coating is killing the budget for no good reason.

Right at the moment the U.S. Air Force is heading for a repeat to the start of World War 2 when its fighters got shot down by far better Axis aircraft. The qualitative edge in the small number of F-22s won’t save the day because they will be overwhelmed by the sheer number of Chinese Flanker variants, as per the RAND study of 2008. There is a solution but it means going overseas to get it. That has been done before. In the 1950s, the U.S. Air Force had the English Electic Canberra bomber built under license in the U.S. as the Martin B-57. It was a great design, illustrated by the fact that one B-57 was resurrected after 40 years in the boneyard in Arizona and used for battlefield communications in Afghanistan. Thirty years after the B-57, the Marine Corps fell in love with another UK aircraft, the Harrier, and had it built in the U.S. from 1985 as the McDonnell Douglas AV-8B.

The first F-35 to come off the assembly line was in 2006. That was ten years ago and, even though the F-35 is still years of from going into full production, it needs a $2.6 billion modernisation to upgrade its combat power. The solution to the F-35 nightmare first flew in 2008. This is the Gripen E of Saab in Sweden, updated from the original Gripen A of 1988. It is a delta wing with canards, likely the ideal planform for a single-engine air-superiority fighter. The last time the US Air Force had a delta-wing fighter was the Convair F-106 Delta Dart, retired in 1988. A promising effort that might have resulted in another delta-wing fighter was the F-16XL, a stretched version of the F-16 with a far greater range and bomb load. The F-16XL was sacrificed for the program that ultimately became the F-22.

Simulation has the Gripen E shooting down the Su-35 at almost the same rate that the F-22 does. The Gripen E is estimated to be able to shoot down 1.6 Su-35s for every Gripen E lost, the F-22 is slightly better at 2.0 Su-35s shot down per F-22 lost. In turn the Su-35 is better than the F-35, shooting down 2.4 F-35s for each Su-35 shot down. The Su-35 slaughters the F-18 Super Hornet at the rate of eight to one, as per General Hostage’s comment. How that comes about is explained by the following graphic of instantaneous turn rate plotted against sustained turn rate:

Screen-Shot-2016-01-22-at-5.09.51-PM-620x396.png

Turning, and carrying a gun, remains as important as it has ever been. Most missiles miss in combat and the fighter aircraft will go on to the merge. Assuming that pilot skill is equal, a 2° per second advantage in sustained turn rate will enable the more agile fighter to dominate the engagement. A high instantaneous turn rate is vital in being able to dodge the air-to-air missiles in the first place. The aircraft on the upper right quadrant of the graph will have a higher survival rate. The ones on the lower left quadrant will produce more widows.

The Gripen E has a U.S.-made engine, the GE F414, which is also the engine of the F-18 Super Hornet. The Swedish Air Force is buying its Gripen Es for $43 million per copy, less than one third of the price of the F-35. Its operating cost per hour is less than a tenth of that of the F-35’s. In fact it is the only aircraft that meets the selection criteria of the Joint Advanced Strike Technology program that spawned the F-35: that the acquisition and operating costs be not more than 80 percent of that of legacy aircraft.

Saab’s partner in the U.S. is Boeing, which will be without a fighter offering of its own once the F-18 Super Hornet production line in St Louis closes. It would be surprising if the two companies haven’t discussed bringing the Gripen to America. That would be good news for U.S. power projection in the Western Pacific, and for the families of U.S. airmen.

The story doesn’t end there. At the moment the Su-35 is the fighter to beat. It is almost as large as the F-22, with an empty weight of 18.4 tonnes and a maximum takeoff weight of 34.5 tonnes. Its fuel fraction of 38 percent gives it a combat range of 1,000 miles. The argument for having a large fighter aircraft is that physics makes larger aircraft more capable. Assuming that a smaller aircraft and a larger aircraft have a very similar lift to drag ratio, cruise at the same Mach number and have the same specific fuel consumption, the larger fighter will have about 40 percent better range. An inevitable consequence of the physics of flight is that long range aerial combat demands larger airframes and two engines, all other parameters being equal.

There is a role for a large, agile, twin-engined fighter aircraft in the Western Pacific. Apart from providing air superiority, such a platform would be ideal for delivering long range anti-ship cruise missiles. But this should not be a resurrected F-22. The F-22 program dates from 1991 when its prototype, the YF-22 produced by Lockheed Martin, won the fly-off competition against the YF-23 produced by Northrop, though the YF-23 was faster and stealthier. The U.S. Air Force awarded the contract to Lockheed Martin because it thought that Northrop would not be up to building the B-2 bomber and the new fighter at the same time. Given that the avionics of the F-22 are now over 25 years old, it would be a better outcome from here, for the long term, to go back to the YF-23 airframe and update its engines and avionics. This would produce an aircraft with a weight, acquisition cost and operating cost similar to that of the F-15. It would be as stealthy as possible from shaping without the expense, logistic footprint and low availability of maintaining a RAM coating. Northrop has been awarded the Long Range Strike Bomber program of 80 aircraft at $550 million each. Northrop’s bomber offering is an enlarged, subsonic YF-23. We also need the updated fighter variant.

David Archibald is the author of Twilight of Abundance (Regnery)

Tags: David Archibald, F-35, Gripen, Pentagon

http://dailycaller.com/2016/01/22/american-gripen-the-solution-to-the-f-35-nightmare/
 
. The latest iteration of the Su-27 Flanker family, the Su-35, has IRST and L band radar on its wings. L band and lower frequency radars can see stealthy aircraft over 100 miles away. So an Su-35 can see a F-35 well before the F-35 can detect it. Stealth, as an end in itself, has outlived its usefulness, and maintaining that RAM coating is killing the budget for no good reason.

Simulation has the Gripen E shooting down the Su-35 at almost the same rate that the F-22 does. The Gripen E is estimated to be able to shoot down 1.6 Su-35s for every Gripen E lost, the F-22 is slightly better at 2.0 Su-35s shot down per F-22 lost. In turn the Su-35 is better than the F-35, shooting down 2.4 F-35s for each Su-35 shot down. The Su-35 slaughters the F-18 Super Hornet at the rate of eight to one, as per General Hostage’s comment.
 
Lieneeköhän tätä juorua / arviota / advertoriaalia vielä esitetty foorumilla: http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/01/most-important-technology-f-35/125228/ eli otsikko "This is the most important technology of the F-35"
Nimittäin, jutussa arvioidaan että kun lentokoneen täytyy selvitä kilpajuoksussa digitaalisesti tuotettujen "kummallisten" tutka-aaltomuotojen kanssa, niin lentokoneen kannattaisi osata "kognitiivista early warningia" eli jotain oppivaa tilastopohjaista tekoälyä joka on yhtä nerokas kuin lepakon reaktiot.
Huom: myös Nebo-M mainittu, eli Venäjän ohjelmoitava tutkajärjestelmä.
 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary...s_Defence_and_Trade/Joint_fighter/Submissions

Mr Michael Price

"All other modern fighter aircraft are capable of operating either alone or in packages at effective stand-off ranges (40kms to 50kms and altitude differentials of 10k to 20k feet) against the JSF and maintaining that engagement zone boundary to the JSF such that the JSF is the proverbial 'sitting duck‘ in a 3D barrel with not enough speed to engage or disengage, nor enough altitude to attain tactical combat superiority."

"The JSF was not designed to be, nor will ever be, a capable all-rounder – it is an unsuitable platform to prosecute air to air superiority over any peer competitor, now and into the foreseeable future. The only thing that has changed since we designed and built those simulations is that the real performance of the JSF has deteriorated relative to its JORD specification,"
 
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