Kaksi oikein mielenkiintoista ja yllättävän avointa väistyvän JPO:n johtajan Chris Bogdanin haastattelua.
Ensimmäinen käsittelee L&M:n ja JPO:n epäluuloista ja vaikeaa suhdetta toisiinsa. Tämä kertoo olennaisen:
Five Years Later, F-35 Relationship Better, But Trust Still Elusive
http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2017/May 2017/Five-Years-Later,-F-35-Relationship-Better,-But-Trust-Still-Elusive.aspx
Toisessa Bogdan kertoo projektin tulevaisuudelle vaarallisimmista ongelmista ja niiden selättämisistä
Turning Points Convinced Bogdan F-35 Would Succeed
http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2017/May 2017/Turning-Points-Convinced-Bogdan-F-35-Would-Succeed.aspx
Moottoripalo:
The fire was “a very big deal and it happened at a very bad time,” Bogdan recalled. The accident resulted in major damage to the one aircraft, forced a grounding of the fleet, and embarrassingly cancelled the F-35’s premiere at the Farnborough Air Show, then only days away. It was “the only time on the program … where we were, no kidding, at least in the (Joint Program Office), working 24-7 … seven days a week,” he said.
Ongelmat kypärässä:
The helmet has had six different issues over the last five years, and Bogdan said one of his “out on a limb” decisions was to break with the plan of his predecessor, Vice Adm. David Venlet, to spur a solution by creating a competitive, alternative source for the helmet.
“I cancelled the second program … for a couple of reasons,” Bogdan explained. First, “I did have some confidence” that the helmet was going to be corrected. But he was also “putting my chips” on helmet contractors Rockwell and Elbit, and they knew it, and that told them “they better get this solved.”
Bogdan said putting this confidence in the helmet team “changed their attitude, a little bit,” and “it helped them come up with better solutions.” It was “an important turning point” on the program because most observers don’t realize “how important the helmet is to this airplane … It’s another sensor. It’s another part of the weapon system,” said Bogdan.
Pysäytyskoukkukatastrofi:
Finally, the arrestor hook was critical because “from the Navy’s point of view, if you cannot land safely on an aircraft carrier, you don’t have a ‘C’ model.” In initial tests, “we couldn’t trap anything—we couldn’t grab a hook on the ground” and “we were worried.” The solution was developed by Fokker, the builder but “not the full design authority” on the hook.
“It’s a credit to Lockheed that they let us” hand over redesign authority to Fokker and “together we worked with Fokker to redesign that hook.” Yet again, “I thought, ‘hmmm, pretty good,’” Bogdan said.
Kaatuiluherkät ja bugiset 3i ja 3F softat:
Perhaps most compelling to Bogdan has been success in fixing the 3i and 3F versions of the F-35’s software. With the 3i version—which now equips USAF’s first operational squadron at Hill AFB, Utah—“the stability … was really bad,” he acknowledged. “We were getting radars turned off, we were getting sensors shutting down, we were getting timeouts on the ground, guys were having to ‘cold iron’ the airplane,” meaning that the whole jet—all systems, including engines had to be shut down—“kind of like … pulling the plug on your computer” to reboot the software. This might have to be done “two or three times to get it airborne.”
As a result, Bogdan decided to halt testing on 3F, the ultimate baseline software build. He said “we need to focus every effort, every person who has a role in mission systems software—the BAEs, the Lockheed guys, the radar guys, the sensor guys—forget 3F for now, we’ve got to fix 3i. Because if you don’t get 3i right, you don’t get 3F.” There was “lot of pushback from industry,” Bogdan said, because “they were worried about timelines and completing the program, and costs.” But if 3i went bad, Bogdan was convinced, “the program would flounder forever.”
A Red Team was brought in, and experts from other services and even some competitors, “believe it or not, with a non-disclosure agreement, and showed them some things. Some of the things they already knew.” Bogdan said, “Credit to Lockheed Martin that they were willing and open to bring in experts from outside [the company] to help look at this.”
Collectively, “we got the stability of the software much, much better. And we put a disciplined process in place to ensure that everything we learned on 3i was going to transfer to 3F … We weren’t going to walk down a path where we were going to add a capability to the software at the expense of stability.”