RPG83
Soome Majori
Hyvä pointti. Muistan Libyan pommituksissa nähneeni Typhoonista kritiikkiä. Ilmeisesti joutuivat ottamaan Tornadon kaveriksi maalittamaan, mikä jonkin verran kömpelöitti toimintaa. Samaan aikaan ranskalaisten Rafalet hoitivat oman leiviskänsä tyylikkäästi. (Vielä tukialus Charles de Gaullelta. Oli siinä varmaan vanhalla merimahti Britannialla parrassa pureskelemista kun vierestä katseli.)
Olisiko tälle antaa tarkempia lähteitä? Itse olen lukenut lähinnä hyvää Eurofighter Typhoonin uudemmista painoksista.
Sivu 10 LESSONS OFFERED FROM THE LIBYA AIR CAMPAIGN:
ATTACK: FOURTH GENERATION
FIGHTER PERFORMANCE
Tornado, Typhoon and Rafale — winds of change
Prior to operation ELLAMY, the RAF’s Typhoon FGR4 had an air-to-air focus with the longer term intention of developing it into a multi-role fighter. Its deployment to theatre was initially for air defence but it was rapidly cleared to deliver air-to-surface weapons as well. Tornado GR4 remained the lead in that respect (regarded by some as the Coalition’s attack platform of choice) owing to its greater variety of weapons, the maturity of its systems and the extensive ground-attack experience of the Tornado force. However, Typhoon’s initial attack capability proved to be most effective so ably complementing Tornado.
The decision to re-activate the FGR4’s dormant air-to-surface capability was made on 31 March, the first multirole sortie was flown seven days later and the first weapon release made five days after that. This was remarkably fast given the complexity of the aircraft and the demands on the support system arising from the high operational tempo.
A mixed pair with the third generation Tornado leading the fourth generation Typhoon was the standard team, thus limiting the use of the Typhoon’s fourth generation aircraft performance, although occasionally it could employ this remarkable performance to good effect. On one occasion a pair was tasked with reaching a possible target 400 miles away “as fast as possible”. The Tornado, already carrying 9,000lb of fuel, set off at once. The Typhoon refuelled (after a five minute wait) and then transited high and supersonic, reaching the target location simultaneously with the Tornado and with a similar on-task time available.
Typhoon proved surprisingly reliable achieving a 99% availability rate, somewhat higher than the considerably more
mature Tornado. The number of ground crew per aircraft for Typhoon was only 70% that of GR4. In over 3,000 flying hours there was only a single Typhoon engine change and that was precautionary after ingestion of some debris from an AAR drogue — the engine turned out to be undamaged. It was notable that both Tornado and Typhoon went through the campaign without a single urgent operational requirement (UOR) being raised; they were able to cope with a demanding operation using the systems and weapons already provisioned. The cost of UORs is often considerable not only in the initial procurement but also after the operation is over. To take such a system into the core programme is expensive as the whole life cost must be met for a system against which there is no budget provision. To discard it means that its single use was extremely expensive.
The sustainability of complex aircraft when deployed remains a challenge despite the years over which GR4 (and Harrier GR9) has operated in Afghanistan. Operating from a well found base such as Gioia del Colle is one thing; an austere base is more difficult while a bare base will be very challenging. In this respect, carrier aviation has much to offer. The carrier itself is a well found base and one that can be deployed to any scenario with a coastline. While expensive to buy and to operate, that must be compared to the cost of deploying land based air to a host nation and sustaining it there. While a carrier can scale the degree of its presence in theatre and withdraw readily, deploying an air wing to another country arguably involves greater overt political commitment. The decision to deploy will be made more reluctantly but once made the decision to withdraw may be delayed owing to the possible connotation of retreat.
S. 11 (sama dokumentti):
Minusta vaikuttaa siltä, että Typhoon oli täysin kykenevä kone ilmasta-maahan hyökkäyksiin, mutta esimerkiksi maalinosoitusta koskien löytyy taktisesti järkeviä syitä, miksi Tornado-Typhoon -koneparin Tornado tekisi sen:THE KINETIC CAMPAIGN: FAST JET AND ATTACK HELICOPTER
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In seven months of 24/7 operations,
RAF Tornados flew 8,000 hours and released around 1,200 weapons. A typical weapon load was two Paveway IV (PWIV) laser/GPS guided bombs, a LITENING III TDP and three DMS Brimstone missiles. Up to five PWIV could be carried but at the cost of the TDP so making the aircraft reliant on cooperative designation or using the weapons on GPS guidance alone. The PWIV fuze delay could be set in the cockpit so allowing optimum engagement of targets of opportunity. In short, it was a highly flexible and effective weapon system.
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A) Tornadon lentäjällä on asiasta enemmän kokemusta
B) Kuljettamalla vain yksi maalinosoitussäiliö koneparin kesken mahtuu mukaan enemmän muuta hyödyllistä kuormaa, kuten polttoainetta ja aseita