Niillä tytärammuksilla itsekin ajattelin ne tuhota mutta niitä vastaan noita tykkitorneja voikin suojata pienin panostuksin, mitä kuormauksia niillä on kun tunnet nuo uusimmat ohjukset ja raketit?
Meritaisteluohjukset ja tykistö
- Viestiketjun aloittaja Einomies1
- Aloitus PVM
Niillä tytärammuksilla itsekin ajattelin ne tuhota mutta niitä vastaan noita tykkitorneja voikin suojata pienin panostuksin, mitä kuormauksia niillä on kun tunnet nuo uusimmat ohjukset ja raketit?
Huhta
Greatest Leader
Kiitos tunnustuksesta! Tosiaan tunnen ne paremmin kuin tiedän.
Venäjänkielinen Wikipedia kertoo Iskander-artikkelissa tytärammuskärjistä, että yhdellä katetaan n. 15 000 neliömetriä eli kaksi jalkapallokenttää (naurahdin, kiteyttää hyvin siviiliuhrien merkityksen Venäjälle). Tosin samassa huomautetaan, että FAE- ja monitoimisirotteilla alue on merkittävästikin pienempi.
Valikoimaan kuuluu mm. herätteellä n. 10 metrin korkeudessa maanpinnasta räjähtävät sirpaleammukset. Näitä tytärammuksia on ilmeisesti 54 per ohjus.
Sitten on olemassa panssariin hakeutuvia tytärammuksia sisältävä variantti. Tytärammus on SPBE-D.
Myös termobaarinen tytärammuskärki löytyy, ylittää ODAB-500P -lentopommin suorituskyvyn. Lisäksi on olemassa panssarimiinoja ja henkilömiinoja levittäviä taistelukärkiä.
Meitä kuitenkin kiinnostaa perinteisempi, hieman läntistä DPICM:ää muistuttava tytärammus PTAB-2.5KO. Se sirpaloituu ja laukaisee pienen ontelopanoksen osuessaan esim. vaunun (tai tykkitornin) katolle. Painoa tytärammuksella on pari kiloa. Läpäisy on useita senttejä terästä.
Kalibr-risteilyohjuksissa ei ole tytärammuskärkeä lainkaan. Kh-101:stä väitetään monissa lähteissä, että siihen olisi tytärammuskärki. Kuitenkaan kaikki eivät ole vakuuttuneita, mm. AirForces Monthly -lehden päätoimittaja twiittasi, että hänen tietääkseen ohjuksesta ei ole tytärammusversiota. Kh-59M:stä sellainen versio olisi venäläisen Wikipedian mukaan, mutta englantilainen on skeptinen ko. version kehitysasteesta ja palveluskäytöstä (tosin toinen lähde on vuodelta 2000 ja toinenkin vuodelta 2007). Kehitteillä olevasta (mm. PAK FA:n alla lennätetty) Kh-59MK2:sta on tytärammusversio, näin ainakin Global Securityn ja RUAviationin mukaan.
Alkaa siis kuulostaa vahvasti kebab-hommilta.
Raveni
Greatest Leader
Tuhottu = kyvytön jatkamaan tehtävää. Ei tuhoaminen tarkoita lähtökohtaisesti sitä, että purkki täytyy saada pinnan alle. kyllä tuollainen ohjuksen osuma sopivassa kohtia lentotukialusta äkkiä tekee sen, että telakka kutsuu jolloin se alus on pois toiminta-alueelta.Vahinkoa varmasti tekee osuessaan, tuurilla rampauttaakin, mutta fysiikan lait kuiskuttelevat korvaani, iivanan hieman liioittelevan väittäessään että se tuhoaa lentotukialuksen
Leaderwolf
Respected Leader
Catastrophic kill ja mission kill ovat eri asia. Tuhota viittaa mielestäni ensimmäiseen.
Raveni
Greatest Leader
Saattaa olla. Loppu tulos on kuitenkin sama. Vihollisen suorittama tehtävä ja tavoite keskeytyy ja sen on mietittävä homma uusiksi.
Kun laivoista on kyse, niin Catastrophic kill ja uponnut alus eivät ole synonyymejä.
Einomies1
Respected Leader
Kuinka paljon ja mitä ilmatorjuntaa meillä on asettaa suojaamaan noita kiinteitä pattereita? Onko siinä paljon järkeäkään, kun niiden paikat on jo tiedossa ennen sotaa?
Ilmeisesti tykit on suojattu häivemateriaalilla ja niiden varustuksena on soihtuja/silputuslaitteita jo nyt. Ainakin näin luin Tk100:n kohdalla olleen.
Jos Glonass-häirintää ja noita heitteitä käytetään, niin saataisiin jo kohtalainen suoja tykeille. Se tarkoittaa että vastapuoli joutuisi uhraamaan enemmän aikaa ja resursseja tykkien vaimentamiseen ja samalla ehkä lisäisi sen tappioita.
Itänaapurin ohjukset käyttävät kuitenkin pääasiassa tutkahakua ja sitä on helpompi häiritä kuin IR-päätä. Pelkkä IR-pääkään ei riitä, vaan ohjuksessa pitää olla älyä kuten NSM:ssä (ATR-kyky).
Sanoin että ne pääosin sijaitsevat alueilla joilla on muutenkin todennäköisesti ilmatorjuntaa, Suomenlahti on vähän sellaista seutua.
Kiva tieto tuo harhamaaliheitteiden käyttö, olen entisestäänkin vakuuttunut linnakkeiden arvosta.
Kustaanmiekka
Kenraali
Lisää harjoittelua rannikkotykeillä.
Rannikkotykistöpatterin varusmiehet juhlivat Puolustusvoimain lippujuhlapäivää työn merkeissä.
Merisotaharjoitus#Silja on suurelle osalle osallistuvista varusmiehistä koulutuksen huipennus, jonka jälkeen on hyvä kotiutua osaksi vahvaa ja motivoitunutta reserviä. Tulta!
Alla olevassa videossa on harvinaisempaa kuvaa toiminnasta tornin sisäpuolelta itse ammunnan aikana.
Rannikkotykistöpatterin varusmiehet juhlivat Puolustusvoimain lippujuhlapäivää työn merkeissä.
Merisotaharjoitus
Alla olevassa videossa on harvinaisempaa kuvaa toiminnasta tornin sisäpuolelta itse ammunnan aikana.
Hanski
Ylipäällikkö
Alkuperäinen MTO-pattereiden ajoneuvo oli rungoltaan jatkettu Rasi-Sisu. Tällä oli ongelmia rungon vääntymisherkkyyden kanssa ja aika pian MTO-patterit saivat nämä alemman kuvan neliakseliset Sisut. Rasit ovat jatkaneet elämäänsä uudelleen lavoitettuna muiden Rasien kanssa, ainoastaan pituudesta erottaa, että kyseessä on poikkeava ajoneuvo.
EDIT vielä: MTO-patterit olivat 1980-luvulla (ihan aiheesta) puolustusvoimien ylpeydenaiheita ja tämä yllä oleva kuva esiintyi monessa yhteydessä. Ohjuslavetteja myös esiteltiin julkisuudessa tiiviisti, minäkin muistan nähneeni Rasi-alustaisen lavetin jossain tapahtumassa. Alustat muuttuivat neliakselisiin Sisuihin varmaan jo 1990-luvun alussa ja sen jälkeen näitä ei ole enää niin paljon esitelty julkisuudessa, lähinnä ehkä merivoimien tapahtumissa. Pääkaupunkiseudullahan näitä näkee varsin usein myös arkiliikenteessä.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Huhta
Greatest Leader
Onko MTO-patterit hankittu kerralla vai useassa erässä? Ts. jouduttiinko muutostyö tekemään kaikkiin 8(?) ajoneuvoon?
Hanski
Ylipäällikkö
Taisi ne aika kerralla tulla.
Einomies1
Respected Leader
Tyler Rogoway kirjoittaa miten hypoteettisesti uusin RGM-109 Maritime Tomahawk toimisi ASM-roolissa. Kirjoituksessa sivutaan lopussa myös LRASM:n roolia häiveohjuksena vs. Tommy. LRASM todennäköisesti käyttää samantyyppistä teknologiaa.
The Tactical Tomahawk Block IV, otherwise known as the "TacTom," is a 'netted' weapon, in that it can receive mid-course targeting updates, or even re-targeting commands, mid-flight. It can also be told to fly around 'pop up' air defense threats making it more survivable when it comes to operating in air space defended by an advanced integrated air defense systems. It can also throttle back its engine and loiter, prolonging its flight time as it searches for targets or as third party sensor systems try and find it a target. These third party sensor platforms include fighter jets, maritime surveillance aircraft, such as the P-8 Poseidon and especially unmanned aircraft like the Navy's MQ-4C Triton, ships, satellites and potentially even other Tactical Tomahawks.
Here is a theoretical example of how a further developed TacTom could be used against a ship during battle:
A MQ-4C Triton, the Navy's broad area maritime surveillance cousin of the RQ-4 Global Hawk, could be orbiting at 60,000 feet and some 500 miles in front of an American Carrier Strike Group. At the edge of its radar range, the MQ-4C detects a target 200 miles away, some 700 miles from American naval assets. The MQ-4C can use its inverse synthetic aperture radar to identify and classify the radar target it sees. It is deems it is an enemy frigate belonging to the enemy.
Still far outside that frigate's air defenses, the MQ-4C's mission commanders on the ground thousands of miles away contact the nearby US Navy Carrier Strike Group and tells them that they are tracking a hostile enemy target 700 miles from their position. The Carrier Strike Group's commanders quickly put an attack plan together, deciding to launch a pair of TacTom at the target due to its extreme range from the Carrier Group and close proximity to enemy shores.
A DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyer, operating at the forward edge of the Carrier Strike Group due to its stealthy design and sensor fusion abilities, ripples off a pair of TacToms in the direction of the enemy frigate. Keep in mind, that the distance between it and the enemy are the same distance between New York and Chicago.
The missiles makes their way toward the target, with a flight time of an hour and a half in front of them. They have been programmed to accept mid-course targeting updates via satellite from the MQ-4C Triton that is orbiting between their launch point and the target itself. After an hour of flight time, the TacToms are closing in on their target but they passively sense an enemy surface to air missile battery coming online on an island near their flight path. The MQ-4C Triton also senses the SAM site's search radar coming online. This information is relayed to the DDG-1000 that fired the Tomahawks well over an hour ago. Mission commanders in the ship's war room like Ship's Mission Center quickly order the missiles to fly around the outer engagement range of the SAM system, so that they are not detected or engaged.
As the missiles navigate at a safe distance around the enemy held island, controllers aboard the DDG-1000 order the TacToms to split up, with one loitering while the other makes a wide question mark shape path around the targeted frigate. This tactic will put the two missiles at an equal distance on opposite sides of the enemy ship, and with precise timing, the missiles will make simulations attack runs on the ship from completely opposite vectors. This makes defending the ship much more complicated and should overwhelm its air defense system operators.
It takes an extra 20 minutes for the TacTom to skirt the edges of the ship's defenses, but now, with both missiles at an equal distance from the target. They both drop down to very low altitude, just feet above the ocean, to make their final attack run on the enemy Frigate. Using their passive seekers, they begin to detect radar and other electromagnetic emissions emanating from the ship, which match the type of target the MQ-4C classified as hostile.
Once the missiles both crest the horizon from opposite directions, one of their milimetric wave radar seekers goes active and locks onto the ship. The ship tries to jam the missile's active seeker but it hops frequencies wildly. Both missiles are also feeding on the ship's own electromagnetic emissions for backup final targeting solution data. Like a fly in a spider's web, the more the ship tries to repulse the attack using jamming, the more directional energy the missiles have to 'feed on' for targeting.
With still only one of the missile's seekers being active, and its targeting data now being fed to the other missile, the ship's defenses are focused on just the active homing TacTom as it comes barreling over the horizon, the other staying silent as not to alert the crew. Just two miles out, the ship's close in weapons system activates, spraying the active homing TacTom with tungsten perpetrators. The missile detonates just 500 yards off the ship's port side. The moment the TacTom with the active seeker goes quiet the silent TacTom approaching from the opposite side goes active. There is not enough time for the CIWS to engage it.
Just before slamming into the enemy ship, the missile's seeker takes a raw millimeter-wave radar 'picture' of its target and transmits it back to its controlling DDG-1000 destroyer. It will be used to assess the TacTom's deadliness as well as to provide a final 'proof of target attacked' for intelligence officers. The missile strikes the ship's superstructure at close to 500mph, detonating its massive warhead while careening through the spine of the ship, blowing the superstructure apart like a firecracker placed inside a tin can.
The MQ-4C, which has been moved closer to the targeted ship during the Tomahawks' mission, does not detect any more threats in the area and its controllers order it to descend down to two thousand feet to take full motion video of the burning ship with its MTS-B multi-spectral targeting system. This video is data-linked via satellite back to the DDG-1000 and the Carrier Strike Group. Within an hour the ship is totally engulfed in flames and listing heavily. Intelligence classifies the ship as a total loss.
Although this situation is hypothetical, it gives some kind of idea as to what a new and improved Tomahawk is capable of. Regardless of what new brains and sensors are packed inside, the Tomahawk lacks a stealthy airframe, which leaves it vulnerable to detection against an enemy with an advanced air defense network. Nor can it be launched by fighter-sized aircraft. This, along with an even more intelligent suite of passive and active sensors, has given Lockheed's Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) a leg up when it comes to the Navy's next anti-ship missile, and LRASM's capabilities continue to rapidly evolve.
https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/this-chase-planes-view-of-a-tomahawk-striking-a-ship-is-1684902149
The Tactical Tomahawk Block IV, otherwise known as the "TacTom," is a 'netted' weapon, in that it can receive mid-course targeting updates, or even re-targeting commands, mid-flight. It can also be told to fly around 'pop up' air defense threats making it more survivable when it comes to operating in air space defended by an advanced integrated air defense systems. It can also throttle back its engine and loiter, prolonging its flight time as it searches for targets or as third party sensor systems try and find it a target. These third party sensor platforms include fighter jets, maritime surveillance aircraft, such as the P-8 Poseidon and especially unmanned aircraft like the Navy's MQ-4C Triton, ships, satellites and potentially even other Tactical Tomahawks.
Here is a theoretical example of how a further developed TacTom could be used against a ship during battle:
A MQ-4C Triton, the Navy's broad area maritime surveillance cousin of the RQ-4 Global Hawk, could be orbiting at 60,000 feet and some 500 miles in front of an American Carrier Strike Group. At the edge of its radar range, the MQ-4C detects a target 200 miles away, some 700 miles from American naval assets. The MQ-4C can use its inverse synthetic aperture radar to identify and classify the radar target it sees. It is deems it is an enemy frigate belonging to the enemy.
Still far outside that frigate's air defenses, the MQ-4C's mission commanders on the ground thousands of miles away contact the nearby US Navy Carrier Strike Group and tells them that they are tracking a hostile enemy target 700 miles from their position. The Carrier Strike Group's commanders quickly put an attack plan together, deciding to launch a pair of TacTom at the target due to its extreme range from the Carrier Group and close proximity to enemy shores.
A DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyer, operating at the forward edge of the Carrier Strike Group due to its stealthy design and sensor fusion abilities, ripples off a pair of TacToms in the direction of the enemy frigate. Keep in mind, that the distance between it and the enemy are the same distance between New York and Chicago.
The missiles makes their way toward the target, with a flight time of an hour and a half in front of them. They have been programmed to accept mid-course targeting updates via satellite from the MQ-4C Triton that is orbiting between their launch point and the target itself. After an hour of flight time, the TacToms are closing in on their target but they passively sense an enemy surface to air missile battery coming online on an island near their flight path. The MQ-4C Triton also senses the SAM site's search radar coming online. This information is relayed to the DDG-1000 that fired the Tomahawks well over an hour ago. Mission commanders in the ship's war room like Ship's Mission Center quickly order the missiles to fly around the outer engagement range of the SAM system, so that they are not detected or engaged.
As the missiles navigate at a safe distance around the enemy held island, controllers aboard the DDG-1000 order the TacToms to split up, with one loitering while the other makes a wide question mark shape path around the targeted frigate. This tactic will put the two missiles at an equal distance on opposite sides of the enemy ship, and with precise timing, the missiles will make simulations attack runs on the ship from completely opposite vectors. This makes defending the ship much more complicated and should overwhelm its air defense system operators.
It takes an extra 20 minutes for the TacTom to skirt the edges of the ship's defenses, but now, with both missiles at an equal distance from the target. They both drop down to very low altitude, just feet above the ocean, to make their final attack run on the enemy Frigate. Using their passive seekers, they begin to detect radar and other electromagnetic emissions emanating from the ship, which match the type of target the MQ-4C classified as hostile.
Once the missiles both crest the horizon from opposite directions, one of their milimetric wave radar seekers goes active and locks onto the ship. The ship tries to jam the missile's active seeker but it hops frequencies wildly. Both missiles are also feeding on the ship's own electromagnetic emissions for backup final targeting solution data. Like a fly in a spider's web, the more the ship tries to repulse the attack using jamming, the more directional energy the missiles have to 'feed on' for targeting.
With still only one of the missile's seekers being active, and its targeting data now being fed to the other missile, the ship's defenses are focused on just the active homing TacTom as it comes barreling over the horizon, the other staying silent as not to alert the crew. Just two miles out, the ship's close in weapons system activates, spraying the active homing TacTom with tungsten perpetrators. The missile detonates just 500 yards off the ship's port side. The moment the TacTom with the active seeker goes quiet the silent TacTom approaching from the opposite side goes active. There is not enough time for the CIWS to engage it.
Just before slamming into the enemy ship, the missile's seeker takes a raw millimeter-wave radar 'picture' of its target and transmits it back to its controlling DDG-1000 destroyer. It will be used to assess the TacTom's deadliness as well as to provide a final 'proof of target attacked' for intelligence officers. The missile strikes the ship's superstructure at close to 500mph, detonating its massive warhead while careening through the spine of the ship, blowing the superstructure apart like a firecracker placed inside a tin can.
The MQ-4C, which has been moved closer to the targeted ship during the Tomahawks' mission, does not detect any more threats in the area and its controllers order it to descend down to two thousand feet to take full motion video of the burning ship with its MTS-B multi-spectral targeting system. This video is data-linked via satellite back to the DDG-1000 and the Carrier Strike Group. Within an hour the ship is totally engulfed in flames and listing heavily. Intelligence classifies the ship as a total loss.
Although this situation is hypothetical, it gives some kind of idea as to what a new and improved Tomahawk is capable of. Regardless of what new brains and sensors are packed inside, the Tomahawk lacks a stealthy airframe, which leaves it vulnerable to detection against an enemy with an advanced air defense network. Nor can it be launched by fighter-sized aircraft. This, along with an even more intelligent suite of passive and active sensors, has given Lockheed's Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) a leg up when it comes to the Navy's next anti-ship missile, and LRASM's capabilities continue to rapidly evolve.
https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/this-chase-planes-view-of-a-tomahawk-striking-a-ship-is-1684902149
Kustaanmiekka
Kenraali
Vanha kunnon rannikkotykistö harjoittelee (vieläkin).
Rannikkoprikaati toteutti rannikkotykistöammunnat itäisellä Suomenlahdella.
30 marraskuuta, Kaakko -19 -harjoitus.
Rannikkoprikaati toteutti rannikkotykistöammunnat itäisellä Suomenlahdella.
30 marraskuuta, Kaakko -19 -harjoitus.
Eikö näiden pitänyt olla kaikki jo museoituja ja a tarvikkeetkin Lapissa pamautettua?
crane
Ylipäällikkö
Ei ole.
Uusia varusmiehiä ei käsittääkseni enää kouluteta kalustolle, mutta reserviläisiähän noille riittää vielä pitkäksi aikaa.