ddude
Majuri
Väitetysti eka kuva siitä pakkolaskun tehneestä IL-22:sta
Ukrainan konflikti/sota
Ettei ole tästä tapauksesta tuo kuva? Eikös Buk:in osumasta tule tuollainen hauliparvi? Toki tätäkään twiittiä ei ole taittu missään varmentaa, että näin olisi käynyt.
Leaderwolf
Respected Leader
Muistetaan että Venäjä mieluummin väittää omaksi vahingoksi, kuin myöntäisi että Ukraina kykenee johonkin.
Ja jos kyse on ilmoitetusta perus PAC-2 Patriotin kantamasta, joka jäisi jonkun 8-10% vajaaksi. Se kymmenen pinnaa on aika vähän sodassa ja ei-wikipedia tiedoilla. Katsokaa historiaa. Sodassa ei lueta sääntöjä ja kerrota jos jotain on paranneltu.
Voi toki olla Friendly fire. Mut se (taas kerran) sopisi liian hyvin ryssälle saada maailma uskomaan että Ukraina ei pysty, ryssä vain ryssii.
Ja jos kyse on ilmoitetusta perus PAC-2 Patriotin kantamasta, joka jäisi jonkun 8-10% vajaaksi. Se kymmenen pinnaa on aika vähän sodassa ja ei-wikipedia tiedoilla. Katsokaa historiaa. Sodassa ei lueta sääntöjä ja kerrota jos jotain on paranneltu.
Voi toki olla Friendly fire. Mut se (taas kerran) sopisi liian hyvin ryssälle saada maailma uskomaan että Ukraina ei pysty, ryssä vain ryssii.
keppiheppa
Korpraali
Kuvaa pakkolaskun tehneestä IL-22:sta?
Stanley
Kapteeni
Tunnistaja-pro sanoo samaa. Ko. kuvan pyrstön yläosasta puuttuu se bulbi tai tämä IL-22PP tötterö. Vaikka tuo alakolo on samanlainen kuin IL-22PP.
Muistetaan myös se, että länsimaiden ilmoittamat arvot ovat sellasia, johon päästään aina ja joissain tapauksissa mennään reilusti yli. Vs ryssien vehkeet, joiden mainostettuihin arvoihin ei päästä koskaan.
ak.tied
Greatest Leader
Taitaa hauliparvea käyttää likimain kaikki hersy-toimiset ohjukset ? Patriot per wiki:
| Warhead |
|
|---|
Mielenkiintoinen havainto oli wikissä Patriotin ohjusvariantti.
Antares
Respected Leader
Rob Lee siteeraa tuoretta GUR:n Vadim Skibitsky haastattelua (sama mies jonka 6.11.2023 kertomiin arvioihin minun "ohjuksia jäljellä" -laskelma perustuu):
From HUR's Vadym Skibitsky:
-Russia produced ~2 million 122mm/152mm artillery rounds in 2023 and received 1 million 122mm/152mm rounds from North Korea
-Russia produces ~115-130 "strategic" (>350km range) missiles per month
-~330-350 Shahed drones can be produced per month. He notes that actual production of Shaheds and missiles each month varies due to parts.
-Russia can produce 100-115 operational-tactical class of missiles (e.g. Kh-31, Kh-59) per month
-He says ~4% of Shahed drones fail to launch or explode immediately
Compared to last year, Russia's missile campaign this winter hasn't focused on energy infrastructure, but instead primarily on other infrastructure like Ukraine's defense industry and C2. He says Russia has started to use Shahed drones against military targets at the front.
He says ~1,000-1,100 Russians join the military every day (mikä tarkoittaisi noin 30 000 per kuukausi), and they are used to replace losses and form reserve regiments. He doesn't specify what percentage of them come from mobilization or volunteers, but he says the salary is the key motivation for those volunteering.
He says former members of Wagner have signed contracts with different PMCs under the command of the Russian MoD or Rosgvardia in Ukraine or in Africa and the Middle East. He also says Iran hopes to receive Su-34 bombers from Russia.
He says almost 80% of the components Russia receives, especially for electronics, comes from China and that most of these aren't even produced in China. As a result, he says it isn't that much of a problem for Russia to find the necessary components.
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Viestin kommenteissa on aiheellinen kysymys:
>"produced" 2 million artillery rounds
Half of those are old shells that are refurbished, aren't they?
Which means once the stocks are gone, that "production" will be halved. If NATO countries were serious, they could easily outproduce that.
Tämä on hyvä kysymys, muistan kuulleeni spekulointia että tietty osa ryssän tykistön laukausten "tuotannosta" on vanhojen, varastoitujen kunnostamista ja toinen osa sitä oikeaa uustuotantoa. JOS näin on, silloin on loogista että kun varastot on käytetty, tämä osuus "tuotannosta" putoaa pois ja jäljellä jää pelkkä uustuotanto.
-
Lainaan spoilerin taakse artikkelin tekstin konekäännöksen (RBC-Ukraine artikkeli julkaistu 15.1.2024): LÄHDE
From HUR's Vadym Skibitsky:
-Russia produced ~2 million 122mm/152mm artillery rounds in 2023 and received 1 million 122mm/152mm rounds from North Korea
-Russia produces ~115-130 "strategic" (>350km range) missiles per month
-~330-350 Shahed drones can be produced per month. He notes that actual production of Shaheds and missiles each month varies due to parts.
-Russia can produce 100-115 operational-tactical class of missiles (e.g. Kh-31, Kh-59) per month
-He says ~4% of Shahed drones fail to launch or explode immediately
Compared to last year, Russia's missile campaign this winter hasn't focused on energy infrastructure, but instead primarily on other infrastructure like Ukraine's defense industry and C2. He says Russia has started to use Shahed drones against military targets at the front.
He says ~1,000-1,100 Russians join the military every day (mikä tarkoittaisi noin 30 000 per kuukausi), and they are used to replace losses and form reserve regiments. He doesn't specify what percentage of them come from mobilization or volunteers, but he says the salary is the key motivation for those volunteering.
He says former members of Wagner have signed contracts with different PMCs under the command of the Russian MoD or Rosgvardia in Ukraine or in Africa and the Middle East. He also says Iran hopes to receive Su-34 bombers from Russia.
He says almost 80% of the components Russia receives, especially for electronics, comes from China and that most of these aren't even produced in China. As a result, he says it isn't that much of a problem for Russia to find the necessary components.
-
Viestin kommenteissa on aiheellinen kysymys:
>"produced" 2 million artillery rounds
Half of those are old shells that are refurbished, aren't they?
Which means once the stocks are gone, that "production" will be halved. If NATO countries were serious, they could easily outproduce that.
Tämä on hyvä kysymys, muistan kuulleeni spekulointia että tietty osa ryssän tykistön laukausten "tuotannosta" on vanhojen, varastoitujen kunnostamista ja toinen osa sitä oikeaa uustuotantoa. JOS näin on, silloin on loogista että kun varastot on käytetty, tämä osuus "tuotannosta" putoaa pois ja jäljellä jää pelkkä uustuotanto.
-
Lainaan spoilerin taakse artikkelin tekstin konekäännöksen (RBC-Ukraine artikkeli julkaistu 15.1.2024): LÄHDE
https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/platizhki-gaz-potribno-splachuvati-vchasno-1704981946.html
UAINRU
Vadim Skibitskyi (all photos: RBC-Ukraine, Vitaly Nosach)
AUTHOR:ULYANA BEZPALKO
What are the goals of today's shelling of Russia, how many missiles and "shaheeds" does the aggressor produce, what military aid does it receive from other countries, and what tasks does Moscow set for itself at the front in 2024 - in an interview with RBC-Ukraine, the representative of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense, Vadym Skibitsky, told .
Since December, Russia has launched massive missile strikes on Ukraine, but its targets are currently not energy facilities, as it was last year. The circumvention of sanctions and the help of third countries allow Moscow to continue the production of long-range missiles, to increase the production of attack drones of the "Shaheed" type, and in general to continue to wage an aggressive, terrorist war.
About the current goals of the Kremlin's missile attacks and the tasks at the front in 2024, whether Putin is preparing a new wave of mobilization in Russia, how Russia is helped by North Korea and why Iran is interested in supporting Moscow - in an interview with RBC-Ukraine, the representative of the Ministry of Defense of the Ministry of Defense, Major General, told Vadim Skibitskyi.
- We see that since December, the Russians have again launched massive missile strikes, in particular with the help of strategic aviation. What are the main goals of these strikes?
- To date, the main efforts of the Russian Federation are focused on the destruction of our infrastructure facilities. These are primarily objects of our defense-industrial complex, headquarters, control systems and separate units that are located on the front line.
How accurate are these shots? It does not achieve the goals that the Russian Federation sets for itself. The weapons used by Russia, in particular "Daggers", are very inaccurate. And, unfortunately, it is mostly the civilian population that suffers from them.
- Energy facilities are not the target of strikes today?
- The fact that they do not strike these objects does not mean that the Russian Federation does not monitor the state of our energy industry. Military intelligence clearly knows that they have conducted an analysis to strike our energy facilities in 2022-2023. The Russians have identified the most critical objects that can be hit by missile weapons, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. The adversary continues to regularly carry out space surveys of our energy facilities in order to carry out such strikes if possible and if necessary. Therefore, the threat to our energy system remains.
- How would you assess the current state of Russian "defense"? We have heard from various sources, in particular, the Russian propaganda media often say that their factories allegedly work in three, and almost five shifts. And is their own production enough to cover their needs at the front?
- If we talk about the so-called Russian "defense", then in the summer of 2022, Moscow adopted a number of laws, government regulations, which actually transferred defense-industrial enterprises to wartime. The number of working days per week has increased. Some businesses even work in three shifts. But this does not mean that they are all right in the defense industry.
The main effort now focuses on restoring those vehicles that have been damaged or damaged on the battlefield. Another issue is the restoration and preparation for combat use of weapons and military equipment, which is removed from arsenals and long-term storage warehouses in order to bring it to normal condition and send it to Ukraine for hostilities. The third task is the production of new weapons, primarily artillery systems, armored weapons, armored personnel carriers, BMPs. The fourth position is the manufacture of ammunition and missiles.
According to our intelligence, everything that is currently produced by Russia is immediately sent to the front and used against Ukraine. Therefore, we do not see Moscow significantly increasing the number of weapons and the volume of production of weapons and military equipment. Confirmation of the fact that they lack their own ammunition is their purchase of ammunition from the same Iran, North Korea, as well as the removal of almost all ammunition from warehouses in Belarus. If we are talking, for example, about artillery ammunition of 122 and 152 caliber, then Russian enterprises produced about 2 million of such ammunition in 2023. But this does not cover all the needs of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.
The enemy is trying to establish and increase the production of weapons and ammunition, but faces a number of problems. This is outdated equipment, this is a shortage of trained workers capable of performing such high-tech work, and this is a shortage of components. But the fact that Russia has the capacity to produce military weapons and equipment remains a threat to us.
- How much ammunition does the DPRK transfer to Russia, and what volumes are we talking about?
- The most active supplies of ammunition from the territory of North Korea were carried out during September, October and November. The main ammunition supplied from the DPRK is 122 mm and 152 mm. According to our estimates, it is about one million such artillery munitions that were delivered to the Russian Federation. This is precisely the deficit that Moscow has in terms of shells, and cannot cover at the expense of its own production.
- The White House also stated that Russia allegedly received ballistic missiles from the DPRK and that it allegedly launched them twice over Ukraine. Does the GUR have data that Russia really received such missiles and used them in Ukraine?
- We are collecting all the information that is available today - about what is supplied from North Korea. The data will be confirmed - then we will talk.
- When we spoke with you at the end of October, you provided in your comment the current data on the production and stockpiles of missiles with a range of more than 350 kilometers in Russia. Then you said that they produce about 115 such missiles per month. What do they have now with the production of missiles with a range of more than 350 kilometers?
- They could not significantly increase these volumes. At present, the maximum indicators remain the same - they are about 115-130 strategic missiles. However, they may vary depending on the month. The level of production depends on capacity loading and components, because a lot of parts - in the same Kh-101, "Kinzhal", "Kalibr" - are of foreign production.
Russia lost a lot due to the fact that its enterprises, which were engaged in the supply of components, are under international sanctions. And with its analogues, it cannot cover its own needs. Again, for example, in December they did not produce some types of missiles at all - there was a zero indicator - both planned and actual.
Secondly, they are now trying to keep a certain strategic reserve. As a rule, this is about 30% of the stocks they have. A vivid example - since mid-September, the Russians have not used either the Kh-101 or the Kalibr. Accumulation of these missiles took place. In addition, we clearly understand that everything produced is immediately delivered to the battlefield. If we talk about the launched cruise missiles, during the attacks, products of the III, IV quarter of production were recorded. This once again shows that their reserves are not very large, and what is produced is immediately used against our state.
- We also see that from September, when the Russians stopped using the Kh-101 and Kalibr, they instead began to use the Kh-59 missiles from tactical aviation quite often. What can you tell us about this rocket? Do they produce a lot of them now or do they have a large stockpile of these missiles?
- They produce them. The entire line - Kh-31, Kh-35, Kh-29, Kh-59 - is produced mostly from Russian components. In addition, this is a missile of a completely different class - it is not strategic. These are guided air missiles. Accordingly, the purposes for which they can be used are also different. These missiles - Kh-31 and Kh-59 - are aimed primarily at air defense facilities, at our radar stations, which must be hit by the enemy before or during massive strikes.
If we estimate production, it depends on the type of missile. Unfortunately, they have the ability to produce 100-115 missiles of this operational-tactical class (such as Kh-31, Kh-59, etc.)
- What is the Russian situation with the production of "Shaheeds"? From the statistics for December, it turns out that only one night they did not use "shahedy". Does their massive usage - and in November, October and September - indicate that they either have very normal production, or that Iran is giving them a lot?
- Indeed, in December there was the most massive use of unmanned aerial vehicles of the "Shaheed" type. If I am not mistaken, in December the enemy used about 770-780 of these attack UAVs. We are talking about only those that were recorded by us. After all, there is still a certain percentage - approximately 4% - of those that do not fly, did not start or exploded immediately after launch. We have confirmed data from the Russian side that such cases also occur.
In terms of production, the Russians did have the first contract to supply unmanned aerial vehicles from Iranian territory. After that, they set up their own production, it already works on the territory of Russia, in particular in Yelabuga. At least two production lines are deployed there today. But mostly components come from other countries.
The next thing that Moscow has managed to date is the establishment of the production of the airframe - the body of these UAVs. Russia already produces them independently. More spare parts and parts now come from other countries, that is, everything is not confined to Iran alone. Our assessment is that the Russian Federation is capable and already produces or assembles unmanned aerial vehicles on its own territory. This is evidenced, first of all, by those fragments that we find after enemy attacks. Secondly, if we talk about the engines in the Shaheds, then earlier they were a maximum of two different companies, but now we are talking about at least 3-4 different companies, including Chinese ones.
Moscow's goal is to reach a full, closed cycle of production of just such UAVs on the territory of Russia by 2026. I am not sure that they will be able to replace or find a Russian analogue, for example, of the electronic base - microcircuits, chips, etc. But the Russian Federation is able to manufacture starters, hull, warhead, engines, and other elements of the navigation system today.
- Do you have data on approximate production volumes? How many of them leave the conveyor of these "shaheeds" per day or per month?
- This also largely depends on the number and availability of components. According to our estimate, they can produce (as much as they did during December, for example) 330-350 units of these UAVs. But, again, it depends on whether there are parts, because, for example, there may be hulls, combat parts, but no engines. They collected what they could and are waiting only for the engines. Engines have arrived - and accordingly, the number of finished products will increase, there will be more than 300 of them.
But, as in the case of missiles, all "Shakhed" or so-called "Geran-2" that are produced are immediately used for combat. And that's why we see a different number of drones in use. December showed that even if the enemy had some reserves, they are running out today, and all these UAVs that are launched are literally coming off the assembly line.
- We saw that only a few of these "shaheeds" were launched on certain days. Were these disruptions in the carriages, or perhaps they are also using these drones to conduct reconnaissance of the location of our air defense system?
- Tactics can be different. What's new is that the enemy has started to use these "shaheds" on our facilities, especially on military facilities on the front line - they did not do this before. For the most part, they were used at our facilities in the depths of the territory of Ukraine.
Secondly, there is the influence of the weather. Frost, gusts of wind or snow - all this affects the combat use of UAVs. This machine operates at low altitudes and its engine is not designed to operate in such conditions.
- So, help with drones, help with ammunition - what else does Iran help Russia militarily?
- Iran is developing military-technical cooperation with Russia, because Tehran is interested in Russian weapons. Iran hopes to receive modern aircraft from the Russian Federation, such as the Su-34, training planes, and radar stations. Negotiations are ongoing between them.
- And what can you say about the Russian air defense system? Because we see that something often flies towards Russia - drones, missiles. And the Russian media often report that they allegedly shot down everything - 41 out of 39 UAVs were shot down. Is their air defense system really that strong?
- Here, of course, there is an element of Russian propaganda. But during the war, the Russian Federation greatly strengthened its anti-aircraft defense in many directions. This is, in particular, the occupied Crimea, namely the Kerch bridge area - there is a very powerful anti-aircraft system there. This is the Moscow direction on the territory of the Russian Federation and other regions. In the indicated directions, it was possible not only to strengthen, but also to create an echeloned air defense system. However, this happened due to the fact that anti-aircraft missile and anti-aircraft artillery units were transferred from other regions of Russia - from the Far East, for example, from the Northern region of the Russian Federation. These areas are actually exposed in the sense of air defense protection.
How effective is it? It is not always as the aggressor tells. In addition, everything depends on how well we plan our operations, including the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and other types of weapons. We know to what extent and in which regions the air defense has been strengthened, where new systems have been deployed. The most powerful complex in their arsenal is the S-400, but even it is not completely perfect. There are facts when their weapons fail. The same well-known "Armor" also allows our air assets to pass, which eventually reach their targets.
- Does China provide any military assistance to Russia?
- Here the problem is that the majority - almost 80% of components, especially - electronics - enter through the territory of China. Moreover, in most cases, they are not even of Chinese production, but of other countries of the world. It's just that China has not joined the international sanctions, so it is not an acute problem for the Russians to buy and import the necessary components through China or through other countries. Many different joint ventures have been created, firms that appear for a week, make some purchases, and then disappear.
Russia tried and is trying to get ammunition from China. It is also trying to get shells from other countries where Soviet weapons remain, including from the countries of Central Asia.
- Is Russia really promoting a message on the international stage about readiness for negotiations with Ukraine to end the war in some format? And if such messages really exist, do they correspond to the real intentions of Putin and his entourage?
- Putin's intentions are obvious - it is control over our territory and its full occupation. And when there are any talks about the enemy being ready for negotiations, we must understand that Russia's conditions are not acceptable to our state.
But in reality, such rhetoric of Moscow is mostly aimed at the countries of the West and the Global South - that they supposedly agree to stop and start the negotiation process. But what does Russia say about our occupied territories? Next, any negotiations give Russia time to restore its potential, build up its forces and create strategic reserves in order to continue aggression. And we have seen this since 2014 - nothing has changed here. Our strategic goal is one - we must liberate all our occupied territories.
- What, according to your assessment and forecast, can be expected at the front in 2024?
- Probably, we will be guided by what strategic goals the Russian Federation sets for itself. What they tried to do and achieve since the beginning of the so-called "special military operation" has not been achieved. Accordingly, one of Moscow's remaining strategic goals is access to the administrative borders of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. The second thing they will do now (and we can already see this from the documents we have at our disposal) is to maintain the captured territories, which are currently under temporary occupation: Kherson, Zaporizhia and part of the Kharkiv region.
Another priority goal they set for themselves is the destruction of our air defense system, our aviation, our defense-industrial complex facilities, in order to prevent the increase of our production and the strengthening of the capabilities of the Armed Forces. These are the tasks that the Russian Federation is currently setting for this year.
- You mentioned the tasks that Moscow sees for 2024 at the front. Do they still plan to conduct a wider, another official wave of mobilization?
- They have created all the conditions for conducting mobilization activities, in particular at the legislative level. There is a record of conscripts. There are also plans for the formation and restoration of, for example, the Leningrad and Moscow military districts. And all this will affect the mobilization needs of their armed forces.
In addition, we now see that the entire mobilization is mostly going to replenish the losses that the Russian Federation bears on our territory. In order to create a powerful strategic reserve, they really need mobilization - that's for sure. Will Putin dare to do this? Hardly before the elections. And in the future - we will watch. It is still too early to talk about it. But all the conditions for mobilization at any time in Russia have been created.
- How many people do they currently manage to attract to the army through covert mobilization, through persuasion to sign contracts with the army?
- About 1,000 - 1,100 people join the ranks of the armed forces of the Russian Federation every day.
- That is, approximately 30,000 per month?
- So. This goes both to replenish losses and to form reserve regiments. But this cannot be called a hidden mobilization. Let's face it: they are mobilizing. It's just not held as massively as in October-December 2022.
However, in reality, the motivation for Russians to join the army is the salary, especially in crisis regions, where there are either low wages or no jobs at all. Russian prisoners of war openly admit that they joined the army because they get paid there, and he has a "mortgage, family and so on." And this motive is currently the main one for those people who voluntarily go to mobilization, sign contracts and fight.
- And what is the salary level?
- They are different. It all depends on where the unit is located, whether it is conducting combat operations. But the Russians clearly define that a day of hostilities is plus 8 thousand rubles to the salary. If we speak in absolute numbers, then this is approximately 220-250 thousand rubles per month (HUOM: tämä tarkoittaa $1,700-1,900 per kuukausi - LÄHDE). This is for those who are directly involved in combat operations on the front line.
- And what now with the remains of "Wagner"?
- They are all reformatted now. Many so-called private military companies have already been created, which are under the control of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and under the control of the Russian Guard. Those "Wagnerians" who signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense or the Russian Guard continue their service either in the armed forces of the Russian Federation or in other private companies.
There was also a reformation of the "Wagner" group in other countries where they were involved, primarily in Africa, in the Middle East - in Syria, in Libya. "Wagner" PVK as such is no longer there. There are other private military campaigns. They are controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense.
- What awaits us in 2024 in terms of Western aid? Can we count on the fact that military aid from Western countries will remain for us in 2024?
- Our allies and partners understand that it is difficult, and in some areas, impossible to wage war with the Russian Federation without their help. Today, the high-precision weapons we have are all Western-made. Ammunition of 155 caliber is also mostly produced by other countries. And they understand that we are now really restraining Russia. She failed to achieve the goals she set for herself. And we simply reduced the potential of the Russian Federation several times.
According to our calculations, in order to restore the potential of the ground forces of the Russian Federation, which was before the start of large-scale aggression, it will need from five to ten years. It will also take three to five years to restore the arsenal of high-precision weapons. It is our merit that we did not allow the Russian military machine to prepare and start aggression not only against us, but also against other countries.
- Will the aid continue?
- Yes, definitely. I have no doubts. The assistance will be multifaceted - it is weapons, military equipment, training, other forces and means to strengthen our capabilities so that we can defend our state and liberate the territories that are currently temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation.
Vadym Skibitsky: Russians have a motivation to fight for money, about 1,000-1,100 people join the army every day
UKRAINE, MONDAY, JANUARY 15, 2024 08:00UAINRU
Vadim Skibitskyi (all photos: RBC-Ukraine, Vitaly Nosach)
AUTHOR:ULYANA BEZPALKO
What are the goals of today's shelling of Russia, how many missiles and "shaheeds" does the aggressor produce, what military aid does it receive from other countries, and what tasks does Moscow set for itself at the front in 2024 - in an interview with RBC-Ukraine, the representative of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense, Vadym Skibitsky, told .
Since December, Russia has launched massive missile strikes on Ukraine, but its targets are currently not energy facilities, as it was last year. The circumvention of sanctions and the help of third countries allow Moscow to continue the production of long-range missiles, to increase the production of attack drones of the "Shaheed" type, and in general to continue to wage an aggressive, terrorist war.
About the current goals of the Kremlin's missile attacks and the tasks at the front in 2024, whether Putin is preparing a new wave of mobilization in Russia, how Russia is helped by North Korea and why Iran is interested in supporting Moscow - in an interview with RBC-Ukraine, the representative of the Ministry of Defense of the Ministry of Defense, Major General, told Vadim Skibitskyi.
- We see that since December, the Russians have again launched massive missile strikes, in particular with the help of strategic aviation. What are the main goals of these strikes?
- To date, the main efforts of the Russian Federation are focused on the destruction of our infrastructure facilities. These are primarily objects of our defense-industrial complex, headquarters, control systems and separate units that are located on the front line.
How accurate are these shots? It does not achieve the goals that the Russian Federation sets for itself. The weapons used by Russia, in particular "Daggers", are very inaccurate. And, unfortunately, it is mostly the civilian population that suffers from them.
- Energy facilities are not the target of strikes today?
- The fact that they do not strike these objects does not mean that the Russian Federation does not monitor the state of our energy industry. Military intelligence clearly knows that they have conducted an analysis to strike our energy facilities in 2022-2023. The Russians have identified the most critical objects that can be hit by missile weapons, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. The adversary continues to regularly carry out space surveys of our energy facilities in order to carry out such strikes if possible and if necessary. Therefore, the threat to our energy system remains.
- How would you assess the current state of Russian "defense"? We have heard from various sources, in particular, the Russian propaganda media often say that their factories allegedly work in three, and almost five shifts. And is their own production enough to cover their needs at the front?
- If we talk about the so-called Russian "defense", then in the summer of 2022, Moscow adopted a number of laws, government regulations, which actually transferred defense-industrial enterprises to wartime. The number of working days per week has increased. Some businesses even work in three shifts. But this does not mean that they are all right in the defense industry.
The main effort now focuses on restoring those vehicles that have been damaged or damaged on the battlefield. Another issue is the restoration and preparation for combat use of weapons and military equipment, which is removed from arsenals and long-term storage warehouses in order to bring it to normal condition and send it to Ukraine for hostilities. The third task is the production of new weapons, primarily artillery systems, armored weapons, armored personnel carriers, BMPs. The fourth position is the manufacture of ammunition and missiles.
According to our intelligence, everything that is currently produced by Russia is immediately sent to the front and used against Ukraine. Therefore, we do not see Moscow significantly increasing the number of weapons and the volume of production of weapons and military equipment. Confirmation of the fact that they lack their own ammunition is their purchase of ammunition from the same Iran, North Korea, as well as the removal of almost all ammunition from warehouses in Belarus. If we are talking, for example, about artillery ammunition of 122 and 152 caliber, then Russian enterprises produced about 2 million of such ammunition in 2023. But this does not cover all the needs of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.
The enemy is trying to establish and increase the production of weapons and ammunition, but faces a number of problems. This is outdated equipment, this is a shortage of trained workers capable of performing such high-tech work, and this is a shortage of components. But the fact that Russia has the capacity to produce military weapons and equipment remains a threat to us.
- How much ammunition does the DPRK transfer to Russia, and what volumes are we talking about?
- The most active supplies of ammunition from the territory of North Korea were carried out during September, October and November. The main ammunition supplied from the DPRK is 122 mm and 152 mm. According to our estimates, it is about one million such artillery munitions that were delivered to the Russian Federation. This is precisely the deficit that Moscow has in terms of shells, and cannot cover at the expense of its own production.
- The White House also stated that Russia allegedly received ballistic missiles from the DPRK and that it allegedly launched them twice over Ukraine. Does the GUR have data that Russia really received such missiles and used them in Ukraine?
- We are collecting all the information that is available today - about what is supplied from North Korea. The data will be confirmed - then we will talk.
- When we spoke with you at the end of October, you provided in your comment the current data on the production and stockpiles of missiles with a range of more than 350 kilometers in Russia. Then you said that they produce about 115 such missiles per month. What do they have now with the production of missiles with a range of more than 350 kilometers?
- They could not significantly increase these volumes. At present, the maximum indicators remain the same - they are about 115-130 strategic missiles. However, they may vary depending on the month. The level of production depends on capacity loading and components, because a lot of parts - in the same Kh-101, "Kinzhal", "Kalibr" - are of foreign production.
Russia lost a lot due to the fact that its enterprises, which were engaged in the supply of components, are under international sanctions. And with its analogues, it cannot cover its own needs. Again, for example, in December they did not produce some types of missiles at all - there was a zero indicator - both planned and actual.
Secondly, they are now trying to keep a certain strategic reserve. As a rule, this is about 30% of the stocks they have. A vivid example - since mid-September, the Russians have not used either the Kh-101 or the Kalibr. Accumulation of these missiles took place. In addition, we clearly understand that everything produced is immediately delivered to the battlefield. If we talk about the launched cruise missiles, during the attacks, products of the III, IV quarter of production were recorded. This once again shows that their reserves are not very large, and what is produced is immediately used against our state.
- We also see that from September, when the Russians stopped using the Kh-101 and Kalibr, they instead began to use the Kh-59 missiles from tactical aviation quite often. What can you tell us about this rocket? Do they produce a lot of them now or do they have a large stockpile of these missiles?
- They produce them. The entire line - Kh-31, Kh-35, Kh-29, Kh-59 - is produced mostly from Russian components. In addition, this is a missile of a completely different class - it is not strategic. These are guided air missiles. Accordingly, the purposes for which they can be used are also different. These missiles - Kh-31 and Kh-59 - are aimed primarily at air defense facilities, at our radar stations, which must be hit by the enemy before or during massive strikes.
If we estimate production, it depends on the type of missile. Unfortunately, they have the ability to produce 100-115 missiles of this operational-tactical class (such as Kh-31, Kh-59, etc.)
- What is the Russian situation with the production of "Shaheeds"? From the statistics for December, it turns out that only one night they did not use "shahedy". Does their massive usage - and in November, October and September - indicate that they either have very normal production, or that Iran is giving them a lot?
- Indeed, in December there was the most massive use of unmanned aerial vehicles of the "Shaheed" type. If I am not mistaken, in December the enemy used about 770-780 of these attack UAVs. We are talking about only those that were recorded by us. After all, there is still a certain percentage - approximately 4% - of those that do not fly, did not start or exploded immediately after launch. We have confirmed data from the Russian side that such cases also occur.
In terms of production, the Russians did have the first contract to supply unmanned aerial vehicles from Iranian territory. After that, they set up their own production, it already works on the territory of Russia, in particular in Yelabuga. At least two production lines are deployed there today. But mostly components come from other countries.
The next thing that Moscow has managed to date is the establishment of the production of the airframe - the body of these UAVs. Russia already produces them independently. More spare parts and parts now come from other countries, that is, everything is not confined to Iran alone. Our assessment is that the Russian Federation is capable and already produces or assembles unmanned aerial vehicles on its own territory. This is evidenced, first of all, by those fragments that we find after enemy attacks. Secondly, if we talk about the engines in the Shaheds, then earlier they were a maximum of two different companies, but now we are talking about at least 3-4 different companies, including Chinese ones.
Moscow's goal is to reach a full, closed cycle of production of just such UAVs on the territory of Russia by 2026. I am not sure that they will be able to replace or find a Russian analogue, for example, of the electronic base - microcircuits, chips, etc. But the Russian Federation is able to manufacture starters, hull, warhead, engines, and other elements of the navigation system today.
- Do you have data on approximate production volumes? How many of them leave the conveyor of these "shaheeds" per day or per month?
- This also largely depends on the number and availability of components. According to our estimate, they can produce (as much as they did during December, for example) 330-350 units of these UAVs. But, again, it depends on whether there are parts, because, for example, there may be hulls, combat parts, but no engines. They collected what they could and are waiting only for the engines. Engines have arrived - and accordingly, the number of finished products will increase, there will be more than 300 of them.
But, as in the case of missiles, all "Shakhed" or so-called "Geran-2" that are produced are immediately used for combat. And that's why we see a different number of drones in use. December showed that even if the enemy had some reserves, they are running out today, and all these UAVs that are launched are literally coming off the assembly line.
- We saw that only a few of these "shaheeds" were launched on certain days. Were these disruptions in the carriages, or perhaps they are also using these drones to conduct reconnaissance of the location of our air defense system?
- Tactics can be different. What's new is that the enemy has started to use these "shaheds" on our facilities, especially on military facilities on the front line - they did not do this before. For the most part, they were used at our facilities in the depths of the territory of Ukraine.
Secondly, there is the influence of the weather. Frost, gusts of wind or snow - all this affects the combat use of UAVs. This machine operates at low altitudes and its engine is not designed to operate in such conditions.
- So, help with drones, help with ammunition - what else does Iran help Russia militarily?
- Iran is developing military-technical cooperation with Russia, because Tehran is interested in Russian weapons. Iran hopes to receive modern aircraft from the Russian Federation, such as the Su-34, training planes, and radar stations. Negotiations are ongoing between them.
- And what can you say about the Russian air defense system? Because we see that something often flies towards Russia - drones, missiles. And the Russian media often report that they allegedly shot down everything - 41 out of 39 UAVs were shot down. Is their air defense system really that strong?
- Here, of course, there is an element of Russian propaganda. But during the war, the Russian Federation greatly strengthened its anti-aircraft defense in many directions. This is, in particular, the occupied Crimea, namely the Kerch bridge area - there is a very powerful anti-aircraft system there. This is the Moscow direction on the territory of the Russian Federation and other regions. In the indicated directions, it was possible not only to strengthen, but also to create an echeloned air defense system. However, this happened due to the fact that anti-aircraft missile and anti-aircraft artillery units were transferred from other regions of Russia - from the Far East, for example, from the Northern region of the Russian Federation. These areas are actually exposed in the sense of air defense protection.
How effective is it? It is not always as the aggressor tells. In addition, everything depends on how well we plan our operations, including the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and other types of weapons. We know to what extent and in which regions the air defense has been strengthened, where new systems have been deployed. The most powerful complex in their arsenal is the S-400, but even it is not completely perfect. There are facts when their weapons fail. The same well-known "Armor" also allows our air assets to pass, which eventually reach their targets.
- Does China provide any military assistance to Russia?
- Here the problem is that the majority - almost 80% of components, especially - electronics - enter through the territory of China. Moreover, in most cases, they are not even of Chinese production, but of other countries of the world. It's just that China has not joined the international sanctions, so it is not an acute problem for the Russians to buy and import the necessary components through China or through other countries. Many different joint ventures have been created, firms that appear for a week, make some purchases, and then disappear.
Russia tried and is trying to get ammunition from China. It is also trying to get shells from other countries where Soviet weapons remain, including from the countries of Central Asia.
- Is Russia really promoting a message on the international stage about readiness for negotiations with Ukraine to end the war in some format? And if such messages really exist, do they correspond to the real intentions of Putin and his entourage?
- Putin's intentions are obvious - it is control over our territory and its full occupation. And when there are any talks about the enemy being ready for negotiations, we must understand that Russia's conditions are not acceptable to our state.
But in reality, such rhetoric of Moscow is mostly aimed at the countries of the West and the Global South - that they supposedly agree to stop and start the negotiation process. But what does Russia say about our occupied territories? Next, any negotiations give Russia time to restore its potential, build up its forces and create strategic reserves in order to continue aggression. And we have seen this since 2014 - nothing has changed here. Our strategic goal is one - we must liberate all our occupied territories.
- What, according to your assessment and forecast, can be expected at the front in 2024?
- Probably, we will be guided by what strategic goals the Russian Federation sets for itself. What they tried to do and achieve since the beginning of the so-called "special military operation" has not been achieved. Accordingly, one of Moscow's remaining strategic goals is access to the administrative borders of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. The second thing they will do now (and we can already see this from the documents we have at our disposal) is to maintain the captured territories, which are currently under temporary occupation: Kherson, Zaporizhia and part of the Kharkiv region.
Another priority goal they set for themselves is the destruction of our air defense system, our aviation, our defense-industrial complex facilities, in order to prevent the increase of our production and the strengthening of the capabilities of the Armed Forces. These are the tasks that the Russian Federation is currently setting for this year.
- You mentioned the tasks that Moscow sees for 2024 at the front. Do they still plan to conduct a wider, another official wave of mobilization?
- They have created all the conditions for conducting mobilization activities, in particular at the legislative level. There is a record of conscripts. There are also plans for the formation and restoration of, for example, the Leningrad and Moscow military districts. And all this will affect the mobilization needs of their armed forces.
In addition, we now see that the entire mobilization is mostly going to replenish the losses that the Russian Federation bears on our territory. In order to create a powerful strategic reserve, they really need mobilization - that's for sure. Will Putin dare to do this? Hardly before the elections. And in the future - we will watch. It is still too early to talk about it. But all the conditions for mobilization at any time in Russia have been created.
- How many people do they currently manage to attract to the army through covert mobilization, through persuasion to sign contracts with the army?
- About 1,000 - 1,100 people join the ranks of the armed forces of the Russian Federation every day.
- That is, approximately 30,000 per month?
- So. This goes both to replenish losses and to form reserve regiments. But this cannot be called a hidden mobilization. Let's face it: they are mobilizing. It's just not held as massively as in October-December 2022.
However, in reality, the motivation for Russians to join the army is the salary, especially in crisis regions, where there are either low wages or no jobs at all. Russian prisoners of war openly admit that they joined the army because they get paid there, and he has a "mortgage, family and so on." And this motive is currently the main one for those people who voluntarily go to mobilization, sign contracts and fight.
- And what is the salary level?
- They are different. It all depends on where the unit is located, whether it is conducting combat operations. But the Russians clearly define that a day of hostilities is plus 8 thousand rubles to the salary. If we speak in absolute numbers, then this is approximately 220-250 thousand rubles per month (HUOM: tämä tarkoittaa $1,700-1,900 per kuukausi - LÄHDE). This is for those who are directly involved in combat operations on the front line.
- And what now with the remains of "Wagner"?
- They are all reformatted now. Many so-called private military companies have already been created, which are under the control of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and under the control of the Russian Guard. Those "Wagnerians" who signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense or the Russian Guard continue their service either in the armed forces of the Russian Federation or in other private companies.
There was also a reformation of the "Wagner" group in other countries where they were involved, primarily in Africa, in the Middle East - in Syria, in Libya. "Wagner" PVK as such is no longer there. There are other private military campaigns. They are controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense.
- What awaits us in 2024 in terms of Western aid? Can we count on the fact that military aid from Western countries will remain for us in 2024?
- Our allies and partners understand that it is difficult, and in some areas, impossible to wage war with the Russian Federation without their help. Today, the high-precision weapons we have are all Western-made. Ammunition of 155 caliber is also mostly produced by other countries. And they understand that we are now really restraining Russia. She failed to achieve the goals she set for herself. And we simply reduced the potential of the Russian Federation several times.
According to our calculations, in order to restore the potential of the ground forces of the Russian Federation, which was before the start of large-scale aggression, it will need from five to ten years. It will also take three to five years to restore the arsenal of high-precision weapons. It is our merit that we did not allow the Russian military machine to prepare and start aggression not only against us, but also against other countries.
- Will the aid continue?
- Yes, definitely. I have no doubts. The assistance will be multifaceted - it is weapons, military equipment, training, other forces and means to strengthen our capabilities so that we can defend our state and liberate the territories that are currently temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Ok,mulla oli jotenkin sekoittunut patriot kineettiseen osumaan mutta taitaa olla sitten vain Davids Sling?
teknohippi
Ylipäällikkö
Eiköhän tuo ole ihan tarkoituksellista. Se tekee lilliputtelin egolle hyvää että merkittävän tappion tieto tulee ensin ulos some/lehdistö kautta kuin että oma organisaatio kertoo sen virallisesti yypelifyylelille. Samalla sahataan ryssän propagandatuutilta reagointiaika pois. Tässäkin tapauksessa lopulta paskoi itse joutui kertomaan jotain kun kaikki jo tietää mitä tapahtui.
Eiköhän tuolla ollut valmiina niin ohjuslavetin vierailu oikeassa ampumapaikassa kuin tiedotteetkin somea varten. Eli ennakolta täysin suunniteltu kokonaisoperaatio informaatio-buustausta myöten. Näin ne some-viestit sai lähtemään heti kun nähtiin tutkasta että ainakin yksi kone tippui.
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Ryssät, hoh hoijaa...
Hah, ukrainalaiset on kekseliäitä. Juttuahan oli jo toissa vuonna, että somen deittisovelluksilla luotiin feikkimimmejä ja näillä vokoteltiin sitten kiimaisia örkkejä paljastamaan asemansa kun kännykkää ja nettiä pläräsivät muna kovana. Ja kun tarttuivat syöttiin, tilattiin paikan päälle kivasti epäreilua tulta niskaan.
KymJP1/96
Kapteeni
Jos ryssä on vetänyt samaa reittiä samalla aikataululla päivästä toiseen, niin kyllähän tuo antaa selkeän mahdollisuuden iskulle. Tietää minuutilleen koska sen lavetin ajaa laukaisupaikalle, laukaisee ohjuksen ja häipyy paikalta. Ei ryssä ehdi reagoida kun ei ole tuntitolkulla paikoillaan.
Eikö ryssiltä ole juuri kielletty soveltaminen operatiivisessa toiminnassa? Joku iso herra sanonut mitä tehdään ja millä aikataululla, niin se on jumalan sana. Kaikki pätevät on tapettu tai erotettu... Tai no ehkä ennemminkin kukaan pätevä ei ole koskaan edes päässyt kokeilemaan kun Puten kavereiden kaverit nostetaan huipulle. Niinhän käy aina noissa korruptoituneissa paskamaissa.
Eikö ryssiltä ole juuri kielletty soveltaminen operatiivisessa toiminnassa? Joku iso herra sanonut mitä tehdään ja millä aikataululla, niin se on jumalan sana. Kaikki pätevät on tapettu tai erotettu... Tai no ehkä ennemminkin kukaan pätevä ei ole koskaan edes päässyt kokeilemaan kun Puten kavereiden kaverit nostetaan huipulle. Niinhän käy aina noissa korruptoituneissa paskamaissa.
Antares
Respected Leader
FighterBomber telegram-kanava julkaisu tuon kuvan 15.1.2024 näillä saatesanoilla: LÄHDE
If we say that the IL-22 crew are real heroes, it means to say nothing.
I hope we hear their story from the first person.
t.me/fighter_bomber/15397
214.3Kviews
Jan 15 at 14:18
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Toki voi silti olla vanha kuva tai kuvituskuva tai jotain muuta, mutta hänellä ei ole ollut tapana pelleillä ja väitetysti on läheiset välit ryssän ilmavoimien kanssa.
Tämän arvion mukaan ei olisi välttämättä Il-22M kyseessä vaan Il-20 - komentokeskuslentokone joka tapauksessa:
IMO, this damaged vertical stabilizer does not belong to the IL22M, it is missing a characteristic sunroof at the top (photo no. 3)The IL20 (photo no. 2), a command plane, is much more suitable, not the WRE
ddude
Majuri
Mun mielestä molemmat puuttuu, sekä toi sivuperäsimen päällä oleva että pyrstössä oleva pullistuma.
Näitä on vielä joku variantti missä on tuolla sivuperäsimen päällä tollainen iso "pallukka"
Onko toi pelkkä iso pallura sitten perus "M" versio ja noi kaksi pullistumaa sitten tuo "command plane".
Joku mua viisaampi osaa kertoa mutta valokuvaan kun lisää valotusta niin mun mielstä kuvassa ei ole mitään noista kolmesta "pallurasta"
Jos kuva on vuodettu kuten lähde sanoi venäjän toimesta niin voihan olla että tämäkin tuli tonttiin ja nyt halutaan uskotella että onnistui pakkolaskussa ja kaivettu joku vanha kuva arkistosta.
EDIT:
Luin @Antares edellä postaaman viestin ja toi missä on noi kaksi erillistä pallukkaa pyrstössä olisikin joku "PP" versio ja "erikoistehtävä kone" lähinnä EW käyttöön, ja siis eri kuin tuo "command plane"
Mulla siis väärä malli mihin vertasin.
Liitteet
Viimeksi muokattu:
Tuosta pyrstöantennin tms.puutteesta osa vääntää keskusteluissa, nyt kun niitä lukenut tuon kuvan tiimoilta. Olisiko toinenkin kone tuhoutunut täysin ja nyt kierrätetään vanhaa kuvaa, joka ei ole aiemmin ollut esillä? No, en ole itse todellakaan asiantuntija näissä tunnistamisissa joten en ota enempää kantaa.
Edit:näköjään dduden kanssa sama ajatus samaan aikaan
Antares
Respected Leader
Tuosta pyrstöantennin tms.puutteesta osa vääntää keskusteluissa, nyt kun niitä lukenut tuon kuvan tiimoilta. Olisiko toinenkin kone tuhoutunut täysin ja nyt kierrätetään vanhaa kuvaa, joka ei ole aiemmin ollut esillä? No, en ole itse todellakaan asiantuntija näissä tunnistamisissa joten en ota enempää kantaa.
Edit:näköjään dduden kanssa sama ajatus samaan aikaan
Paloauton malli ja numero täsmäävät Anapa-lentokentän sammutuskaluston kanssa. Toki jos se aikaisempi BUK-osuman saanut kone laskeutui myös pimeän aikaan Anapa-lentokentälle, niin silloin voi olla kuva siitä tapauksesta. Oletan kuitenkin että kuva olisi tästä tuoreesta, en näe syytä olettaa että ei olisi.
The firetruck design and number matches one of the fire station at airport Anapa.
sources:
1) https://aeroflap.com.br/ru/Российск...садку-на-самолеты,-которые-никуда-не-улетают/
2) https://livekuban.ru/news/obshchestvo/v-aeroportu-anapy-uvelichili-avtopark-pozharnoy-tekhniki
Antares
Respected Leader
Rostovin alueella sijaitsevan suuren kemiantehtaan alueella syttynyt tulipalo, väitetysti tulipaloa edelsivät räjähdysten äänet:
Explosions were heard in the Rostov Region at one of the largest chemical enterprises in the south of the Russian Federation
A fire started at the state-owned Kamensky Combine in the city of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky. Local residents reported explosions before the fire started. Workers were evacuated.
Explosions were heard in the Rostov Region at one of the largest chemical enterprises in the south of the Russian Federation
A fire started at the state-owned Kamensky Combine in the city of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky. Local residents reported explosions before the fire started. Workers were evacuated.
hyvis
Eversti
Taitaa vaan putikka olla niitä miehiä, ettei paljoa lue nettiä tai mitään muutakaan, vaan luottaa (jos luottaa) jees jees miehiensä raportteihin.