Vonka
Supreme Leader
Ja minkä hinnan tavaran antaja määrää tavaralle. Eivät numerot kerro mitään sotatavaran laadusta. Yleensä pulassa oleva saa b-luokan juttua a-luokan hinnalla.
Ukrainan konflikti/sota
Vonka
Supreme Leader
Kasperin tarina.
yle.fi
Kasper Alhoniemi, 23, kaatui taistellessaan Ukrainan puolesta – tämä on hänen tarinansa
Kasper Alhoniemi oli ensimmäinen Ukrainan puolella taistellut suomalainen, joka kaatui. Ylen saama poikkeuksellinen materiaali kertoo hänen tarinansa.
yle.fi
Gyllis1
Respected Leader
Joo, lahjoitetun kaluston arvo taidetaan ilmoittaa sen mukaan mikä tulevan korvausoston arvo on.
Sinänsä varmaan ihan viisas ratkaisu. Tulee vähemmän mölinää sitten kun pv:n rahoitusta pitää tuon takia korottaa: "ei pv rahaa tarvi, antoivat miljoonan arvosta paseja ja nyt vaativat miljardia AMV hankintoihin"...
Ryssä kokeilee etelässä vaihteeksi. Jonkin tiedon mukaan tuonne olisi kasattu reippaasti joukkoja
The enemy advanced near Ivanovsky and Verbovoy. Fighting continues south and west of Robotyny.
Since yesterday, active assaults by the enemy of the Robotinsky ledge began. Katsaps are trying to enter Robotyn itself, the fighting is going on for a stronghold south of the village. Katsaps have pushed through the defenses of south-western Verbovoy, stabilization measures are ongoing. Without the introduction of reserves, a bad situation can develop - both ours and the enemy understand this.
The enemy advanced near Ivanovsky and Verbovoy. Fighting continues south and west of Robotyny.
Since yesterday, active assaults by the enemy of the Robotinsky ledge began. Katsaps are trying to enter Robotyn itself, the fighting is going on for a stronghold south of the village. Katsaps have pushed through the defenses of south-western Verbovoy, stabilization measures are ongoing. Without the introduction of reserves, a bad situation can develop - both ours and the enemy understand this.
ak.tied
Greatest Leader
Onkohan tuossa mennyt sekaisin 122 H 63 ja 122 PSH 74? Jälkimmäistä meiltä tuskin on lähtenyt vaikka Ukrainalle varmasti olisi kelvannutkin.
teknohippi
Ylipäällikkö
No jostain noihin rahataulukoihin ne luvut aina keräillään, eli lähinnä kritiikin vois kohdistaa laiskaan lehdistöön, EU:n virkakoneistosta saisi taatusti eurolleen tarkat lukemat näiden julkisten henkselipaukuttelujen siaan. Kun vertaillaan, niin vertaillaan sitten oikeilla luvuilla. Vaikka ovatkin maitten itseilmoittamia.
On mennyt. Suomessa ollut elämyskäytössä ainakin 3kpl jotka toimitettu.
Majakovskilta pitkä postaus miksi Avdiivka, lähes kahden vuoden sodan jälkeen, lopulta juuri nyt menetettiin. Tiedän että täällä foorumilla ei monia asia edes kiinnosta, kaupunki muiden joukossa eikä edes iso. Mutta laitetaan silti. Ja lisättäköön että minua on suuresti ihmetyttänyt tuo viemäriputkiepisodi. Ukraina on pitänyt aluetta hallussaan lähes 10v, rakentanut puolustuksia yms. mutta vain ryssän tiedossa on nähtävästi viemäriputket, joiden kautta päästääkin satoja metrejä - jopa 1.5km ryömimällä vastustajan linnoitusten taakse..
I draw inspiration from a question that was asked to me: "you predicted in January that Avdiivka would last for another 3 years (for a long time), what led to the fall and change in your assessments instead?"
It must be said that I do not deny the January analysis, which was based on the data I had at the time and on the type of war that was taking place, an incorrect assessment was revealed due to the change in some conditions of the war, which I am going to analyze and to expand:
1) The Russians sent an incredible amount of men and equipment. Probably more than anyone imagined. I also wonder, would this alone have guaranteed the conquest of Avdiivka if there had been no other factors? I answer no. The attack on Stepove and Sjeverne (i.e. on the flanks), if conducted in the same manner as in January, would not have had any effect, considering that the thaw would have made these areas even more difficult for Russian logistics.
2) I believe that a fundamental point is the Russian ability to adapt to the reality of the battlefield. They stopped (or rather, slowed down, continuing to exert constant pressure) with the disastrous mechanized attacks of January, and began to move in small groups of infantry, supported by a lot of artillery and a lot of aviation (fab), which especially in the city area contributed to the crumbling of the fortifications. The Russians identified a weak point in the water basin area, and began to push into this area, also helped by some Ukrainian errors especially in the southern sector.
3) The chapter of Ukrainian mistakes is a chapter that is very linked to that of Russian success. Still taking into account the disproportion of men and equipment, the lack of artillery, and the current absence of defenses against aviation, I believe that some errors in the approach and tactics at the local command level were decisive:
a) The Ukrainians were very good at defending on the flanks, while in the city areas, they substantially relied on the fortified front lines of 2014. Perhaps also an excess of confidence, or perhaps the lack of planning of the previous months (or years), but there was a substantial absence of a well-thought-out second line system and fast communication channels, perhaps with mobile units ready to cover the gaps. It should also be noted that the area had been mined very little, dedicating this activity more to the areas outside the city (the famous flanks) than to the internal parts. As if the confidence in the 2014 fortifications was such as to discourage the Russians themselves
b) The bad weather blinded the drones, demonstrating the dependence on their eyes, on the Ukrainian side, which evidently reduced the classic Recon part, in favor of the automatic one, guaranteed by the drones. However, the fog played some nasty tricks, causing the Russians to enter the city perimeter at least twice in the south and once in the north.
c)I Russians have used the sewer pipes to enter the area of Via Soborna, and also to circumvent the zenith in recent days. I wonder why these conduits were only known to the Russians, and why, if they were known to the Ukrainians, they were not mined or destroyed. This seems like a really big intelligence flaw on the Ukrainian side to me. This allowed the Russians to come out behind the fortified front lines and cut the communication between them and the rear guards.
d) Once these "breaks" in the front occurred, there was also some automatism and some excessive delay in trying to plug the leaks. The Russians, contemptuous of the human and resource costs, threw their numbers into these holes, and some delays, as in the case of the industrial zone and Via Soborna, were fundamental.
Once the Russians managed to enter the urban perimeter of the city, the fate of the battle was essentially sealed. Not only the numbers, but also the aviation and artillery, mean that at this moment the Russians have a decisive advantage, especially in urban warfare. An advantage that is more difficult to capitalize when we talk about open areas (see Stepove and Sjeverne).
Surely the defense of Avdiivka could have been better prepared, at least to try to reach spring and slow down Russian logistics with the mud. The Ukrainian mistakes are perhaps not even very serious and are typical of battlefields. The problem is that the limited artillery ammunition, and the current impotence against the Russian air force, mean that every slightest Ukrainian mistake is fatal.
Above all because the Russian army, which traditionally does not worry about losses, has also demonstrated (already this summer) a surprising ability to adapt, which it certainly did not show at the beginning of the war, learning at its own expense from the enormous mistakes of the beginning.
It is hoped that even these defeats will help the Ukrainians to learn the lesson and improve and adapt to the changing war. Avdiivka is a great tactical success for the Russians, who remove the Ukrainian artillery from Donetsk, but it has very low strategic importance compared to other fronts.
It is hoped that the Ukrainian awareness (which I seem to glimpse) of a new defensive strategy (which I was already talking about in November), and the ability to learn from mistakes, will be of help in the future, when the entry into service of the planes (delayed spring\summer) will certainly limit the role of the Russian air force, and when (we hope) the ammunition needed to implement good defensive tactics has arrived, which is the basis for future changes and prospects.
It must be said that I do not deny the January analysis, which was based on the data I had at the time and on the type of war that was taking place, an incorrect assessment was revealed due to the change in some conditions of the war, which I am going to analyze and to expand:
1) The Russians sent an incredible amount of men and equipment. Probably more than anyone imagined. I also wonder, would this alone have guaranteed the conquest of Avdiivka if there had been no other factors? I answer no. The attack on Stepove and Sjeverne (i.e. on the flanks), if conducted in the same manner as in January, would not have had any effect, considering that the thaw would have made these areas even more difficult for Russian logistics.
2) I believe that a fundamental point is the Russian ability to adapt to the reality of the battlefield. They stopped (or rather, slowed down, continuing to exert constant pressure) with the disastrous mechanized attacks of January, and began to move in small groups of infantry, supported by a lot of artillery and a lot of aviation (fab), which especially in the city area contributed to the crumbling of the fortifications. The Russians identified a weak point in the water basin area, and began to push into this area, also helped by some Ukrainian errors especially in the southern sector.
3) The chapter of Ukrainian mistakes is a chapter that is very linked to that of Russian success. Still taking into account the disproportion of men and equipment, the lack of artillery, and the current absence of defenses against aviation, I believe that some errors in the approach and tactics at the local command level were decisive:
a) The Ukrainians were very good at defending on the flanks, while in the city areas, they substantially relied on the fortified front lines of 2014. Perhaps also an excess of confidence, or perhaps the lack of planning of the previous months (or years), but there was a substantial absence of a well-thought-out second line system and fast communication channels, perhaps with mobile units ready to cover the gaps. It should also be noted that the area had been mined very little, dedicating this activity more to the areas outside the city (the famous flanks) than to the internal parts. As if the confidence in the 2014 fortifications was such as to discourage the Russians themselves
b) The bad weather blinded the drones, demonstrating the dependence on their eyes, on the Ukrainian side, which evidently reduced the classic Recon part, in favor of the automatic one, guaranteed by the drones. However, the fog played some nasty tricks, causing the Russians to enter the city perimeter at least twice in the south and once in the north.
c)I Russians have used the sewer pipes to enter the area of Via Soborna, and also to circumvent the zenith in recent days. I wonder why these conduits were only known to the Russians, and why, if they were known to the Ukrainians, they were not mined or destroyed. This seems like a really big intelligence flaw on the Ukrainian side to me. This allowed the Russians to come out behind the fortified front lines and cut the communication between them and the rear guards.
d) Once these "breaks" in the front occurred, there was also some automatism and some excessive delay in trying to plug the leaks. The Russians, contemptuous of the human and resource costs, threw their numbers into these holes, and some delays, as in the case of the industrial zone and Via Soborna, were fundamental.
Once the Russians managed to enter the urban perimeter of the city, the fate of the battle was essentially sealed. Not only the numbers, but also the aviation and artillery, mean that at this moment the Russians have a decisive advantage, especially in urban warfare. An advantage that is more difficult to capitalize when we talk about open areas (see Stepove and Sjeverne).
Surely the defense of Avdiivka could have been better prepared, at least to try to reach spring and slow down Russian logistics with the mud. The Ukrainian mistakes are perhaps not even very serious and are typical of battlefields. The problem is that the limited artillery ammunition, and the current impotence against the Russian air force, mean that every slightest Ukrainian mistake is fatal.
Above all because the Russian army, which traditionally does not worry about losses, has also demonstrated (already this summer) a surprising ability to adapt, which it certainly did not show at the beginning of the war, learning at its own expense from the enormous mistakes of the beginning.
It is hoped that even these defeats will help the Ukrainians to learn the lesson and improve and adapt to the changing war. Avdiivka is a great tactical success for the Russians, who remove the Ukrainian artillery from Donetsk, but it has very low strategic importance compared to other fronts.
It is hoped that the Ukrainian awareness (which I seem to glimpse) of a new defensive strategy (which I was already talking about in November), and the ability to learn from mistakes, will be of help in the future, when the entry into service of the planes (delayed spring\summer) will certainly limit the role of the Russian air force, and when (we hope) the ammunition needed to implement good defensive tactics has arrived, which is the basis for future changes and prospects.
teknohippi
Ylipäällikkö
Nammo ja muut näyttää keskittyvän hyvin yksipuolisesti 155mm murkulan tuotannon kasvattamiseen. Muutenkin nyt nähdyn perusteella tykistöaseessa ei putket maksa vaan ne murkulat. M777 hinta lienee jossain 4milj USD paikkeilla. Yhdellä tuliputkella ammuttaneen tiukassa paikassa se 5000 laukausta, a' 8000eur/kpl. Eli jo yhden tuliputken kulutuksella laukaukset 40milj ja tykki 4milj. Tuo tykin hinnan säästää jo logistiikassa äkkiä kun jää jälleen yksi ampumatarvike kaikkineen pois.
En ihmettelisi yhtään jos nykytilanteessa olisi laskettu niin että jopa 122mm panssarihaupitsi kannattaa pistää pikaisesti Ukrainan käyttöön ja katsoa tilalle vaikka 155mm vedettävääkin. Kun hankkii tuliputket ulkomailta niin kotimainen osaaminen rakentaa kyllä sen ympärille vedettävän alustan. Ukrainan opeilla panssarihaupitsi on hyvä mutta valitettavasti tykistömassaa tarvitaan paljon. Dronevaaran takia 10 vedettävää onkin turvallisempi kuin yksi panssarihaupitsi. Tuollainen 122mm on aivan onneton kantamansa takia kun dronet ylettää liian runsaslukuisesti.
Pääkirjoitus: Putin on pysäytettävä Ukrainassa – Venäjän voitto olisi katastrofi myös Suomelle
Länsimaiden pitäisi lisätä tukeaan Ukrainalle, mutta Münchenin turvallisuusraportti herättää huolta tukihalujen hiipumisesta.
www.is.fi
Täyttä totta kirjoittas IS. Saas nähä löytyykö euroopasta vielä kivekset ennenkuin on myöhäistä.
Rantojen mies
Kenraali
Paljolti samaa mieltä, mutta se ei muuta sitä, että ryssä etenee, valtaa lisää alaa, saa "voittoja" ja ukrainalaiset joutuu vetäytymään vaikeissa oloissa. Aina vetäytymisessä on riskit isommalle murtumiselle ja vaikutus joukkojen moraaliin.
Huolestuttavaa on se, että sekä taistelevat osat on Ukrainalla selkeästi alivoimaisia, myös heidän ilmoituksen mukaan, että taktisen ja strategisen reservin ainakin näennäinen puuttuminen.
Tämä sama kuvio on toistunut jo liian monta kertaa. Liian monta kertaa on "tuotettu hirvittäviä tappioita", "kaupunki on hallussa" ja sitten vetäydytty, kaikkien ennalta näkemän käsikirjoituksen mukaan. Jos Ukraina ei saa selkeästi lisää joukkoja jostain ( 200 000 - 300 000 kokoluokkaa), mikä tässä kaavassa ei ole venäjän kannalta edullinen ja toistettava?
Ilman merkittävää tukea lännestä ( eli saat*na vihdoin ja viimein ne F-16, IT:tä ja kaikkea epäsuoraa) plus Ukrainan merkittävää mobilisaatiota, tämä ei pääty hyvin.
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Mitään muuta ryssällä ei näytä keinovalikoimassa olevan kuin tämä lihamyllytaktiikka. Ja siviilikohteiden ja infran pommittaminen. Vähät välittävät omista tappioistaan. Laskevat kylmästi että vaikka edettäisiin se 10 metriä per viikko, on se silti etenemistä. Ja aivan takuulla laskevat sen varaan, että Ukrainan auttajat lännessä heittävät pyyhkeen kehään, kun mukavuudenhaluisina pehmoina eivät tätä pidemmän päälle jaksa.
Kuulemma pohjoiskorealaisia ballistisia ohjuksia oli Kunikovin lastina
[medialink]Linkki: https://twitter.com/JarekKuczko/status/1759218587305173495[/medialink]
[medialink]Linkki: https://twitter.com/JarekKuczko/status/1759218867421716635[/medialink]
[medialink]Linkki: https://twitter.com/JarekKuczko/status/1759218587305173495[/medialink]
[medialink]Linkki: https://twitter.com/JarekKuczko/status/1759218867421716635[/medialink]
Myrskyhiiri
Respected Leader
Tässä on hyvä sivu tarkistaa:
Answering The Call: Heavy Weaponry Supplied To Ukraine
www.oryxspioenkop.com
ps. Siellä on merkattu Suomesta mm. 152H89, 130K54 ja 122H74
Oli siellä myös
Mutta mielenkiintoisempaa on että olisi 122mm panssarihaupitseja mennyt, omilla teloilla liikkuvia siis.
Puolasta olisi lähtenyt menemään Ukrainalle viime kesästä alkaen iso määrä Rosomak:eja. Onko kellään tietoa miten AMV on kestänyt osumaa tuolla itärintamalla? Vai onko ne niin hyviä ettei niihin osu?
Viimeksi muokattu:
Von Telkka
Kersantti
Ottipas se jotenkin tunteisiin tuon tarinan lukeminen.Kasperin tarina.
Kasper Alhoniemi, 23, kaatui taistellessaan Ukrainan puolesta – tämä on hänen tarinansa
Kasper Alhoniemi oli ensimmäinen Ukrainan puolella taistellut suomalainen, joka kaatui. Ylen saama poikkeuksellinen materiaali kertoo hänen tarinansa.
Ohjus-tiedustelija
Ylipäällikkö
122Psh74 "tilalle" on jo tullut K9 moukareita(varmaan suunnitelmissa korvata ne niillä kokonaan), niin on tuo mahdollista (ei välttämättä kaikkia ole kerralla mennyt + aikoinaan noita tuli "spare parts" termin alla huomattava määrä itse 72kpl lisäksi, mutta ei ole tietoa mitä "osia/kokonaisuuksia" se sisälsi), toki 122H63:sia pitäisi olla ennestäänkin reilusti yli SA-vahvuuksien niin sieltä olisi teoriassa ollut helpompi irroittaa
Ohjus-tiedustelija
Ylipäällikkö
Kerro toki lisää?
Ylimatruusi
Kapteeni
Eikös noita 122H63 ole vain noin 500kpl. Määrä on laatua.122Psh74 "tilalle" on jo tullut K9 moukareita(varmaan suunnitelmissa korvata ne niillä kokonaan), niin on tuo mahdollista (ei välttämättä kaikkia ole kerralla mennyt + aikoinaan noita tuli "spare parts" termin alla huomattava määrä itse 72kpl lisäksi, mutta ei ole tietoa mitä "osia/kokonaisuuksia" se sisälsi), toki 122H63:sia pitäisi olla ennestäänkin reilusti yli SA-vahvuuksien niin sieltä olisi teoriassa ollut helpompi irroittaa