Antares
Respected Leader
Ukrainalainen OSINT-ryhmä vishun_military on julkaissut tuoreen artikkelin jossa on tarkasteltu ryssän varastotukikohtia.
Julkaisivat 11.4.2024 artikkelin jossa keskityttiin panssarivaunuja varastoiviin tukikohtiin ja niiden tuoreisiin satelliittikuviin. Sen artikkelin tekstin voi lukea tästä viestistä: LINKKI
Nyt he ovat tehneet saman tarkastelun mutta AFV-ajoneuvoja (käännös ukrainasta englanniksi tuottaa BBM) varastoivien tukikohtien osalta (BMP- BMD-, BTR- ja BRDM-2 sekä MT-LB vaunut).
Telegramissa julkaistun yhteenvedon käännös (lihavoinnit alkuperäisen lähteen): LÄHDE
Tässä varsinainen artikkeli (julkaistu 24.4.2024):
https://www.vishchun.com/post/tempy...idbuvaietsia_na_rosiiskykh_bazakh_zberihannia
After a large study of the tank potential of the Russian Federation, it is also worth looking at armored combat vehicles , the role of which has significantly increased in the tactics of the Russian offensive.
In this study, we will focus more on the processes that take place at the largest storage bases, because we do not have fresh satellite images of all the bases, where before the war there were as many as 14,000 units of BBM and special equipment based on BBM.
We analyzed the 2024 winter images and compared the number of cars with the 2021 count. This time we paid attention to the condition of the machines and divided them into two categories, because very interesting things are happening there.
The calculation of equipment was carried out by the analysts of " Military Fortune Teller " and Osinter Jompy , so we got two sources of information, which has the most positive impact on research.
The Fortune Teller's Count
We approached the calculation very conservatively. Machines with a whole body without visual signs of cannibalization were classified as " relatively good" , machines that have visually undergone or are undergoing the process of cannibalization (machines without turrets, with partially or completely disassembled mechanics) were classified as "disassembled into parts" . Empty bodies without tracks in disposal areas were not counted.
The calculation error is 5-7% plus or minus due to weather conditions, image quality and human factor.
Jompy count
Jompy did a much more extensive calculation and analyzed the equipment not only by suitability (bad/good), but also identified the types of machines. To begin with, a summary table with the number of bad/good cars.
And counting by types:
Jompy's count is more liberal with regard to unusable machinery. These are visually intact (not disassembled for parts) machines that are in terrible condition: they are located in remote areas of bases where there is no trace of activity, they are rusted, they have not moved for a decade, some have bushes and trees growing on them.
What the analysis showed
Despite small discrepancies in the numbers, the overall result of the count (the number of all machines at the bases) at the strategic level coincided with a small error.
As a result of the analysis, we saw two main events:
(jätän lainaamatta artikkelin osan jossa käsitellään yksityiskohtaisesti varastotukikohtia yksi toisensa jälkeen - sen voi käydä lukemassa artikkelista linkin takaa - lainaan sitä seuraavat osuudet kokonaisuudessaan tähän jatkoksi)
What's next?
Although the Russians have a large number of BMP-1 and BTR-70/60 in stock, the capacity of repair plants is limited, which is why they are trying to restore the equipment directly at the storage bases by cannibalization.
The Russians are in a hurry and trying to squeeze the most out of their offensive, so in 2023 they used quick decisions to supply equipment to the army "here and now", exchanging quality for speed and quantity. That is why now, every day in the east, the positions are being stormed by endless columns of lured Päpelatians, who, after such losses, will sooner or later have to take a long operational break.
If you look at the calculation not so conservatively, then the vast majority of the equipment at these bases is not "liftable" and must be overhauled at the armored repair plant. Theoretically, everything can be restored, practically it will stretch for a long period of time.
Assessment of the pace of repair and production of BBM
This topic has always been difficult, and the exact numbers can be named for sure only by intelligence. We only have pre-war production figures, information from open sources about the processes at enterprises, the increase in staff and the figures of the increase in production declared by the Russians: "2 times more than last year", "we produced the same amount in one month as in the previous year" quarter" etc.
We can extract some figures from open sources, understand how the number of employees has increased and how production can increase at the same time, comparing with pre-war production. The figures are indicative and cannot reflect a complete and accurate picture.
Some samples of equipment are not included, as the exact numbers are not known. We are talking about armored cars, MRAPs, BMD-4, BTR-D, etc. They are not so numerous, but they must be taken into account.
Repair is not manufacturing
And let's decipher a little some numbers that may seem overestimated to someone. Let's take BMP-3 and Kurganmashzavod as an example. Someone will say that the plant cannot ship as many as 360 cars a year, but they do not take into account that they include repaired units of equipment.
In September 2023, there were a hundred units of BMP-3 with different camouflage on the Kurganmashzavod site. That is, these are previously produced BMP-3 at different times for different military units. It is likely that these vehicles undergo repairs and receive an additional set of 688M-SB3KDZ armor, after which
This is also explained by the graph , on which you can see a significant increase in the losses of BMP-3 688M-SB3KDZ. The root of this growth is pictured above. To take a car from the army and add armor to it is not to be made from scratch.
I would also like to draw attention to the fact that the figures of the increase in production announced by the Russians should be treated with extreme skepticism, since these figures are primarily based on propaganda.
BMP-1 at site 560 BTRZ
The propagandist of the "Military Acceptance" program pokes his finger at one of the BMPs and wonders how much time should be spent on restoring such a vehicle?
Further, the propagandist's off-screen voice explains that if it used to take months to restore such a car, now cars in this condition are restored in a matter of days. Shall we do a little fact check?
Here is this very site in June 2022:
June 2022
And here is the same site on March 29, 2024:
March 29, 2024
Were all cars repaired in "a matter of days"? Is it a piece of junk that hasn't even been touched? The situation is the same at another site. Only a small number of tanks were repaired.
In general, work is carried out primarily on cars in better condition from storage bases. Also, the factories are charged with equipment that was damaged at the front, which then goes to the general column of "manufactured machines".
Result
As with tanks, the Russians still have enough material to restore BBM.
Depletion of "lifting" reserves is expected closer to 2026 if current average annual loss rates are maintained.
-
Varastotukikohtia seuraava ja satelliittikuvista ajoneuvoja laskeva Jompy avusti vishun_military ryhmää yllä lainatun artikkelin teossa.
Hän kommentoi sitä näin:
Awesome article written by @Vishun_military!
If you want to check BMP cannibalization rates in the main Russian storage bases this is the best source right now.
It's been a pleasure working with them.
LINKKI
I'll publish my own analysis ASAP, although I might not have time until tomorrow.
-
Muistutan myös että Jompy kommentoi tätä laskelmaa twitterissä 21.4.2024, lainasin hänen kommenttinsa tässä viestissä: LINKKI
Sanoisin että hänen kommenttinsa tiivistyvät pitkälti näihin lauseisiin:
I just finished counting @Vishun_military 's footage of all major storage bases they bought to help them with AFVs. Without revealing anything, Russian storage situation is a lot more dire than I thought. Many bases are close to depletion and other still hold hundreds of armored vehicles, but they have been thoroughly cannibalized.
I always feared I was a bit optimistic with my 1,5-2 years until depletion of Russian stored equipment estimate, but now I think I'm being a bit conservative.
-
Footage is either from January, February or March 2024.
-
Kysymys: If you can say, what is your revised estimate of how much longer they have? Thanks for all the work you do!
Johon Jompy vastasi näin: 1-1,5 years, without accounting for external factors such as buying foreign equipment from friendly countries or managing to increase domestic production, and also considering Russia staying kinda close to their current attrition rate.
Julkaisivat 11.4.2024 artikkelin jossa keskityttiin panssarivaunuja varastoiviin tukikohtiin ja niiden tuoreisiin satelliittikuviin. Sen artikkelin tekstin voi lukea tästä viestistä: LINKKI
Nyt he ovat tehneet saman tarkastelun mutta AFV-ajoneuvoja (käännös ukrainasta englanniksi tuottaa BBM) varastoivien tukikohtien osalta (BMP- BMD-, BTR- ja BRDM-2 sekä MT-LB vaunut).
Telegramissa julkaistun yhteenvedon käännös (lihavoinnit alkuperäisen lähteen): LÄHDE
https://t.me/vishun_military/4044
️Military Fortune Teller
🗡The rate of deconservation of BBM is falling: what is happening at the Russian bases for storing armored vehicles? When will equipment supplies run out?
Vishun military team prepared a study of the state and process of deconservation of the fleet of armored combat vehicles by the Russian army during the invasion. Our research is based on the analysis of satellite images of storage bases, as well as information from open sources, the Jompi analyst also participated in the research .
You can get acquainted with the full results of the study on the website
https://www.vishchun.com/post/tempy...idbuvaietsia_na_rosiiskykh_bazakh_zberihannia
Summary. In the study, we compared snapshots of 6 major storage bases for 2024 and 2021. We divided the cars into two categories: relatively good and dismantled.
what happened As of 2021, the Russian Federation had 14,000 units of BBM in storage .
Russia has already deconserved 40% of BBM. That is why endless columns are currently storming the positions in the east every day, which after such losses will sooner or later have to take a long operational pause.
What now? According to Vishchun's conservative estimate , as of 2024, the Russian Federation has 3,617 BBMs in storage (at 5 analyzed bases), of which 23% are in dismantled condition . According to Jompy's liberal estimate, there are 3,821 (53%) of them, respectively , that is, the vast majority of equipment at these bases is not "liftable" and must undergo major repairs at the armored repair plants.
25-50% of the remains of the technique are unsuitable for restoration (depending on how conservatively you perceive the analysis). The rate of de-conservation of equipment has dropped significantly over the past 6 months.
How much BBM is produced per year? From 1,670 units - the enemy's ability to manufacture/repair per year. Repair is not manufacturing. Factory output statistics also include repaired units of equipment.
When will BBM end? 12-24 months - the period in which the enemy will run out of BBMs. Depletion of "lifting" reserves is expected closer to 2026 if current average annual loss rates are maintained.
If you liked the results of the work and our cooperation, be sure to write about it in the comments so that we know the need.
Telegram
️Military Fortune Teller
️
Military Vishun is an intelligence and analytical platform that collects and analyzes data about the armies of the world and Ukraine, including their military potential
@vishun_military_platform_bot - contact
t.me/vishun_military/4044
12.8Kviewsedited Apr 24 at 19:32
️Military Fortune Teller🗡The rate of deconservation of BBM is falling: what is happening at the Russian bases for storing armored vehicles? When will equipment supplies run out?
Vishun military team prepared a study of the state and process of deconservation of the fleet of armored combat vehicles by the Russian army during the invasion. Our research is based on the analysis of satellite images of storage bases, as well as information from open sources, the Jompi analyst also participated in the research .You can get acquainted with the full results of the study on the website
https://www.vishchun.com/post/tempy...idbuvaietsia_na_rosiiskykh_bazakh_zberihannia
Summary. In the study, we compared snapshots of 6 major storage bases for 2024 and 2021. We divided the cars into two categories: relatively good and dismantled.
what happened As of 2021, the Russian Federation had 14,000 units of BBM in storage .Russia has already deconserved 40% of BBM. That is why endless columns are currently storming the positions in the east every day, which after such losses will sooner or later have to take a long operational pause.What now? According to Vishchun's conservative estimate , as of 2024, the Russian Federation has 3,617 BBMs in storage (at 5 analyzed bases), of which 23% are in dismantled condition . According to Jompy's liberal estimate, there are 3,821 (53%) of them, respectively , that is, the vast majority of equipment at these bases is not "liftable" and must undergo major repairs at the armored repair plants.25-50% of the remains of the technique are unsuitable for restoration (depending on how conservatively you perceive the analysis). The rate of de-conservation of equipment has dropped significantly over the past 6 months.How much BBM is produced per year? From 1,670 units - the enemy's ability to manufacture/repair per year. Repair is not manufacturing. Factory output statistics also include repaired units of equipment.When will BBM end? 12-24 months - the period in which the enemy will run out of BBMs. Depletion of "lifting" reserves is expected closer to 2026 if current average annual loss rates are maintained.If you liked the results of the work and our cooperation, be sure to write about it in the comments so that we know the need.
Telegram
️Military Fortune Teller️Military Vishun is an intelligence and analytical platform that collects and analyzes data about the armies of the world and Ukraine, including their military potential@vishun_military_platform_bot - contact
t.me/vishun_military/4044
12.8Kviewsedited Apr 24 at 19:32
Tässä varsinainen artikkeli (julkaistu 24.4.2024):
https://www.vishchun.com/post/tempy...idbuvaietsia_na_rosiiskykh_bazakh_zberihannia
- 1 годину тому
- Read 6 min
The rate of deconservation of BBM is falling: what is happening at Russian storage bases
After a large study of the tank potential of the Russian Federation, it is also worth looking at armored combat vehicles , the role of which has significantly increased in the tactics of the Russian offensive.
In this study, we will focus more on the processes that take place at the largest storage bases, because we do not have fresh satellite images of all the bases, where before the war there were as many as 14,000 units of BBM and special equipment based on BBM.
We analyzed the 2024 winter images and compared the number of cars with the 2021 count. This time we paid attention to the condition of the machines and divided them into two categories, because very interesting things are happening there.
The calculation of equipment was carried out by the analysts of " Military Fortune Teller " and Osinter Jompy , so we got two sources of information, which has the most positive impact on research.
The Fortune Teller's Count
We approached the calculation very conservatively. Machines with a whole body without visual signs of cannibalization were classified as " relatively good" , machines that have visually undergone or are undergoing the process of cannibalization (machines without turrets, with partially or completely disassembled mechanics) were classified as "disassembled into parts" . Empty bodies without tracks in disposal areas were not counted.
The calculation error is 5-7% plus or minus due to weather conditions, image quality and human factor.
| Base | 2021 (High Marsed) | 01-02.2024 (relatively good) | 01-02.2024 (disassembled into spare parts) | Total 2024 | The percentage of cannibalized BBM |
| 22 (Buy) | 1220 | 700 | 30 | 730 | 4,11% |
| 1295 (Arsenyev) | 275 | 103 | 23 | 126 | 18,25% |
| 111 (Halgaso) | 1032 | 694 | 212 | 906 | 23,40% |
| 769 (Vagzhanova) | 989 | 137 | 464 | 601 | 77,20% |
| 6018 (Kamishlov) | 1194 | 545 | 60 | 605 | 9,92% |
| 2455 (Kozulka) | 1118 | 596 | 53 | 649 | 8,17% |
| Together | 5828 | 2775 | 842 | 3617 | 23,28% |
Jompy count
Jompy did a much more extensive calculation and analyzed the equipment not only by suitability (bad/good), but also identified the types of machines. To begin with, a summary table with the number of bad/good cars.
| Base | Working vehicles | Broken hulls | Total | cannibalized % |
| 3018th/6018th | 379 | 317 | 696 | 45.55% |
| 769th | 80 | 572 | 652 | 87.73% |
| 111th | 196 | 756 | 952 | 79.41% |
| 1295th | 103 | 101 | 204 | 49.51% |
| 2544th | 633 | 48 | 681 | 7.05% |
| 22nd | 417 | 219 | 636 | 34.43% |
| Total | 1808 | 2013 | 3821 | 52.68% |
And counting by types:
Jompy's count is more liberal with regard to unusable machinery. These are visually intact (not disassembled for parts) machines that are in terrible condition: they are located in remote areas of bases where there is no trace of activity, they are rusted, they have not moved for a decade, some have bushes and trees growing on them.
What the analysis showed
Despite small discrepancies in the numbers, the overall result of the count (the number of all machines at the bases) at the strategic level coincided with a small error.
As a result of the analysis, we saw two main events:
- The pace of equipment deconservation over the past 6 months has dropped significantly;
- 25-50% of the remains of the technique are unsuitable for restoration (depending on how conservatively you perceive the analysis).
(jätän lainaamatta artikkelin osan jossa käsitellään yksityiskohtaisesti varastotukikohtia yksi toisensa jälkeen - sen voi käydä lukemassa artikkelista linkin takaa - lainaan sitä seuraavat osuudet kokonaisuudessaan tähän jatkoksi)
What's next?
Although the Russians have a large number of BMP-1 and BTR-70/60 in stock, the capacity of repair plants is limited, which is why they are trying to restore the equipment directly at the storage bases by cannibalization.
The Russians are in a hurry and trying to squeeze the most out of their offensive, so in 2023 they used quick decisions to supply equipment to the army "here and now", exchanging quality for speed and quantity. That is why now, every day in the east, the positions are being stormed by endless columns of lured Päpelatians, who, after such losses, will sooner or later have to take a long operational break.
If you look at the calculation not so conservatively, then the vast majority of the equipment at these bases is not "liftable" and must be overhauled at the armored repair plant. Theoretically, everything can be restored, practically it will stretch for a long period of time.
Assessment of the pace of repair and production of BBM
This topic has always been difficult, and the exact numbers can be named for sure only by intelligence. We only have pre-war production figures, information from open sources about the processes at enterprises, the increase in staff and the figures of the increase in production declared by the Russians: "2 times more than last year", "we produced the same amount in one month as in the previous year" quarter" etc.
We can extract some figures from open sources, understand how the number of employees has increased and how production can increase at the same time, comparing with pre-war production. The figures are indicative and cannot reflect a complete and accurate picture.
| Institution | Model | Estimated annual amount |
| Arzamas Machine-Building Plant | BTR-82A/BTR-82AM (production) | 480 |
| Shcheglovsky Val | BMP-2/BMD-2 (repair/modernization) | 120 |
| Kurganmashzavod | BMP-3/BMP-2M (production and repair/modernization) | 360 |
| Rubtsovsky Machine-Building Plant | BMP-1AM (modernization) | 120 |
| 103 BTRZ | BMP-2/BRDM-2M (repair/modernization) | 70 |
| 163 BTRZ | BMP-1/BMP-2 (repair) | 200 |
| 560 BTRZ | BMP-2/BMD-2 (repair) | 160 |
| 81 BTRZ | BTR-82AM (modernization of BTR-80) | 160 (?) |
| 103 arsenal | BMP-1/2 | ? |
| 71-72 BTRZ | ? | ? |
| Together | - | from 1670 units |
Some samples of equipment are not included, as the exact numbers are not known. We are talking about armored cars, MRAPs, BMD-4, BTR-D, etc. They are not so numerous, but they must be taken into account.
Repair is not manufacturing
And let's decipher a little some numbers that may seem overestimated to someone. Let's take BMP-3 and Kurganmashzavod as an example. Someone will say that the plant cannot ship as many as 360 cars a year, but they do not take into account that they include repaired units of equipment.
In September 2023, there were a hundred units of BMP-3 with different camouflage on the Kurganmashzavod site. That is, these are previously produced BMP-3 at different times for different military units. It is likely that these vehicles undergo repairs and receive an additional set of 688M-SB3KDZ armor, after which
This is also explained by the graph , on which you can see a significant increase in the losses of BMP-3 688M-SB3KDZ. The root of this growth is pictured above. To take a car from the army and add armor to it is not to be made from scratch.
I would also like to draw attention to the fact that the figures of the increase in production announced by the Russians should be treated with extreme skepticism, since these figures are primarily based on propaganda.
BMP-1 at site 560 BTRZ
The propagandist of the "Military Acceptance" program pokes his finger at one of the BMPs and wonders how much time should be spent on restoring such a vehicle?
Further, the propagandist's off-screen voice explains that if it used to take months to restore such a car, now cars in this condition are restored in a matter of days. Shall we do a little fact check?
Here is this very site in June 2022:
June 2022
And here is the same site on March 29, 2024:
March 29, 2024
Were all cars repaired in "a matter of days"? Is it a piece of junk that hasn't even been touched? The situation is the same at another site. Only a small number of tanks were repaired.
In general, work is carried out primarily on cars in better condition from storage bases. Also, the factories are charged with equipment that was damaged at the front, which then goes to the general column of "manufactured machines".
Result
As with tanks, the Russians still have enough material to restore BBM.
Depletion of "lifting" reserves is expected closer to 2026 if current average annual loss rates are maintained.
-
Varastotukikohtia seuraava ja satelliittikuvista ajoneuvoja laskeva Jompy avusti vishun_military ryhmää yllä lainatun artikkelin teossa.
Hän kommentoi sitä näin:
Awesome article written by @Vishun_military!
If you want to check BMP cannibalization rates in the main Russian storage bases this is the best source right now.
It's been a pleasure working with them.
LINKKI
I'll publish my own analysis ASAP, although I might not have time until tomorrow.
-
Muistutan myös että Jompy kommentoi tätä laskelmaa twitterissä 21.4.2024, lainasin hänen kommenttinsa tässä viestissä: LINKKI
Sanoisin että hänen kommenttinsa tiivistyvät pitkälti näihin lauseisiin:
I just finished counting @Vishun_military 's footage of all major storage bases they bought to help them with AFVs. Without revealing anything, Russian storage situation is a lot more dire than I thought. Many bases are close to depletion and other still hold hundreds of armored vehicles, but they have been thoroughly cannibalized.
I always feared I was a bit optimistic with my 1,5-2 years until depletion of Russian stored equipment estimate, but now I think I'm being a bit conservative.
-
Footage is either from January, February or March 2024.
-
Kysymys: If you can say, what is your revised estimate of how much longer they have? Thanks for all the work you do!
Johon Jompy vastasi näin: 1-1,5 years, without accounting for external factors such as buying foreign equipment from friendly countries or managing to increase domestic production, and also considering Russia staying kinda close to their current attrition rate.
Viimeksi muokattu:
