tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Viron pääministeri. Upea nainen. On selkärankaa.
Ukrainan konflikti/sota
Taistelu Krimistä alkoi jo ajat sitten poistattamalla lentokoneita ja laivasto paikalta. Se jatkui sillan lojauttamisella, jonka johdosta venäläisillä on isoakin isompi logistinen ongelma. Krimille ei saa millään ilveellä tarpeeksi tavaraa pitämään 2.5 miljoonaa siviiliä hengissä.
Anakin joutuvat ryssät vetämään joukkonsa kunnolla joen taakse, tulva nääs tulee just sille puolelle jokea, mihin vetäytyvät...
saftamil
Kenraali
Varautuminen on hyvästä ja tervettä! Jos huolestuttavat analyysit tulevat pitkänlinjan kirjoittajilta, joilla selvästikään ei ole muuta agendaa, luen niitä suurella mielenkiinnolla.
Jos analyysit tulevat uusilta kirjoittajilta, joilla ei ole merkittävää taustaa osoittamassa heidän todellista näkemystä, suhtaudun niihin kriittisesti.
Toistan itseäni, pelon lietsonta palvelee rysyjen agendaa. Viideskolonna on Suomessa ajanut tätä joko tarkoituksellisesti tai tahattomasti vuosikymmenten ajan.
Täällä toivotaan Ukrainan voittoa se on ainoa ainoa vaihtoehto! Ukraina taistelee tällä hetkellä meidän kaikkien puolesta!
Kunnia Ukrainalle! Kunnia Sankareille!
teknohippi
Ylipäällikkö
Tilanteen jäädytystä en kyllä ymmärrä miten se olisi mahdollista, ryssältä palaa joka päivä se ~500 örkkiä rivistä. Tämä tahti alkoi pysyä vakiona kun ensimmäiset kunnolla koulutetut ja varustetut tuli Ukrainalle riviin.
Kherson koko alueena ja Enerhodar myös on huolloltaan Kerchin salmen varassa noin käytännössä. Jos rintamaa ei saa huollettua Khersoniaa, ei sitä saa huollettua Krimilläkään. Terävin kärki on syöty tai kiinni etulinjassa ryssällä niin mitähän tapahtuu kun rintama murtuu Khersonissa. Tuo on hyvin lähellä sitä että samalla rynnistyksellä mennään sitten Kerchin salmelle asti kun ryssä alkaa etenemään takaperin. LKP tuli kun ei saada muten väkeä riviin, joten tuolla on sitten mobikkeja jollain kalustolla. Vihreä pulla-uaz ja rynkky lienee ne varusteet, tosin uaz myytiin että saivat ruokaa.
En itse keksi että mistä niitä joukkoja kaivetaan kun nykyinen etulijan on kulutettu loppuun. Ukrainalle taasen tulee kokoajan uutta väkeä lännessä koulutettuna&varustettuna. Oma koulutus päälle.
Antares
Respected Leader
Ketju Putinin julistaman poikkeustilan antamista valtuuksista:
Yesterday, #Putin declared martial law in parts of Russian-occupied #Ukraine and created a legal framework to move closer to martial law in parts of #Russia (detailed below). I and
@TheStudyofWar team examined his presidential decrees. A thread:
#Putin's moves to full-scale martial law are disordered—a competent military should implement economic mobilization, secure transportation, and coordinate territorial defense before or as mobilization begins, not as follow-on reserve mobilization nears its completion.
These moves are likely to fulfill basic military requirements—feeding, housing, equipping, and transporting troops to the front lines—and may force defense contractors or other private businesses to align with government production requirements.
#Putin’s moves also allow for better control of both the #Russian population and the #Ukrainian civilian populations in #Russian-occupied parts of #Ukraine.
But Putin was always going to do these things–martial law simply provides the framework to expand them. He seems to believe that using Russian law as a veneer lends legitimacy to his illegal war of choice.
Putin has slow-rolled his introduction of legal concepts and frameworks like military and economic mobilization, annexation, and martial law to the Russian population since September, attempting to normalize these concepts and limit domestic dissent.
Putin likely understands that these measures are unpopular but may be counting on an upswell of fatalistic patriotism as more Russian families & businesses become tied to, & implicated in, the war. He’s slowly bringing the pot to a boil to prevent the people from leaping out.
By gradually introducing additional measures, Putin likely also intends to improve the state’s implementation of concepts like mobilization, attempting to create a more competent bureaucracy to implement autumn conscription and likely future waves of mobilization.
That is what yesterday’s decrees are really about: preparing the Russian government & population for more. More restrictions, more losses, & more mobilization in the months & years to come. Putin now has the legal framework he needs. He is confusing legality with legitimacy. End.
@TheStudyofWar team examined his presidential decrees. A thread:
#Putin's moves to full-scale martial law are disordered—a competent military should implement economic mobilization, secure transportation, and coordinate territorial defense before or as mobilization begins, not as follow-on reserve mobilization nears its completion.
These moves are likely to fulfill basic military requirements—feeding, housing, equipping, and transporting troops to the front lines—and may force defense contractors or other private businesses to align with government production requirements.
#Putin’s moves also allow for better control of both the #Russian population and the #Ukrainian civilian populations in #Russian-occupied parts of #Ukraine.
But Putin was always going to do these things–martial law simply provides the framework to expand them. He seems to believe that using Russian law as a veneer lends legitimacy to his illegal war of choice.
Putin has slow-rolled his introduction of legal concepts and frameworks like military and economic mobilization, annexation, and martial law to the Russian population since September, attempting to normalize these concepts and limit domestic dissent.
Putin likely understands that these measures are unpopular but may be counting on an upswell of fatalistic patriotism as more Russian families & businesses become tied to, & implicated in, the war. He’s slowly bringing the pot to a boil to prevent the people from leaping out.
By gradually introducing additional measures, Putin likely also intends to improve the state’s implementation of concepts like mobilization, attempting to create a more competent bureaucracy to implement autumn conscription and likely future waves of mobilization.
That is what yesterday’s decrees are really about: preparing the Russian government & population for more. More restrictions, more losses, & more mobilization in the months & years to come. Putin now has the legal framework he needs. He is confusing legality with legitimacy. End.
Kiina taitaa olla ongelmallinen tossa kauppasaarrossa, katoin huvikseni pari Alteran Cyclone IV protolautaa aliexpresistä ja niitä oli myyty lähinnä ryssälään ja ukrainaan.(sinällään ei yllättävää, ryssät ovat monessa tuotteessa suurin yksittäinen ostaja aliexpressissä)
viime ajan huhut ryssän vetäytymisistä ovat mielenkiintoisia mutta saas nähdä, onhan näitä huhuja pyörinyt jatkuvasti alkaen putten välittömästi tappavasta kivessyövästä(tm)
hyvis
Eversti
Niitä haavakkoja, jotka olisivat länsimaisella kenttälääkinnällä selvinneet, on tullut alusta lähtien todella paljon. Tämä johtuu osittain ihan vanjan systeemistä, jossa hyökkäys on pääasiallinen taistelutapa. Tällöin haavoittuneita ei juuri kyetä tai välttämättä edes pyritä evakuoimaan. Tähän viittaa myös se, että lääkintämiehiä on organisaatiossa tolkuttoman vähän, eikä haavoittuneiden evakuointiin tarkoitettuja ajoneuvoja ole komppaniatasolla lainkaan, jolloin ne kriittiset ensimmäiset tunnit haavoittumisen jälkeen kuluvat odotellessa. Sitten kun vanja alkaa improvisoimaan, on tulos aika lailla ennalta arvattavissa.
...Ja mitäs sitten, jos sanovat "ei"? Ollaan hiljaa ja nyökkäillään? "No ne nyt sitten vie droneja ryssille"?
Sanavalmis Muurinen
Kenraali
Ukrainalaiset ovat rakentaneet asiallisen korsusaunan sinne jonnekin.
Coffee Man
Respected Leader
Leaderdog
Kaukopartio
Nyt siitä business ideaa, eturintamalle kovanluokan saunamatkoja myymään, lähden heti jos myyntiin tulee..........Ukrainalaiset ovat rakentaneet asiallisen korsusaunan sinne jonnekin.
Jenkeiltä tuo onnistui jo 60-luvulla, joten on ihan mahdollista että venäjä on 55 vuodessa saavuttanut saman teknologisen tason.
https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Forrestalin_tulipalo
Sanotaan, että mitään pakotteiden poistamista on turha odotella. Sanotaan, että maassa kapinoivat ihmiset alkavat saada tukea ulkoapäin.
Ja siis voidaan sanoa myös toisinpäin. Lopetat ne dronekaupat ja saat alkaa myydä kaasua Eurooppaan.
Antares
Respected Leader
Pitkä ketju siitä miten Putin on keskittänyt valtaa sodan pitkittyessä pienemmälle porukalle ja mihin se voi johtaa:
Putin is consolidating his power projection system around those willing to pursue his maximalist goals in Ukraine, increasingly relying on a smaller cadre of devoted followers and a silent majority who will simply comply. My latest at @TheStudyofWar:
https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...disappoint-multiple-competing-factions-russia
We should not underestimate Putin’s ability to stay in power nor Russia’s ability to normalize a new worse reality. However, Putin is on a path to disappoint all elements of his power projection system, as he is consolidating this system around conflicting objectives.
The Kremlin’s reality problem in Ukraine is too big for any propaganda to close, while Russia’s capability gap requires fixing compounded mistakes of the past 20 years, not just the past 8 months.
Putin is neither addressing the systemic issues that led to the erosion of Russian capabilities nor is he trying to appease his entire base or change their perception of the war in Ukraine.
Instead, Putin is “crystallizing” the Russian system—the people, the regime, and the information space—around his maximalist objectives in Ukraine and those who will pursue them.
Putin is doubling down on his central goals and narratives, including securing complete control of Ukraine. Putin is spotlighting extreme nationalists in his regime willing or seemingly willing to pursue Putin’s goals in Ukraine regardless of the cost.
Putin is also orienting on those who will get in line—regardless of their beliefs. The mobilization is selecting precisely for this type. While some Russians fled, many stayed and have been marching obediently as Russian priests and musical bands send them off to Ukraine.
Putin’s “get in line or get out” approach worked for him in the past. Each time Putin tightened his grip on power, most of the Russian population and the Kremlin’s inner circles normalized a new and often worse reality.
This time, however, Putin is attempting to crystallize the system around increasingly conflicting objectives, introducing a schism and risking collision with his own base.
Putin is on a trajectory to disappoint the extreme nationalists rallying around the idea of a total victory in Ukraine, which he cannot deliver. Even the most extreme options are unlikely to bridge the gap between Russia’s capabilities and Putin’s unchanged goals in Ukraine.
The nationalists, who are trying to get Russia back on track to “winning” in Ukraine, are in for a disappointing surprise: attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure and scapegoating the MoD may provide short-lived illusions of action but not lasting effects on the battlefield.
Putin is also on a collision course with the core elements of his regime whose personal power is linked to Russia’s and who may not wish to sacrifice Russia’s entire long-term strength in pursuit of Putin’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine.
The invasion of Ukraine is eroding Russia’s perceived and real power. Russia has expended some of its best equipment and manpower (the most willing and able) in the war in Ukraine. It will take years to replenish these losses, especially among officers.
The war revealed limitations in Russia's influence. Belarus is Russia’s co-belligerent in this war. However, Putin has never managed to force Lukashenko to fully commit to fighting in Ukraine—despite constant efforts to do so and years of investments into control over Belarus.
Russia’s global value proposition has decreased—be it the weapons or technology Russia can sell, the assistance it can provide, or the threats it can make.
The elements of Putin’s regime who may not wish to sacrifice Russia’s entire long-term strength in pursuit of Putin’s objectives in Ukraine may be few and those that exist may never push back. But Putin cannot afford to alienate them and rely solely on extreme nationalists.
Putin has also started to project weakness. His consolidation further removes him from knowledge and competence because he is not selecting for either.
Competence and knowledge matter for more than just Russian attempts to reverse the battlefield momentum. The perception of cluelessness can indicate weakness. And a perception of weakness can be lethal in a system that is built solely on the premise of strength.
None of these risks make Putin instantly vulnerable. The West should not underestimate the resilience of Putin’s regime or the ability of Russians to get in line and normalize an increasingly worse reality.
However, Russia’s military setbacks will likely worsen the schism within Putin’s regime. Those who seek a total victory in Ukraine will eventually realize that Putin is unlikely to deliver it.
Those who care about Russia preserving at least some of its power and global standing for sake of their own power likely already realize that the invasion of Ukraine may degrade Russia’s power in perpetuity.
The West must help Ukraine make Russia fail on the battlefield faster. Russia cannot reverse its lost momentum in Ukraine rapidly. Ukraine has a window of opportunity to further liberate its territories and people.
The West must also be laser-focused on depriving Russia of military technology. Putin will not hesitate to throw additional people at the problem in Ukraine.
The desire for a powerful Russia that is based on control of Ukraine extends beyond Putin. His errors may take him down in the process—only for others with more effective approaches to carry the mantle forward.
This makes the question of the Russian ability to produce heavy and advanced weapons one of the most essential dynamics of the next few years. Efforts to degrade Russia’s military-industrial complex should be a priority for the West and Ukraine.
https://www.understandingwar.org/ba...disappoint-multiple-competing-factions-russia
We should not underestimate Putin’s ability to stay in power nor Russia’s ability to normalize a new worse reality. However, Putin is on a path to disappoint all elements of his power projection system, as he is consolidating this system around conflicting objectives.
The Kremlin’s reality problem in Ukraine is too big for any propaganda to close, while Russia’s capability gap requires fixing compounded mistakes of the past 20 years, not just the past 8 months.
Putin is neither addressing the systemic issues that led to the erosion of Russian capabilities nor is he trying to appease his entire base or change their perception of the war in Ukraine.
Instead, Putin is “crystallizing” the Russian system—the people, the regime, and the information space—around his maximalist objectives in Ukraine and those who will pursue them.
Putin is doubling down on his central goals and narratives, including securing complete control of Ukraine. Putin is spotlighting extreme nationalists in his regime willing or seemingly willing to pursue Putin’s goals in Ukraine regardless of the cost.
Putin is also orienting on those who will get in line—regardless of their beliefs. The mobilization is selecting precisely for this type. While some Russians fled, many stayed and have been marching obediently as Russian priests and musical bands send them off to Ukraine.
Putin’s “get in line or get out” approach worked for him in the past. Each time Putin tightened his grip on power, most of the Russian population and the Kremlin’s inner circles normalized a new and often worse reality.
This time, however, Putin is attempting to crystallize the system around increasingly conflicting objectives, introducing a schism and risking collision with his own base.
Putin is on a trajectory to disappoint the extreme nationalists rallying around the idea of a total victory in Ukraine, which he cannot deliver. Even the most extreme options are unlikely to bridge the gap between Russia’s capabilities and Putin’s unchanged goals in Ukraine.
The nationalists, who are trying to get Russia back on track to “winning” in Ukraine, are in for a disappointing surprise: attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure and scapegoating the MoD may provide short-lived illusions of action but not lasting effects on the battlefield.
Putin is also on a collision course with the core elements of his regime whose personal power is linked to Russia’s and who may not wish to sacrifice Russia’s entire long-term strength in pursuit of Putin’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine.
The invasion of Ukraine is eroding Russia’s perceived and real power. Russia has expended some of its best equipment and manpower (the most willing and able) in the war in Ukraine. It will take years to replenish these losses, especially among officers.
The war revealed limitations in Russia's influence. Belarus is Russia’s co-belligerent in this war. However, Putin has never managed to force Lukashenko to fully commit to fighting in Ukraine—despite constant efforts to do so and years of investments into control over Belarus.
Russia’s global value proposition has decreased—be it the weapons or technology Russia can sell, the assistance it can provide, or the threats it can make.
The elements of Putin’s regime who may not wish to sacrifice Russia’s entire long-term strength in pursuit of Putin’s objectives in Ukraine may be few and those that exist may never push back. But Putin cannot afford to alienate them and rely solely on extreme nationalists.
Putin has also started to project weakness. His consolidation further removes him from knowledge and competence because he is not selecting for either.
Competence and knowledge matter for more than just Russian attempts to reverse the battlefield momentum. The perception of cluelessness can indicate weakness. And a perception of weakness can be lethal in a system that is built solely on the premise of strength.
None of these risks make Putin instantly vulnerable. The West should not underestimate the resilience of Putin’s regime or the ability of Russians to get in line and normalize an increasingly worse reality.
However, Russia’s military setbacks will likely worsen the schism within Putin’s regime. Those who seek a total victory in Ukraine will eventually realize that Putin is unlikely to deliver it.
Those who care about Russia preserving at least some of its power and global standing for sake of their own power likely already realize that the invasion of Ukraine may degrade Russia’s power in perpetuity.
The West must help Ukraine make Russia fail on the battlefield faster. Russia cannot reverse its lost momentum in Ukraine rapidly. Ukraine has a window of opportunity to further liberate its territories and people.
The West must also be laser-focused on depriving Russia of military technology. Putin will not hesitate to throw additional people at the problem in Ukraine.
The desire for a powerful Russia that is based on control of Ukraine extends beyond Putin. His errors may take him down in the process—only for others with more effective approaches to carry the mantle forward.
This makes the question of the Russian ability to produce heavy and advanced weapons one of the most essential dynamics of the next few years. Efforts to degrade Russia’s military-industrial complex should be a priority for the West and Ukraine.
Täh... siis tuettaisiin mullaheita rahalla etteivät myisi droneja ryssille? Kuulostaa tosi toimivalle idealle...
Viimeksi muokattu:
proileri
Kenraali
Toki eri kysymys että onnistuuko se jäädytysyritys. Mutta tällä hetkellä Dnipro (Dnepr) tarjoaa siihen parhaan luonnollisen maastoesteen, minkä vastarannalle voi koettaa kaivautua siilipuolustukseen. Tietty joen yli vetäytyminen tarkoittaa että myös ryssällä on vaikea tehdä uutta hyökkäystä joen yli, mutta siihen ei näytä olevan rahkeita muutenkaan.
No ampuuhan ne; se tekojärvi varastoi veden, josta Krimin kanavaan johdetaan vettä:
Tämä menee kaikki nyt yli ymmärryksen..