Ukrainan konflikti/sota
Ylimatruusi
Kapteeni
Huomasitteko, tuli nopea ilmoitus. Joku pelaa surovikia ja sitä uutta alue komentajaa vastaan.
Antares
Respected Leader
Tuon BBC:n artikkelin takaa löytyi toinen heidän artikkelinsa, pari päivää vanha. Jos kiinnostaa lukea ennustuksia / arvauksia siitä, miten sota voisi sujua ensi vuonna niin tässä viisi vaihtoehtoa: LÄHDE
Lainaan alle kappaleiden otsikot jotka kielivät siitä mitä kukin asiantuntija ennakoi:
Uskon että nyt kun vuodenvaihde on käsillä, tullaan näkemään loputon määrä ennustuksia tulevan vuoden osalta. Ei se toki haittaa, kyllä hyvin perusteltuja näkemyksiä kuuntelee mielellään. Jos siis on lihaa sen analyysin luiden ympärillä.
Lainaan alle kappaleiden otsikot jotka kielivät siitä mitä kukin asiantuntija ennakoi:
'Russia's spring offensive will be key'
'Ukraine will win back its land'
'There is no end in sight'
'No other outcome except Russian defeat'
'Expect more of the same'
Uskon että nyt kun vuodenvaihde on käsillä, tullaan näkemään loputon määrä ennustuksia tulevan vuoden osalta. Ei se toki haittaa, kyllä hyvin perusteltuja näkemyksiä kuuntelee mielellään. Jos siis on lihaa sen analyysin luiden ympärillä.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-63987113
Could it conclude in the coming year and how - on the battlefield or at the negotiating table? Or might it grind on to 2024?
Those who seek to invade another country anywhere across the great Eurasian steppes are condemned eventually to winter in it.
Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin all had to keep their armies moving in the face of a steppes winter, and now - his invasion going backwards on the ground - Vladimir Putin is digging his forces in for the winter to await a new Russian offensive in the spring.
Both sides need a pause but the Ukrainians are better equipped and motivated to keep going, and we can expect them to maintain the pressure, at least in the Donbas.
Around Kreminna and Svatove they are very close to a big breakthrough that would throw Russian forces 40 miles back to the next natural defensive line, close to where their invasion effectively began in February.
Kyiv will be reluctant to halt when the immediate prize is so great. Ukrainian offensives might, nevertheless, pause down in the south-west, following the recovery of Kherson.
Crossing over to the east side of the Dnipro river to pressure Russia's vulnerable road and rail links into Crimea might be too demanding. But the possibility of Kyiv launching a surprise new offensive can never be ruled out.
For 2023, the key determinant will be the fate of Russia's spring offensive. Putin had admitted that about 50,000 of the newly mobilised troops are already at the front; the other 250,000 of those just mobilised are training for next year.
There is no scope for anything but more war until the fortunes of those new Russian forces are settled on the battlefield.
A short and unstable ceasefire is the only other prospect. Putin has made it clear he will not stop. And Ukraine has made it clear it is still fighting for its life.
Ukraine will win by restoring completely its territorial integrity by spring 2023 at the latest. Two factors are shaping this conclusion.
One is the motivation, determination and courage of the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian nation as a whole, which is unprecedented in modern war history.
The other is the fact that, after years of appeasement of a Russian dictator, the West has finally grown up to realise the magnitude of historical challenge it faces. This is best illustrated by a recent statement by Nato General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg.
"The price we pay is in money. While the price the Ukrainians pay is in blood. If authoritarian regimes see that force is rewarded we will all pay a much higher price. And the world will become a more dangerous world for all of us."
The exact timing of the inevitable Ukrainian victory will be determined by the speed at which Nato can deliver a new game-changing package of military assault weapons (tanks, planes, long-ranged missiles).
I expect Melitopol will become the key battle point in the coming months (maybe weeks). Having taken over Melitopol, Ukrainians will easily move to the Azov Sea, effectively cutting off supply and communication lines to Crimea.
Russian capitulation will be formally agreed upon at technical talks after devastating Ukrainian advances on the battleground.
The victorious powers - Ukraine, UK, USA - will shape a new international security architecture.
Vladimir Putin expected Ukraine's passive acceptance of its more powerful neighbour's actions, with no meaningful involvement of other countries. This grave miscalculation has led to a protracted conflict, with seemingly no end in sight.
The winter will be difficult, as Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure will try to break the morale and endurance of an already shattered population. But Ukrainian resilience has proved to be remarkable. They will stand firm. The war will drag on. And on.
The prospects for negotiation are bleak. For a potential peace deal the core demands of at least one side need to change. There is no evidence that this has happened, or that it will happen soon.
How will the end come, then?
The costs of the war, both material and human, might break the level of commitment of the Russian political elite. The key will be inside Russia.
Past wars in which miscalculation was a crucial element, such as Vietnam for United States, or Afghanistan for the Soviet Union, only ended in this way. Domestic political conditions shifted in the country that had miscalculated, making exit - either "honourable" or not - the only viable option.
This may only happen, however, if the West stands firm in its support for Ukraine, in the face of increased domestic pressures linked to the costs of the war.
Sadly, this will continue to be a long-protracted political, economic and military battle of resolve. And by the end of 2023 it will most probably still be ongoing.
It's too early to plan a victory parade in Kyiv but all the momentum is with Ukraine now and there is no doubt in my mind that they will win this war, probably in 2023.
Things will move slower over the winter but there's no doubt that Ukraine's forces will be better able to cope than Russia's because of all the winter equipment coming from the UK, Canada and Germany.
By January, Ukraine could be in a position to begin the final phase of the campaign which is the liberation of Crimea.
We know from history that war is a test of will and a test of logistics. When I see the determination of the Ukrainian people and soldiers, and the rapidly improving logistical situation for Ukraine, I see no other outcome but a Russian defeat.
The Russian pull-out from Kherson has partly led me to this conclusion. Firstly as a psychological boost for the Ukrainian people, secondly as a profound embarrassment for the Kremlin and thirdly by handing Ukraine's forces a key operational advantage - all approaches into Crimea are now within range of Ukrainian weapon systems.
I believe that the end of 2023 will see Crimea fully restored to Ukrainian control and sovereignty though there may be some sort or agreement that allows Russia to phase out some of its naval presence in Sevastopol… perhaps even to the end of the treaty (approximately 2025) that had existed before Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea.
Reconstruction efforts will be under way on the Ukrainian infrastructure along the Azov Sea coast, including the important ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, and the reopening of the North Crimean Canal that diverts water from the Dnipro to Crimea will be another important project receiving attention.
Instead of "how it's going to end" here is what each side would like to achieve in the next phase.
Only about half of Russia's 300,000 mobilised troops are already in the fighting zone. The rest, together with the forces freed for action after Kherson withdrawal, gives the Russians an opportunity to launch an offensive.
The occupation of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions will continue but a major Russian breakthrough like a drive from the south to Pavlograd to encircle the Ukrainian forces in the Donbas is less likely.
More probable is a continuation of current tactics - a slow grinding of Ukrainian forces on narrow directions and a slow advance, like in Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas, with possible same tactics in Svatove-Kreminna area.
Continuing targeting of Ukrainian energy infrastructure and other attacks on Ukrainian rear will complete this war of attrition strategy.
Significant Ukrainian forces were also freed after a Russian retreat from Kherson. For them the most strategically valuable direction is south, to Melitopol or Berdyansk, aiming to cut the Russian mainland corridor to Crimea. That would be a major Ukrainian victory, and that is exactly why Russians are fortifying Melitopol.
Another option for Ukraine is Svatove - success there would endanger the whole northern flank of the entire Russian frontline.
The big question is how many Ukrainian forces are free and available for the offensive at this point, and what timetable General Zaluzhnyi has on his desk stating how many new reserve brigades and corps that are being built will be ready in one, two or three months from now, including manpower, armoured vehicles and heavy weapons.
After the mud freezes, we will get the answer to this question. And this answer will get us a little closer to "how it's going to end".
The analysts were chosen for their military expertise and their mix of perspectives
Ukraine war: Five ways conflict could go in 2023
- Published 2 days ago
- Published 2 days ago
Could it conclude in the coming year and how - on the battlefield or at the negotiating table? Or might it grind on to 2024?
'Russia's spring offensive will be key'
Michael Clarke, associate director of the Strategic Studies Institute, Exeter, UKThose who seek to invade another country anywhere across the great Eurasian steppes are condemned eventually to winter in it.
Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin all had to keep their armies moving in the face of a steppes winter, and now - his invasion going backwards on the ground - Vladimir Putin is digging his forces in for the winter to await a new Russian offensive in the spring.
Both sides need a pause but the Ukrainians are better equipped and motivated to keep going, and we can expect them to maintain the pressure, at least in the Donbas.
Around Kreminna and Svatove they are very close to a big breakthrough that would throw Russian forces 40 miles back to the next natural defensive line, close to where their invasion effectively began in February.
Kyiv will be reluctant to halt when the immediate prize is so great. Ukrainian offensives might, nevertheless, pause down in the south-west, following the recovery of Kherson.
Crossing over to the east side of the Dnipro river to pressure Russia's vulnerable road and rail links into Crimea might be too demanding. But the possibility of Kyiv launching a surprise new offensive can never be ruled out.
For 2023, the key determinant will be the fate of Russia's spring offensive. Putin had admitted that about 50,000 of the newly mobilised troops are already at the front; the other 250,000 of those just mobilised are training for next year.
There is no scope for anything but more war until the fortunes of those new Russian forces are settled on the battlefield.
A short and unstable ceasefire is the only other prospect. Putin has made it clear he will not stop. And Ukraine has made it clear it is still fighting for its life.
'Ukraine will win back its land'
Andrei Piontkovsky, scientist and analyst based in Washington DCUkraine will win by restoring completely its territorial integrity by spring 2023 at the latest. Two factors are shaping this conclusion.
One is the motivation, determination and courage of the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian nation as a whole, which is unprecedented in modern war history.
The other is the fact that, after years of appeasement of a Russian dictator, the West has finally grown up to realise the magnitude of historical challenge it faces. This is best illustrated by a recent statement by Nato General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg.
"The price we pay is in money. While the price the Ukrainians pay is in blood. If authoritarian regimes see that force is rewarded we will all pay a much higher price. And the world will become a more dangerous world for all of us."
The exact timing of the inevitable Ukrainian victory will be determined by the speed at which Nato can deliver a new game-changing package of military assault weapons (tanks, planes, long-ranged missiles).
I expect Melitopol will become the key battle point in the coming months (maybe weeks). Having taken over Melitopol, Ukrainians will easily move to the Azov Sea, effectively cutting off supply and communication lines to Crimea.
Russian capitulation will be formally agreed upon at technical talks after devastating Ukrainian advances on the battleground.
The victorious powers - Ukraine, UK, USA - will shape a new international security architecture.
'There is no end in sight'
Barbara Zanchetta, Department of War Studies, King's College LondonVladimir Putin expected Ukraine's passive acceptance of its more powerful neighbour's actions, with no meaningful involvement of other countries. This grave miscalculation has led to a protracted conflict, with seemingly no end in sight.
The winter will be difficult, as Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure will try to break the morale and endurance of an already shattered population. But Ukrainian resilience has proved to be remarkable. They will stand firm. The war will drag on. And on.
The prospects for negotiation are bleak. For a potential peace deal the core demands of at least one side need to change. There is no evidence that this has happened, or that it will happen soon.
How will the end come, then?
The costs of the war, both material and human, might break the level of commitment of the Russian political elite. The key will be inside Russia.
Past wars in which miscalculation was a crucial element, such as Vietnam for United States, or Afghanistan for the Soviet Union, only ended in this way. Domestic political conditions shifted in the country that had miscalculated, making exit - either "honourable" or not - the only viable option.
This may only happen, however, if the West stands firm in its support for Ukraine, in the face of increased domestic pressures linked to the costs of the war.
Sadly, this will continue to be a long-protracted political, economic and military battle of resolve. And by the end of 2023 it will most probably still be ongoing.
'No other outcome except Russian defeat'
Ben Hodges, former commanding general, United States Army EuropeIt's too early to plan a victory parade in Kyiv but all the momentum is with Ukraine now and there is no doubt in my mind that they will win this war, probably in 2023.
Things will move slower over the winter but there's no doubt that Ukraine's forces will be better able to cope than Russia's because of all the winter equipment coming from the UK, Canada and Germany.
By January, Ukraine could be in a position to begin the final phase of the campaign which is the liberation of Crimea.
We know from history that war is a test of will and a test of logistics. When I see the determination of the Ukrainian people and soldiers, and the rapidly improving logistical situation for Ukraine, I see no other outcome but a Russian defeat.
The Russian pull-out from Kherson has partly led me to this conclusion. Firstly as a psychological boost for the Ukrainian people, secondly as a profound embarrassment for the Kremlin and thirdly by handing Ukraine's forces a key operational advantage - all approaches into Crimea are now within range of Ukrainian weapon systems.
I believe that the end of 2023 will see Crimea fully restored to Ukrainian control and sovereignty though there may be some sort or agreement that allows Russia to phase out some of its naval presence in Sevastopol… perhaps even to the end of the treaty (approximately 2025) that had existed before Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea.
Reconstruction efforts will be under way on the Ukrainian infrastructure along the Azov Sea coast, including the important ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, and the reopening of the North Crimean Canal that diverts water from the Dnipro to Crimea will be another important project receiving attention.
'Expect more of the same'
David Gendelman, military expert based in IsraelInstead of "how it's going to end" here is what each side would like to achieve in the next phase.
Only about half of Russia's 300,000 mobilised troops are already in the fighting zone. The rest, together with the forces freed for action after Kherson withdrawal, gives the Russians an opportunity to launch an offensive.
The occupation of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions will continue but a major Russian breakthrough like a drive from the south to Pavlograd to encircle the Ukrainian forces in the Donbas is less likely.
More probable is a continuation of current tactics - a slow grinding of Ukrainian forces on narrow directions and a slow advance, like in Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas, with possible same tactics in Svatove-Kreminna area.
Continuing targeting of Ukrainian energy infrastructure and other attacks on Ukrainian rear will complete this war of attrition strategy.
Significant Ukrainian forces were also freed after a Russian retreat from Kherson. For them the most strategically valuable direction is south, to Melitopol or Berdyansk, aiming to cut the Russian mainland corridor to Crimea. That would be a major Ukrainian victory, and that is exactly why Russians are fortifying Melitopol.
Another option for Ukraine is Svatove - success there would endanger the whole northern flank of the entire Russian frontline.
The big question is how many Ukrainian forces are free and available for the offensive at this point, and what timetable General Zaluzhnyi has on his desk stating how many new reserve brigades and corps that are being built will be ready in one, two or three months from now, including manpower, armoured vehicles and heavy weapons.
After the mud freezes, we will get the answer to this question. And this answer will get us a little closer to "how it's going to end".
The analysts were chosen for their military expertise and their mix of perspectives
Ohjus-tiedustelija
Ylipäällikkö
Vaikea sanoa mistä kaikesta länsivaunujen toimitus kiikastaa, mutta aivan äärimmäisen vaikea uskoa että se olisi Suomen esimerkistä kiinni
Saksa on ymmärtääkseni tähän mennessä kieltänyt valmistamiensa vaunujen toimittamisen (joko julkisesti kiertäen tai kulisseissa suoraan), jos vaunut siitä huolimatta lähetettäisiin ja rikottaisiin sopimusta, niin valmistaja voi tehdä sekä vaunun nykyisen että tulevan käyttäjän elämästä todella hankalaa kieltäytymällä myymästä varaosia tai nostamalla hinnat taivaisiin, keinoja kyllä löytyy. En todellakaan lähtisi tuohon leikkiin valtakunnan ykkösnyrkkien kalustolla!
Ja edelleen, ongelma ei ole niinkään kalusto pulassa vaan osaavien käyttäjien/organisaatioiden puutteessa.
Kaikista järkevin tst-vaunu kalusto Ukrainalle löytyy tällä hetkellä Puolasta, pari sataa lämpökameroitua PT-91:stä vanhan lautan jatkoksi
Puolalle on mahdollista korvata nuo vaunut monella eri vaihtoehdolla/tyylillä. Minusta tuntuu yhä vahvemmin että joidenkin artikkeleiden toimittamista rajoitetaan pitkälti myös(muitakin syitä varmaan on) osaavien käyttäjien/käyttötavan puutteiden takia... Onhan vähän sen suuntaista juttua kuulunut, että Ukrainan perinteisen epäsuoran käyttö ns. neukkutyyliin on liian tuhlailevaa länsimaisella mittapuulla... Ei nuo drone kuvista tutut kauttaaltaan reijitetyt pellot kyllä oikein vakuuta tehokkuudellaan vaikka täsmä ammusten käyttö vaikuttaa toisaalta täyden kympin työskentelyltä -> josta päästään siihen että niitä epäsuoran organisaatiotakin taitaa olla todella moneen lähtöön
Vastuuttoman
No nyt on löytynyt kriitikko, millä näkemys parempi kuin Zelenskyillä. Oletko koskaan kuullut että viisaus ei asu titteleissä eikä välttämättä menneissä tekemisissä.
StepanRudanskij
Respected Leader
Ne rei'itetyt pellot on enimmäkseen ryssän jäljiltä... Ei nuo drone kuvista tutut kauttaaltaan reijitetyt pellot kyllä oikein vakuuta tehokkuudellaan vaikka täsmä ammusten käyttö vaikuttaa toisaalta täyden kympin työskentelyltä -> josta päästään siihen että niitä epäsuoran organisaatiotakin taitaa olla todella moneen lähtöön
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Katariina Suuren patsas kaadettiin Odessassa. Ryssä kun pyrkii tuhoamaan Ukrainan ja ukrainalaisen kulttuurin, niin miksi Ukrainan sitten pitäisi kunnioittaa ryssän ylivallan symboleja omassa maassaan.
Ohjus-tiedustelija
Ylipäällikkö
Tätä kaapattujen vaunujen käyttämistä yksittäisinä epäsuoran alustoina on vähän vaikea pureskelematta niellä
Ne pitäisi luovuttaa korkeammalle portaalle joka kasaa/kouluttaa niistä isompia kokonaisuuksia joissa vaunujen oikeanlainen käyttö tuo niistä saatavat edut huomattavasti paremmin hyötykäyttöön.Jos BMP-3 jää liian kuriositeetiksi määriltään, niin sitten noin ihan ok! Mutta tuo epäsuoran ampuminen vaunukanuunalla on edelleen
(teoriassa tuollainen matalapainekanuuna voi videolla ampua tähystettyäkin tulta noin isoilla kulmilla, mutta ei ihan siltä ehkä kuitenkaan näytä)
Kumpujen yöstä
Kapteeni
Jos pitääkin Afaganistania persereikien persereikänä (taisi joku USA:n kultatukkainen presidenttikin näin todeta) niin yhdessä asiassa täytyy noille paimentolaisille kuvitteellista Turbaania nostaa: Eivät perkeleet alistuneet ryssänkään saappaan alle 1979-88 ( niinkuin eivät aikoinaan alistuneet brittienkään vallan alle).
Hirveä alkukantainen maa, touhuavat vaan omiaan vaikka mikä suurvalta on yrittänyt saada ne aisoihin. Naisia kyllä käy sääli. Totaalinen OT taas kerran.
Antares
Respected Leader
Luin pari päivää sitten Defence24 artikkelia (muistaakseni oli heillä, puolalainen joka tapauksessa) siitä miten ovat varanneet tietyn osan tulevien vuosien budjetista PT-91 panssarivaunujen remontointia varten. Lisäksi he aikovat jatkaa T-72M1R vaunujen modernisointiohjelmaa, vaikka parina viime vuonna valmistetut vaunut on toimitettu Ukrainaan.
Artikkelin sävy oli sellainen, että ilmeisesti PT-91 vaunut eivät ole niin hyvässä kunnossa kuin mitä moni on kuvitellut. Tämä herättää myös kysymysmerkkejä heidän Leopard 2 kaluston nykykunnosta. Puolalaiset alaa seuraavat ovat kommentoineet hieman huvittuneena mm. Espanjan, Saksan yms. panssarikaluston huonoa tilaa mutta tätä uutista kommentoitiin hyvin vakavasti. He eivät myöskään olleet toiveikkaita nopeasti remontista, vaunuja valmistunee pienenä norona seuraavan kolmen tai neljän vuoden aikana.
Voi olla, että heidän T-72 perheen vaunut (ja ehkä myös Leopard 2) on päästetty yhtä heikkoon kuntoon kuin monella muulla Euroopan maalla ja siten lisää ei ole luovutettavissa lähiaikoina. JOS olisi mahdollista luovuttaa loput T-72 perheen vaunut niin sille olisi pari "helppoa" ratkaisua:
1) Yhdysvallat antaa lainaksi 250-300 kpl M1A1 tai M1A2 panssarivaunuja, Puola pitää vaunut sen aikaa kunnes K2-vaunujen toimitukset valmistuvat (vuonna 2026) ja ehkä jopa pari vuotta sen jälkeen kunnes saavat K2PL-tuotannon rullaamaan (jos saavat)
2) Yhdysvallat en anna vaunuja lainaksi, mutta tuo sen sijaan riittävän vahvan panssarijoukon tai mekanisoidun pumpun Puolaan siksi aikaa kunnes K2-vaunujen toimitukset valmistuvat (vuonna 2026) ja ehkä jopa pari vuotta sen jälkeen kunnes saavat K2PL-tuotannon rullaamaan (jos saavat). Tämä voisi tarkoittaa seuraavaa viittä vuotta, joten olisi aikamoinen sitoumus ja menoerä
3) Saksa antaa lainaksi tietyn määrän Leopard 2 vaunuja, Puola pitää vaunut sen aikaa kunnes K2-vaunujen toimitukset valmistuvat (vuonna 2026) ja ehkä jopa pari vuotta sen jälkeen kunnes saavat K2PL-tuotannon rullaamaan (jos saavat). Oletan että Saksalla ei ole tuollaista 250-300 kpl lainattavaksi JOTEN pienempi määrä tarkoittaisi myös sitä että Puola antaisi Ukrainalle pienemmän määrän omia vaunujaan
PT-91 ja erilaiset T-72 modernisoinnit alkavat olemaan ehtoopuolella Puolan panssarijoukkojen käytön kannalta MUTTA siihen on vielä jokunen vuosi aikaa. Odottavan aika on pitkä, varsinkin kun on sota voitettavana ja kaikki irtoavat vaunut tarvittaisiin.
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MUOKKAUS: tarkoitin tätä artikkelia:
Suora linkki:
https://defence24.pl/przemysl/t-72-i-leopardy-z-bumaru-ida-do-wojska
T-72s and Leopards from Bumar are joining the army
ASADAM ŚWIERKOWSKI
27.12.2022 16:13
Zakłady Mechaniczne Bumar-Łabędy published this year's summary of its achievements, in which we read, among others: about the delivery of over 30 tanks to the Polish Army (Leopard 2PL and T-72M1R) or the signing of contracts for repairs of WZT-2 technical recovery vehicles and PT-91 tanks.
This year, the company from Gliwice delivered 17 modernized Leopard 2PL/PL M1 main battle tanks to the Polish Army, and another three are currently being commissioned by the user, so they can also be adopted by the army by the end of the year. The number of delivered machines is higher than in the previous year, when the army received only 13 vehicles. This means that soon the Polish Armored Forces will have a total of 45 out of 142 ordered Leopard 2PL/PL M1.
As we wrote on Defence24.pl, the date of completion of the modernization works has been postponed once again from 2025 to 2027. The contract originally signed in December 2015 was to be finalized by 2021, but the tank deliveries were delayed for various reasons.
As regards the delivery of renovated and modified T-72M/M1 tanks to the T-72M1R standard on the basis of the agreement of July 2019, this year the army received 22 vehicles from the Gliwice company. A year earlier, 29 vehicles renovated by Bumar were delivered to the recipient. The renovation works are carried out in a consortium which also includes Wojskowe Zakłady Motoryzacyjne from Poznań, which also supplies tanks.
It is worth noting that some of the T-72M1R vehicles were handed over to Ukraine as part of military assistance. However, the program is to be continued in the coming years.
This year, Zakłady Mechaniczne Bumar-Łabędy also received an order for repairs of WZT-2 technical recovery vehicles, of which the Polish Army has 40 copies in stock. In addition, the company has signed a contract for the renovation of PT-91 Twardy tanks, which will be implemented in 2022-2024. During the renovation works, it is possible that certain elements of the tanks, such as thermal imaging cameras, will be replaced.
Muistin väärin, uutinen kertoo vain että T-72M1R modernisointi jatkuu JA että PT-91 vaunuja tullaan remontoimaan aikavälillä 2022-2024.
Puolalaisen twitter-väen reaktio tähän uutiseen oli sellainen, jonka mukaan tämä voi kertoa siitä että PT-91 kalusto olisi huonommassa kunnossa kuin mitä on kuviteltu JA siten ei lähetettävissä Ukrainaan.
Viimeksi muokattu:
missileman
Kenraali
Shoigu on lähettänyt Patriot ryhmänsä liikkeelle...nyt alkaa tapahtumaan
Einomies1
Respected Leader
Suomen antamat kranaatit saavat kehuja kuitenkin.
rty19
Greatest Leader
varmaan lähelle arvasitJa mitähän vit..a tässäkin nyt sitten tapahtuu? Epäsuoraa itkolla...?
Jos varastovääpelin ominaisuudessa olisin pakkaamassa itkolaatikoita Ukrainaan Globemasterin ruumaan, niin tämän nähtyä trukissa menisi pakki silmään nopeammin kuin silmä räpsähtää(Paavo M.Petäjä äänellä + lookilla) ja laatikot päätyisi takaisin traktori+sontakärri yhdistelmän kyytiin ja käsky vm-kuskille kuuluisi terävästi: Takaisin varikolle, ajoon!!
Omatunnistuslaitteena Eyeball Mk1?