Vonka
Supreme Leader
Venäjä romahtaa tällä menolla alta kahden vuoden eikä tämä liene mielipidekysymys.
Venäjä romahtaa tällä menolla alta kahden vuoden eikä tämä liene mielipidekysymys.
Vonka
Supreme Leader
Nämähän ovat taas erittäin hyviä uutisia. Tässä on katsos pieni nyanssiero.
Suomalaisyrittäjä (tiedän jopa pieniä remonttipuulaakeja) joka kierrättää Liettuan ja Skotlannin ja sitten vielä kolmannen pankkimaan kautta toimintansa, välttää veroja, mutta hänen bisneksensä on yksin täällä. Hän voi toki mennä ETA-alueen ulkopuolelle, vaikka Venäjälle, pistämään putiikkinsa pystyyn, jos ei veronmaksu maistu. Tervemenoa ja onnea matkaan! Jospa se oma ala ja tarve löytyy sitten sieltä.
Tuli tehtyä kierros, joka jatkuu vielä tovin, ja sanompa, että itä-eurooppa on lohduton. Venäjän talouden rymähtäminen voi olla tuskallinen kokemus monelle valtiolle. Haluamme mieluusti luulotella, että itä-eurooppa on jotain samista, kun ovat EU:ssa ja erityisesti Natossa, van eivät ne ole. Tsekki voi olla virkistävänoloinen poikkeus tähän mainioon kaartiin, mutta mutta. Paikan päällä asiat näyttävät muulta kuin mitä naistenlehdissä kirjoitetaan. Tuntemillani aloilla ei ole tapahtunut minkäänlaista kehitystä pitkään aikaan, tietty pysähtyneisyys on vallitseva olotila.
reservin esikuntaupseeri
Kapteeni
Ei se ennenkään ole ollut mikään ongelma, joten ei (yritetä) tehdä siitä nytkään sitä. Vallan mainiostihan se tuo leikkirupla "menestyi" neukkuhallinnon hoivassa kunnioitettavat yli 70 vuotta. Leikkiruplalla leikittiin neukkutalouden omia leikkejä. Oikeat kaupat tehtiin sitten dollareilla
Mites Puola?
Viimeksi muokattu:
reservin esikuntaupseeri
Kapteeni
Nämähän ovat taas erittäin hyviä uutisia. Tässä on katsos pieni nyanssiero.
Suomalaisyrittäjä (tiedän jopa pieniä remonttipuulaakeja) joka kierrättää Liettuan ja Skotlannin ja sitten vielä kolmannen pankkimaan kautta toimintansa, välttää veroja, mutta hänen bisneksensä on yksin täällä. Hän voi toki mennä ETA-alueen ulkopuolelle, vaikka Venäjälle, pistämään putiikkinsa pystyyn, jos ei veronmaksu maistu. Tervemenoa ja onnea matkaan! Jospa se oma ala ja tarve löytyy sitten sieltä.
Kerrotko Vonka, millä tavalla se on veronkiertoa, jos perustaa firman Viroon ja laskuttaa täällä tehdystä työstä? (älä sotke nyt tähän mitään moraalikysymyksiä jne jotka ovat puhtaasti arvokysymyksiä, ihan juridikalla ym. kerrot mitenkä homma on veronkiertoa - jos et saa hommaa estettyä juridisin syin, ei se silloin ole per definition veronkiertoakaan vaan verosuunnittelua - mikä onkin laillista hommoo...)
EU:sta ei kyllä apuva ole EU-sisäisen laskutusliikenteen paimentamiseen. Sehän ei siihen puutu - vaan päinvastoin kannustaa siihen! Sekun on EU(vostoliiton) mielestä "tervettä ja lisääntynyttä" kilpailua, että virolainen firma tarjoaa työtä tehdyksi Suomessa ja laskuttaa siitä. Se on sitä sisämarkkinata*, pojat!
* kaiken tämän saitte siinä kansanäänestyspaketissa kun äänestitte 'yes till EU', mikäs vuosi se nyt olikaan....1994?
Romahtaa tai sitten palaa täysstalinistinen meininki. Veikkaan jälkimmäisen puolesta. Nomenklatuura ei luovu hevin vallastaan.
Madonlukuja luetaan taasen...
http://www.talouselama.fi/venaja/pa...n+ajan+kaltaiseen+pysahdyksen+tilaan/a2272931
http://www.talouselama.fi/venaja/pa...n+ajan+kaltaiseen+pysahdyksen+tilaan/a2272931
Pari tuoretta Economistin artikkelia öljyn hinnan laskusta ja sen poliittisista vaikutuksista.
Kysyntä ja tarjonta näyttävät nyt painavan öljyn hintaa alaspäin. Merkittävin tekijä lienee USAn massiivisesti kasvanut liuskeöljyntuotanto. Itselleni oli uutta Libyan ja Irakin kasvaneet tuotantomäärät.
http://www.economist.com/news/leade...and-harm-some-unpleasant-regimesbut-there-are
Many winners, a few bad losers
A lower price will boost the world economy and harm some unpleasant regimes—but there are risks
THE collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had many causes. None was as basic as the fall in the price of oil, its main export, by two-thirds in real terms between 1980 and 1986. By the same token, the 14-year rule of Vladimir Putin, heir to what remained, has been bolstered by a threefold rise in the oil price.
Now the oil price is falling again. Since June, it has dropped from about $115 for a barrel of Brent crude to $85 or so—a reduction of roughly a quarter. If prices settle at today’s level, the bill for oil consumers will be about $1 trillion a year lower. That would be a shot in the arm for a stagnating world economy. It would also have big political consequences. For some governments it would be a rare opportunity; for others, a threat.
The scale of shale
Predicting oil prices is a mug’s game (we speak from experience). The fall of the past three months is partly the result of unexpected—and maybe short-lived—developments. Who would have guessed that chaotic, war-torn Libya would somehow be pumping 40% more oil at the end of September than it had just a month earlier? Saudi Arabia’s decision to boost output to protect its market share and hurt American shale producers and see off new developments in the Arctic was also a surprise. Perhaps the fall was exaggerated by hedge-fund investors dumping oil they had been holding in the false expectation of rising prices.
Geopolitical shocks can surprise on the upside as well as the down. Saudi Arabia may well decide to resume its self-appointed post as swing producer and cut output to push prices up once more. With war stalking Iraq, Libya still fragile and Nigeria prey to insurgency (see article), supply is vulnerable to chaotic forces.
But many of the causes of lower prices have staying power. The economic malaise weighing down on demand is not about to lift, despite the tonic of cheaper oil (see article). Conservation, spurred by high prices and green regulation, is more like a ratchet than a piece of elastic. The average new car consumes 25% less petrol per mile than ten years ago. Some observers think the rich world has reached “peak car”, and that motoring is in long-term decline. Even if they are wrong, and lower prices encourage people to drive more, energy-saving ideas will not suddenly be uninvented.
Much of the extra supply is baked in, too. Most oil investment takes years of planning and, after a certain point, cannot easily be turned off. The fracking revolution is also likely to rage on. Since the start of 2010 the United States, the main winner, has increased its output by more than 3m barrels per day to 8.5m b/d. Shale oil is relatively expensive, because it comes from many small, short-lived wells. Analysts claim that a third of wells lose money below $80 a barrel, so shale-oil production will adjust, helping put a floor under the price. But the floor will sag. Break-even points are falling. In past price squeezes, oilmen confounded the experts by finding unimagined savings. This time will be no different.
For governments in consuming countries the price fall offers some budgetary breathing-room. Fuel subsidies hog scandalous amounts of money in many developing countries—20% of public spending in Indonesia and 14% in India (including fertiliser and food). Lower prices give governments the opportunity to spend the money more productively or return it to the taxpayers. This week India led the way by announcing an end to diesel subsidies. Others should follow Narendra Modi’s lead.
The axis of diesel
For those governments that have used the windfall revenues from higher prices to run aggressive foreign policies, by contrast, things could get uncomfortable. The most vulnerable are Venezuela, Iran and Russia.
The first to crack could be Venezuela, home to the anti-American “Bolivarian revolution”, which the late Hugo Chávez tried to export around his region. Venezuela’s budget is based on oil at $120 a barrel. Even before the price fall it was struggling to pay its debts. Foreign-exchange reserves are dwindling, inflation is rampant and Venezuelans are enduring shortages of everyday goods such as flour and toilet paper.
Iran is also in a tricky position. It needs oil at about $140 a barrel to balance a profligate budget padded with the extravagant spending schemes of its former president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. Sanctions designed to curb its nuclear programme make it especially vulnerable. Some claim that Sunni Saudi Arabia is conspiring with America to use the oil price to put pressure on its Shia rival. Whatever the motivation, the falling price is certainly having that effect.
Compared with these two, Russia can bide its time. A falling currency means that the rouble value of oil sales has dropped less than its dollar value, cushioning tax revenues and limiting the budget deficit. The Kremlin can draw on money it has saved in reserve funds, though these are smaller than they were a few years ago and it had already budgeted to run them down. Russia can probably cope with today’s prices for 18 months to two years, but the money will eventually run out. Mr Putin’s military modernisation, which has absorbed 20% of public spending, looks like an extravagance. Sanctions are stifling the economy and making it hard to borrow. Poorer Russians will be less able to afford imported food and consumer goods. If the oil price stays where it is, it will foster discontent.
Democrats and liberals should welcome the curb the oil price imposes on countries like Iran, Venezuela and Russia. But there is also an increased risk of instability. Iran’s relatively outward-looking president, Hassan Rouhani, was elected to improve living standards. If the economy sinks, it could strengthen the hand of his hardline opponents. Similarly, a default in Venezuela could have dire consequences not just for Venezuelans but also for the Caribbean countries that have come to depend on Bolivarian aid. And Mr Putin, deprived of economic legitimacy, could well plunge deeper into the xenophobic nationalism that has fuelled his campaign in Ukraine. Cheaper oil is welcome, but it is not trouble-free.
A lower price will boost the world economy and harm some unpleasant regimes—but there are risks
THE collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had many causes. None was as basic as the fall in the price of oil, its main export, by two-thirds in real terms between 1980 and 1986. By the same token, the 14-year rule of Vladimir Putin, heir to what remained, has been bolstered by a threefold rise in the oil price.
Now the oil price is falling again. Since June, it has dropped from about $115 for a barrel of Brent crude to $85 or so—a reduction of roughly a quarter. If prices settle at today’s level, the bill for oil consumers will be about $1 trillion a year lower. That would be a shot in the arm for a stagnating world economy. It would also have big political consequences. For some governments it would be a rare opportunity; for others, a threat.
The scale of shale
Predicting oil prices is a mug’s game (we speak from experience). The fall of the past three months is partly the result of unexpected—and maybe short-lived—developments. Who would have guessed that chaotic, war-torn Libya would somehow be pumping 40% more oil at the end of September than it had just a month earlier? Saudi Arabia’s decision to boost output to protect its market share and hurt American shale producers and see off new developments in the Arctic was also a surprise. Perhaps the fall was exaggerated by hedge-fund investors dumping oil they had been holding in the false expectation of rising prices.
Geopolitical shocks can surprise on the upside as well as the down. Saudi Arabia may well decide to resume its self-appointed post as swing producer and cut output to push prices up once more. With war stalking Iraq, Libya still fragile and Nigeria prey to insurgency (see article), supply is vulnerable to chaotic forces.
But many of the causes of lower prices have staying power. The economic malaise weighing down on demand is not about to lift, despite the tonic of cheaper oil (see article). Conservation, spurred by high prices and green regulation, is more like a ratchet than a piece of elastic. The average new car consumes 25% less petrol per mile than ten years ago. Some observers think the rich world has reached “peak car”, and that motoring is in long-term decline. Even if they are wrong, and lower prices encourage people to drive more, energy-saving ideas will not suddenly be uninvented.
Much of the extra supply is baked in, too. Most oil investment takes years of planning and, after a certain point, cannot easily be turned off. The fracking revolution is also likely to rage on. Since the start of 2010 the United States, the main winner, has increased its output by more than 3m barrels per day to 8.5m b/d. Shale oil is relatively expensive, because it comes from many small, short-lived wells. Analysts claim that a third of wells lose money below $80 a barrel, so shale-oil production will adjust, helping put a floor under the price. But the floor will sag. Break-even points are falling. In past price squeezes, oilmen confounded the experts by finding unimagined savings. This time will be no different.
For governments in consuming countries the price fall offers some budgetary breathing-room. Fuel subsidies hog scandalous amounts of money in many developing countries—20% of public spending in Indonesia and 14% in India (including fertiliser and food). Lower prices give governments the opportunity to spend the money more productively or return it to the taxpayers. This week India led the way by announcing an end to diesel subsidies. Others should follow Narendra Modi’s lead.
The axis of diesel
For those governments that have used the windfall revenues from higher prices to run aggressive foreign policies, by contrast, things could get uncomfortable. The most vulnerable are Venezuela, Iran and Russia.
The first to crack could be Venezuela, home to the anti-American “Bolivarian revolution”, which the late Hugo Chávez tried to export around his region. Venezuela’s budget is based on oil at $120 a barrel. Even before the price fall it was struggling to pay its debts. Foreign-exchange reserves are dwindling, inflation is rampant and Venezuelans are enduring shortages of everyday goods such as flour and toilet paper.
Iran is also in a tricky position. It needs oil at about $140 a barrel to balance a profligate budget padded with the extravagant spending schemes of its former president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. Sanctions designed to curb its nuclear programme make it especially vulnerable. Some claim that Sunni Saudi Arabia is conspiring with America to use the oil price to put pressure on its Shia rival. Whatever the motivation, the falling price is certainly having that effect.
Compared with these two, Russia can bide its time. A falling currency means that the rouble value of oil sales has dropped less than its dollar value, cushioning tax revenues and limiting the budget deficit. The Kremlin can draw on money it has saved in reserve funds, though these are smaller than they were a few years ago and it had already budgeted to run them down. Russia can probably cope with today’s prices for 18 months to two years, but the money will eventually run out. Mr Putin’s military modernisation, which has absorbed 20% of public spending, looks like an extravagance. Sanctions are stifling the economy and making it hard to borrow. Poorer Russians will be less able to afford imported food and consumer goods. If the oil price stays where it is, it will foster discontent.
Democrats and liberals should welcome the curb the oil price imposes on countries like Iran, Venezuela and Russia. But there is also an increased risk of instability. Iran’s relatively outward-looking president, Hassan Rouhani, was elected to improve living standards. If the economy sinks, it could strengthen the hand of his hardline opponents. Similarly, a default in Venezuela could have dire consequences not just for Venezuelans but also for the Caribbean countries that have come to depend on Bolivarian aid. And Mr Putin, deprived of economic legitimacy, could well plunge deeper into the xenophobic nationalism that has fuelled his campaign in Ukraine. Cheaper oil is welcome, but it is not trouble-free.
The oil price is tumbling. Is that good or bad news for the world economy?
Normally, falling oil prices would boost global growth. A $10-a-barrel fall in the oil price transfers around 0.5% of world GDP from oil exporters to oil importers. Consumers in importing countries are more likely to spend the money quickly than cash-rich oil exporters. By boosting spending cheaper oil therefore tends to boost global output.
This time, though, matters are less clear cut. The big economic question is whether lower prices reflect weak demand or have been caused by a surge in the supply of crude. If weak demand is the culprit, that is worrying: it suggests the oil price is a symptom of weakening growth. If the source of weakness is financial (debt overhangs and so on), then cheaper oil may not boost growth all that much: consumers may simply use the gains to pay down their debts. Indeed, in some countries, cheaper oil may even make matters worse by increasing the risk of deflation. On the other hand, if plentiful supply is driving prices down, that is potentially better news: cheaper oil should eventually boost spending in the world’s biggest economies.
The global economy is certainly weak. Japan’s GDP fell in the second quarter. Germany’s did too, and may be heading towards recession (recent figures for industrial production and exports were dreadful). America’s growth has accelerated recently, but its recovery is weak by historical standards. Just before this week’s oil-price slump, the International Monetary Fund cut its projection for global growth in 2014 for the third time this year to 3.3%. It is still expecting growth to pick up again in 2015, but only slightly.
Weaker growth translates into lower energy demand. This week, the International Energy Agency, an oil importers’ club, said it expects global demand to rise by just 700,000 barrels a day (b/d) this year. That is 200,000 b/d below its forecast only last month. Demand has been weak for a while but the recent slowdown—notably in Germany—took markets by surprise, hence the sharp fall in the price.
But feeble demand is not the only explanation. There has also been a big supply shock. Since April last year the world’s total output of oil has been rising strongly. Most months’ output has been 1m-2m b/d a day higher than the year before. In September, this expansion jumped dramatically (see chart); global output was 2.8m b/d above the level of September 2013.
Most of the growth in supply has come from countries that are not members of OPEC, the oil exporters’ club—from America in particular. Thanks partly to increases in shale-oil output, the United States pumped 8.8m b/d in September—13% more than in the year before, 56% above the level of 2011 and not far short of Saudi Arabia. Russian oil production is also inching up, suggesting sanctions have not yet begun to be felt in its oilfields. In September, its output rose to 10.6m b/d, within a whisker of the highest monthly figure since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Non-OPEC production, though, has been rising for a while. The biggest recent change has come from within the cartel. In April, Libya’s production—hit by civil war—crashed to just 200,000 b/d; by the end of September output was back up to 900,000 b/d and heading towards its pre-war level of 1.5m b/d. No less surprisingly, Iraq’s output is rising, too. The upshot is that OPEC production started to grow again in September after almost two years of decline, compounding the impact of growing non-OPEC supplies.
With demand weak, much of the extra output has gone into rebuilding oil stocks in rich countries. But that cannot go on indefinitely. As the hoarding slows, prices are likely to weaken again—unless world demand picks up or oil production is cut.
Neither seems imminent. Antoine Halff, the IEA’s chief oil analyst, points out that very little current production becomes uneconomic even at $80 a barrel. The break-even point for most American shale-oil producers has been falling as they have refined their fracking techniques, and is now well below $70 a barrel. So prices will have to fall further if they are to drive marginal producers out of business.
New trade patterns reinforce the downward pressure on prices. OPEC exporters once informally carved up the world between them, with Nigeria and Venezuela selling to America, smaller Gulf states to Japan, and so on. But American oil imports have fallen from 309m barrels a month in 2010 to 236m a month now. European demand is weak. So everyone is competing for market share in Asia.
Saudi Arabia shocked the rest of OPEC by cutting forward prices for Asian delivery and by increasing oil output slightly in September (by 107,000 barrels), at a time when other exporters wanted it to cut back. The organisation is due to meet again in November. But as Kuwait’s oil minister remarked recently, “I don’t think there is a chance today that [OPEC] countries would reduce their production.” How soon—and how much—lower prices will translate into an increase in global demand, though, is far less certain.
Normally, falling oil prices would boost global growth. A $10-a-barrel fall in the oil price transfers around 0.5% of world GDP from oil exporters to oil importers. Consumers in importing countries are more likely to spend the money quickly than cash-rich oil exporters. By boosting spending cheaper oil therefore tends to boost global output.
This time, though, matters are less clear cut. The big economic question is whether lower prices reflect weak demand or have been caused by a surge in the supply of crude. If weak demand is the culprit, that is worrying: it suggests the oil price is a symptom of weakening growth. If the source of weakness is financial (debt overhangs and so on), then cheaper oil may not boost growth all that much: consumers may simply use the gains to pay down their debts. Indeed, in some countries, cheaper oil may even make matters worse by increasing the risk of deflation. On the other hand, if plentiful supply is driving prices down, that is potentially better news: cheaper oil should eventually boost spending in the world’s biggest economies.
The global economy is certainly weak. Japan’s GDP fell in the second quarter. Germany’s did too, and may be heading towards recession (recent figures for industrial production and exports were dreadful). America’s growth has accelerated recently, but its recovery is weak by historical standards. Just before this week’s oil-price slump, the International Monetary Fund cut its projection for global growth in 2014 for the third time this year to 3.3%. It is still expecting growth to pick up again in 2015, but only slightly.
Weaker growth translates into lower energy demand. This week, the International Energy Agency, an oil importers’ club, said it expects global demand to rise by just 700,000 barrels a day (b/d) this year. That is 200,000 b/d below its forecast only last month. Demand has been weak for a while but the recent slowdown—notably in Germany—took markets by surprise, hence the sharp fall in the price.
But feeble demand is not the only explanation. There has also been a big supply shock. Since April last year the world’s total output of oil has been rising strongly. Most months’ output has been 1m-2m b/d a day higher than the year before. In September, this expansion jumped dramatically (see chart); global output was 2.8m b/d above the level of September 2013.
Most of the growth in supply has come from countries that are not members of OPEC, the oil exporters’ club—from America in particular. Thanks partly to increases in shale-oil output, the United States pumped 8.8m b/d in September—13% more than in the year before, 56% above the level of 2011 and not far short of Saudi Arabia. Russian oil production is also inching up, suggesting sanctions have not yet begun to be felt in its oilfields. In September, its output rose to 10.6m b/d, within a whisker of the highest monthly figure since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Non-OPEC production, though, has been rising for a while. The biggest recent change has come from within the cartel. In April, Libya’s production—hit by civil war—crashed to just 200,000 b/d; by the end of September output was back up to 900,000 b/d and heading towards its pre-war level of 1.5m b/d. No less surprisingly, Iraq’s output is rising, too. The upshot is that OPEC production started to grow again in September after almost two years of decline, compounding the impact of growing non-OPEC supplies.
With demand weak, much of the extra output has gone into rebuilding oil stocks in rich countries. But that cannot go on indefinitely. As the hoarding slows, prices are likely to weaken again—unless world demand picks up or oil production is cut.
Neither seems imminent. Antoine Halff, the IEA’s chief oil analyst, points out that very little current production becomes uneconomic even at $80 a barrel. The break-even point for most American shale-oil producers has been falling as they have refined their fracking techniques, and is now well below $70 a barrel. So prices will have to fall further if they are to drive marginal producers out of business.
New trade patterns reinforce the downward pressure on prices. OPEC exporters once informally carved up the world between them, with Nigeria and Venezuela selling to America, smaller Gulf states to Japan, and so on. But American oil imports have fallen from 309m barrels a month in 2010 to 236m a month now. European demand is weak. So everyone is competing for market share in Asia.
Saudi Arabia shocked the rest of OPEC by cutting forward prices for Asian delivery and by increasing oil output slightly in September (by 107,000 barrels), at a time when other exporters wanted it to cut back. The organisation is due to meet again in November. But as Kuwait’s oil minister remarked recently, “I don’t think there is a chance today that [OPEC] countries would reduce their production.” How soon—and how much—lower prices will translate into an increase in global demand, though, is far less certain.
Pääomien lisäksi lähtee myös ihmisiä, jotka osaavat ajatella tai viitsivät yrittää...
http://www.taloussanomat.fi/tyomark...a-kiihtyy-pakotteiden-vuoksi/201414873/12?n=1
http://www.taloussanomat.fi/tyomark...a-kiihtyy-pakotteiden-vuoksi/201414873/12?n=1
Mikoyan
Ylipäällikkö
Pakotteitahan kannattaisi vain lisätä, jotta vasemmistonleiri lähtisi osoittamaan reippaasti mieltään kaduille. Tuskinpa keisarin hallinto aivan loputtomasti voi venyä ja aseelliset mielenosoitusten tukahduttamiset ajaisivat oppositiota aseelliseen varustautumiseen, jonka myötä länsi voisi tukea opposition joukkoja ja saataisiin viimein aikaan vähän säpinää.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Vonka
Supreme Leader
Lakitupa hyväksyy täälläkin, oikeustaju ei aina. Saa nähdä, millaisia asetuksia tulevaisuudessa tulee, sillä monille maille yhteisöverotuotto on kiinnostava asia.
Aivopako maksaa yhteiskunnalle niin paljon, että oksat pois. Ne ajat ovat menneet, jolloin eliitti katsoi yhteiskunnalliseksi velvollisuudekseen tehdä työtä kruunun hyväksi hartiavoimin. Globaali maailmanmeno takaa sen, että aivoja menettävät jotkut ja toiset saavat. Suomi on luonnollisesti Unionin osana voittaja.
Saahan nähdä tuleeko muutoksia luonnonvaroja hyödyntävien yhtiöiden verotukseen tai omistusjärjestelyihin. Liberaali markkinatalous ei ole toiminut Venäjällä(kään). Pienen joukon huimat tulot eivät ole kumuloituneet sijoituksina ja talouden piristymisenä. Energian ja raaka-aineiden hintojen noustessa tilanne oli siedettävissä Venäjän johdon kannalta. Hintojen pudotessa tilanne on toinen. Putinille saattaa tulla kiusaus käydä oligarkien lompakolla. Kansan kannatus olisi varmaan taattu. Länsimaat suhtautuisivat huomattavasti nihkeämmin. Tiedä sitten onko Putinin asema riittävän vankka suurempiin muutoksiin.
YliKoo
Greatest Leader
Suunnitelmatalous rules
Haluttuun tavoitteeseen.
Sodan ja parin ydinpommin jälkeen, toisin olisi jos Japanilla olisi ollut ydinase.
Jenkit halusivat sodan Japanin kanssa, mutta japsit piti saada ampumaan ensimmäinen laukaus. Ymmärtämättömyyttään japanilaiset tekivät juuri sen minkä Roosevelt lähipiireineen halusi.
Sodan aloittaja ei välttämättä ole sotaan syyllinen.