Venäläinen sotataito

SJ

Ylipäällikkö
Lahjoittaja
Venäjän sotasuunnitelmaa: Koko maa kytketään pois internetistä

Antti Kirkkala | 12.03.2018 | 23:54- päivitetty 12.03.2018 | 17:50

Venäjä on rakentanut kattavan sisäisen viestintäverkon armeijalle ja viranomaisille.

Verkon kapasiteettia on jatkuvasti lisätty, joten sotatilanteessa koko maa voitaisiin eristää globaalista internetistä.
– Olemme valmiita mihin tahansa tilanteeseen, presidentti Vladimir Putinin neuvonantaja Herman Klimenko totesi NTV-kanavalla maaliskuun alussa.
Klimenkon mukaan koko maan siirtäminen sisäiseen verkkoon olisi silti hyvin haastavaa. Hän toteaa, että siirtymäprosessi olisi ”kivulias”.

Venäjän hallitus otti jo vuonna 2016 käyttöön armeijalle ja hallinnolle tarkoitetun suljetun tietoverkon. Verkko muistuttaa rakenteeltaan internetiä, mutta sinne pääsee vain armeijan kehittämällä käyttöjärjestelmällä.
– Yhdysvaltain armeija käyttää lukuisia eri verkkoja. Heidän järjestelmässään on liian monta yhteyspistettä julkisen internetin kanssa, minkä vuoksi järjestelmä on altis tietomurroille, FAITID-säätiön tutkija Dmitri Burkov toteaa.
Putin on kutsunut internetiä ”CIA:n projektiksi”, minkä vuoksi Venäjä on pyrkinyt vähentämään riippuvuutta ulkomaisesta informaatioteknologiasta.
– Mihin tahansa internetiin kytkettyyn laitteeseen voidaan murtautua, Klimenko toteaa.

Vuonna 2010 aloitetun projektin tarkoituksena oli kehittää hallinnon käyttöön Linux-pohjainen käyttöjärjestelmä. Näin maa pääsisi eroon Microsoftin tuotteista.
Venäjä on myös kehittänyt vaihtoehtoista DNS-järjestelmää Brasilian, Intian, Kiinan ja Etelä-Afrikan kanssa, kertoo Defense One -julkaisu.
Asiantuntijoiden mukaan irtautuminen internetistä olisi todellisuudessa hyvin raju toimenpide, millä olisi myös valtavia vaikutuksia Venäjän talouteen.

https://www.verkkouutiset.fi/venajan-sotasuunnitelma-koko-maa-kytketaan-pois-internetista/
Tuota olen miettinyt, että voisiko ryssät sulkea pois internetistä, jos nämä alkaisivat liialti kukkoilemaan.
 

Herman30

Ylipäällikkö
Lahjoittaja
Toi olisi win-win tilanne. Ulkomaalaiset eivät pääse sotkeman Venäjän verkkoa eivätkä venäläiset pääse sotkemaan maanlaajuista verkkoa.
 
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Reactions: PSS

SJ

Ylipäällikkö
Lahjoittaja
Toi olisi win-win tilanne. Ulkomaalaiset eivät pääse sotkeman Venäjän verkkoa eivätkä venäläiset pääse sotkemaan maanlaajuista verkkoa.
Kyllä ne sotkijat saataisiin järjestettyä johonkin maahan venäjän ulkopuolella.
 

adam7

Ylipäällikkö
Venäjän sotasuunnitelmaa: Koko maa kytketään pois internetistä

Antti Kirkkala | 12.03.2018 | 23:54- päivitetty 12.03.2018 | 17:50

Venäjä on rakentanut kattavan sisäisen viestintäverkon armeijalle ja viranomaisille.

Verkon kapasiteettia on jatkuvasti lisätty, joten sotatilanteessa koko maa voitaisiin eristää globaalista internetistä.
– Olemme valmiita mihin tahansa tilanteeseen, presidentti Vladimir Putinin neuvonantaja Herman Klimenko totesi NTV-kanavalla maaliskuun alussa.
Klimenkon mukaan koko maan siirtäminen sisäiseen verkkoon olisi silti hyvin haastavaa. Hän toteaa, että siirtymäprosessi olisi ”kivulias”.

Venäjän hallitus otti jo vuonna 2016 käyttöön armeijalle ja hallinnolle tarkoitetun suljetun tietoverkon. Verkko muistuttaa rakenteeltaan internetiä, mutta sinne pääsee vain armeijan kehittämällä käyttöjärjestelmällä.
– Yhdysvaltain armeija käyttää lukuisia eri verkkoja. Heidän järjestelmässään on liian monta yhteyspistettä julkisen internetin kanssa, minkä vuoksi järjestelmä on altis tietomurroille, FAITID-säätiön tutkija Dmitri Burkov toteaa.
Putin on kutsunut internetiä ”CIA:n projektiksi”, minkä vuoksi Venäjä on pyrkinyt vähentämään riippuvuutta ulkomaisesta informaatioteknologiasta.
– Mihin tahansa internetiin kytkettyyn laitteeseen voidaan murtautua, Klimenko toteaa.

Vuonna 2010 aloitetun projektin tarkoituksena oli kehittää hallinnon käyttöön Linux-pohjainen käyttöjärjestelmä. Näin maa pääsisi eroon Microsoftin tuotteista.
Venäjä on myös kehittänyt vaihtoehtoista DNS-järjestelmää Brasilian, Intian, Kiinan ja Etelä-Afrikan kanssa, kertoo Defense One -julkaisu.
Asiantuntijoiden mukaan irtautuminen internetistä olisi todellisuudessa hyvin raju toimenpide, millä olisi myös valtavia vaikutuksia Venäjän talouteen.

https://www.verkkouutiset.fi/venajan-sotasuunnitelma-koko-maa-kytketaan-pois-internetista/
Siis ovat keksineet erillisverkon. Mahtavaa innovointia.

Tuo oman DNS-järjestelmän tekeminen onkin sitten jo eri juttu.
 

Osasto 31

Kapteeni
Russian Military Expert: Moscow Must Focus on Defending Itself Against Hybrid Wars

The Vladimir Putin regime, which is generally given credit for coming up with the concept of “hybrid war” (“New Type Warfare”) and deploying it against other countries, is now struggling with another task: figuring out how to defend the Russian Federation from “hybrid war” attacks. On the one hand, the debate about this subject is, in the first instance, about refining the original concept of attacking others, so that Moscow would be able to overcome the defenses they may put up against hybrid war. But on the other, it is the recognition by the Kremlin that its approach may come back to haunt it and that Moscow must be prepared to counter “hybrid war” moves against Russia.

Discussions about both, the offensive and defensive aspects of hybrid war, have been a feature of Russian military thought since at least 2014. But if earlier Russian military theorists focused on the ways in which such tactics could be used offensively, they are increasingly devoting their attention to the defensive side of the equation. This is what Aleksandr Bartosh, a leading Russian military commentator, makes clear in an important new 3,700-word article in Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie that is significantly titled “Russia Cannot Avoid Hybrid Wars” (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, March 9).

Bartosh cites with approval the conclusions of retired Colonel General Leonid Ivashov that Russian military thinking must make “a breakthrough” if it is to defend the country against hybrid wars. “We still do not have any clarity as to what a hybrid war is and naturally there is no theory on this. And we do not have a strategy of countering it and how we can defend ourselves in the information field, the educational field, the scientific field, the military field and so forth,” Ivashov says.

In his essay, the commentator attempts to describe the current state of play in Russian discussions about the nature of defending against hybrid war moves by the United States and other countries. He argues that hybrid war, precisely because it has no clear limits, requires a fundamental reorganization of the Russian armed services and their involvement earlier and in more areas than they have ever been involved in the past. To the extent that happens, the most important consequence of the rise of hybrid wars around the world may very well be the militarization of security thinking in the Russian Federation and perhaps other countries as well—something that would change the nature not only of their foreign policies, but also their domestic ones, while the distinction between the two would become almost meaningless.

“The term ‘hybrid war’ unites a broad range of actions that are carried out by one’s opponent via the combination of the application of regular and irregular formations, with the simultaneous involvement of civilian components,” Bartosh says. That represents a radical shift in the nature of the military’s task if it is to defend the country against attack. That is especially important, because, as General Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the Russian General Staff, has written, hybrid wars can allow an opponent to deprive the country of its “sovereignty without seizing any territory.”

According to Bartosh, hybrid wars create conditions for coups and color revolutions, as has already happened in Ukraine. And this represents a development of Western strategy from the time of the Cold War, when it used ideological means to undermine Communist regimes. Now, he says, the United States has broadened its attack on Russia to include “worldview” issues, and that requires a more serious response. Furthermore, Bartosh argues that as long as nuclear weapons continue to play their restraining influence, both sides will use other mechanisms, including hybrid wars, to undermine one another.

Responding to these new kinds of threats, he continues, will require the acceptance of a new and broader definition of war, one that must form “the foundation of the strategy of the state as a whole and that of the construction of national armed forces in particular.” If hybrid war eliminates the divide between war and peace, then the military must be involved on both sides of that division, something that not everyone accepts, but that US military theorists are increasingly supportive of, he contends.

“The logic behind any strategy of opposing hybrid wars,” Bartosh writes, “must be built by taking into account the characteristics of uninterrupted conflicts and the nonlinear configuration of forces and possibilities characteristic of that.” He argues that it must meet the following “key tasks.” First, the military must stop focusing on control of territory alone and instead focus on control of key institutions on that territory. Second, it must have the capacity to move forces both territorially and functionally to the most vulnerable places. Third, it must carry out constant monitoring of the situation even when there is no apparent threat. And fourth, it must train officers to be able to display that kind of flexibility in the field.

In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Kingdom and the US, military theorists have devoted a great deal of attention to and reached some key conclusions on the nature of “hybrid military actions.” But in Russia, to this day, Bartosh says, there has been an incomplete incorporation of these ideas, especially with regard to defending against hybrid efforts. Instead, the Russian military talks about hybrid wars offensively, but generally ignores the task of defending Russia against their use by other powers. That must change, the military theorist posits, because the threat against Russia is all too real.
 

Passi

Kenraali
Siis ovat keksineet erillisverkon. Mahtavaa innovointia.

Tuo oman DNS-järjestelmän tekeminen onkin sitten jo eri juttu.
Eikai tuossa kyse ole keksimisestä vaan tekemisestä. Jos tuo nyt pitää paikkansa niin olisi aika iso projekti rakentaa venäjän kokoiseen maahan erillisverkko varsinkin jos siihen halutaan liittää kaikki viranomaiset ja hallinto Tyyneltämereltä Itämerelle. Yhtäkkiä katsoin että suomes tuve verkon kustannukset oli arvioitu 190 miljoonaa euroa ja tämä vain runkoverkon osalta.
Liittymiskustannukset käyttäjpäässäkin on isot ja ei taida olla vielä läheskään jokapaikassa.

”Siinä entisestä puolustusvoimien tietoverkosta laajennetaan valtakunnallinen viranomaisten runkoverkko. Verkkoa täydennetään laskemalla maahan lähes 2700 kilometriä uutta valokaapelia ja rannikoille yli tuhat kilometriä merikaapelia.
Osa verkosta rakennetaan vuokraamalla valokaapeliyhteyksiä teleoperaattoreilta. Turvavaatimukset näissä ovat poikkeuksellisen suuret: valtiolle vuokrattavat kuitukaapelit eivät ole saaneet olla aiemmin missään muussa käytössä. Lisäksi valtio tuo omat päätelaitteensa teleyhtiöiden laitetiloihin”

Jos Venäjälle meinataan läheskää saman tasoinen rakentaa, niin siinä menee kaapelia muutama metri ja aikaa ”muutama” vuosi.

Suomessa tuve hanke alkoi 2009 ja valmista ei ole vieläkää.
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö
The new technology Gerasimov discusses would allow Russia to conduct deep-strikes within enemy territory, thus ‘pushing’ the actual fighting far from Russian borders and Russian vulnerability to Western precision-guided weapons,” he said.

What would Gerasimov hit with those weapons? In his talk, the Russian general said that enemy economic and non-military aspects of government could be on the list of potential targets. “The objects of the economy and the state administration of the enemy will be subject to immediate destruction, in addition to the traditional spheres of armed struggle, the information sphere and space will be actively involved,” he told the audience.

Says Bendett, “the use of such technologies is especially important given the type of war Moscow intends to fight. Gerasimov stated that potential adversary’s economic targets, as well as government’s ability to govern, will be fair game. Striking deep into enemy territory can be accomplished more easily by unmanned systems—whether armed with EW, various sensors or strike components … All this also depends on the Russian military-industrial complex’s ability to properly marshal the needed resources in an organized fashion in order to field this technology.”
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/03/russian-military-chief-lays-out-kremlins-high-tech-war-plans/147051/?oref=d-river

So the high-tech approach that Gerasimov outlined — space-based weapons, ‘military robots’ — is the next evolutionary stage in Russian military’s evolution to a more high-tech, sophisticated forces capable of rapid strike.”

Gerasimov also took a moment to denounce what he claimed were Western attempts to destabilize the Russian government through information and influence warfare and other subtle tactics. The charge may strike Western audiences as brazenly hypocritical given the Kremlin’s on-going attempts to sow misinformation to global audiences through social media, email theft and propaganda campaigns. But it’s an old talking point for Gerasimov.

Said UMV’s Galeotti: “At a time when the Kremlin is demonstrably worried about what it sees as Western ‘gibridnaya voina‘ [or hybrid war] being waged against it — we don’t have to accept their premises to acknowledge that the Russians genuinely believe this — he is staking out the military’s claims to being relevant in this age. And his answer, as in his infamous 2013 article, and as played out in the first stage of Zapad [the major wargame Russia executed in Belarus last summer] is that the military will deploy massive firepower to smash any foreign incursions meant to instigate risings against Moscow
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö

Artikkeli numerokaupungeista

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union organized its vast academic and industrial resources to achieve scientific and industrial breakthroughs for the nation’s military forces. Locked in the global struggle against Washington’s massive military-industrial complex, Moscow needed its best and brightest citizens working on a vast array of technologies and principles to match and potentially “overtake” its rival.

Much of that science-and-technology and research-and-development work was conducted across Soviet universities and scientific institutions – while a massive amount of work was done at secret science cities spread across the country.

These cities — some with tens of thousands of inhabitants — were usually centered around a specific S&T laboratory or an institution dealing with work such as nuclear, biological, chemical research, rocket and ballistic technologies, development and testing of various weapons, and many other activities carried out in the service of the “state and nation.”
http://warisboring.com/russia-wants-to-build-a-whole-city-for-developing-weapons/
 

Zero The Hero

Kersantti
Eikai tuossa kyse ole keksimisestä vaan tekemisestä. Jos tuo nyt pitää paikkansa niin olisi aika iso projekti rakentaa venäjän kokoiseen maahan erillisverkko varsinkin jos siihen halutaan liittää kaikki viranomaiset ja hallinto Tyyneltämereltä Itämerelle. Yhtäkkiä katsoin että suomes tuve verkon kustannukset oli arvioitu 190 miljoonaa euroa ja tämä vain runkoverkon osalta.
Liittymiskustannukset käyttäjpäässäkin on isot ja ei taida olla vielä läheskään jokapaikassa.

”Siinä entisestä puolustusvoimien tietoverkosta laajennetaan valtakunnallinen viranomaisten runkoverkko. Verkkoa täydennetään laskemalla maahan lähes 2700 kilometriä uutta valokaapelia ja rannikoille yli tuhat kilometriä merikaapelia.
Osa verkosta rakennetaan vuokraamalla valokaapeliyhteyksiä teleoperaattoreilta. Turvavaatimukset näissä ovat poikkeuksellisen suuret: valtiolle vuokrattavat kuitukaapelit eivät ole saaneet olla aiemmin missään muussa käytössä. Lisäksi valtio tuo omat päätelaitteensa teleyhtiöiden laitetiloihin”

Jos Venäjälle meinataan läheskää saman tasoinen rakentaa, niin siinä menee kaapelia muutama metri ja aikaa ”muutama” vuosi.

Suomessa tuve hanke alkoi 2009 ja valmista ei ole vieläkää.
Nokkela valtio ensin yhtiöitti vuonna 1994 ja sittemmin myi vuonna 2002 aiemmin omistamansa viestiverkot ulkomaalaiselle omistajalle. Seitsemän vuotta myöhemmin tajuttiin että hupsis - mitähän tulikaan tehtyä?
 

Osasto 31

Kapteeni
Russia Employs New ‘Hybrid War’ Methods Against Georgia

The Moscow-backed authorities of separatist South Ossetia released, on March 23, Georgian citizens David Gerkeuli and Iosif Gundishvili (Imedinews March 23). The two men had been arrested by South Ossetian KGB agents (the special service of this breakaway republic still carries the old Soviet name) and Russian border guards (Kavkazsky Uzel, March 22).

Gerkeuli and Gundishvili were accused of “violating the state border of South Ossetia.” Relatives of the detainees told reporters that they were going to church when the agents seized them in an ambush. The arrested were released after the family paid a fine (Imedinews, March 23).

Georgia does not recognize the “border” with South Ossetia and considers this territory occupied by Russian troops. After the August 2008 war, Russia violated all norms of international law by establishing an illegal “border” that passes through a number of Georgian villages. In this region of the Caucasus, where people have lived and worked for millennia, there had never been any such “boundaries” to block the free movement of local residents. The dividing line, drawn and regularly redrawn by the occupation forces (see EDM, October 2, 2013; December 2, 2013; July 20, 2015), is so artificial, that hundreds of Georgian citizens become its “victims” each year. They are arrested and transferred to Tskhinvali prison, where they often endure various humiliations and even beatings or other torture (see below).

On March 24, 35-year-old Archil Tatunashvili was buried at the Mukhatgverdi military cemetery, near the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. He was a retired soldier: in 2008, Tatunashvili served in Iraq, where his brigade fought alongside the United States military (Oc-media.org 23 February). After the start of the Five Day War with Russia, the brigade returned to its homeland but did not have time to take part in the hostilities (Diplomaatia, August 2013). Soon thereafter, Archil Tatunashvili resigned and rejoined civilian life. With the permission of the separatist authorities of South Ossetia, he was engaged in a small business in the Akhalgori region, where he was born and raised.

KGB agents had arrested Tatunashvili on February 22, on the “border,” and transferred him to Tskhinvali prison. News reports revealed that he had died the following day, during an interrogation (Civil Georgia, March 20). After his body was handed back to Georgia on March 20, a month after his capture, experts confirmed he had been severely beaten and tortured while in custody. The final conclusions about the cause of death have yet to be published, but the young man was almost certainly killed because of the beating (Civil Georgia, March 21).

“The Tatunashvili Affair” appears to have been used by Moscow to put additional pressure on Georgia. The occupation authorities refused to transfer Tatunashvili’s body to his family for weeks. And that refusal angered relatives and the populations of villages located near the “border” with South Ossetia. Indeed, in late February, hundreds of local people blocked the strategically important Tbilisi–Poti highway for several hours. Without the normal functioning of this road, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan all risk being cut off from Black Sea ports. At the same time, a group of activists blocked the Tbilisi–Vladikavkaz road, the main overland route that connects (via Georgian territory) Armenia and Russia. The protesters demanded that the Georgian government “do everything to return the body of the deceased to the family.” Some demonstrators taking part in the blockade threatened not to let Russian tourists into the country.

The roads were unblocked only after Georgia’s Interior Minister Giorgi Mghebrishvili, on the instructions of the prime minister, met with the father of the deceased Archil Tatunashvili and promised that he would soon be given his son’s body for burial (Sova.news, February 26).

Negotiations over Tatunashvili, with the involvement of the Red Cross, lasted for several days. But the South Ossetian occupying authorities refused to resolve the humanitarian issue. Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili made an emotional appeal to the Russian government and suggested starting a dialogue “to break the deadlock in which Russian-Georgian relations ended up after the Five-Day War.” In addition, he expressed Tbilisi’s readiness to start “a direct dialogue with the Abkhazians and Ossetians” (Georgia Today, March 12; see EDM, March 26).

It soon emerged that Georgia had agreed to sign a joint declaration with Russia in Geneva. The bilateral Geneva talks have been held since the August 2008 war with the participation of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE. But now, Russia has apparently convinced Georgia to sign a “peace declaration” together with representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Kommersant, March 20).

David Avalishvili, a columnist with the independent information and analytical agency GHN, said that the signing of the declaration with Abkhazia and South Ossetia “is a big victory for Moscow because Georgia will indirectly recognize the legitimacy of the occupying administrations—even though these ‘administrations’ were created in the territories where the ethnic cleaning of the Georgian population took place” (Author’s interview, March 23).

For almost ten years, Avalishvili noted, the Georgian government has refused to sign such a declaration with separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia, demanding that Russia first pledge not to use further force against Georgia. But now, “Moscow achieved its desired goal as a result of a provocation—the arrest and murder of former Georgian army officer Archil Tatunashvili. It was easy [for Moscow] to predict the emotional reaction of Georgian society and the helplessness of the Georgian authorities when the West cannot really support Georgia because of the many problems [it has to deal with] from Ukraine to Salisbury,” the expert asserted.

The “Tatunashvili case” represents a new “Hybrid War”–style method developed by Moscow, Avalishvili argued. “This method allows Russia to influence the emotions of society and put the [Georgian] government in a desperate situation, forcing the country’s authorities to make concessions to Russia in order to prevent a civil confrontation, the blocking of [national] infrastructure, or other destabilizing actions [by the population]. At the same time, mass media and social networks are actively used [by Moscow],” he explained (Author’s interview, March 23).

Analysis of the dangerous situation around the occupied regions of Georgia lends credence to Avalishvili’s theory. The strategy has already been shown to work with the Tatuanshvili case. Hence, the occupation forces can be expected to increase their use of abductions of Georgian citizens to again influence the emotions of Georgian society. And presented with additional ultimatums, the Georgian government will again be pressed to make new concessions to Moscow.
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö
Russian infantry weapons have a reputation for reliability. The AK and PKM are renowned for enduring through adverse conditions, powered by their powerful long-stroke piston actions. However, a recent report by warhead.su suggests that when these weapons do fail in Russian service, the problem is often not in their design, but rather in the Russian ammunition they fire.

This is not a new phenomenon. Russian imported ammunition to the United States has always been regarded as “budget” brands, with inconsistent quality. But apparently, the same problems apply to Russian military ammunition.

The report opens with a story of a soldier operating a Kord 12.7-millimeter heavy machine gun. The soldier noticed the belt was a little lighter than usual, and when he pulled the trigger… the bullet got stuck in the barrel, not even passing the gas port on the barrel.

The cause for this is the inconsistencies in Russian powder manufacture. In addition to bullets getting stuck in the barrel, there are stories of guns shooting hotter than usual, and guns exploding due to too much powder being in a cartridge. Of course, for these reasons, Russian domestic ammunition is rarely the ammo of choice for Russian precision shooters.

The occurrence of these squibs poses a significant reliability problem for all weapons, as they can cause the barrel to explode if the soldier does not realize a squib has been fired and attempts another shot. Given the Russian predilection for automatic modes of fire, this only compounds the problem as a soldier would likely not have time to react before the second round is fired.

Moving from powder problems, the report goes on to talk about primer problems. The primer is the small explosive component in the rear of the cartridge that detonates when the firing pin strikes it, setting off the rest of the gunpowder in a cartridge. It usually is placed in the “primer pocket” in the rear of a cartridge and then sealed with varnish to keep them in place.

Russian cartridges also have significant difficulty with this. The primers are inserted in backward or sideways and are sometimes missing the primer itself.
http://warisboring.com/russian-soldiers-are-complaining-about-exploding-guns/
 

baikal

Ylipäällikkö
Lahjoittaja
skärdis said:
Se oli Lipposen hallitus eli toverit demarit häärivät kukkona tunkiolla.
Lipponen on kokoomuslainen.

Lipponen vetää Kokoomusta oikealta ohi reippaammin kuin Kupsin puolustajat ohitetaan veikkausliigassa.....tosin ne ohitetaan molemmilta puolin kuin merimerkit. :eek:
 

baikal

Ylipäällikkö
Lahjoittaja
Venäjän sotasuunnitelmaa: Koko maa kytketään pois internetistä blaa blaa blaa


Eli tää on luettava: Venäjän kansa on -tarvittaessa- saatava veks netin piiristä, eikö niin? Sellainen "sotasuunnitelma" tämä todennäköisesti on.

Oranssit torilla tavataan - keissit ovat kiusallisia ja tarpeen vaatiessa snips.....ja kas, eipä löydä toveri toveria snäpissä tsätissä eikä vätzäpissä facessa ym.
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö
Kommentoin tästä eilen cyberosiossa, mutta tässä paremmasta kynästä Venäjän kyberohjelmasta. Henkilökohtaisesti minulle VPNFiltteri on työkalu mikä on kehitetty takaamaan että naapuri on kytketty pois muusta maailmasta katkaisemalla muun maailman nettiliikenne. Russia Stronk! Kukaan ei voi tehdä mitään koska valtiollisiin ei voi koskea.

Former GCHQ chief Robert Hannigan has warned that the emergence of a commodity marketplace for hacking has changed and escalated the threat.

Crooks have solved the skills shortage problem by creating a gig economy and creating "more impressive" and capable tools. Hannigan made the comments during a keynote speech Weaponising the web: Nation-state hacking and what it means for enterprise cybersecurity at the Infosec conference in London yesterday morning.

During a wide-ranging presentation, the former cyber spy boss said that the problem posed by nation state attackers had increased over the last five years and become an issue for enterprises as well as governments. "Nation state attacks using criminal group as a proxy" is a "fairly new issue" and one of the issues along with the commoditisation of hacking tools that makes international geo-politics a feature of corporate security.

Nation states behave in cyberspace in the same way as the real world, Hannigan explained. North Korea (a centre for counterfeiting) is attacking banks that are on the SWIFT network, as well as crypto exchanges to steal money. "This is a rational state pursuing rational objectives," Hannigan told Infosec Europe delegates.

Iran targeted banks and more recently unis, according to the attribution of Western intel agencies, the former spy boss said, warning that the Trump administration's rejection of a nuclear treaty with Iran could escalate tension in cyberspace.

Russia presents a greater threat in terms of sophistication and a greater overall danger – not least because it doesn't mind being destructive, Hannigan warned. The destructive element of attacks blamed on Russia includes NotPetya and attacks on the Ukrainian power grid.

Attacks attributed back to Russia have become more sophisticated, brazen and even a little bit reckless. Russia appears to be live-testing cyberattacks – as has been speculated about the recent planting of the VPNFilter backdoor on routers – although the intent is unknown.

"It's unclear if that was a mistake or an experiment," Hannigan said. "Russia seems to be live testing things in cyber, as it has been [on the ground] in Syria, but it's a doctrine we don’t fully understand."

Power systems and hospitals are connected to the 'net and, as the WannaCry attack showed, the possibilities of collateral damage from malware are massive. "The problem is that the risk of miscalculation is huge," Hannigan warned.

Asked at the start of an audience Q+A whether the UK was at cyberwar with Russia, Hannigan replied that it probably was. "It certainly feels like we are in a state of conflict," he mused.

Hannigan served as the GCHQ's director between November 2014 until January 2017. Highlights of his tenure include the creation of the NCSC as an operational part of GCHQ. Since leaving the signals intelligence agency, Hannigan has spoken out repeatedly against the advisability and practicality of encryption backdoors.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/06/08/gchq_former_boss_infosec_keynote/
 

Protheon_93

Eversti
Russian_Battalion_Tactical_Group.png
Venäjä näyttää myös viimevuosina keskittyneen lännen tavoin pienempiin sotatoimiyhtymiin, kuten uppaamaani Battalion Tactical Group - yhtymiin.

Nämä ovat ihan itsenäiseen toimintaan kykeneviä ja nopeassa valmiudessa olevia suurennettuja noin tuhannen vahvuudessa olevia, joita muistaakseni ainakin joku vuosi sitten Venäjällä oli 66.

Aika paljon keveämpiä ovat kuin suomalaiset taisteluosastot, kun katsoo organisaatiota. Tykistöä patterin verran vain, ilmatorjuntaa joukkueen verran vain eikä patteria (näyttää vanhat kunnon IT-tykit puuttuvan), pioneereja vain joukkue eikä kompaniaa, kranaatinheittimiä vain joukkueen verran, jne...

Suomalainen taisteluosasto on tällaista vastaan aika vahvoilla.
 

Herman30

Ylipäällikkö
Lahjoittaja
Äläpäs nyt aliarvioi veli venäläistä, kyllä siellä on miestä ja pyssyä ja amisuunia ihan tarpeeks suomalaisellekin antamaan vastustusta.
 
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