Varmaankin saa, mutta tuskin se silloin ekana IT:n kantamalle menee. Jos siis tarkoitat ulkoisia ripustimia. Ja IT:n lamauttamiseen olettaisin käytettävän jotakin pitemmän kantaman omaavaa.
F-35 Lightning II
- Viestiketjun aloittaja Hejsan
- Aloitus PVM
Varmaankin saa, mutta tuskin se silloin ekana IT:n kantamalle menee. Jos siis tarkoitat ulkoisia ripustimia. Ja IT:n lamauttamiseen olettaisin käytettävän jotakin pitemmän kantaman omaavaa.
Raveni
Greatest Leader
Usan omaan puolustukseenhan ne onkin tarkoitettu... eikä näköpiirissä ole että joku olisi edes hyökkäämässä usaan. Nämä viimeisten vuosikymmenten sodat ovat olleet sellaista koko luokkaa että eipä niissä ole ollut edes tarvetta kun vastustajat ovat olleet enemmän ja vähemmän kehitysmaa tasoa jonka konekanta on luokkaa nousee ilmaan ei nouse. Tarkoitan sanoa että vaikka jenkkien resurssit ovatkin valtavat ei heilläkään liene isoa tarvetta ilmataisteluihin optimoituihin koneisiin koska todellista vastavoimaa ei ole eikä ole ihan heti näköpiirissäkään. Sen sijaan tarvetta on koneelle joka on hyvä pommittamaan ja joka on hyvin verkotettu ja joka on riittävän hyvä pudottamaan ne satunnaiset viholliset jotka ilmaan uskaltavat 30 vuotta vanhemmilla koneilla. Tämä riittää siis jenkeille...
crane
Ylipäällikkö
Crane totesi vain että koneiden hinta halpenee.
En puhunu mitään mistään vitun talopaketeista!
Pointti oli siinä, että annettiin ymmärtää että koneiden hinta halpenee ja vakuudeksi vielä mainittiin, airframe, moottori ja pommiripustimet ( kaikki maalaamattomana pakkauspusseissa ), jotta jonkun "hölmöläisten" maan päättäjät menisivät vipuun...kuten esim Suomen.
Näkökulmaa Etelä-Koreasta
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/10/17/2014101701403.html
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/10/20/2014102001599.html
--
Tässä pari kuvaa F-35:n lastauksesta
http://s13.postimg.org/abgx72tvb/1625988.jpg
http://s11.postimg.org/j7xwkchn7/1625993.jpg
http://s29.postimg.org/ewt5bkdd3/1625990.jpg
Tuo omat haasteensa verrattuna perinteiseen siipien alle ripustamiseen.
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/10/17/2014101701403.html
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/10/20/2014102001599.html
--
Tässä pari kuvaa F-35:n lastauksesta
http://s13.postimg.org/abgx72tvb/1625988.jpg
http://s11.postimg.org/j7xwkchn7/1625993.jpg
http://s29.postimg.org/ewt5bkdd3/1625990.jpg
Tuo omat haasteensa verrattuna perinteiseen siipien alle ripustamiseen.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Mikoyan
Ylipäällikkö
Vanha artikkeli ja keskustelussa jo vilahtanut, mutta kovin mielenkiintoinen:
New U.S. Stealth Jet Can’t Hide From Russian Radar
America’s gazillion-dollar Joint Strike Fighter is supposed to go virtually unseen when flying over enemy turf. But that’s not how things are working out.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter—the jet that the Pentagon is counting on to be the stealthy future of its tactical aircraft—is having all sorts of shortcomings. But the most serious may be that the JSF is not, in fact, stealthy in the eyes of a growing number of Russian and Chinese radars. Nor is it particularly good at jamming enemy radar. Which means the Defense Department is committing hundreds of billions of dollars to a fighter that will need the help of specialized jamming aircraft that protect non-stealthy—“radar-shiny,” as some insiders call them—aircraft today.
These problems are not secret at all. The F-35 is susceptible to detection by radars operating in the VHF bands of the spectrum. The fighter’s jamming is mostly confined to the X-band, in the sector covered by its APG-81 radar. These are not criticisms of the program but the result of choices by the customer, the Pentagon.
To suggest that the F-35 is VHF-stealthy is like arguing that the sky is not blue—literally, because both involve the same phenomenon. The late-Victorian physicist Lord Rayleigh gave his name to the way that electromagnetic radiation is scattered by objects that are smaller than its wavelength. This applies to the particles in the air that scatter sunlight, and aircraft stabilizers and wingtips that are about the same meter-class size as VHF waves.
The counter-stealth attributes of VHF have been public knowledge for decades. They were known at the dawn of stealth, in 1983, when the MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory ordered a 150-foot-wide radar to emulate Russia’s P-14 Oborona VHF early-warning system. Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth division—makers of the F-35—should know about that radar: they built it.
Making a plane VHF-stealthy starts with removing the target’s tails, as on the B-2 bombers. But we did not know how to do that on a supersonic, agile airplane (like the F-35 is supposed to be) when the JSF specifications were written.
Neither did the technology to add broadband-active jamming to a stealth aircraft exist in 1995. Not only did stealth advocates expect jamming to fade away, but there was an obvious and (at the time) insoluble problem: To use jamming you have to be certain that the radar has detected you. Otherwise, jamming is going to reveal your presence and identify you as a stealth aircraft, since the adversary can see a signal but not a reflection.
We can be sure that onboard jamming has not been added to the F-35 since. Had the JSF requirements been tightened by one iota since the program started, its advocates would be blaming that for the delays and overruns.
What the JSF does have is a jamming function—also known as “electronic attack,” or EA, in militaryese—in the radar. It also has an expendable radar decoy—BAE Systems’ ALE-70. Both are last-ditch measures to disrupt a missile engagement, not to prevent tracking.
JSF’s planners, in the mid-1990s, were close to correct when they calculated that low-band stealth and limited EA, combined with passive electronic surveillance for situational awareness, would be adequate at service entry. But they expected that the F-35 would reach squadrons in 2010, and China’s military modernization was barely imaginable.
The threats of the late 2010s will be qualitatively different. Old VHF radars could be dealt with by breaking the kill chain between detection and tracking: they did not provide good enough cueing to put analog, mechanically scanned tracking radars on to the target. Active electronically scanned array (AESA), high-power VHF radars and decimeter- and centimeter-wave trackers are more tenacious foes.
Last August, at an air show near Moscow, I talked to designers of a new, highly mobile counterstealth radar system, now being delivered to the Russian armed forces. Its centerpiece was a 100-foot-wide all-digital VHF AESA, but it also incorporated powerful higher-frequency radars that can track small targets once the VHF radar has detected them. More recently, however, it has emerged that the U.S. Navy is worried because new Chinese warships carry the Type 517M VHF search radar, which its maker says is an AESA.
None of this is to say that stealth is dead, but it is not reasonable to expect that the cat-and-mouse game of detection and evasion in air combat has stopped, or that it ever will. EA and stealth still do not coexist very comfortably on the same platform, but offboard EA and stealth are synergistic: the smaller the target, the less jamming power is needed to mask it.
But the threat’s demonstrated agility drives home the lesson that there is no one winning move in the radar game. Excessive reliance on a single-point design is not a good idea, and using fictitious secrecy to quash the debate is an even worse one.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articl...tealth-jet-can-t-hide-from-russian-radar.html
New U.S. Stealth Jet Can’t Hide From Russian Radar
America’s gazillion-dollar Joint Strike Fighter is supposed to go virtually unseen when flying over enemy turf. But that’s not how things are working out.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter—the jet that the Pentagon is counting on to be the stealthy future of its tactical aircraft—is having all sorts of shortcomings. But the most serious may be that the JSF is not, in fact, stealthy in the eyes of a growing number of Russian and Chinese radars. Nor is it particularly good at jamming enemy radar. Which means the Defense Department is committing hundreds of billions of dollars to a fighter that will need the help of specialized jamming aircraft that protect non-stealthy—“radar-shiny,” as some insiders call them—aircraft today.
These problems are not secret at all. The F-35 is susceptible to detection by radars operating in the VHF bands of the spectrum. The fighter’s jamming is mostly confined to the X-band, in the sector covered by its APG-81 radar. These are not criticisms of the program but the result of choices by the customer, the Pentagon.
To suggest that the F-35 is VHF-stealthy is like arguing that the sky is not blue—literally, because both involve the same phenomenon. The late-Victorian physicist Lord Rayleigh gave his name to the way that electromagnetic radiation is scattered by objects that are smaller than its wavelength. This applies to the particles in the air that scatter sunlight, and aircraft stabilizers and wingtips that are about the same meter-class size as VHF waves.
The counter-stealth attributes of VHF have been public knowledge for decades. They were known at the dawn of stealth, in 1983, when the MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory ordered a 150-foot-wide radar to emulate Russia’s P-14 Oborona VHF early-warning system. Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth division—makers of the F-35—should know about that radar: they built it.
Making a plane VHF-stealthy starts with removing the target’s tails, as on the B-2 bombers. But we did not know how to do that on a supersonic, agile airplane (like the F-35 is supposed to be) when the JSF specifications were written.
Neither did the technology to add broadband-active jamming to a stealth aircraft exist in 1995. Not only did stealth advocates expect jamming to fade away, but there was an obvious and (at the time) insoluble problem: To use jamming you have to be certain that the radar has detected you. Otherwise, jamming is going to reveal your presence and identify you as a stealth aircraft, since the adversary can see a signal but not a reflection.
We can be sure that onboard jamming has not been added to the F-35 since. Had the JSF requirements been tightened by one iota since the program started, its advocates would be blaming that for the delays and overruns.
What the JSF does have is a jamming function—also known as “electronic attack,” or EA, in militaryese—in the radar. It also has an expendable radar decoy—BAE Systems’ ALE-70. Both are last-ditch measures to disrupt a missile engagement, not to prevent tracking.
JSF’s planners, in the mid-1990s, were close to correct when they calculated that low-band stealth and limited EA, combined with passive electronic surveillance for situational awareness, would be adequate at service entry. But they expected that the F-35 would reach squadrons in 2010, and China’s military modernization was barely imaginable.
The threats of the late 2010s will be qualitatively different. Old VHF radars could be dealt with by breaking the kill chain between detection and tracking: they did not provide good enough cueing to put analog, mechanically scanned tracking radars on to the target. Active electronically scanned array (AESA), high-power VHF radars and decimeter- and centimeter-wave trackers are more tenacious foes.
Last August, at an air show near Moscow, I talked to designers of a new, highly mobile counterstealth radar system, now being delivered to the Russian armed forces. Its centerpiece was a 100-foot-wide all-digital VHF AESA, but it also incorporated powerful higher-frequency radars that can track small targets once the VHF radar has detected them. More recently, however, it has emerged that the U.S. Navy is worried because new Chinese warships carry the Type 517M VHF search radar, which its maker says is an AESA.
None of this is to say that stealth is dead, but it is not reasonable to expect that the cat-and-mouse game of detection and evasion in air combat has stopped, or that it ever will. EA and stealth still do not coexist very comfortably on the same platform, but offboard EA and stealth are synergistic: the smaller the target, the less jamming power is needed to mask it.
But the threat’s demonstrated agility drives home the lesson that there is no one winning move in the radar game. Excessive reliance on a single-point design is not a good idea, and using fictitious secrecy to quash the debate is an even worse one.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articl...tealth-jet-can-t-hide-from-russian-radar.html
BarrelNut
Kenraali
Ei ole.
RPG83
Soome Majori
Jotkut ovat valitelleet, kuinka F-35 ei ota sisäänsä kuin neljä Amraamia. Mutta tarvitseeko sen edes?
F-35:n RCS luku lienee aika pieni, jotain luokkaa 0,01-0,001 m^2. Entä jos yksikertaisesti pultattaisiin Amraamit siipiin (esim. neljä kappaletta) ja asennettaisiin sisäisiin ripustimiin kaksi Amraamia ja kaksi Sidewinderia? Nuo neljä ulkoista Amraamia tuskin nostavat herätettä aivan hirveästi. Ideana on ampua ulkoiset Amraamit kaukaa (ennen kuin F-35 on tullut havaituksi) ja sitten siirtyä lähemmäksi laukomaan sisäisiä aseita tutkahäiveen samalla pienennyttyä "normaalitasolle". Ulkoiset ripustimet taitavat jäädä yhä kiinni siipiin, mutta ne voitaneen suunnitella häiveominaisuuksia hyödyntäviksi - ehkä jopa ohjuslaukaisun jälkeen irtoaviksi.
Taktiikat ovat kyllä vähän monimutkaisempia kuin että lennetään suoraan kohti ja ammutaan ohjuksia, mutta näin perusperiaatteena tällainen ehdotus.
F-35:n RCS luku lienee aika pieni, jotain luokkaa 0,01-0,001 m^2. Entä jos yksikertaisesti pultattaisiin Amraamit siipiin (esim. neljä kappaletta) ja asennettaisiin sisäisiin ripustimiin kaksi Amraamia ja kaksi Sidewinderia? Nuo neljä ulkoista Amraamia tuskin nostavat herätettä aivan hirveästi. Ideana on ampua ulkoiset Amraamit kaukaa (ennen kuin F-35 on tullut havaituksi) ja sitten siirtyä lähemmäksi laukomaan sisäisiä aseita tutkahäiveen samalla pienennyttyä "normaalitasolle". Ulkoiset ripustimet taitavat jäädä yhä kiinni siipiin, mutta ne voitaneen suunnitella häiveominaisuuksia hyödyntäviksi - ehkä jopa ohjuslaukaisun jälkeen irtoaviksi.
Taktiikat ovat kyllä vähän monimutkaisempia kuin että lennetään suoraan kohti ja ammutaan ohjuksia, mutta näin perusperiaatteena tällainen ehdotus.
RPG83
Soome Majori
No ei se kyllä näy. Tai näkyy, mutta esim. Mig-29 tai F/A-18C näkyykin sitten moninkertaisesti pitemmältä etäisyydeltä.
Amraamit vaativat tutkan käyttämistä ja se taas paljastaa häivekoneen.
Ei vaadi. Vihollisen häirintälähettimeen voi ampua ohjuksen ihan milloin vain, lisäksi jos koneessa on kylliksi hyvät sensorit, niin passiivisilta sensoreilta (ip+laser) saadut tiedot riittää kohteen sijaintitiedoiksi. Lisäksi sitä tutkaa ei välttämättä tarvitse käyttää kauaa.
riippuu miten laukaisee amraamin, että milloin mikäkin kone paljastuu... jos AWACS tai maatutka esim antaa vihollisen vektorin...
tai toinen F-35 maalaa kohteen ensimmäiselle F-35:lle joka laukaisee.
fulcrum
Greatest Leader
Nykyään häirintälähettimet tuppaavat olemaan hinattavia, jossain näin myös kertakäyttöisiä lähettimiä (jotka tiputettaisiin koneesta ohjuksen lähestyessä, houkutellen ohjuksen lähettimeen).
IP-sensori on erittäin huono mittaamaan etäisyyttä. Laser on hyvä, mutta sen kantama on erittäin rajattu. Kumpikaan järjestelmä ei toimi pilvessä.
Nykyaikaiset tutkat ovat enenevissä määrin tosin LPI-tutkia joiden havaittavuus on huono. Mutta epäilemättä signaaliprosessoinnin kehitys jossain vaiheessa tämänkin edun poistaa tai ainakin vähentää.
http://aviationweek.com/awin/gripen-sensors-claim-counter-stealth-performance
As a passive system, IRST does not have inherent range data, but it can perform “kinetic ranging”—the aircraft performs a weaving maneuver and the range is determined by the change in azimuth angle to the target—or the IRSTs on two aircraft can triangulate the target
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/ar...159230/the-myth-of-declining-f_35-prices.html
The average unit cost of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter continues to rise, despite claims by the program’s Joint Program Office and the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, that they are decreasing with each annual production lot.
The Pentagon’s method of awarding F-35 contracts, which is illustrated by our tables, seems to be specifically devised to confuse anyone attempting to make some sense of the huge sums being awarded to Lockheed Martin and to Pratt a Whitney
The average unit cost of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter continues to rise, despite claims by the program’s Joint Program Office and the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, that they are decreasing with each annual production lot.
The Pentagon’s method of awarding F-35 contracts, which is illustrated by our tables, seems to be specifically devised to confuse anyone attempting to make some sense of the huge sums being awarded to Lockheed Martin and to Pratt a Whitney
Peuhkis
Luutnantti
Niin tai mitä jos hommataan joku toinen kone. Missä ois parempi hinta/laatu suhde?
