Kolumni Airpower Journalista, vuodelta 1989 koskien Bekaan laakson tapahtumia 1982.
Vahvensin kolumnissa esiteltäviä opetuksia, syitä, seurauksia ja johtopäätöksiä ilmasodasta ja sen voittamisesta.
Voimmeko / pitäisikö meidän oppia tästä jotain? Onko ilmapuolustuksemme painotettu oikein? Onko ECM / ECCM kyky tai AWACS kalusto puutteellinen tai täysin puuttuva?
Entä miten meidän käyttämä (tulevaisuus) Link-16 ja maasta toimiva taistelunjohto
pärjäävät kovassa ELSO ympäristössä?
Reports of what happened next vary. It is generally accepted that in the course of the first attack against the Bekaa an 9 June 1982, the IAF destroyed 17 of the 19 Syrian SAM batteries and their radar sites, as well as 29 Syrian Air Force (SAF) fighters, without loss.15 The following day, the IAF destroyed the remaining two missile batteries. The SAF once more challenged the Israelis and lost approximately 35 more aircraft, again without downing an Israeli aircraft. By the end of July, Syria had lost at least 87 aircraft, while Israeli losses amounted to a few helicopters, one RF-4E, and an A-4 Skyhawk downed by a PLO SA-7.16
Naturally, Arab claims differed from Western and Israeli accounts. The Syrian news agency SANA claimed that 19 Israeli and 14 Syrian planes had been downed on 9 June. The next day, the Syrians maintained that six Israeli and seven Syrian aircraft had been destroyed, while no mention was made on either day of any damage to their SAMS. The Soviets went even further in extolling the SAF's combat virtues: the military newspaper Red Star announced triumphantly that "sixty-seven Israeli aircraft, including modern US-made F-15 and F-16 fighters, were downed" in the fighting.18 Further Soviet reports included an account in Red Star about a meeting with a Syrian airman who eagerly recounted an engagement in which he shot down an Israeli F-15: "The victory had not been easy; the enemy had been subtle."19
These claims met with great skepticism, even within Soviet ranks. After the Bekaa Valley debacle, for example, a story circulated around the Soviet military about how the Syrian Air Force maintained a departure control but no approach control. Even the Syrians themselves privately admitted defeat. After the Bekaa turkey shoot, Gen Mustafa Tlas, the defense minister, told President Hafez Assad and other government leaders that "the Syrian Air Force was outclassed, the ground-to-air missiles useless, and that without air cover, the army could not fight on." Indeed, it seems a bit odd that the Soviets would celebrate a great Syrian victory by sending the first deputy commander of the Soviet air defense forces to find out what went wrong. It seems even stranger that they would conclude that a new SAM system of SA-8s, SA-9s, and long-range SA-5s was necessary, manned by some 1,000 to 1,500 Soviet "advisers."
The lopsided results of the battle stem from a number of factors. The most visible in any air engagement are the quality and capabilities of the weapon systems employed, especially aircraft and air-to-air armament. The IAF had a definite qualitative advantage in both. The primary Syrian fighter during the Lebanon War was the relatively obsolescent MiG-21, with considerable numbers of export model MiG-23s and Su-20s also deployed.23 The Israelis, on the other hand, were flying new-generation McDonnell Douglas F-15s and General Dynamics F-16s, as well as older but still effective McDonnell Douglas F-4s and Israeli Aircraft Industries Kfirs.24
Despite their technological advantages, the Israelis placed considerable priority on the human element, maintaining that high technology is useless without the ability to employ it successfully. According to General Eitan, "Training is of greater importance and significance than the means of warfare, the weaponry systems, and the technology." It was precisely this philosophy that allowed the IAF to exploit fully the capabilities of their equipment during the Bekaa Valley battle. Pilots and ground crews were so well trained that the aircraft turnaround rate (the time it took to refuel, reload, and service an aircraft before the next mission) was in some cases reduced to less than 10 minutes.51 Furthermore, Israeli pilots were for years exposed to the most realistic training of all--combat. Besides conducting simulated strikes against mock SAM sites in the Negev Desert, the IAF had fought three major wars against their Arab opponents since 1967, including considerable combat experience between the wars. The IAF had also been flying virtually unopposed over Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley for years, affording it a familiarity with the target area and deployment of enemy forces unprecedented in modern warfare.
Qualitative advantages in equipment and manpower, however impressive, are relative; therefore, Syrian deficiencies-and there were plenty--were equally important in determining the outcome of the Bekaa Valley battle. In air combat, for example, the Syrians displayed a marked inferiority to the Israelis in tactics and training. The fact that they were largely dependent on ground control not only limited pilot initiative and independence but also encouraged the Israelis to continually jam their communication links. The constraints thus imposed on the Syrian pilots degraded their already inferior technological capabilities. An anonymous senior IAF officer concluded, "They could have flown the best fighter in the world, but if they flew it the way they were flying, we would have shot them down in exactly the same way. It wasn't the equipment at fault, but their tactics." General Eitan echoed this attitude, complaining that although the IAF encountered the MiG-25 during the Lebanon War, it was difficult to assess the aircraft's capabilities because "the Syrians don't know how to fly or operate the MiG, 25. If we could have been sitting in a MiG-25, nobody could have touched us."
Syrian SAM operators also invited disaster upon themselves. Their Soviet equipment was generally regarded as quite good; Syrian handling of it was appalling. As noted by Lt Gen Leonard Perroots, director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, "The Syrians used mobile missiles in a fixed configuration; they put the radars in the valley instead of the hills because they didn't want to dig latrines--seriously." The Syrian practice of stationing mobile missiles in one place for several months allowed Israeli reconnaissance to determine the exact location of the missiles and their radars, giving the IAF a definite tactical advantage on the eve of battle. Even so, the Syrians might have been able to avoid the complete destruction of their SAM complex had they effectively camouflaged their sites; instead, they used smoke to "hide" them, which actually made them easier to spot from the air. It is ironic that the Syrians, who have been criticized for their strict adherence to Soviet doctrine, chose to ignore the viable doctrine that emphasizes the utility of maneuver and camouflage. According to a 1981 article in Soviet Military Review, alternate firing positions, defensive ambushes, regular repositioning of mobile SAMs to confuse enemy intelligence, and the emplacement of dummy SAM sites are fundamental considerations for the effective deployment and survivability of ground-based air defenses.
Three lessons of special relevance to the United States may be drawn from the Bekaa Valley battle. First is the overwhelming importance of winning the war in the fourth dimension (i.e., electronic warfare and C3). It is generally accepted today that to win the land and sea battle, a fighting force must first control the air. This concept--revolutionary in its genesis--was demonstrated numerous times in World War II and subsequent conflicts. Now, in order to win the air battle, one must first conquer the electromagnetic spectrum. What used to be "a minor side show to the real battles that raged on the land, on the sea, or in the air" is now a prerequisite for modern warfighting. The Bekaa Valley has shown that an effective electronic warfighting capability is no longer a luxury, but a necessity.
The Bekaa Valley air battle also demonstrated the need for effective doctrine and organization. The Israelis had suffered in this respect between 1967 and 1973, but by 1962 had reorganized themselves into the effective fighting force that dominated the Bekaa Valley battle. Interservice cooperation has become the standard for the IDF; indeed, the Israeli Air Force and navy are incorporated into the ground forces staff at the national level. This integrated command structure allows a strict division of responsibility and gives the IAF an easily defined mission-- control of the air, both to support the ground forces and to protect Israel from air attack. Therefore, the IAF controls all the helicopters and since 1971 has controlled all the air defense forces as well, including air defense artillery. In short, the IAF controls all assets used in gaining and maintaining control of the air and in projecting power from the air.
But perhaps the most important lesson from the Bekaa Valley is not to try to infer too many lessons. There are many factors that make the Lebanon War in general and the Bekaa Valley battle in particular of limited relevance to the US military.
Muita tärkeitä tapahtumia ja huomioita jutussa olivat:
- E-2C Hawkeyen (AWACS) käyttäminen ilmasodan koordinoinnin lisäksi myös ESM roolissa (IAI moodaus). Tämä mahdollisti Syyrian SAM-asemien paikannuksen yhdessä UAV-syötin käyttämisen lisäksi ja tuhoamisen miltei I hyökkäyspäivänä.
- Syyrian SAM-joukkojen heikko taktiikka ja N-liiton SAM oppien hylkääminen mm. savuttamalla ohjusasemat, sijoittamalla ne laaksojen pohjiin ja totaalinen liikkumattomuus helpottivat Israelin tiedustelua paikantamaan asemat jo ennen konfliktia.
- IAF:n taajushyppivät radiot estivät Syyrian radiohäirinnän ja toisaalta IAF käytti paljon ELSOa hyväkseen ja häiritsi rankasti Syyrian taistelun johdon(maasta käsin toimiva) ja hävittäjien viestintää.
- Kova Radar suppression yhdessä ARM-ohjusten kanssa lamautti käytännössä Syyrian ilmatorjunnan.
- IAF oli harjoitellut ankarasti juuri SAM-järjestelmiä vastaan toimimista ja panostanut kalustoonsa vuoden 1973 Yom Kippur tappioiden jälkeen. Vanha ja kulunut sanonta " hiki säästää verta" toimi.
Jos "opetuksia" suhteuttaa meidän nykyiseen tilanteeseemme (joka tietenkään ei ole 1:1 suhteessa oikea), nykyinen tilanne ilmapuolustuksen ja sen kehityksen osalta näyttää kulkevan valta-osin samaan suuntaan:
-Ilmavoimat ja ilmatorjunta ovat yhdistyneet
-yhteistoiminta (joint-ajattelu maa-meri-ilma) on kehittymässä yhteisen tilannekuvan suuntaan
-yhtenäinen ja suoraviivaisempi komentoketju (puolustusvoimauudistus) on tehostumassa.
Kysymysmerkkeinä ovat koulutuksen tehokkuus ja riittävyys (ml. harjoitukset), ELSO JA ECCM kyky ilmapuolustuksessa, taktiikka, AEW:n puute ja LINK-16 häiriön sietokyky joka lienee taistelun johtamisen kannalta olennaisen tärkeää.
Paljon muutakin mielenkiintoista juttua ja analyysiä kähinästä jos kiinnostaa:
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj89/win89/hurley.html
