Stick or Twist? - The Future of Tiger
Aug 23, 2020
Story by Paul Kennard
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has to make a significant decision re future helicopter capability soon. Paul Kennard examines the LAND 4503 ARH Replacement Programme that will see the ADF take delivery of replacement Attack Helicopters in the second half of this decade to replace the current Eurocopter/EADS/Airbus Tiger fleet, and aiming for a Full Operating Capability (FOC) in 2028.
Program Failure
The current Australian Tiger fleet has, I think I can state without risk of violent contradiction, hardly been the runaway success it was hoped for when it was selected under the AIR 87 competition at the turn of the century.
AIR 87 mandated that the winner should be an “Off The Shelf” (OTS) design, with the first squadron ready for operations in 2006 and the second a year later. By 2007, however, the ADF were withholding payment due to prolonged delays in both delivery and certification/qualification; dates cast in stone for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and FOC were sliding to the right day by day. Most embarrassingly for the ADF, their very expensive new helicopter wasn’t capable of being deployed to Afghanistan to escort their Chinooks in Theatre; instead, ADF CH-47s had to rely upon other Coalition assets, such as UK/US AH-64s or USMC AH-1s, to fly escort missions and provide overwatch during troop insertions and extractions.
The Tiger was in danger of becoming an Aus$1.5Bn procurement disaster. Indeed, the ADF had to formally state, amid intense speculation, that they were not simply going to throw the aircraft away in 2017. There was a decision point regarding support funding for spares and the need for a Mid Life Update (MLU) to account for minor obsolescence issues. Ironically, this MLU was being considered only a year after the Tiger, finally, achieved FOC ( 2016); some 7 years after the planned and contracted date. There had been a multitude of problems both technically and programmatically, including delays in training and issues surrounding bespoke ADF comms equipment, missile firing damage to the tail and, most worrying for the crews (and an issue that, it is alleged, almost caused a ‘mutiny’ in 2012) a tendency to vent toxic fumes into the cockpit. Unburnt, pooled, oil in the transmissions burnt off and, somehow, entered the air conditioning system causing crews to be subjected to dark noxious fumes so bad that in at least one case that the crew were forced to jettison parts of the canopy. Finally, the supply of spare parts to the remote Antipodes provided a continual issue for the aircraft, and a frustration for commanders, pilots and engineers alike.
The Tiger was simply never ready to deploy through a combination of unreliability and unavailability. However, the Germans and French, amongst others, have deployed their Tigers successfully to operational theatres including Afghanistan and Mali. The problem the ARH had was that, tacitly, the COTS aircraft they ADF thought they were buying was anything but, it was still in the latter stages of development. This situation was exacerbated by the changes the ADF demanded and by the distance from the Airbus/Eurocopter ‘mothership’ including the natural desire to prioritise the supply of spares to the major European backers (France, Spain and Germany), especially as they were deploying the aircraft on operations.
Review
To help situate the debate over the future of the ARH requirement, the ADF commissioned the Australian branch of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) to examine the options available to replace the Tiger as the ARH in ADF service. One would imagine that such a paper would look at what alternatives to the Tiger are out there?
Except, of course, as per the words of The Who, it might be a case of “Meet the new Boss, same as the old Boss” as sticking with the Tiger, despite all of its travails, is one of the options examined in the report. The report was published 30 Jan 20. Readers can study it here, and draw their own conclusions.
To be blunt, I have a number of issues with it.
Where’s the User?
Firstly, it’s drawn up by a highly qualified engineer. It’s important to state right off the bat that this is no criticism of the individual nor his trade; indeed, given the major issues that Tiger suffered from (provision of spares, poor serviceability, technical issues inter alia) it makes complete sense to have an engineer heavily involved. However, capability statements are looking ahead not back, and whilst Logistics/Support are key components of capability, I can’t help thinking that the report should have been authored by a combination of User (Pilot), Commander and Engineer. I think this would have helped to prevent a number of omissions and oversights that the report contains.
My concerns start at the beginning of the comprehensive table that flows through the document. The author makes a good point about the ‘orphaned’ nature of the ADF Tigers, that the changes to the ‘basic’ design have left it harder to support. However, the 22 ADF aircraft should be in the table, and there should also be reference to the fact that the Tigers flown by France, Germany and Spain are also different aircraft. The German UHT (Unterstützungshubschrauber Tiger) variant optimised for different roles than the French and Spanish HAP (Hélicoptère d'Appui Protection) and HAD (Hélicoptère d'Appui Destruction) versions. There is also inconsistency between how aircraft numbers are counted. For example, the AH-1Z ‘Users’ are broadly correct for that specific version, whilst the AH-64E ‘Users’ appear to be conflated with current AH-64D operators. It could give a false sense of the AH-64E’s ubiquity.
Errors
When it comes to technology and systems there are also some inconsistencies. The radio fits are largely irrelevant as they will be bespoke to user, as will the DAS (for example, some AH-64 operators already fit a DIRCM to the aircraft, typically via the
Terma AMASE pod on the wingtip stations), the AH64E also has a laser designator (but you’d need to know what the MTADS contained to realise that) and the author makes no mention of the AH-64E’s mast mounted Modernized – Radio Frequency Interferometer (M-RFI) which acts like a second Radar Warning Receiver (RWR).
The most glaring sensor omission, however, is that the table fails to acknowledge one of the AH-64’s ace cards, the AN/APG-78 Longbow Fire Control Radar. Neither the Tiger nor the AH-1 routinely mount a radar; indeed, part of the rationale behind the D-E upgrade for the Apache was to ensure there was enough engine power to carry the radar on a regular basis. In Afghanistan, UK AH-64Ds (with bigger RTM engines) flew every mission with Longbow radars. They were not used in their designed role for finding and designating targets for RF Hellfire missiles, but as airspace sweepers to keep their escorted packages clear from UAVs and manned aircraft who were in the wrong place at the wrong height at the wrong time. For those of you that didn’t experience ‘Airspace Control’ in Southern Afghanistan, suffice to say it was procedural rather than controlled by radar and depended totally on crews (and UAVs) flying where and when they said they would; near misses were common. It was always reassuring knowing a UK -64 was on your wing scanning ahead for those not complying with their clearance…
There are also errors in weapons. The author, correctly, notes that the AH-1Z can be equipped with AIM-9 Sidewinder Air-to-Air missiles, but omits to mention that the Apache is cleared to carry and fire the airborne version of the FIM-92 Stinger missile, the AIM-92 ATAS (Air to Air Stinger) which is also capable of being fitted to the Tiger, and that is now appearing on Reaper UAVs as a form of self-defence. As well as the Stinger, the Tiger can also carry an airborne version of the MBDA Mistral MANPADS heat-seeking missile.
Sadly, the author has elected to state ‘No public information found’ regarding any history of the AH-64 conducting amphibious operations. The AH-64E, maybe, but this will come as news to the UK Army Air Corps who have been operating AH-64D’s off a number of amphibious platforms for over a decade, including, famously, in intense combat over Libya in 2011 operating from HMS Ocean. Hundreds of combat missions against armoured vehicles, Air Defence assets and other targets were flown under testing conditions. The author is correct in his assumption that there is an engineering penalty for operating the aircraft at sea, and that the AH-1Z is the only one of the 3 helicopters that is designed from the bottom up as a maritime aircraft, but the Apache has well and truly earned its’ Littoral ‘spurs’, including the development of an applique flotation kit to keep the aircraft afloat long enough for the crew to abandon the aircraft.
Strengths
The author has clearly played to his strengths; logistics and support, but I think there’s a more rounded view of the actual platforms under consideration needed and matching to the variety of roles they may need to perform. His brief has also, clearly, been to focus on the incumbent ARH Tiger, and the two obvious US options. Which leaves quite a few platforms unrepresented.
The Leonardo AW129 Mangusta is the most obvious missing platform. Somewhat lighter than the other offerings, the AW129 nonetheless should be considered, if only to be discarded if it cannot fulfil any of the Key User Requirements. AW129 is also about to be reborn as the AW249, a significantly larger and more powerful machine, but (potentially) too high a risk and unavailable in the timescale required. Nonetheless, I imagine that marketeers at Leonardo Helicopters are working out if AW249 could be available to fulfil the FOC on 2028/29.
Basic Question
There is also the thorny question, which the paper does not tackle, of whether the ADF actually needs a ‘full-on’ attack helicopter. There are several admirable ‘Tier 2’ combat helicopters that could do a significant proportion of the Tiger’s work whilst offering a more flexible platform (in both peace and war time) and, potentially, at much reduced cost. Closest to a ‘proper’ combat helicopter would be the AW159 Wildcat. This multi-role platform has much to offer the ADF as it is fully marinised like the AH-1Z yet has a multi-purpose cabin capable of carrying a small detachment of troops, cargo or weapon reloads. This makes it far more than a ‘one trick pony’ as it can play an important role in disaster relief and SAR as well as combat operations. Depending on fit, the Wildcat can be configured for maritime roles such as Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) / Anti Surface Warfare (ASuW), carrying an advanced multi-mode radar and a full suite of torpedoes, Anti-Ship Missiles.
Whilst the ADF has the MH-60R for the maritime helicopter role, the Wildcat could be used to supplement the Seahawk if needed. In the littoral / land domain, the Wildcat is employed by the AAC as a “Find” asset, ‘sniffing’ the battlefield with a suite of sensors. Although routinely armed with a M3M 0.50Cal door gun, the AAC has so far resisted exploiting the Wildcat’s prodigious weapons capability, doubtless to prevent awkward questions about why it needs two helicopters in similar roles with the Apache as the designated ‘Attack’ platform. For the RN, the Wildcat will be armed with two types of missile from the FASGW (Future Anti Surface Guided Weapon) project; FASGW (Light) is the ‘Martlet’ missile (a nice historical touch as the Grumman F4F Wildcat fighter of World War 2 was initially known as the Martlet in RN service) of which 4 launchers, each with 5 missiles, can be carried by a Wildcat for use against small boats and Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIACs). FASGW (Heavy) is the replacement for the Sea Skua missile. Known as the ‘Venom’, it will give the Wildcat the ability to punch hard against small warships up to 1000 tons. Given that the pylons and armament wiring is all there, there is little to suggest that an ADF-optimised Wildcat couldn’t be equipped with Hellfire missiles, unguided 2.75” rockets or the BAES Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System (APKWS) – nor, indeed, an Air to Air Missile. What the Wildcat lacks is a gun turret. A gun pod could be fitted relatively simply at the expense of a missile/rocket station, but the integration of a ‘chin’ gun with a Helmet Mounted Sight (HMS) would be more complex – although not impossible. Both land and maritime Wildcats have their EO/IR turret (L3/Wescam MX-15Di) on the top of the nose, whilst the RN version carries a Leonardo Seaspray 7000 AESA Radar on the underside whilst the AAC Wildcat is ‘clean’ – so there may be real estate to mount some form of lightweight gun system.
Another non-traditional alternative to the ‘big 3’ attack helicopters comes from the incumbent OEM, Airbus. They are marketing the “H-Force’ concept, weaponizing the civil-certified H135 and H145 helicopters with scalable weapons and sensor fits. The H-Force would make a lot of sense for the ADF; Airbus are already pitching it as a Special Forces platform for Australian SOF and all ADF helicopter pilots are now trained on the H135 so conversion costs would be minimised. Adopting the H-Force H145 would offer the ADF a far more flexible and cost-effective solution than the expense of a dedicated attack helicopter. However, unlike the Tiger, Viper and Apache, or even the Wildcat, the H145 is potentially not as survivable in the potential near-peer conflicts that the ADF may need to prepare to fight in the coming decades, and the bad experience with Airbus support during the original Tiger purchase may leave some lingering doubts amongst ADF planners and decision makers.
There is, however, one remaining elephant in the corner. And a pretty big one it is too.
The FOC date of 2029 would, conceivably, enable the ADF to opt for the winner of the US Army’s Future Attack and Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) competition. All three of the ‘usual suspects’ are already dated designs, albeit updated. The Cobra and Apache date from the 60s and 70s respectively, whilst the Tiger is a product of 90s technology. Realistically, they’re all nearer the end of their development lives than the beginning. The FARA will be a true 21st century design, with significant growth potential. Given the size of the likely production contract, whatever design wins the competition should be affordable as an FMS product. Given the plethora of new equipment being ordered for the ADF, such as E7 Wedgetails and F-35A Lightnings, the ‘born digital’ FARA would be a perfect fit in the future battlespace, and eminently survivable as it’s designed from first principles to fight on it. FARA would also offer the very best in interoperability with US Forces, a key tenet of ADF policy.
The US Army is running the FARA competition to a very aggressive timescale. In March this year, they down select from the five proposals to just two and will fund the development of flight demonstration machines with a ‘winner takes all’ fly-of scheduled for 2023. Notionally set to enter service in 2028, the Army is heavily encouraging the bidders to innovate to bring that entry to service date as much to ‘the left’ as possible. Such a policy could bring FARA very much into the ADF’s timeframe.
The ADF have a big decision to make. ‘Stick’ with an upgrade Tiger, exploiting the money already invested and hope that a developed Tiger will prove more reliable and available, or ‘twist’ to a different aircraft type. Twisting in itself is not straightforward; do the ADF seek a mature design or an advanced, modern, helicopter in FARA?
Whatever the choice, the ADF must hope that, in future, their assault and transport helicopters can be supported and escorted by their own crews and platforms, not have to rely upon the support of Allies.
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