A similar story can be told about Russia’s manufacture of long-range missiles. One of the cruise missiles most widely employed by Russian forces during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been the Kh-101.24 In 2021, prior to the fullscale invasion, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) had a target of producing 350 of these missiles per year. Actual production was just 56 missiles. In 2022, the Russian MoD set a target of producing 460 Kh-101s per year. By 2023, actual production had reached 420 Kh-101s per year, not only dwarfing pre-war production, but also closing the gap between Russia’s ambitions and its outputs.25 At the beginning of 2023, Russia had approximately 50 9M723 ballistic missiles
left in stock.26 Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia produced approximately six of these missiles per month.27 Production has since more than tripled, such that, despite using Iskanders throughout 2023, Russia began 2024 with 180 9M723 and 9M727 in stock.28
Shahed-136 production, meanwhile, has similarly expanded drastically. Original Iranian production rates were close to 40 per month. Between Russia and Iran, current production of these munitions has surpassed 250 per month.29 Given that all these munitions are critically dependent on US- and foreign-origin microelectronics, these figures clearly demonstrate that sanctions and other measures have entirely failed to slow production. Indeed, in some instances, access to specific components has increased. When the Russian military began to drop aerial bombs with UMPK glide kits, they were guided by Kometa-M satellite navigation modules using antennae from the Irish company Taoglas.30 Despite these components being identified early in 2023, Russia has not only significantly increased production of Kometa-M, now using it across a number of UAVs including Geran-2s, but has also developed an eight-antennae array for the UMPK, doubling the number of Taoglas antennae used per system.31 The Russian MoD assesses that the impact of Western sanctions on production of key weapons systems has been to impose a 30% increase in the price of microelectronic components.32 This is not trivial, but it is also manageable.
The picture of Russian armoured vehicle production is distorted by the volume of equipment that the Russians can withdraw from storage and refurbish. For example, Russia is producing approximately 1,500 tanks and 3,000 other armoured fighting vehicles in 2024 and is set to produce a similar number in 2025.33 Approximately 85% of these are vehicles refurbished from storage. Nevertheless, the number of newly produced vehicles has also been rising. For example, the Kurganmashzavod plant produced 100 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles during Q1 2023. In Q2, this rose to 108 vehicles. In Q3, 120 BMP-3s rolled off the production line and in Q4, 135 were produced.34 This increase may seem modest, but it shows that Russia is steadily expanding production capacity. In some cases, this is achieved by cutting corners and reprioritising. For example, in 2023, Russia produced 728 Tigr-M, a rate that is anticipated to fall to 721 in 2024, while the level of environmental protection from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats on the vehicle is being reduced. This frees up capacity elsewhere. There is also some substitution away from components sourced from the US and Europe. Refurbished tanks, for example, had used Catherine thermal sights made by Thales before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.35 Refurbished tanks today are instead fitted with Chinese- or Belarusian-supplied tank sights, which are less capable, but adequate.36 Here, therefore, there has been some successful import substitution. Ultimately, however, the refocusing on capability requires changes to machine tools, and large volumes of these continue to flow to Russia from the US, Europe, Taiwan and further afield, along with the software updates to run them.
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Numeroidut lähdeviittaukset:
24. Ian Williams, Putin’s Missile War: Russia’s Strike Campaign in Ukraine (Washington, DC and Lanham, MD: Center for Strategic and International Studies and Rowman & Littlefield), 2023, p. 27, <
https://www.csis.org/analysis/putins-missile-war>, accessed 22 February 2024.
25. Reports to the Russian MoD on missile production during 2023, seen by the authors in February 2024.
26. Assessment of the Ukrainian intelligence community, briefed to the authors in Ukraine in February 2024.
27. Ibid.
28. Reports to the Russian MoD on missile production during 2023, seen by the authors in February 2024.
29. Assessment of the Ukrainian intelligence community, briefed to the authors in Ukraine in February 2024.
30. Sean Pollock, ‘Parts Made by Irish Tech Company Allegedly Found in 500 Kg Russian Bomb in Ukraine’, Irish Independent, 16 July 2023.
31. Author inspection of UMPK and multiple Kometa-M modules across several Russian platforms, Ukraine, February and April 2024.
32. Report from the Russian defence industry to the Russian MoD concerning challenges in meeting production targets, seen by the authors in February 2024.
33. Reports to the Russian MoD on armoured vehicle production during 2023, seen by the authors in February 2024.
34. Production figures from the Kurganmashzavod plant, seen by the authors in February 2024.
35. Author inspection of captured Russian vehicles, Ukraine, June 2022.
36. Recently captured Russian vehicles, Ukraine, February 2024.