First generation
The first missiles deployed in the 1960s were IR missiles. First generation shoulder-fired SAMs such as the U.S. Redeye, early versions of the Soviet SA-7, and the Chinese HN-5 are considered “tail-chase weapons” as their seekers can only acquire and engage a high performance aircraft after it has passed the missile’s firing position. In this flight profile, the aircraft’s engines are fully exposed to the missile’s seeker and provide a sufficient thermal signature for engagement. First generation IR missiles are also highly susceptible to interfering thermal signatures from background sources, including the sun, which many experts feel makes them somewhat unreliable.
Second generation
Second generation IR missiles such as early versions of the U.S. Stinger, the Soviet SA-14, and the Chinese FN-6 use improved coolants to cool the seeker head which enables the seeker to filter out most interfering background IR sources as well as permitting head-on and side engagement profiles. These missiles also employ technologies to counter decoy flares that might be deployed by targeted aircraft and also have backup target detection modes such as the ultraviolet (UV) mode found on the Stinger missile.
Third generation
Third generation IR shoulder-fired SAMs such as the French Mistral, the Russian SA-18, and the U.S. Stinger B use single or multiple detectors to produce a quasi-image of the target and also have the ability to recognize and reject flares dispensed from aircraft.
Fourth generation
Fourth generation missiles such as the U.S. Stinger Block 2, and missiles believed to be under development in Russia, Japan, France, and Israel could incorporate focal plane array guidance systems and other advanced sensor systems which will permit engagement at greater ranges.
Command line-of-sight
Command line-of-sight (CLOS) missiles do not home in on a particular aspect (heat source or radio or radar transmissions) of the targeted aircraft. Instead, the missile operator or gunner visually acquires the target using a magnified optical sight and then uses radio controls to “fly” the missile into the aircraft. One of the benefits of such a missile is that it is virtually immune to flares and other basic countermeasure systems which are designed primarily to defeat IR missiles. The major drawback of CLOS missiles is that they require highly trained and skilled operators. Numerous reports from the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s cite Afghan mujahedin as being disappointed with the British-supplied Blowpipe CLOS missile because it was too difficult to learn to use and highly inaccurate, particularly when employed against fast moving jet aircraft. Given these considerations, many experts believe that CLOS missiles are not as ideally suited for freedom fighter's use as are IR missiles, which sometimes are referred to as “fire and forget” missiles.
Later versions of CLOS missiles, such as the British Javelin, use a solid state television camera in lieu of the optical tracker to make the gunner's task easier. The Javelin’s manufacturer, Thales Air Defence claims that their missile is virtually impervious to countermeasures. Even more advanced CLOS versions, such as the British Starburst, use a laser data link in lieu of earlier radio guidance links to fly the missile to the target.
Laser guided
Laser guided shoulder-fired SAMs use lasers to guide the missiles to the target. The missile flies along the laser beam and strikes the aircraft where the missile operator or gunner aims the laser. Missiles such as Sweden’s RBS-70 and Britain’s Starstreak can engage aircraft from all angles and only require the operator to continuously track the target using a joystick to keep the laser aim point on the target. Because there are no data links from the ground to the missile, the missile cannot be effectively jammed after it is launched. This technique is known as Beam riding. Future laser guided SAMs may require the operator to designate the target only once and not manually keep a continuous laser aimpoint on the aircraft. Even though laser guided missiles require relatively extensive training and skill to operate, many experts consider these missiles particularly menacing in the hands of terrorists due to the missiles’ resistance to most conventional countermeasures in use today
. Tiedustelu upseeri totesi kylmästi, että puolustusvoimien komentaja joko valehtelee tai sitten tietää, että puolustusbudjettia tullaan kasvattamaan valtavasti lähivuosina. Kaveri piti lyhyen esitelmän ilmamekanisoitujen joukkojen käytöstä ja kertoi laskelmiensa pohjalta kuinka paljon tarvitaan resursseja edes jonkinkokoisten ilmarynnäkköjoukkojen luomiseen ja ylläpitoon. Tuomio oli tyly - homma ei tule toimimaan Suomen resursseilla.
